


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THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS
THROUGH THE STUDY OF
MODERN SYSTEMS

BY

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DOPPELTE STANDPUNKT IN DER PSYCHOLOGIE"

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PREFACE

I MUST admit at the outset that this book is not written to lure students, guiltless of metaphysical aspirations, into pleasant paths of philosophical speculation. It is intended rather for students and readers who are seriously concerned with the problems of philosophy and genuinely anxious to study metaphysics under the guidance of the great thinkers. The book is, none the less, designed for beginners in philosophy, as well as for those more advanced, and I have tried to make it clear in statement and logical in order. I have audaciously attempted to combine, also, what seem to me the essential features of a systematic Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of Modern Philosophy. This I have done both because I believe that the problems of philosophy are, at the outset, best studied as formulated in the actual systems of great thinkers, and because the historical sequence of philosophies, from Descartes's to Hegel's, seems to coincide, roughly, with a logical order.

I am well aware that in writing a book which seeks to combine two functions, often distinguished, and which attempts to meet the needs of two groups of students, I have run the risk of fulfilling neither purpose and of helping neither set of readers. I hope, however, that certain features of the book may prove useful; in particular, the plan on which it classifies metaphysical systems, the summaries it offers as well of the arguments as of the conclusions of modern philosophers, the exact quotations and multiplied text references of its expositions. If I have overloaded the book with quotations and references, it is because I have myself suffered greatly from my inability to find in the writings of the philosophers the doctrines attributed to them by the commentators. I shall be much

disappointed if these citations do not whet the appetite of the reader and send him directly to the texts of Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, and the rest. I cannot, indeed, too emphatically express my sense of the value of a study of texts, and my conviction that this Introduction, and any other, should be used to supplement and not to supplant a reading of the philosophers. The advanced student will, I trust, be aided in such text study by the relative abundance of bibliographical and critical material. In the main, this has been relegated, with the biographies, to the Appendix of the book, that the continuity of metaphysical discussion may not be broken.

It is only fair to point out, finally, that the book, though mainly exposition and criticism, is written from the standpoint of a metaphysical theory fairly well defined. This I have indicated in my last chapter. My philosophical predilections have inevitably colored my criticisms; but I trust that they have not distorted my interpretation of the thought of the philosophers whom I have considered, and that the book may, therefore, be of service to those who do not agree with its estimates or with its conclusions.

The succeeding chapters disclose the nature and extent of my chief intellectual obligations. But I cannot deny myself the pleasure of acknowledging my personal indebtedness to my first instructor in philosophy, Professor H. N. Gardiner, to my constant counsellor, Professor George H. Palmer, and to the teacher of my more recent student years, Professor Josiah Royce. For generous and invaluable help in the preparation of this book, I am grateful, beyond my power of expression, to my colleague, Professor Mary S. Case, who has read the book in manuscript and has criticised it in detail, to its great advantage; to my father, who has read all the proofs; and to my friend and pupil, Helen G. Hood, who has verified the citations and references of footnotes and Appendix, and has prepared the Index.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

January, 1907.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

IT has been necessary to make ready the second edition of this book at a few days' notice ; but I have tried, in spite of haste, to profit by the counsels of my critics. I am under special obligation to Professor Ellen B. Talbot of Mount Holyoke College, for supplementing a published review by written suggestions. The greater number of the changes which I have made affect my discussions of Hume's doctrine of causality and of Kant's doctrine of the categories. I have altered my statement of the concept of causality, in conformity with Rickert's teaching, by distinguishing (pp. 155, 161, 162, *et al.*; 213 *seq.*) between causal and natural law; I have explicitly attributed to Kant (p. 225) the conception of epistemological in addition to that of logical necessity; and I have corrected the passages (pp. 205 *seq.* and 221) in which I had carelessly identified universality and necessity. There may come a later opportunity for more detailed discussion of this whole subject through a section added to the Appendix. None of these changes involve, in my opinion, a revision of my general estimate and interpretation of Kant's teaching. To this estimate, with all respect to the views of my conservatively Kantian critics, I still adhere.

Changes of statement which involve no important alteration of doctrine are the attempt (p. 10) to include Kant, Fichte, and Schelling in my Table of Modern Philosophers; the modified exposition (p. 29) and the reformulated criticism (pp. 48-49) of one of Descartes's arguments; the reference, on p. 111, to Spinoza; the specific assertion (p. 351, footnote) that my interpretation of Schopenhauer diverges from that which is usual; and, finally, the restatement (pp. 408-409)

of the conception of self, and the comparison of this doctrine with that of 'spiritual substance.' I take this opportunity to refer readers, who are interested in the discussion of the nature of the self, to my papers in the *Journal of Philosophy* for January 30 and for February 27, 1908, and in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1908.

The remaining changes in the body of the book are merely verbal corrections. Additions to the Bibliography are made on pp. 506, 556, and 558. The paging of the first edition is retained.

M. W. C.

February, 1908.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

THE present revision of this book has been undertaken primarily in order to relate its conclusions to the more recent of contemporary philosophical writings and, in particular, to refer to the arguments against idealism so loudly urged by the writers who call themselves 'neo-realists.' Advantage has also been taken of the opportunity to amend and to supplement many passages of the book.

In more detail, the important additions are the following: a summary (pp. 42-43) of Descartes's philosophy of nature; a reference (p. 185, note) to modern forms of the Humian doctrine of the self; a statement (pp. 399-400) of W. P. Montague's conception of consciousness as potential energy; a section (pp. 402-404) on contemporary neo-realism; a brief statement (pp. 409-410) of the bearing of the facts of so-called multiple personality on the doctrine of the unity of the self; a summary (p. 420, note) of Russell's argument in opposition to absolutism; an indication (p. 441) of the points of contact between Bergson's conception of time and that of absolutistic personalism;

and additions to the Bibliography (pp. 557-559 *et al.*, and Supplement, pp. 564-566). The principal changes are corrections (pp. 45, 52, 53) of my earlier formulations of Descartes's criterion of certainty and of portions of his arguments for the existence of God; a correction (pp. 62-63) of my former summary of Hobbes's argument for materialism; a restatement, without essential change (pp. 122, 130), of part of Berkeley's argument; a more spiritualistic interpretation (pp. 339-342) of Schelling's identity philosophy; and a re-writing (pp. 429, 449, 451-452) of certain passages in the discussion concerning absolute will and human freedom. Minor changes occur on pages 9, 10, 69, 99, 163, 216, 237, 331, 336, 337, 407, 424, 428, 447, 485, 492, 494, 500, 515 f., 523 note, 525 note, 546, 555 note, 556. Certain sentences and paragraphs of the earlier editions have been omitted, so that the paging is, in the main, undisturbed.

Especial attention is called, in conclusion, to two points of terminology: (1) to the useful, and neglected, distinction between 'qualitatively' and 'numerically' pluralistic or monistic systems, and (2) to the use, throughout the book, of the term 'idealism' in the widest possible sense to mean 'the conception of reality as of the nature of consciousness.' The present-day tendency to identify idealism either with ideism or with subjective idealism is much to be regretted; for there is no other term by which to cover both ideism (the Humian doctrine that reality reduces to momentary states of consciousness) and spiritualism (or personalism), the doctrine that the universe is throughout personal. In this wider use, the term idealism applies not only to ideism and to subjective idealism — the form of spiritualism which teaches that the universe narrows to *my* consciousness — but also to the other forms of spiritualism; to pluralistic spiritualism, the doctrine of Leibniz and Berkeley and Ward, and to absolutistic spir-

itualism, the doctrine of Hegel, of Royce, of Bosanquet, which the last chapter of this book expounds and upholds.

M. W. C.

July, 1912.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

THE issue of a fourth edition of this book gives opportunity for a few changes. The description of the self (p. 408) and the discussion of freedom (pp. 451-453) have been re-written. Bibliographical references have been added to the footnotes of pages 404, 408, 410, 425, 447. Other changes are made on pages 65, 205, 224, 237, 244, 351, 404, 517, 518, 557.

M. W. C.

December, 1916.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE, TYPES, AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

ῥφιλοσόφους . . . τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινοὺς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας. — PLATO.

I. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

WHEN Socrates, in the immortal conversation at the house of Cephalus, defined the philosopher as lover of the vision of the truth, he was describing, not the metaphysician, but the seer. For philosophy, in the more technical sense, differs from the mere love of wisdom; it is reasoned knowledge, not pure insight, and the philosophic lover of the vision must work out the blessed way to realized truth. With philosophy in this more restricted meaning of the term, a meaning which Plato and Aristotle fixed by adopting it, this chapter and this book will principally deal.

Philosophy, once conceived as reasoning discipline, is not, however, completely defined. Thus regarded, philosophy is indeed distinguished, as reflective, from everyday experience which accepts or rejects but does not reflect on its object; and is distinguished, as theoretical, from art which creates but does not reason. In both these contrasts, however, philosophy resembles natural science, for that also reflects and reasons. The really important problem of the definition of philosophy is consequently this: to distinguish philosophy from natural science. Evidently, philosophy differs from science negatively in so far as, unlike science, it does not seek and classify facts, but rather takes its materials ready-made from the sciences, simply reasoning about them and from them. But if this constituted the only contrast, then philosophy would be a part, merely, of science, not a distinct dis-

cipline. For science does not stop at observation, though it begins with it; in truth, science as well as philosophy reasons and explains. Philosophy, therefore, if conceived simply as the process of reasoning about scientific phenomena, would be merely the explanatory side of science. There are, however, in the view of most students, two important contrasts which hold between science and philosophy: philosophy *must* take as its object the utterly irreducible nature of some reality; and philosophy *may* take as its object the ultimate nature not only of a single fact or group of facts, but of all-that-there-is, "the ultimate reality into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond, that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything outside itself."¹ In both respects a natural science differs from philosophy. To begin with the character last named: philosophy, as has been said, may concern itself with the all-of-reality — and an adequate philosophy will certainly seek to discover the nature of the all-of-reality; a science, on the other hand, studies facts of one order only, that is, it analyzes merely a limited group of phenomena. Again, philosophy, whatever its scope, always concerns itself with the irreducible nature of some reality; whereas a science does not properly raise the question whether these, its phenomena, are in the end reducible to those of another order.

These distinctions may be readily illustrated. The physiologist, for example, does not inquire whether or not the limited object of his study, the living cell, is in its fundamental nature a physical or a psychical phenomenon — whether, in other words, protoplasm reduces, on the one hand, to physical energy, or, on the other hand, to consciousness. On the contrary the physiologist, properly unconcerned about the com-

¹ R. B. Haldane, "The Pathway to Reality," I., p. 19. Cf. also Hegel, "Encyclopædia," I., "Logic," Chapters 1, 2, 6, for discussion of the nature of philosophy; and cf. *infra*, Chapter 11, pp. 369 *seq.* for consideration of Hegel's view that no irreducible reality can be limited, and that consequently the object of philosophy is, of necessity, the all-of-reality.

pleteness or about the utter irreducibleness of his object, confines himself to analysis within arbitrary limits of his living cells, leaving to the philosopher the questions: What is the real nature of these psychical and these physical processes? Is reality ultimately split up into psychical and physical? Is the division a final one, or is the psychical reducible to the physical? Is thought a function of brain activity? Or, finally, is the physical itself reducible to the psychical; that is, is matter a manifestation of conscious spirit? More than this, the physicist links fact with fact, the rising temperature with the increased friction, the spark with the electric contact. The philosopher, on the other hand, if he take the largest view of his calling, seeks the connection of each fact or group of facts — each limited portion of reality — with the adequate and complete reality. His question is not, how does one fact explain another fact? but, how does each fact fit into the scheme as a whole?

Both characters of the object of philosophy are indicated by the epithet 'ultimate,' of which frequent use is made in this book. Because the object of philosophy is entirely irreducible and because the object of philosophy may be the all-of-reality—for both these reasons, it is often called ultimate and is contrasted with the proximate realities of natural science. It is ultimate because it is utterly irreducible and is not a mere manifestation of a deeper reality; it is ultimate, also, in so far as there is nothing beyond it, in so far, that is, as it includes all that exists. It follows, from the utter irreducibleness and from the absolute completeness which an adequate philosophy sets before itself, that philosophy is rather a search, a pursuit, an endeavor, than an achievement. This character is widely recognized. Stumpf, for example, conceives philosophy as the question-science; James defines metaphysics as the unusually obstinate effort to ask questions; and Paulsen says that philosophy is no 'closed theory' but a 'problem.' All these characters assigned to philosophy may finally be gathered up into one definition: Philosophy is the attempt to

discover by reasoning the utterly irreducible nature of anything; and philosophy, in its most adequate form, seeks the ultimate nature of all-that-there-is.

II. THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

The preceding discussion, brief as it is, of the nature of philosophy, has disclosed certain perils which menace the student of philosophy. Because the systematic observation of phenomena is the peculiar province not of philosophy but of science, the student of philosophy is tempted to deal in vague abstractions, in lifeless generalities, often, alas, in mere bloodless words and phrases. And because he admits that his own study is, at the beginning, a setting of problems, a questioning, not a dogmatic formulation, he is tempted not to press for a solution of his problems, to cherish his questions for their own sake.

The only way of avoiding both these pitfalls is to approach the philosophical problems by the avenue of scientific investigation, and from time immemorial, the great philosophers have emphasized this truth. Hegel heaped scorn upon the common view that philosophy consists in the lack of scientific information, and had no condemnation too severe for the 'arm-chair philosophy' which makes of metaphysic a 'rhetoric of trivial truths'; and, in the same spirit, Paulsen recently writes, "A true philosopher attacks things (*ein recht-schaffener Philosoph macht sich an die Dinge selbst*)."

The philosopher, Paulsen continues, "must at some point, touch bottom with his feet. . . . He may freely choose his subject from the psychological or from the physical sciences; for as all roads lead to Rome, so among the sciences, all paths lead to philosophy, but there are no paths through the air."

Paulsen's assertion that philosophy may be reached by way of any one of the sciences is confirmed by the experience of the great philosophers. Descartes and Leibniz and Kant were

mathematicians and physical scientists as well as philosophers; and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were psychologists. But though metaphysics may be approached from any point on the circumference of the sciences, it is not to be denied that certain inconsistencies and even fallacies have often characterized the systems of mathematicians and natural scientists who turn to philosophy.¹ It is equally certain that these defects have been due to a confusion of scientific with philosophical ideals, of scientific with metaphysical standards. Indirectly, these confusions suggest the value of still another entrance to philosophy, the approach by way of what is ordinarily called the history of philosophy.

Such a study has two definite advantages, and one of these is distinctive. In common with the natural sciences, this study of philosophical texts shares the advantage of being a study of facts. Its facts, to be sure, are second-hand transcripts of reality, not direct experiences (and herein lies the disadvantage of the method); but nobody who hammers out the meaning of Spinoza, of Kant, or of Aristotle, who compares passages to get at their common significance or divergence, who estimates the different statements of a philosopher with reference to the date of their formulation — no student of texts, in a word, can be accused of floating about vaguely in a sea of abstractions. The more characteristic advantage of this approach to philosophy is the fact that it forces the student to take different points of view. Spinoza's monism challenges the dualism of Descartes, and Leibniz's emphasis on individuality throws into relief the problem neglected by Spinoza. The student of pre-Kantian philosophy may turn out dualist or monist or pluralist, but he cannot accept any one hypothesis in a wholly uncritical and dogmatic way, as if no other alternative could be seriously considered. Even the scrupulous and rigorous study of any one great philosophical system must reveal the means for the correction of its own

¹ Cf. Appendix, pp. 518 *seq.*, and Chapter 11, pp. 398 *seq.*

inconsistencies. Hume, for example, implies the existence of the self which he denies, for he employs the *I* to make the denial; and Kant's admissions concerning the moral consciousness, if applied as they logically should be to all experience, would solve his paradox of self-consciousness.

All this suggests the requirements of an adequate study of philosophical texts. It is, first and foremost, the duty of the student to find out what the philosopher whom he studies says and means. This is not always an easy task. If, for example, one is studying Kant or Hegel, one has virtually to learn a new language. It makes no difference how much German one knows, Kant and Hegel do not always speak in German, and Kant does not even always use the same language for two consecutive sections. This bare text criticism, indispensable as it is, is however a mere preliminary to the real expository process, the re-thinking of a philosopher's argument, the sympathetic apprehension of his thought. This means, of course, that one reads and re-reads his text, that one outlines his argument and supplies the links that are evidently implied but verbally lacking, and that one combines the arguments of his different philosophical works. Only when this task of interpretation is completed can one fairly enter upon the criticism of a metaphysical system. But the criticism, though chronologically later, is a necessary feature of the study. We do not read philosophy in order to become disciples or to adopt, wholesale, anybody's views. We must, therefore, challenge a philosopher's conclusions and probe his arguments. The only danger in the process is that it will be premature; in other words, that we oppose what we do not fully understand. Both interpretation and criticism, to be of value, must be primarily first-hand. The curse of the study of literature and of philosophy alike is the pernicious habit of reading books about books, without reading the books themselves. Interpretation and criticism, finally, have for their main purpose the development of one's own capacity to think constructively, or at any rate, independently. One's

first object in reading philosophy is, to be sure, the discovery of what philosophers mean, but this is not one's main purpose. For of the great teacher of philosophy that must be true which Herder said of Kant in the early years of his teaching, "He obliged me to think for myself; for tyranny was foreign to his soul." Independent thought about the problems of ultimate reality is, thus, the goal of philosophical study.


III. THE TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical systems are best grouped from the standpoint of the object of a complete philosophy. Regarding this object, the irreducible all-of-reality, two questions suggest themselves: First, what exactly is the nature of the universe when it is reduced to the fundamentally real; to what sort or sorts of reality does it, in other words, reduce? And second, is this ultimate reality one being or many beings; is it simple or complex? To the second of these questions one of two answers may obviously be given: the all-of-reality is one, or else it is more-than-one, that is, many. Systems of philosophy which give the first answer may be called *numerically monistic*; theories which regard the all-of-reality as ultimately a manifold are *numerically pluralistic*.

But neither answer gives us information of the nature of the all-of-reality; that is, neither answers the first of the questions of philosophy. Whether the universe consist of one being, or of many, still the student of philosophy demands the nature of this one real, or of these many reals. At first, this problem, also, is a question of one or many. The universe, even if it consist of many beings, may be all of a kind; and on the other hand, if it be one, that One may conceivably have a plural nature. The first is a *qualitatively monistic*, the second a *qualitatively pluralistic*, conception. (It thus appears that monism is a doctrine which teaches that ultimate reality has a unity in some sense fundamental to its plurality, and that pluralism is a doctrine which denies this fundamental unity.)

One problem remains: that of describing or naming the ultimate kind, or kinds, of reality. And to facilitate this description we must distinguish two kinds of reality: the universe may be of the same nature as my consciousness of it; or it may be radically and absolutely unlike my consciousness. Philosophic systems are *idealistic* or *non-idealistic* as they give the first or the second answer to this question; and idealistic systems are again distinguished according as they regard consciousness as mere succession of ideas (and in this case they are *phenomenalistic* or *ideistic*); or as they mean by consciousness a self or selves being conscious (and these systems are called *spiritualistic* or *personalistic*). The various chapters of this book will explain these terms more fully and will seek to show that all modern systems of philosophy are naturally grouped in harmony with these distinctions. In the following scheme this grouping is indicated:—

THE REPRESENTATIVE MODERN PHILOSOPHERS (through Hegel)



¹ It will later appear that the systems of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling are internally inconsistent.

IV. THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

The effort has been made to show that there is room for a philosophy fundamental to science, and that it need not be a vague or abstract study. An outline of the main types of philosophic thought has been offered and all seems propitious for our metaphysical venture. And yet we are perhaps reluctant to embark. Certain questions about the value of metaphysics press upon us: Is the study of philosophy of supreme importance? Is it worth while to attempt to know the nature of the irreducible, and of the all-of-reality, while one is still so ignorant of many of the facts of science? May one not, with greater advantage, devote oneself to the scientific study of certain well-defined groups of phenomena, instead of losing oneself in a nebulous search for ultimate truth — a quest which promises nothing, which sets out from a problem, without assurance of being able to solve it?

For some of us, it must be admitted, the time for asking these questions is long gone by. The passion for the highest certainty, the most inclusive and irreducible reality, has taken possession of our souls; and we could not check ourselves, if we would, in even a hopeless pursuit of ultimate reality. The prophecy of disappointment avails nothing against such a mood. But even the fact that we must be philosophers, whether we will or not, need not deter us from the effort to estimate correctly, to judge dispassionately, the value of philosophical study. It is, above all things, necessary to advance no false claim, and to recognize resolutely that the study of metaphysics holds out no promise of definite results. "Philosophy," said Novalis, "can bake no bread, but she can give us God, freedom, and immortality." But though one agree with Novalis's disclaimer of any narrowly utilitarian end for philosophy, one must oppose with equal vigor his assertion that philosophy gives us God, freedom, or immortality. Philosophy, in the first place, gives us nothing; we

wrest from her all that we gain; and it is, furthermore, impossible at the outset to prophesy with certainty what will be the result of our philosophic questioning, our rigorously honest search for the irreducible and complete reality. We may not, therefore, enter on the study of philosophy for any assurance of definite results.

Let us face the worst. Let us suppose that our metaphysical quest is an endless one, that we never reach a satisfying conclusion of thought, that no results withstand the blasting force of our own criticism; even so, the true lover of philosophy will claim that there is at least a satisfaction in the bare pursuit of the ultimate reality, a keen exhilaration in the chase, an exceeding joy in even a fleeting vision of the truth. In less figurative terms: if philosophy is no more than a questioning, at least it formulates our questions, makes them consistent with each other; in a word, makes us capable of asking intelligent questions. It is good to know; but even to know why we do not know may be a gain.

But I cannot honestly leave the subject here. My experience and my observation alike persuade me that the patient and courageous student gains more from philosophical study than the mere formulation of his problem. It is indeed true that the finite thinker is incapacitated from the perfect apprehension of absolutely complete reality. But though he may not, in the nature of the case, gain the complete solution of his problem, he can scarcely help answering some questions and discovering that others cannot rationally be asked. More than this, he may well learn the terms in which the solution of his problem is possible, may be assured whether ultimate reality is one or many, spirit or matter. To one who grants this as a probable, or even a possible, outcome of metaphysical investigation, philosophy becomes not merely a privilege but a duty, since the philosophical conclusion has, inevitably, a bearing on the personal life. Artificially, and by an effort, it is true, one may divorce one's life from one's announced philosophy — may hold, for example, to egoistic hedonism as

the justified philosophical system while one lives a life of self-sacrifice, or may combine the most arrant self-indulgence with a rigorous ethical doctrine. Ideally, however, as we all admit, and actually always to a certain degree, our philosophy "makes a difference";¹ it affects conduct; it moulds the life of personal relations. Philosophy is, in other words, a phase of life, not an observation of life from the outside; and the more adequate the philosophy, the more consistent the life may become. To provide sound theoretical foundation for noble living, to shape and to supplement conduct by doctrine, becomes, thus, the complete aim of the philosopher, whose instinct and whose duty alike impel him to the search for ultimate truth.

¹ F. C. S. Schiller, "Humanism," p. 197.

SYSTEMS OF NUMERICAL
PLURALISM



CHAPTER II

PLURALISTIC DUALISM:¹ THE SYSTEM OF DESCARTES

“Il faut . . . admirer toujours Descartes et le suivre quelquefois.”
— D’ALEMBERT.

I. THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

No one has ever written the history of any period of thought or of life without being greatly puzzled about the point at which to begin it. For whatever event be chosen as the first of the chronicle, this hypothetically first event is conditioned by other events. Every history, therefore, begins at a more or less arbitrary point; and the history of modern philosophy is no exception. The dividing line between the mediæval and the modern period is one which it is very hard to draw; in other words, it is impossible to enumerate qualities which mark off absolutely the modern from the mediæval epoch.

The mediæval period seems, however, to be distinguished by these two characters among others: a subordination of thought to revelation, of philosophy to dogma; and a disregard for scientific observation. The first of these attributes of mediæval philosophy is prominent in the works of philosophers throughout the period. The mediæval, and especially

¹ The clumsiness of a full description, in technical terms, of the different systems of philosophy has been avoided in these chapter headings. Two terms are employed, here and throughout, of which the first describes the system from the numerical, the second from the qualitative, standpoint. Thus, ‘pluralistic dualism’ means, ‘(numerically) pluralistic (qualitative) dualism.’ (Dualism is a form of pluralism, here a doctrine of two *kinds* of reality.) Of course this device of order is purely arbitrary; it is equally possible to describe this system, for instance, as dualistic pluralism, understanding that the first term is used in the qualitative, the second in the numerical, sense. It is important simply to contrast sharply these two points of view.

the scholastic, disregard for fact — in particular, for the facts of external nature — is equally apparent. The thinkers of the Middle Ages so immersed themselves in religious doctrine and in the implied problems of ethics, psychology, and demonology, that they could not be affected by the world of nature. Men who speculated with warm concern on the composition of angels' bodies naturally were uninterested in the organs of an animal's body or in the conformation of the physical world.

One is fairly safe in the assertion that a growing independence of dogma and a revived interest in natural science mark off the period of modern philosophy from that which precedes it, though even this generalization is distinctly untrue if too rigidly applied. There were men in the mediæval period imbued with the modern instincts for independence and for scientific investigation; and there were few philosophers in the seventeenth century who were untouched by mediævalism. But the teaching of the greater number of philosophical thinkers and, thus, the trend of philosophical thought certainly shows signs of a change toward the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. We are therefore justified in dating modern philosophy from this time.

It is a more difficult and a less important task to indicate the very first of modern philosophers. Some historians make the claim for Francis Bacon, but the "*Novum Organon*" is a doctrine of the methods of science rather than a philosophical system. With far more reason, it is often held that the Italian Giordano Bruno¹ was the first of modern philosophers. There is, indeed, no question of Bruno's independence of ecclesiastical authority, of his keen interest in the nature world, and of the depth of his philosophic vision; but vision and interest are often those of poet or seer, not those of scientist or philosopher, and Bruno's works, which are without argumen-

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 457.

tative form, are mystic rhapsody or unargued insight rather than ordered philosophy. By some such process of elimination many historians of philosophy have dated the modern period from René Descartes.¹ It is convenient to follow their lead, for unquestionably Descartes's philosophy is of a relatively common type, probably representing, in a way, the philosophy of most of the readers of this book.

The revolt of modern philosophy from the influence of the church is curiously illustrated by the outward life and station of Descartes. The philosophers of the mediæval period had been priests or monks, or, at least, university teachers; but Descartes started out as courtier and man of the world, and though he remained throughout his life an obedient son of the church, he never occupied an ecclesiastical or an academic office. His immediate preparation for the career of mathematician and philosopher consisted of four years of foreign military service, chiefly spent in the Netherlands and in Bohemia, in search, as he says, for "the knowledge which could be found in the great book of the world."² At the end of this period, intellectual interests asserted supreme control over Descartes's outward life. "I was in Germany," he writes, "and . . . returning from the coronation of the emperor, the coming of winter detained me in a place where, having no conversation to divert me, and . . . no cares or passions to trouble me, I spent the day, shut up alone in a tent where I had leisure to entertain myself with my thoughts." These thoughts concerned themselves with the deepest problems of reality; their immediate outcome was the stirring of philosophic doubt in the mind of Descartes, his conviction that he had too uncritically adopted the opinions of his teachers, and his resolve to build up for himself an independent philo-

¹ Cf., however, N. Smith, "Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy," Chapter 1, note, p. vi., for the assertion that "all that lies outside [Descartes's] philosophy of nature . . . remains in essentials scholastic in conception."

² "Discourse on Method," Pt. I., second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 9.

sophic system. The criterion of truth which he adopted was the following, "never to receive as true anything which I did not evidently know to be true."¹ And he proposed to gain this evident knowledge by a method formulated in the following precepts: "To divide my difficulties," "To conduct my thoughts in order," "To review my conclusions."²

These statements of Descartes's purpose make it evident that he adopts, on the one hand, the three acknowledged methods of scientific thought, analysis, logical reasoning, and verification; and, on the other hand, the philosopher's attitude as well, dissatisfaction with conclusions that lack utter certainty. This desire for truth gives way, however, to a positive philosophical doctrine. From a study of this teaching it will appear that Descartes gains, by his philosophic reflection and reasoning, a conception familiar to us all. He regards the universe as made up of spirits, or selves, and of bodies, inorganic and organic. Supreme over all the finite or limited spirits, he teaches, and over all the bodies is an infinite and perfect spirit, God. Descartes's philosophical system is evidently, therefore, pluralistic — both from the qualitative and from the numerical standpoint. It is qualitatively pluralistic or, more specifically, *dualistic*, in that it teaches that there are precisely two kinds of reality, spiritual and material. It is numerically pluralistic through its teaching that, of each of these classes of reality, there are innumerable examples or instances; that each sort of reality is embodied, as it were, in an indefinite number of specific individuals, or things. The effort will be made in this chapter, first, to outline this system and then to estimate it. Criticism will be postponed till the doctrine is fully stated, in the hope that a sympathetic under-

¹ This criterion is embodied in his first 'precept of method.' Cf. "Discourse on Method," Pt. II., seventh paragraph, Open Court edition, p. 19².

² *Ibid.*, paragraphs 8-10, p. 19. These precepts clearly state Descartes's method and are therefore to be distinguished from the first precept, quoted above, which states his criterion of truth.

standing of Descartes's opinions may precede the attempt to estimate their value.

II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF DESCARTES ¹

a. The preparation for philosophy: universal doubt

At the very outset of his philosophical study, Descartes finds his way barred by a formidable difficulty: philosophy is the attempt by reasoning to reach a perfect certainty; and therefore the student of philosophy must start from some admitted fact, from some perfect certainty, however small. But Descartes discovers, when he searches experience for some truth unambiguously certain and incapable of being doubted, that he can find not one. Of all that he has been taught to believe there is nothing whose reality may not be questioned. His quest for some small certainty leaves him without any certainty on any subject; in other words, he finds it necessary to doubt everything.

At first sight Descartes's attitude of universal doubt seems absurd. It is possible, we shall most of us admit, to question the existence of the unseen and the unexperienced; but how can any one in his senses doubt the reality of the things he himself touches, sees, and hears — the existence of objects of the physical world? Descartes has a ready answer to this question: we cannot be absolutely certain, he teaches, of the existence of the things we perceive, for we know that our senses sometimes mislead us. "All," he says, "that I have up to this moment accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I have learned either from or through my senses." ²

¹ This study of Descartes's system is based on the "Meditations" (written 1629, published 1641), the "Principles of Philosophy" (1644), and the "Discourse on Method" (1631). The student of philosophy should read at least the "Meditations" before entering on this chapter; and he may well add "Discourse," I. and V., and "Principles," Pts. I., II., and IV., as abbreviated in the Open Court edition.

² "Meditations," I., paragraph 2.

But the senses have "sometimes misled us;"¹ . . . I have frequently observed that towers, which at a distance seem round, appear square when more closely viewed, and that colossal figures, raised on the summits of these towers, look like small statues when viewed from the bottom of them. . . . Also, I have sometimes been informed by persons whose arms or legs have been amputated that they still occasionally seem to feel pain in that part of the body which they have lost."² These examples and innumerable others like them are sufficient to prove the fallaciousness of the senses. "And," Descartes continues, "it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we may have even once been deceived."³ There is no escape from this argument of Descartes's. Surely we have all heard footsteps, when, as we have later discovered, there was no one near, and we have met in our dreams people as vivid as any in so-called waking life; and yet these illusory sounds and these dream people are admitted to be unreal. And it is possible, however unlikely, that I am dreaming at this very instant; or that the pen I grasp, the words I hear, are mere illusions.

So far, Descartes has proved only the uncertainty of objects known through sense-perception. But our doubt, he believes, is of wider extent. It is possible to doubt of every object of knowledge: even mathematical truths concerning "body, figure, extension, motion, and place" may be "merely fictions of my mind."⁴ This follows, he teaches, because every human knower is a finite and a limited being. How then can the human knower be sure that he is not deceived in his most profound conviction? He does not know everything; how can he be certain that he knows anything?⁵ In truth he may be, at every point, in error.

¹ "Meditations," I., paragraph 2.

² *Ibid.*, VI., paragraph 6, Open Court edition, p. 89².

³ *Ibid.*, I., paragraph 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II., paragraph 2. Cf. "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 5.

⁵ "Meditations," I., second paragraph from end. The exact form in which Descartes conceives this possibility is the following: that God — or, more likely, some 'malignant demon' — has deceived him.

Descartes does not teach, it will be noticed, that we are in error in all that we believe; he insists merely that we may be in error. In other words, he does not deny, but he doubts, the reality of everything. And in this situation, as he clearly recognizes, philosophy is impossible.

b. The implication of doubt: the existence of myself

The hopelessness of Descartes's situation is suddenly relieved by his discovery of one unquestioned truth: that he himself exists. He cannot doubt this, for doubt itself would be impossible if he did not exist. "I suppose myself to be deceived," he exclaims, "doubtless then I exist, since I am deceived."¹ Herewith Descartes reaches the real starting point of his philosophical system, the certainty which is immediately evident to each one of us, namely, the existence of myself. "I had the persuasion" he says, "that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies. Was I not, then, at the same time persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded." It is, indeed, impossible "that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. . . . This proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me or conceived in my mind."² In other words, Descartes asserts that he is immediately certain of his own existence and that the certainty of a self which doubts is implied by every doubt, even the most radical.

This doubting self, Descartes proceeds to describe. It is, first of all, conscious: it is known in doubting, believing — in a word, in 'thinking,' for Descartes understands by the word "thought (*cogitatio*), all that which so takes place in us that we of ourselves are immediately conscious of it; and

¹ "Meditations," II., paragraph 3.

² *Ibid.*

accordingly not only understanding, willing, imagining, but even perceiving.”¹ Furthermore, the self is not identical with any one of its thoughts or doubts, — in other words, with any one of its ideas, — or even with the sum of them. Descartes expresses this by the teaching that there is a self, soul, or mind, which *has* ideas and *is* conscious. “I am,” he says, “precisely speaking, . . . a thinking thing, a mind.”² In the third place, Descartes teaches, the self is free. Of this freedom, he believes that he is directly conscious. “I experience,” he says, “. . . the freedom of choice;”³ “I am conscious of will, so ample and extended as to be superior to all limits.” (The conception of the freedom of the self will be considered in more detail in another connection.⁴)

It is most important to realize the meaning of this doctrine of the self. For if Descartes’s preliminary doubt is justified, the certainty of myself is the starting point of every philosophy, and not of Descartes’s only. It is true that philosophy was defined as the attempt to discover the irreducible nature of *anything*; but if I must begin by doubting everything save my own existence, then the truth that I am must be my point of departure in the search for ultimate reality. For as Descartes and St. Augustine long before him⁵ pointed out, it is the one certainty immediately evident in the very act of doubting. To be uncertain is to be conscious; and consciousness inevitably implies the existence of somebody being conscious. As surely then as doubt or uncertainty exists on any subject, so surely a conscious, doubting self exists. The nature of this

¹ “Principles,” Pt. I., Prop. 9. Cf. Definition I., from “Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations,” Open Court edition, p. 215. For a view opposed to that here stated, *i.e.* for the teaching that perception is an “attribute of the soul . . . impossible without the body,” cf. “Meditations,” II., paragraph 5, Open Court edition, p. 32.

² *Ibid.*, II., paragraph 5, Open Court edition, p. 33¹.

³ *Ibid.*, IV., paragraph 7, Open Court edition, p. 67 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. *infra*, pp. 44, 91 *seq.*, 265 *seq.*

⁵ “De Beata Vita,” 7; “De Trinitate,” X., 14 *et al.*; “De Civitate Dei,” XI., c. 26, Eng. trans. (by Dods), pp. 468–469. “If I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived.”

knowledge of oneself — the foundation stone of Descartes's system — should be carefully defined. In a sense, of course, it is immediate or unreasoned knowledge, the unreflective sense of one's own existence which is common to us all. Yet, as taken up into philosophy, this knowledge is not instinctive, uncritical self-consciousness. For it has been reasoned about; though itself immediate, it has been shown to be implied in all doubt. So viewed, it is distinguished from that uncritical consciousness of self which belongs to the everyday life and which often may be in no wise distinguished by its degree of conviction from one's persuasion of the existence of physical objects.

c. The inference from my own existence: the existence of God

The persistent student of philosophy — the seeker for a knowledge of the irreducible all-of-reality — may not rest contented when he has established, by reasoning, this one conviction of his own existence. For it is evident that whatever is required or implied by this truth — whatever, in other words, may be demonstrated from it — must share in its certainty. Thus, the next question of the philosopher, who starts with Descartes's conviction of his own existence, is the following: may I demonstrate from my own existence the existence of any other reality? To this question Descartes worked out a definite answer. As will appear, he concluded that, reasoning from his own existence, he could demonstrate the existence of God; and that, reasoning from God's existence, he could prove the existence of the physical world. Evidently, then, Descartes's conception of God's nature and his arguments for God's existence are of greatest significance to a student of his system.

It is enough, for the present, to say that Descartes means by God a perfect (that is, a complete) spirit or self: a being all-powerful, all-wise, all-good. For the existence of God, he

has four arguments and these are of two main types: two ontological arguments, that is, arguments from the character of the conception of God's nature, and two causal arguments. The statement of these arguments, which follows, has been made as simple and as clear as possible. The arguments are, none the less, full of complications and will claim the close attention of the untrained reader. The critical consideration of them is postponed to a later section. The point of departure, it will be remembered, always is the clear and evident knowledge of one's own existence.

The first of the ontological arguments may be stated thus: That of which I have a consciousness as clear as my consciousness of myself, must exist. But I am as clearly conscious of God as of myself; hence God exists. In Descartes's own words, "Whatever mode of probation I adopt, it always returns to this, that it is only the things I clearly and distinctly conceive which have the power of completely persuading me. . . . And with respect to God . . . I know nothing sooner . . . than the existence of a Supreme Being, or of God. And although the right conception of this truth has cost me much close thinking, . . . I feel as assured of it as of what I deem most certain."¹

The second of Descartes's ontological arguments is many times restated in his works, but it is not original with him. It was first formulated by the mediæval philosopher, St. Anselm, and is always known as Anselm's argument for the existence of God.² In brief, as given by Descartes, it is the following: The idea of God is the idea of an all-perfect Being. But to perfection, or completeness, belong all attributes: power, goodness, knowledge, and also *existence*. Therefore God, of necessity, exists. "When the mind," says Descartes, ". . . reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them — that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it ob-

¹ "Meditations," V., paragraph 6, Open Court edition, p. 81¹.

² "Proslogium," Chapters II. and III.

serves that in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists.”¹

Descartes's causal arguments for God's existence may both be summarized in the following propositions: I know that I exist and that I am a finite, incorporeal being, possessed of the idea of God, an infinite and perfect Being. But both I myself and my idea of God must have been caused by a being capable of creating and preserving me and the idea of God within me. And only an infinite and perfect Being can be the real or ultimate cause of me, and of this idea of God. Therefore such an infinite Being, God, exists.²

Before stating these arguments with the care they demand, it is important to analyze the concept of causality on which they are based. Descartes's fundamental principle of causality is the doctrine that every finite reality has some cause. This conviction is implied by almost every statement which he makes about causality. In the second place, Descartes believes that the cause of every finite reality is a 'conserving cause' — that is to say, that it continues while its effect continues. In other words, he denies the possibility that a cause should cease before its effect ceases. Finally, Descartes holds that each finite reality has a cause which is more than finite — which is, in other words, 'self-existent,' 'ultimate,' 'total,'

¹ "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 14. Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 3; and "Reply to Second Objections," Axiom X. (quoted Open Court edition, p. 219 seq.).

² It may be well for the untrained reader to omit the remainder of this section in the first reading of the chapter.

and 'efficient.' Such a cause has, he teaches, two essential characters; it has at least as much reality as its effect; and it is non-ideal, or in Descartes's terminology 'formal,' — that is, it is no mere idea. Both Descartes's causal arguments for the existence of an all-perfect God are based, as will appear, upon the principles just formulated — in other words, upon the necessity of (1) some cause of every finite reality, which is (2) a conserving cause and (3) a more-than-finite, — in fact, an ultimate cause; and, because ultimate, (a) 'formal' or real, and (b) as perfect as its effect.¹

The first of the causal arguments for God's existence, in which Descartes embodies these principles, if not entirely original with Descartes, is so forcibly stated in his discussions of God's existence that it is justly known as the Cartesian argument. In brief, it is this: An all-perfect Being, God, must exist. For I have the idea of such an all-perfect Being; this idea must have some cause; I, a finite being, could not cause in myself this idea of an infinite God; and indeed God alone is capable of producing this idea of God which unquestionably I possess. In Descartes's own words the argument is as follows: "There . . . remains . . . the idea of God, in which I must consider whether there is anything which cannot be supposed to originate with myself. By the name God, I understand a Substance infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing which exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent that . . . it is absolutely necessary to conclude . . . that God exists: for I should not . . . have the idea of an infinite substance,

¹ Descartes qualifies this doctrine by the teaching that an effect is "produced by that which contains in itself *formally or eminently* all that enters into its composition, in other words by that which contains in itself the same . . . properties or others that are superior to them." ("Meditations," III., paragraph 11 (French translation), Open Court edition, p. 49². Italics mine. Cf. "Reply to the Second Objections," Def. IV., and Axiom IV., Open Court edition, pp. 216, 219.)

seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite.”¹

This argument explicitly involves all the features of Descartes's conception of cause, save the doctrine that a cause must conserve its effect. It first of all assumes that my idea of God must have some cause; in the next place, it assumes that the cause must be ultimate, and therefore real being (or in Descartes's term, 'formal' reality) and not a mere idea (in Descartes's words, it cannot be 'objective' reality).² "In order," Descartes says, "that an idea may contain this objective [ideal] reality, rather than that, it must doubtless derive it from some cause in which is found at least as much formal [not-ideal] reality as the idea contains of objective [ideal]." ³ In other words, every idea is, of necessity, caused by something which is more real than any idea. This argument that God exists as inevitable cause of the idea of God implies, finally, that the ultimate cause cannot be less perfect than its effect. Hence, Descartes argues, I cannot myself be the cause of this idea of God, seeing that I am not infinitely powerful and good. It follows from these causal principles, that an infinite God must exist to cause the idea of God. "Because we discover in our mind," Descartes says, "the idea of God, or of an all-perfect Being, we have a right to inquire into the source whence we derive it; and we shall discover that the perfections it represents are so immense as to render it quite certain that we could only derive it from an all-perfect Being; that is, from a God really existing. For it is not only manifest by the natural light that nothing cannot be the cause

¹ "Meditations," III., paragraph 15, Open Court edition, p. 54.

² This terminology of Descartes must be carefully borne in mind by the reader of his works. For by 'objective' he means what we often express by precisely the opposite term (subjective); that is, he means object of consciousness, thought, or idea. By 'formal,' on the other hand, he means the opposite of 'objective' — namely, 'real,' in the sense of not-idea. This use of the word 'formal' is foreign to modern usage. It should be contrasted also with Descartes's use of 'formal' in opposition to 'eminent.' Cf. Note, p. 28 *supra*, also Open Court edition, p. 244, Note.

³ "Meditations," III., paragraph 11, Open Court edition, p. 50.

of anything whatever, and that the more perfect cannot arise from the less perfect . . . but also that it is impossible we can have the idea or representation of anything whatever, unless there be somewhere . . . an original which comprises, in reality, all the perfections that are thus represented to us; but as we do not in any way find in ourselves those absolute perfections of which we have the idea, we must conclude that they exist in some nature different from ours, that is, in God."¹

This argument is of unquestioned validity, if once Descartes's conception of cause be accepted, and he, therefore, needs no other causal argument for God's existence. None the less, he formulates another argument, of some complexity, to prove that God must exist — not merely as cause of my idea of God but as cause of *me*. Descartes's proof of this is by elimination. It is evident that there must be some cause of me, and Descartes seeks to disprove the possibility that any other being, save God, could be the cause of me.

(1) I am not, in the first place, cause of myself. For, if I were, I must be conscious of this causality, whereas "I am conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know that I am dependent on some being different from myself." Moreover, "if I were myself the author of my being I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be wanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God."² Both these arguments are based on my immediate consciousness of my own limited powers and defects; though the latter may be derived, also, from the principle that the effect may be no more perfect than the cause.

(2) It is equally certain that no being less perfect than God could have produced me. Descartes argues this mainly on two grounds: No finite being, in the first place, can be the

¹ "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 18.

² "Meditations," III., sixth paragraph from end. Open Court edition, pp. 57 and 59.

ultimate cause of me, for every finite being has itself to be explained by a cause outside itself. Thus a finite being could only be the proximate or immediate, not the ultimate, cause of me; and concerning such a proximate, finite, cause, Descartes says, we should rightly "demand again . . . whether [it] exists of itself or through some other, until, from stage to stage, we at length arrive at an ultimate cause which will be God."¹ In the second place, even granting that "some other cause less perfect than God" — that is, some finite cause — were the cause which created me, it could not be the cause which conserves me during every moment of my conscious life. But according to Descartes's conception of causality, every real cause, it will be remembered, must be a conserving cause. For the cessation of a cause would imply, Descartes says, that one moment of time could be dependent on a previous moment of time; and this, he declares, is impossible. "The whole time of my life," he says, "may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on any other; and accordingly, because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were — that is, conserve me."² Now no finite cause can be conceived as existing, not merely through my life, but through the life of the succession of finite beings.³ Therefore the conserving cause of me must be an infinite, not a finite, cause.

Evidently these different arguments, against the possibility that a being less than God has produced me, have involved not only the principle that every limited reality has a cause, but also the conviction that this cause is more than finite — in truth that it is ultimate, that it is a conserving cause, and that it is no less perfect than its effect. This last principle is at

¹ "Meditations," III., fifth paragraph from end.

² *Ibid.*, III., sixth paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 58. Cf. "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 21; and "Reply to Second Objections," Axiom I., Open Court edition, p. 218.

³ The part of this argument which is formulated in this sentence is not expressly stated by Descartes.

the root of Descartes's argument against the hypothesis which remains to be eliminated. It has been shown that neither I myself nor any being less than God can cause me. It is, however, (3) still conceivable that a group of beings, each of them less than God, might produce me. Descartes outlines this possibility and argues against it in the following way: "Nor can it," he says, "be supposed that several causes concurred in my production, and that from one I received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to the Deity, and from another the idea of some other, and thus that all those perfections are indeed found somewhere in the universe, but do not all exist together in a single being who is God; for, on the contrary, the unity, the simplicity or inseparability of all the properties of Deity, is one of the chief perfections I conceive him to possess; and the idea of this unity of all the perfections of Deity could certainly not be put into my mind by any cause from which I did not likewise receive the ideas of all the other perfections; for no power could enable me to embrace them in an inseparable unity, without at the same time giving me the knowledge of what they were."¹ Obviously the heart of this reasoning is the principle that a cause must be no less perfect than its effect. For this reason, Descartes teaches, no composite cause could produce in me the idea which I certainly have of an infinite simple being; and it follows that the cause of me is one ultimate being, resembling in its unity, as well as in its other qualities, the idea of itself that it produces in me. This disproof of the possibility that a group of beings produced me of course carries with it the disproof of the doctrine that "my parents" caused me. Descartes, however, adds, in opposition to this doctrine, the statement that one's parents are the causes only of bodily dispositions, not of mind.²

Descartes has, therefore, argued that neither I myself, nor any other being less than God, nor any group of beings, could

¹ "Meditations," III., fourth paragraph from end.

² *Ibid.*, III., paragraph three from end.

have caused me. Only one other cause of my existence is possible. I must believe that God exists, for every finite reality must have a cause, and only God could cause that finite reality, myself, of whose existence I am immediately certain.¹

In arguing for God's existence, Descartes has indicated his conception of God's nature. It is summed up in the definition of God as "a Being . . . absolutely perfect."² From his absoluteness, follows his entire self-dependence: he is the absolute substance which "stands in need of no other thing in order to its existence."³ From his perfection follow the positive characters: omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness. From his absolute perfection, also, according to Descartes, there result three negative characters. These are the following: In the first place, "God is not corporeal . . . for . . . since extension constitutes the nature of body, and since divisibility is included in local extension, and this indicates imperfection, it is certain that God is not body."⁴ Furthermore, "God does not perceive by means of senses. . . . Since in every sense there is passivity which indicates dependency, we must conclude," Descartes says, "that God is in no manner possessed of senses, and that he only understands and wills; that he does not, however, like us, understand and will by acts in any way distinct, but that he always by an act that is one, identical, and the simplest possible, understands, wills, and operates all, that is, all things that in reality exist: for he does not will the evil of sin, seeing this is but the negation of being."⁵ From God's perfect goodness it follows, finally, that

¹ For a summary of both causal arguments, cf. "Reply to Second Objections," Prop. 3, Dem., Open Court edition, p. 221.

² "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 14. Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 3.

³ "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Pt. I., Prop. 23. The second clause belongs not to the Latin original, but to the French translation.

⁵ *Ibid.* The French translation, in place of the second clause quoted, has the following: "Because our perceptions rise from impressions made upon us from another source" — *i.e.* than ourselves.

God does not deceive. "It is impossible," Descartes says, "for him ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection; and, although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice or weakness; and such accordingly cannot be found in God."¹

d. The consequence of God's existence: the existence of corporeal things and of finite selves

Descartes starts out by doubting everything. In the doubt of himself he finds the certainty of his own existence. From the existence of himself he demonstrates, as he believes, the existence of an all-perfect God. From this certainty of the existence of an all-powerful and absolutely good God, he goes on to demonstrate the existence of corporeal (or material) things. He argues mainly from the impossibility that a good God should deceive me. I doubtless possess sense perceptions, and I have a clear consciousness that these ideas are caused by real objects external to me. And as God "has given me . . . a very strong inclination to believe that those ideas arise from corporeal objects, I do not see," Descartes says, "how he could be vindicated from the charge of deceit, if in truth they proceeded from any other source; or were produced by other causes than corporeal things; and accordingly it must be concluded, that corporeal objects exist."² The same argument, it may be observed, would serve to prove the existence of limited, or finite,³ spirits other than myself.

¹ "Meditations," IV., paragraph 2.

² *Ibid.*, VI., paragraph 9, Open Court edition, p. 93.

³ This term 'finite' is commonly applied to realities other than God or the Absolute. The use of the expression 'finite spirit' is, however, unfortunate in that it begs the question of the possible infinitude of the limited, the so-called finite, spirit or self; whereas infinitude, in some sense of the word, has by more than one philosopher been attributed to selves other than the divine self. (Cf. *infra*, Appendix, p. 523 *seq.*; Royce, "World and Individual," I., pp. 554 *seq.*) To discuss the problem is here impossible, for it would involve a consideration of the exact meaning

Descartes assumes their existence, but he might have argued it. For I surely conceive the existence of human beings as clearly and distinctly as that of corporeal objects, and the absolutely good God "could not be vindicated from the charge of deceit," if so distinct a consciousness were a mere illusion.

Descartes has a second, though subordinate, argument for the existence of corporeal objects. It is the argument, later emphasized by the English philosopher Locke, on which most of us depend when we are challenged to prove the reality of external things — trees or stones, for instance. They must exist, we say, else we should never have these perceptions of them. My imaginations I control as I will; even my dreams are copies of my previous experience; but my percepts force themselves upon me, I can neither change nor modify them, they are unavoidable. Evidently then real objects must exist outside me to force on me these impressions of themselves. Descartes makes use of this argument for the reality of physical things. I am directly conscious of "hardness, heat, and the other tactile qualities, . . . light, colors, odors, tastes, and sounds."¹ And assuredly," he says, "it was not without reason that I thought I perceived certain objects wholly different from my thought, namely, bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented to me without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of sense; and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus present. And because the ideas I perceived by the senses were much more lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, . . . it seemed that they could not have proceeded from myself, of infinity. So far as possible in this book some one of the expressions, 'limited,' 'partial,' 'relative,' or 'lesser spirit' will be used in place of the words 'finite spirit,' and the latter expression, when employed, must be understood merely to mark out the antithesis between divine (or absolute) and less-than-divine (or less-than-absolute).

¹ "Meditations," VI., paragraph 5.

and must therefore have been caused in me by some other objects; and as of those objects themselves I had no knowledge beyond what the ideas themselves gave me, nothing was so likely to occur to my mind as the supposition that the objects were similar to the ideas which they had caused." This second argument for the existence of material things is based on an undoubted fact: that our sense perception is forced upon us, that we must see and smell and hear what we do. It follows that we do not ourselves voluntarily cause these sense perceptions; and it is evidently natural for us to refer them to corporeal objects "wholly different from any thought." Of the real existence of these objects, however, we can be assured only if we know that our inferences are to be trusted — in other words, if we are sure that God does not deceive us. So this second argument for the existence of corporeal things presupposes the first argument.¹

Thus Descartes argues for the existence of 'corporeal objects.' But precisely what, it must next be asked, does he mean by the 'corporeal object'? It is natural to answer that a corporeal object, a material thing, is a real being possessed of qualities corresponding to our sensations: that a corporeal rose, for example, is red and fragrant and smooth and the like.

¹ The second and third sentences of the following passage show that Descartes clearly understood the relation of these two arguments. "It cannot be doubted," he says, "that every perception we have comes to us from some object different from our mind; for it is not in our power to cause ourselves to experience one perception rather than another, the perception being entirely dependent on the object which affects our senses. It may indeed be matter of inquiry whether that object be God or something different from God; but because we perceive, or rather — stimulated by sense — clearly and distinctly apprehend, certain matter extended in length, breadth and thickness, the various parts of which . . . give rise to the sensation we have of colors, smells, pain, etc., God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if he directly and of himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by some object which possessed neither extension, figure, or motion. For we clearly conceive this matter as entirely distinct from God, and from ourselves, or our mind. . . . But . . . God cannot deceive us, for this is repugnant to his nature. . . ." ("Principles," Pt. II., Prop. 1.)

Descartes, however, teaches that the corporeal objects whose existence he holds so certain are not the colored, fragrant, sounding things which we believe ourselves to perceive. On the contrary, he says, real, material things are simply extended things: they have no color, or fragrance, or texture, or resistance; they have mere shape and figure and extent. The hardness and color and the rest, which we no doubt attribute to things outside us, really are mere sensations in us, due to the 'different figures and motions'¹ of extended bodies. "The nature of body," Descartes says, "consists not in weight, hardness, color, and the like, but in extension alone . . . in its being a substance extended in length, breadth, and height. . . ." ² The real rose, in other words, has no corporeal qualities save its shape and size and movement: to our sensations of its redness and fragrance there correspond no similar qualities in the rose itself; these sensations are caused by modifications of the real extension of bodies, that is to say, the sensations are caused by motions of the particles of the real, extended body.

Thus the world of external things, as conceived by Descartes, is a world of extended and moving, but of uncolored, odorless, soundless things. And different as such a world is from the world of objects which we suppose ourselves to see and touch, it is — we must remember — precisely this sort of physical world which the science of our own time assumes. According to the teaching of the physicists, our sensations of light and of color are due to the vibrations of colorless, and indeed of invisible, ether waves, our sound sensations are produced by moving air-vibrations, our tastes and smells are due, finally, to molecular and atomic movements. The natural science of Descartes's day conceived the physical world in a closely allied fashion as a world of extended bodies and of moving particles — therefore, Descartes, in this doctrine of extension as the only quality of objects, is simply adopting

¹ Motion, Descartes teaches, is a mere modification of extension.

² "Principles," Pt. II., Prop. 4.

the widest generalization of the science of his time. But, of course, Descartes does not make, without argument, the assumption that external things have only one quality, extension, and that the other sensible qualities are mere sensations in us produced by the modifications of extended bodies. He offers, in fact, four arguments for this conclusion, and these must now be outlined.

(1) Descartes urges, first, that extension is the only bodily attribute which is clearly apprehended. By 'clear apprehension' Descartes always means the kind of consciousness which the mathematician has; and evidently, extension is the only one of the qualities of a body which can be mathematically known. The rest, 'weight, color, and all the other qualities of this sort' are thought with 'obscurity and confusion.'

(2) It is certain also, Descartes thinks, that the qualities, except extension, of corporeal substances are not necessary to the nature of body. "With respect to hardness," for example, "we know nothing of it by sense farther than that the parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our hands on coming into contact with them; but if every time our hands moved towards any part, all the bodies in that place receded as quickly as our hands approached, we should never feel hardness; and yet we have no reason to believe that bodies which might thus recede would on this account lose that which makes them bodies. The nature of body does not, therefore, consist in hardness."¹

(3) In the third place, Descartes points out, this theory that motion may produce in us sensations, of color, odor, and the like, is in accord with the admitted fact that certain sensations — those in particular of pain and of 'titillation' — are due to moving things. "The motion merely," he says, "of a sword cutting a part of our skin causes pain. And it is certain that this sensation of pain is not less different from the motion that causes it . . . than are the sensations we have

¹ "Principles," Pt. II., Prop. 4.

of color, sound, odor, or taste. On this ground we may conclude that our mind is of such a nature that the motions alone of certain bodies can also easily excite in it all the other sensations, as the motion of a sword excites in it the sensation of pain." ¹

(4) It is probable, Descartes argues finally, that the remote, physical causes of sensation are movements of extended things, since it is everywhere admitted that the immediate physiological, or bodily, conditions of all sensations are 'local motions' of the nerves and brain organs. There is no reason, Descartes believes, to think "that anything at all reaches the brain besides the local motion of the nerves themselves. And we see that local motion alone causes in us not only the sensation of titillation and of pain, but also of light and sounds. For if we receive a blow on the eye of sufficient force to cause the vibration of the stroke to reach the retina, we see numerous sparks of fire . . .; and when we stop our ear with our finger, we hear a humming sound, the cause of which can only proceed from the agitation of the air that is shut up within it." ²

e. Descartes's summary of his positive teaching: the substance doctrine

This account of Descartes's doctrine has followed mainly his "Meditations." In the end of Part I. of that later work, the "Principles of Philosophy," from which quotation has repeatedly been made, Descartes summarized and supplemented his metaphysical system, in a terminology resembling that of mediæval philosophy, as a doctrine of substances. This form of his teaching must now be outlined, partly because it forcibly restates the essentials of Descartes's doctrine, as already considered, partly because it brings out more clearly his conception of matter, and finally,

¹ "Principles," Pt. IV., Prop. 197.

² *Ibid.*, Pt. IV., Prop. 198.

because it is the form in which Descartes's doctrine exerted a strong influence on the course of philosophical thought.¹

By 'substance,' in the strict sense of the term, is meant, Descartes says, "a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of no other thing in order to its existence."² Evidently, if substance be thus defined, "there can be conceived but one substance . . . and that is God." The absoluteness of God is accordingly taught by Descartes in the doctrine that God is Substance.

But besides the one absolutely independent Substance, there exist — as Descartes believes that he has found — realities directly dependent on God, and these Descartes calls 'created substances.' Of these there are two sorts, 'corporeal' and 'thinking' substances.³ Every thinking substance has "one principal property which constitutes its nature or essence," namely consciousness, or 'thinking.' Every corporeal substance also has a 'principal attribute,' extension. "For every other thing," Descartes says, "which can be attributed to body presupposes extension." Corporeal as well as thinking things are termed 'substances' because "they stand in need of nothing but the concurrence of God." In other words, though dependent on God, they are relatively self-sufficient. The thinking substance, myself, for example, is fundamental to, and in this sense independent of, its own thoughts and ideas; it is also — Descartes teaches — independent of corporeal substances. Our mind, he says, is "of a nature entirely independent of the body."⁴ It must be noted that Descartes, though he constantly refers to many substances, also speaks of two substances — thought and matter. In these passages, however, he very clearly means by 'substance,' kind or class of substance. Because of a misunderstanding of his teaching at this point, Descartes has sometimes

¹ Cf. for less complete treatment of the substance doctrine, "Meditations," VI., paragraphs 9-10.

² "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 51.

⁴ "Discourse," V., last paragraph.

³ *Ibid.*, Prop. 52, 53.

been unjustly accused of attributing a fictitious reality to a mere general notion.¹

The belief that a created substance is independent save of God leads Descartes, as has appeared, to conclude that every such created substance is independent of every other, and in particular that any extended substance is independent of any thinking substance, and *vice versa*. One of the corollaries of this doctrine is of especial importance. For from the independence (save on God) of each created substance it follows obviously that a bodily organism is uninfluenced by what is called its soul. Every body, animal or human, is consequently a mere extended thing, a machine subject only to mechanical — or, more strictly, to mathematical — laws. Descartes does not shrink from this conclusion in its application to animals. An animal, he teaches, is an automaton, a mere body without soul, a machine made by the hands of God. "Were there machines," he says, "exactly resembling in organs and outward form an ape and any other irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a different nature from these animals."² But Descartes could not bring himself to regard the human body as utterly independent of spirit. Both the logic of his substance doctrine and the analogy with his teaching about animals require this conclusion, yet he teaches that "the reasonable soul . . . is joined and united . . . to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites."³ In perception, the soul is affected by the bodily changes due to the stimulus of external objects; and by volition the soul or spirit causes bodily movements. Descartes, however, reduces to its lowest terms this influence of body on soul and of soul on body. He teaches that the soul affects only the direction, never the amount, of bodily

2 can
more
exact

¹ Cf. "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 9, for Descartes's doctrine of 'universals,' or general notions.

² "Discourse," V., second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 60.

³ "Discourse," V., last paragraph, Open Court edition, p. 63².

movement; and that the mind immediately influences the body at one small point only, the pineal gland of the brain.¹

A complete account of Descartes's teaching would include at this point a sketch of his philosophy of nature. Descartes's metaphysics is so deeply spiritualistic that the student is unprepared for his rigidly mechanistic conception of the physical universe. The truth is, however, that the complete qualitative dualism of Descartes's system (the teaching that spirit is radically different from matter and that a finite spirit is independent of its body) left Descartes free to conceive the physical universe as unhampered by spiritual law. It has already appeared that he everywhere teaches that the human body is no more nor less than a machine.² And somewhat as the human body is influenced at one point only by its spirit so, Descartes teaches, the world might conceivably have been created, once for all, by God as a chaotic mass and might have attained its present state by the working out of purely mechanical laws. "If God," he says,³ "were now to create . . . enough matter to make the world," in the form of "a confused chaos," and if he were then to "leave this chaos to act according to the laws which he has established," then this chaotic matter would so dispose and order itself as to form planets, sun, fixed stars, and earth. The result, Descartes concludes, would be "a world entirely similar to ours." Not only inorganic bodies and plants but even animal bodies might have come into being through the succession of natural effects upon their causes. It is unnecessary to point out that this conception of the possible continuity of complex with simple organism and of organism with inorganic form, is none other than the theory at the basis

¹ "Meditations," VI.; cf. "Les Passions de l'Âme," Prem. Partie, Art. 31.

² Cf. "Discourse," V., paragraph 6: "The movement of the heart follows as necessarily from the disposition of the organs . . . as that of a clock from the force, position, and form of its balances and wheels."

³ *Ibid.*, V., paragraph 2. Cf. "Principles," III, § 45.

of modern evolutionary science. And though Descartes, after outlining this daring hypothesis, still asserts, in conformity with the teaching of the church, that the world was created by God "from the beginning with all its perfections," we are none the less justified in agreeing with Buffon that "it is Descartes who takes the first step" toward that mechanistic conception of the universe which has mainly dominated natural science since his day.

III. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF DESCARTES'S SYSTEM

This study of Descartes has, up to this point, concerned itself to outline clearly his philosophical theory and to make distinct the arguments by which he sought to establish it. But the student of philosophy has not merely the task of understanding a metaphysical system; it is his duty, also, to estimate it critically, to challenge its assertions, to scrutinize its arguments. And before this critical estimate is undertaken, a warning sounded in the preface of this book must be emphatically repeated. Adequate criticism at this stage of philosophical study is impossible. If it is true, as will be argued, that Descartes did not fully understand, in all their bearings, the problems which he discussed, still more is it true that without a study of other systems no one is fitted to criticise Descartes.

a. The adequate basis of Descartes's system: my existence

The writer of this book believes, as firmly as Descartes believed, that I as conscious self exist and that I know my own existence, not only in knowing anything whatever, but even in doubting everything. In a later chapter the effort will be made to show that the critics who have questioned the existence of a self really have throughout implied and assumed it.¹ For the present it will be taken for granted that the reader either admits or grants for argument's sake Descartes's foundation teaching: that I myself exist.

¹ Cf. Chapter 6, on Hume, especially pp. 179 seq.

But while insisting on the significance and the truth of Descartes's teaching, I doubt and in doubting I exist, it is certainly possible to criticise, at certain points, his conception of the 'I' or 'self.' He is right in insisting that the nature of a self is to be conscious and that any self is more than a mere series of ideas. But he does not adequately conceive the relation of a self, or soul, either to external objects or to God. In particular, Descartes assumes without discussion the freedom of the self, or soul. He never realizes, or at least he never solves, the difficulty involved in conceiving that God is all-powerful and all-good, and yet that finite selves have the freedom to make mistakes and to commit sin.¹


b. Descartes's inadequate arguments for God's existence

From his own existence Descartes infers that of an all-perfect God. The arguments on which he bases this conclusion must be scrutinized with special care, for — as has been shown — the existence of a perfect God is to Descartes the warrant for all other reality. The existence of God is thus, as it were, the second foundation stone of Descartes's system. Every other conclusion is derived, not from the certainty implied in every doubt of his own existence, but from the demonstrated existence of God.² One by one, therefore, it will be wise to examine Descartes's arguments for God's existence.

According to the first of the ontological arguments,³ God is known to exist because I conceive him as clearly as I conceive myself. Obviously the argument involves the follow-

¹ For fuller discussion of the nature of a self, cf. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and especially 11, pp. 116 *seq.*, 179 *seq.*, 229 *seq.*, and 407 *seq.*

² The course of the argument may be schematically represented thus:--



³ Cf. *supra*, p. 26.

ing premises: (1) that God is clearly conceived and (2) that clear conception is a guarantee of truth. The argument is sometimes criticised by challenging the assertion that God can be clearly and distinctly conceived. Indeed, Descartes himself admits that he may not comprehend the nature of God, though in the same breath he says that we "know clearly" God's perfections.¹ But whatever the outcome of this criticism, it will become evident that the second premise of the argument is of doubtful validity. The best clue to Descartes's meaning is gained by considering his two examples of an object of clear conception: (1) myself and (2) a mathematical truth, such as $2 + 3 = 5$. Now it has already appeared that I assert my own existence on the ground that it is implied in the doubt or denial of it. Similarly, I am sure of the existence, that is of the actual occurrence in my thought, of a mathematical judgment or of a mathematical idea (for example, the concept of a triangle) or indeed of any idea; and I have this certainty because the judgment or the idea perforce 'occurs' to me while I am doubting or denying it. There is, it is true, another type of mathematical certainty: I am sure that $(2+3)$ equals 5, not 6 or 7, because I am directly conscious of the identity of $(2+3)$ and 5. But the assertion, that God exists, obviously has not the certainty attaching to an identical proposition, nor is the existence of God directly implied in the denial of it. Therefore, whatever the sense in which Descartes is clearly and distinctly conscious of God, such consciousness is not parallel with the clear conception of myself and of mathematical truths and cannot, on the sole ground of this analogy, be supposed to imply the existence of God.³

¹ "Principles," Pt. I., Prop. 19. Cf. "Meditations," III., eighth paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 55³.

² Cf. "Meditations," III., paragraph 3, end: "No one will ever yet be able to bring it about that I am not, so long as I shall be conscious that I am, or . . . [to] make two and three more or less than five, in supposing which . . . absurdities I discover a manifest contradiction."

³ It is possible that Descartes urged these considerations, not as an argu-

According to the second ontological argument, God is known to exist because the conception of God is that of an all-perfect being, and because perfection — that is, completeness — means the possession of all attributes, therefore of existence.¹ A strong objection may be brought forward to this teaching. The argument, it may be said, makes too little of the distinction between conception (or idea) and existence. Unquestionably the idea of God includes the idea of really-existing, but the idea of real existence, like any other idea, does not, it is pointed out, carry with it actual existence. I may, for instance, carry out in imagination the demonstration of a geometrical proposition concerning the angles of a triangle. But though I clearly visualize a perfect triangle, this does not prove that the triangle has actual existence. So, though Descartes is right in the teaching that the idea of existence belongs to the idea of God as certainly as the idea of equality to two right angles “is comprised in the idea of a triangle,” he may, nevertheless, be unjustified in his conclusion that the idea of an existing God inevitably implies an existing God.

It would be unjust to Descartes to suppose that this difficulty did not occur to him. “Though,” he says, “I cannot conceive a God unless as existing any more than I can a mountain without a valley, yet, just as it does not follow that there is any mountain in the world merely because I conceive a mountain with a valley, so likewise, though I conceive God as existing, it does not seem to follow on that account that God exists; for my thought imposes no necessity on things. . . .”² It will be admitted that the difficulty could not be more adequately stated, but Descartes’s answer is not equally satisfactory. It is most clearly formulated in his

ment for the existence of God, but as a psychological explanation of our conviction of his existence. This view (suggested to me by Professor M. S. Case) is borne out by the fact that Descartes does not employ the argument in his “Reply to the Second Objections.”

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 26.

² “Meditations,” V., paragraph 4.

"Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations."¹ Here he says, "In the idea or concept of a thing existence is contained because we are unable to conceive anything unless under the form of a thing which exists; but with this difference that, in the concept of a limited thing, possible or contingent existence is alone contained, and in the concept of a being sovereignly perfect, perfect and necessary existence is included." Thus Descartes argues the existence of God, not on the ground that the idea of mere existence implies actual existence, but on the ground that the idea of necessary existence implies actual existence. Now no finite thing of which I have an idea has more than contingent existence, for I can always imagine that such a finite thing was never created; for example, I can imagine a demon without knowing that he exists. But it is impossible to conceive the necessarily existing being as perhaps non-existent. In other words, Descartes here teaches that the idea of God-as-existing differs from the idea of a finite-thing-as-existing,—say, the idea of a mountain,—since to the idea of a finite thing belongs merely the idea of contingent, created existence, whereas to the idea of God belongs that of necessary existence. But this argument merely pushes back the difficulty without meeting it. My idea of God does indeed, as Descartes shows, differ from my ideas of finite things herein, that it includes the idea, not of possible, but of necessary, existence. But my idea of God none the less can contain only the *idea* of necessary existence; in other words, from my idea, even of the necessarily existing, actual necessary existence cannot be directly inferred.²

There remain Descartes's causal arguments for the existence of God. The first of these, it will be remembered, urges that God must exist on the ground that I possess the

¹ Axiom X., Open Court edition, pp. 219–220.

² Descartes does not deny this conclusion with respect to other "true ideas which were born with me." (Cf. "Meditations," V., paragraph 5, near end.) For a fuller statement of this criticism on Descartes, cf. *infra*, Chapter 7, pp. 247 *seq.* For an outline of a metaphysically valid form of the ontological argument, cf. Chapter 11, pp. 418 *seq.*

idea of God and that God only could cause this idea in my mind.¹ This argument, as was shown, involves three assumptions. The first of these, that every phenomenon has some cause, may be admitted.² The second and third assumptions are these: that the *ultimate* cause of every finite reality must be (a) 'formal'—that is, not-idea—and (b) no less perfect than its effect. It should be noted that Descartes admits the existence of *finite* causes which are 'objective' and are also unlike their effects. And our experience confirms his admission. On the one hand, my fear may be due to my imaged idea of a burglar, and my resolve to walk to the city, to my anticipated need of coal. And on the other hand, observation furnishes us with countless examples of a cause unlike the effect.³ Descartes himself points out, in another connection,⁴ that corporeal motion has effects so unlike itself as sensations of sound, color, and pain. But in spite of the frequent occurrence of finite causes which are mere ideas, Descartes is justified in the teaching that an ultimate, a self-sufficient, cause could not be mere idea, for an idea is, as he might say, a 'mode' not a 'substance'; that is, the occurrence of an idea implies the existence of some being 'whose' the idea is. Similarly, in spite of instances of causes unlike effects, Descartes is right in holding that an ultimate, or 'total,' cause must be as perfect as its effect.³ "An idea," he says, "may give rise to another idea" but "we must in the end reach a . . . cause in which all the reality that is found objectively in these ideas is contained formally." It is however evident, on Descartes's

¹ Cf. pp. 28-30.

² For discussion, cf. Chapter 5, "The System of Hume," pp. 153 *seq.*

³ Cf. James, "Principles of Psychology," I., pp. 136 *seq.* Descartes, it is true, admits that a cause (and in particular the 'first and total cause') may be 'eminently' as well as 'formally' like its effect: in other words, that it may possess properties corresponding to those of the effect but superior to them. But this is virtually to yield the principle of the likeness of effect to cause. Cf. *supra*, p. 28, note.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 38.

own admission, that before he can prove that God exists actually, and not merely in idea, and that God has attributes corresponding with those of the idea of God, he must prove that an ultimate cause of every finite reality necessarily exists. It will be pointed out, in the following pages, that Descartes does not fully establish this proposition.

Descartes's last 'proof' argues for a God as necessary cause of myself.¹ To this end Descartes attempts to disprove successively the possibilities that I myself, that any other being less perfect than God, and that any group of beings could have produced me. In the first of the subordinate conclusions of this argument by elimination, Descartes, in the opinion of the writer, is correct. It is indeed impossible to hold in the face of my utter unconsciousness of such a relation, that I cause myself.

Descartes next argues, it will be remembered, that a being less than God could not have caused me.² For this conclusion, he offers two arguments, of which the less important is the statement that no being, less perfect than God, could be the permanent and preserving — or, in Descartes's term, the conserving — cause of me. This argument assumes (1) that everything has not merely a cause, but a conserving cause, which exists along with its effect; and (2) that finite causes cannot be conserving causes. But the first of these positions cannot be sustained. It is not clear that every cause must be a conserving cause. The friction of two bits of wood may light a fire which goes on burning long after the sticks have been thrown aside. In fact, the combustion of every moment may be said to have its cause in the conditions of the preceding moment. Observation thus substantiates what Descartes names impossible: the dependence of one moment, and its content, on a previous moment and the contents of the earlier moment. There is no need, then, to examine the assumption that finite causes may not be conserving causes,

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 30 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*

since Descartes has failed to prove the necessity of the conserving cause.

Descartes argues finally that God, and no being less than God, must be cause of me, since — as he teaches — every finite reality must have an ultimate cause and since no finite being can be ultimate. Evidently, this argument is further reaching than the others. For if it be true that there exists an ultimate cause, then from its ultimacy we may argue (what Descartes has not succeeded in proving directly) that it is a conserving cause and an all-perfect being. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the argument with especial care. Descartes is, in the first place, unquestionably right in insisting that every finite reality, because finite, has itself a cause, and that it is, therefore, incomplete, dependent — in a word, not ultimate. For, as he recognizes, only a self-sufficient being can be ultimate. The cogency of his argument turns, therefore, on the validity of its major premise, 'every finite reality must have an ultimate cause.' If this be true, then there must indeed exist an ultimate cause of me, who am a finite being. We turn, therefore, to the reasoning by which Descartes seeks to establish this proposition. We find him arguing for an ultimate cause which is also a first cause. There must be a first cause of me — this is the implication of his argument — for if the cause of me were finite, it also would require a cause, finite or infinite. And if the cause of the cause of me were finite, it too would require a cause, finite or infinite; and so on *ad infinitum*. And such an 'infinite regress,' Descartes holds, is impossible;¹ hence there must be a first cause, that is, an uncaused cause, which is self-caused, self-sufficient, ultimate. The difficulties with this argument are the following: In the first place, the conception of a first cause involves

¹ Cf. "Meditations," III., paragraphs 5 and 6 from end, Open Court edition, pp. 59-60. The specific reason which Descartes urges against the infinite regress is that so there would be no conserving cause. (It has been shown already that he has no right to the argument, since he has not succeeded in proving that the finite reality must have a conserving cause.)

a contradiction. For that which is first is, by hypothesis, a temporal reality, and it is the nature of everything temporal to be necessarily connected with a past as with a future; in other words, when we proceed 'from stage to stage' in a temporal series, we must conceive it as extending endlessly and have no reason to assume any first cause. And in the second place, so long as we think of the cause of a finite reality as belonging to a temporal, or indeed to an anywise conditioned series, we have no right to conceive it as ultimate, or self-sufficient, for every term, even the first term, of a series is in some sense conditioned by all the others, whereas an ultimate cause must be unconditioned. Descartes's conception of a first cause which is ultimate is really therefore an attempt to combine the irreconcilable.

We must conclude that Descartes has not proved, from the alleged impossibility of an endless series, that a finite reality must have an ultimate cause. He has, however, made definite the conception of a self-sufficient, an ultimate cause; and he has apprehended, more by insight than by reasoning, that the ultimate is implied by the finite, the unlimited by the limited. Later thinkers will establish this insight, will argue cogently for the existence of an ultimate reality, which is not indeed *first*, or temporal, cause, but which is yet ground or explanation of me.¹

We have reached, then, the last stage of Descartes's argu-

¹ This criticism of Descartes has revealed the fact that there are two conceptions of cause. According to one of these, a cause (whatever else it is) is the temporally prior; according to the second, a cause (whatever else it is) is the adequate explanation or ground. (A cause in this sense, if ultimate, cannot, as has just been argued, be a temporal event.) In the opinion of the writer it is more convenient to apply the term 'cause' exclusively to the temporal event, since there are other terms — as reality and substance — to express what is meant by cause in the other sense. It will later appear that Hume invariably means by 'cause' a temporal event; that Berkeley employs the term only in the second sense; and that Kant and Spinoza carefully distinguish the two meanings, but employ the word in both. Cf. *infra*, pp. 210, 258, 260 *seq.*, and 299 *seq.* Cf. also A. E. Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," pp. 165 *seq.*

ment, his attempted disproof of the possibility that "several causes concurred in my production."¹ To this, Descartes makes the objection that a combination of causes could not possibly have endowed me with the idea, which I possess, of God's unity. But the assumption made by this argument surely is not beyond challenge. Not only have we instances of a composition of mechanical causes followed by simple effect, but, by Descartes's own admission, I have the consciousness of myself as one. Granting then that I had gained from different 'causes' all the other parts of my conception of God I might conceivably add to these the idea of unity gained from self-observation. Descartes does not even consider this possibility.

All Descartes's arguments, ontological and causal, for the existence of God have thus been reviewed (with the acknowledgment that criticism at this early stage of philosophical study is, in the nature of the case, inadequate). If the criticisms on these arguments are valid, it results that the arguments, as they stand, do not prove the existence of God. Of course it by no means follows that God does not exist, for it is always possible that a correct doctrine is based on an invalid argument; and it is even possible that Descartes's reasoning was more cogent than his formulation of it. Thus the writer of this book questions the validity and the adequacy of Descartes's doctrine as he states it, yet agrees with him, not only in a general way in his conception of God's nature and in the conviction that it is possible to establish the truth of God's existence, but in the conviction that God is necessarily the existing explanation of the universe.²

c. Descartes's inadequate arguments for the existence of other finite realities

The admission of the failure of Descartes's argument to prove the existence of God carries with it consequences of

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 32.

² Cf. especially Chapters 10 and 11.

the gravest import to Descartes's system. For on the truth of God's existence depends, for Descartes, the truth that spirits, other than myself, and external objects exist. He argues the existence of spirits and objects alike, on the ground of God's veracity; and his argument loses all its force if the very existence of a veracious God is uncertain.

There are other reasons for rejecting Descartes's attempt to prove the existence of material things from the veracity of God. For Descartes himself impugns the veracity of God by admitting that we are deceived in our belief that external objects are not merely extended, but colored, fragrant, and tangible as well. To be sure, he attempts to reconcile the inconsistency by insisting that we are not clearly and distinctly conscious of any qualities save extension; and by admitting that God allows us to be in error in the case of our obscure and confused consciousness: We are often, Descartes admits, at fault in our judgments about the color, the fragrance, or the texture of objects, but we have, he insists, a clear geometrical knowledge of their space relations. We have, for instance, a clear and distinct conception of the cubic contents of an object, whereas we are not certain how to name the color. But this attempted reconciliation will not bear analysis. The peculiar certainty of mathematical propositions has already appeared¹ to be of two types: (1) I am certain that a mathematical truth exists in the sense that I am actually conscious of it; and (2) I am certain that one mathematical quantity is identical with another. But both these kinds of 'clear conception' and consequent certainty have to do with ideas, not with corporeal realities. And from the fact that I have a clear idea of a cubic content it no more follows that the cubic content corporeally exists than it follows from my idea (confused or clear) of green color that the color corporeally exists. In the second place, it may be

¹ Cf. page 45, *supra*.

objected that if any of our errors imply God's deceitfulness, then all must imply it. For, according to Descartes, God is our creator and is thus responsible alike for our indistinct and for our distinct apprehension.¹ In truth, Descartes's argument proves too much. He cannot well be right both in the teaching that we cannot be mistaken in supposing that material things exist, and in the doctrine that we must be mistaken in supposing that material things are colored and tangible.

d. The inadequacy of Descartes's qualitative dualism

One general difficulty with Descartes's teaching has already been pointed out: it was the first to trouble his immediate successors; and indeed it constitutes one of the fundamental issues of philosophy. This is the problem of the relation between 'a spirit' and what is called 'its body.' Descartes, it will be remembered, teaches that a spiritual substance and an extended substance are realities utterly independent of each other. And yet he teaches that bodily conditions, for instance the changes of the retina in the light, affect the mind with perception; that the mind by willing causes conditions in the pineal gland which result in the altered direction of muscular movement; and that God, who is an incorporeal being, produces matter. It is evident that such interaction between minds and bodies is quite incompatible with the asserted independence of the spiritual and the corporeal. Either a spirit and a body do not really affect each other, — but in that case God could not create corporeal objects, and objects could not cause perceptions, and the will could have no effect on bodily movements, — or there are not, after all, two entirely

¹ Descartes's explanation of the occurrence of error, in spite of God's goodness, is, briefly, the following: Finite beings have free will, and when their will occupies itself with subjects beyond the limits of the finite understanding, "it readily falls into error" ("Meditations," III., paragraphs 7-9, Open Court edition, pp. 67, 69). The main difficulty with this doctrine is the fact that Descartes fails even to recognize the problem of reconciling human freedom with God's infinite power.

independent sorts of reality. The attempt to reconcile these concepts forms the starting point of the philosophies immediately succeeding on that of Descartes, all of them strongly influenced by his teaching.¹

Other criticisms, some of them trivial or unjustified, some well founded, have been made on the system of Descartes. It is not, however, necessary to consider these criticisms of detail, seeing that there is, as has been shown, good reason to impugn the completeness or the cogency of the arguments by which Descartes seeks to demonstrate the existence of God, and with it the existence of the world outside me. Such a negative estimate of the decisiveness of Descartes's argument is entirely consistent with a deep conviction of the value of Descartes's contribution to philosophy. His most significant achievement is his vigorous teaching that the existence of a self is immediately certain and implied in every doubt; and that philosophical inference must start from this certainty. The defects of his system are due to his abandonment of this starting point and to his adoption of other foundation principles — for example, the alleged criterion of 'clear thought' and the uncritically assumed law of causality. But even Descartes's defective arguments have at least the merit of stating clearly inevitable problems of philosophy. He formulates, in enduring outlines, a qualitatively dualistic, numerically pluralistic, theistic system. He conceives the universe as made up of finite beings, either spiritual or corporeal, in subordination to an Infinite Spirit, God. He holds this doctrine neither as an unsubstantiated insight, nor as a revealed truth, but as a result of philosophic reasoning. Even when this reasoning proves unsatisfactory, Descartes does good service by so clearly stating the issues involved. Succeeding systems, as will appear, have their starting point in the attack on some one of Descartes's vulnerable positions, or in the development of the truth inherent in some one of his faulty arguments.

¹ Cf. Chapters 3 and 4, especially pp. 56 and 72.

CHAPTER III

PLURALISTIC MATERIALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HOBBES¹

“Il fût loué et blâmé sans mesure ; la plupart de ceux qui ne peuvent entendre son nom sans fremir, n’ont pas lu et ne sont pas en état de lire une page de ses ouvrages.” — DIDEROT.

I. THE MATERIALISTIC DOCTRINE OF HOBBES

MODERN philosophy, as has appeared, starts from the qualitatively dualistic standpoint natural to the stage of life at which reflection begins, but it is almost inevitably led to the correction of this dualism. The difficulty inherent in qualitatively dualistic systems such as those of Descartes and of Locke is clearly the following: Granted that reality is of two fundamentally unrelated kinds, spiritual and material, how does it happen that an individual of the one sort has an influence on an individual of the other? Why do material things affect a mind so as to produce sensations, and why does a mind induce voluntary movements in a body, if — as Descartes teaches — material substance is independent of any spiritual substance save only God? Must not we even ask how God, a spiritual substance, can create or influence material things, if spirits and material realities are totally unrelated? The difficulty thus involved in asserting on the one hand the unrelatedness, on the other the necessary relation, of minds and bodies, is the problem met by the systems of qualitative monism. These systems remove the source of the difficulty by denying the twofold nature of reality. Bodies and minds, they declare, affect each other simply

¹ Materialism, like idealism, is a form of qualitative monism. The term ‘materialism’ is used for simplicity in place of the fuller expression, ‘qualitatively monistic materialism.’

because they are inherently one in nature; the apparent unlikeness is subordinate to a real unity.

Two main forms of monism are logically possible. The monist may teach that all realities are ultimately ideal, that is, of the nature of consciousness; or he may teach that all realities are fundamentally non-ideal, not of the nature of consciousness and existing independently of any selves or any ideas. Of non-idealism also there are two forms. Ultimate and non-ideal reality may be conceived as material, that is, as partaking of a character (or of several characters) of the physical universe — it may be conceived, for example, as motion or as energy; or ultimate reality may be conceived as an unknown reality, neither ideal nor material, but manifested both in minds and in bodies. The earliest of English philosophers, Thomas Hobbes, better known for his philosophy of government than for his metaphysics, developed a striking system of materialism. In truth, his inimitably vigorous treatises, both philosophical and political, breathed a defiance of traditional beliefs in curious contrast to his personal timidity. The works of Hobbes were later published than those of Descartes, though he was by eight years the older. He conceives of all reality, bodies and so-called spirits, physical processes and ideas, as ultimately corporeal in their nature.

a. Preliminary sketch of the doctrine

"The Universe being the Aggregate," Hobbes says, "of all Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body."¹

¹ "Leviathan," Pt. III., Chapter 34, Works, edited by Molesworth, Vol. III., p. 381; Open Court edition, p. 174. (References to Hobbes, throughout the footnotes of this chapter, are made to the Molesworth edition, and also, wherever it is possible, to the volume of Selections, issued by the Open Court Company. The quotations from the "Leviathan" are, however, made from a copy of the first edition, in the possession of the writer, and follow the orthography of the original text.) The student is counselled to read, before entering upon this chapter, at least the following: "Concerning Body," Chapters 1, 6-10, 25; "Human Nature," Chapter 2; "Leviathan," Chapters 11, 31, 34 (Open Court edition, pp. 5-80, 113-134, 157-180).

Bodies, he teaches, are of two sorts, less and more subtle. The less subtle — in other words, the visible and palpable — bodies are commonly known as bodies, or external things. The more subtle bodies, on the other hand, are called spirits and are further distinguished from bodies of the more palpable sort, in that they contain within themselves the representations of other things.¹ In the words of Hobbes, "some natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others of none at all."² Descartes had taught that the universe is made up of God, finite spirits, and bodies. Hobbes accepts the words of this teaching but insists that finite spirits and infinite spirit are alike corporeal in nature. The existence of finite spirits he acknowledges without argument. For the existence of a supreme being, God, he argues much as Descartes had done: ". . . He that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one first Mover; that is, a First and an Eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God."³ But beyond the certainty that God is really somewhat, since "body is doubtlessly a real substance,"⁴ and the reasoned conviction that he is "first cause of all causes," we have, Hobbes teaches,

¹ Cf. "Human Nature," Chapter 11 (4), Works, IV., p. 60; "Leviathan," Pt. IV., Chapters 34 and 36, Works, III., pp. 382 and 672²; Open Court edition, p. 175.

² "Concerning Body," Pt. IV., Chapter 25 (1), Works, I., p. 389²; Open Court edition, p. 115.

³ "Leviathan," Pt. I., Chapter 12, Works, III., pp. 95-96; Open Court edition, p. 168. Cf. "Human Nature," Chapter 11, Works, IV., p. 59. Hobbes appeals to Scripture for confirmation of this doctrine that God is corporeal, asserting that "the Scripture favoureth them more that hold angels and spirits corporeal than them that hold the contrary" ("Human Nature," Chapter 11 (5), Works, IV., p. 62; cf. "Leviathan," Pt. III., Chapter 34, and Pt. IV., Chapter 45.)

⁴ "Answer to Bishop Bramhall," Works, IV., p. 383.

...e may not attribute to him figure or place, nor ascribe to him sight, or knowledge, or understanding, or passions, for "that were," Hobbes declares, "to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy."¹ Thus, he says, "all that will consider may know that God is, though not what he is."²

Along with natural bodies, thus enumerated, Hobbes also recognizes what he calls the commonwealth. "Two chief kinds of bodies . . . offer themselves," he says, "to such as search after their generation and properties; one whereof being the work of nature, is called a *natural body*, the other is called a *commonwealth*, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. And from these spring the two parts of philosophy, called *natural* and *civil*."³ This is not the place in which to discuss the civil philosophy of Hobbes, though he is best known by his brilliant and paradoxical political theory. As is evident from the preceding summary, his natural philosophy or metaphysics is really a system of physics, a doctrine of body. Accordingly, he names his chief metaphysical work "De Corpore (Concerning Body)," and divides it into three parts: (1) The First Grounds of Philosophy; (2) The Properties of Motions and Magnitudes; (3) Physics or the Phenomena of Nature. Under this last head, Hobbes describes both the world of external nature, of "light, heat and colours, cold, wind, ice, lightening and thunder" (to quote from his chapter headings), and also the inner world of consciousness, of "sight, sound, odour, savour, and touch." His whole philosophy is simply a development of the teaching which he summarizes in these words, "the world (I mean the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body; . . . and that which is not body is no part of the universe."⁴

¹ "Leviathan," Pt. II., Chapter 31, Works, III, p. 352; Open Court edition, p. 173.

² "Human Nature," Chapter 11 (2), *loc. cit.*

³ "Concerning Body," Pt. I., Chapter 1 (9), Works, I., p. 11; Open Court edition, p. 14.

⁴ "Leviathan" Pt. IV Chapter 46. Works, III., p. 672².

b. The doctrine of Hobbes concerning the nature of bodies

This preliminary sketch of the doctrine of Hobbes must be supplemented by a closer study of his conception of body. He defines body as "that which having no dependance upon our thought is coincident or co-extended with some part of space."¹ This definition assigns to body two characteristics: (1) independence of thought, and (2) spatialness or extension. A consideration of the first of these characters reveals a certain ambiguity in Hobbes's expression. As it stands, the statement that body is independent of thought implies the dualistic doctrine that thought as well as body has reality. But the reiterated statements of Hobbes, that spirit is a form of body, forbid this view and justify us in the conclusion that Hobbes means by body that which is ultimately non-consciousness, not-ideal.

The second and more positive character of body is its coincidence with some part of space. Space, which "is the same thing," Hobbes says, with extension or magnitude, is here to be understood as 'real space.'² It does not "depend upon our cogitation"; it is a property or 'accident' or 'faculty' of body.³ Here again, Hobbes's doctrine of body is in harmony with that of Descartes.

A third and once more a positive character of body is often recognized by Hobbes, though not included in the definition just quoted. This is motion, which he defines as "a continual relinquishing of one place and acquiring of another."⁴ Thus conceived, motion seems to be a complex attribute of

¹ "Concerning Body," Pt. I., Chapter 8 (1), Works, I., p. 102; Open Court edition, p. 53.

² "Concerning Body," Chapter 8 (4), Works, I., p. 105²; Open Court edition, p. 55².

³ *Ibid.*, Pt. II., Chapter 8 (2), Works I., p. 103; Open Court edition, pp. 53-54. Cf. "Leviathan," Pt. III., Chapter 34, paragraph 2, Works, III., p. 38, Open Court edition, p. 174².

⁴ *Ibid.*, Chapter 8 (10), Works, I., p. 109; Open Court edition, p. 59.

body, consisting of spatial position and temporal succession. Hobbes, however, though he often implies that motion is subordinate to extension, more often regards it as an attribute of body coördinate with spatialness: "Motion and Magnitude," he says, "are the most common accidents of bodies."¹ He is at pains to emphasize also two subsidiary theories concerning motion, both following from the doctrine that reality is corporeal. The first is the teaching that all forms of change are motion. "Mutation," he says, "can be nothing else but motion of the parts of that body which is changed."² This is obviously true on Hobbes's principles. For if all reality is body, and if body is spatial, then the only change possible certainly is change of place, that is, motion.³ The second of the corollaries of his materialistic doctrine concerns the cause of motion. Hobbes teaches that "there can be no cause of motion except in a body contiguous and moved."⁴ The proof which he offers for this teaching that motion must be caused by the impact of a moving body is, in his own words, the following: "a cause is such that being supposed to be present it cannot be conceived but that the effect will follow." But if a body be untouched by any other and "if it be supposed to be now at rest, we may conceive it will continue so till it be touched by some other body. . . . And in like manner seeing we may conceive that whatsoever is at rest will still be at rest, though it be touched by some other body, except that other body be moved, therefore in a contiguous body which is at rest there can be no cause of motion."

¹ "Concerning Body," Pt. III., Chapter 15 (1), Works, I., p. 203; Open Court edition, p. 95. Cf. the title of Pt. III., "Proportions of Motions and Magnitudes."

² *Ibid.*, Pt. II., Chapter 9 (9), Works, I., p. 126; Open Court edition, p. 75². Cf. Pt. IV., Chapter 25 (2).

³ Hobbes argues this doctrine from the proposition that motion is the cause of change (cf. below). But this argument involves the improved assumption of the necessary likeness of cause and effect (cf. above, Chapter 2, p. 48).

⁴ *Ibid.*, Pt. II., Chapter 9 (7), Works, I., p. 124; Open Court edition, p. 73².

It is needless to discuss in further detail Hobbes's doctrine of the nature of reality. His philosophy becomes, indeed, a mixture of geometry and mechanics. He discusses "Motion Accelerated and Uniform," "The Figures Deficient," "The Equation of Strait Lines with the Crooked Lines of Parabolas," "Angles of Incidence and Reflection," "The Dimension of a Circle," "Circular Motion," "The Centre of Equiponderation," "Refraction and Reflection."¹ On most of these subjects his views are — to say the least — now antiquated, and he was never other than an amateur in mathematics;² but his introduction of these topics is entirely consistent. For if "every part of the universe is body," the mathematical laws of the physical world are indeed the principles of all reality.

c. The argument of Hobbes

From this outline of the system of Hobbes it is necessary now to turn to a consideration of the arguments by which he reaches his conclusions. It is fair to say that he himself lays little stress on these arguments, and that for the most part he asserts and makes plausible, instead of arguing, his materialistic teaching. In the first place Hobbes reduces all qualities of the external world to extension and motion. This he achieves by arguing for the 'phantastical' character of the remaining qualities. (1) ~~It is universally agreed,~~ Hobbes first points out, that certain 'images' (by which he means sense-ideas), for example, the percept of an oar as bent in a stream, and the hearing of an echo — are 'merely phantastical,' that is, that no 'real' objects correspond to these images. But this admission throws doubt on the existence of any 'real' shape, or color, or sound corresponding to the consciousness of these qualities. Why should there be a 'real' oar corresponding to one's per-

¹ These are titles, or part-titles, of chapters in "Concerning Body," Pt. III.

² Cf. G. C. Robertson, "Hobbes," pp. 167 *seq.*; as also the comment on "Concerning Body," Open Court edition, p. xix.

cept of a straight oar, if there is no 'real' oar corresponding to one's percept of the oar as bent? Or why should there be a 'real' sound which tallies with the hearing of a shout and no 'real' sound parallel with the equally clear hearing of the echo?¹ (2) It is certain, Hobbes also argues, that the same object produces different ideas in different people. For instance, "it is apparent enough," he says, "that the smell and taste of the same thing are not the same to every man." But the smell and taste which vary with every observer "are not," Hobbes says, "in the thing smelt and tasted but in the men."² (3) A consciousness of light, Hobbes proceeds, may be produced not by any external object but by direct stimulation of the end-organ.³ In this case it is clearly wrong to infer from the 'apparition of light' the existence of any external light. All that can rightly be inferred is the occurrence of motion in the organ.⁴

For Hobbes, as for Descartes, the implication of all these facts is that "the things that really are in the world without us are . . . motions." But Hobbes goes further than Descartes and argues that consciousness, because caused by motion, is itself a form of motion. Consciousness, Hobbes points out, is the inevitable consequent of brain and nerve excitations; and these in turn follow upon motions in the external object. For example, "it is evident," he says, "that fire worketh by motion. . . . And further, that that motion whereby the fire worketh, is *dilation* and *contrac-*

¹ "Human Nature," Chapter 2 (5), Works, IV., p. 4; Open Court edition, p. 158.

² "Human Nature," Chapter 2 (9), Works, IV., p. 6; Open Court edition, p. 161. Berkeley later turned this doctrine to idealistic use. (Cf. Chap. IV.)

³ "Human Nature," Chapter 2 (7), Works, IV., p. 5; Open Court edition, p. 159.

⁴ In the corresponding paragraph of the earlier editions of this book I treated the three considerations here brought forward as arguments for the untrustworthiness of consciousness, and thus indirect arguments for the ultimate reality of body. I have come to the conclusion that such an interpretation is forced.

tion of itself alternately. . . . From such motion in the fire must needs arise a rejection or casting from itself of that part of the medium which is contiguous to it whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back another to the very eye; and in the same manner the exterior part of the eye presseth the interior . . . and therefore the motion is still continued thereby into the brain. . . . And thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here described. . . ."¹ It follows, Hobbes believes, that operations of the mind, or as he calls them, "*conceptions and apparitions* are nothing really but motion in some internal substance of the head; which motion *not stopping there* but proceeding to the heart must there either *help* or *hinder* the motion which is called *vital*; when it *helpeth* it is called *delight* . . . which is nothing really but motion about the heart as conception is nothing but motion in the head . . .; but when such motion . . . hindereth the vital motion then it is called *pain*."² This is the familiar argument which has given all materialistic theories their force. Consciousness is observed to follow, and, in some sense of the word, to depend, on physical processes, notably those of the brain, and is, therefore, easily conceived as itself a form of physical process, a function of the brain.³

II. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE DOCTRINE OF HOBBS

The attempt to estimate the system and the arguments of Hobbes, thus outlined, must follow on this exposition. To

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chapter 2 (8), Works, IV., p. 6; Open Court edition, p. 160.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter 7 (1), p. 31. Cf. "Concerning Body," Pt. IV., Chapter 25 (12), Works, I., p. 406²; Open Court edition, p. 131¹; also "Leviathan," Pt. I., Chapter 1, Works, III., p. 2: "All which qualities called *Sensible* are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by the which it presseth our organs. . . . Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion)."

³ Cf., for fuller statement and discussion of this argument, Chapter 5, p. 132 *seq.*

students of the history of philosophy it is evident that Hobbes reduces consciousness to motion in essentially the fashion in which, in succeeding centuries, Holbach and Vogt and Haeckel have argued that mind is a function of matter. In every form of his argument Hobbes *assumes* the ultimately material nature of that 'motion' in the external object which, when 'continued into the brain' and 'to the heart' becomes the antecedent condition of consciousness; and he assumes also the inevitable likeness of effect to cause. He argues in other words, that because motion causes consciousness, therefore consciousness is motion. To this conclusion several objections may be raised. In the first place, Hobbes does not prove, any more than Descartes had proved,¹ that effect and cause must resemble each other. Everyday observation shows us many exceptions to the rule. Even therefore if one grant that consciousness is caused by motion, it does not follow that Hobbes is right in his constant assertions that consciousness is a form of motion.²

From this indication that Hobbes does not prove his point we may go a step farther. When he says that a given consciousness — conception, or pleasure, or pain — is 'nothing really but motion,' he must mean that this consciousness is a kind of motion. Now the final authority on the nature of consciousness is consciousness itself; in other words, by introspection only may one know what consciousness is.³ But introspection of any given consciousness will assure any one that it is not identical with the brain excitation which is its physical correlate. The sensation of red may be caused or accompanied by 'motion and agitation' of the brain, but the sensation of red, as directly known by us, is not identical with the brain excitation which occasions it. One could not, for instance, replace the term 'color sensation' by the term

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 48 *seq.*

² "Human Nature," Chapter 8 (1), Works, IV., p. 34.

³ Cf. Hobbes's virtual admission of this, *op. cit.*, Chapter 1 (2), Works, IV., p. 1.

'occipital lobe excitation,' as would be possible if the two terms stood for an identical reality.

A final objection of an utterly different sort may now be urged against the materialism of Hobbes.¹ Even if one granted the validity of his arguments, his doctrine would refute itself, for body, conceived as he conceives it as the 'space-filling' or 'moving,' turns out to be a mere nothing or else itself a form of consciousness. This objection must be made good by a careful reëxamination of his teaching about body, or matter.

Body, it will be recalled, is conceived by Hobbes as (1) independent, as (2) spatial, and as (3) possessed of motion. The first of these is obviously a negative character. Spatialness, on the other hand, has the appearance of a positive attribute of body. But space (magnitude) is defined by Hobbes as the 'peculiar accident of every body';² and accident is defined as 'that faculty of any body by which it works in us a conception of itself';³ so that real space, according to Hobbes, is no more than this: cause of the conception of space. In other words, space is defined in terms of consciousness. Our only clue to the nature of real space is then our acquaintance with the idea of space. But such a view endows consciousness with a more certain and primary reality than that of body; and this conception, though plainly implied by the definitions just quoted, is of course at utter variance with the materialistic doctrine of Hobbes: the consciousness or idea of anything is indeed, on his view of it, the mere phantasm or appearance of body — less real, not more real, than body. Combining the conclusions of Hobbes himself, we have then the following curious result: —

The peculiar attribute of body is space.

¹ The untrained student is advised to omit the remainder of this section in his first reading of the chapter.

² "Concerning Body," Pt. II., Chapter 8 (5), Works, I., p. 105³; Open Court edition, p. 56.

³ *Ibid.*, Chapter 8 (2), Works, I., p. 103; Open Court edition, p. 54.

Space can be defined only as cause of the consciousness of space.

The consciousness of space is the effect of space, it has only superficial reality of its own.

In other words: x is the cause of y , and y is the effect of x , and this is all that is true of either of them.

The statement that Hobbes has no positive conception of body is justified, therefore, so far as the independence and the spatialness of body are concerned. How, then, does it fare with the third attribute, motion? Hobbes's definition of motion has been quoted, 'the continual relinquishing of one place and acquiring of another.' He conceives motion, in other words, as succession of places (that is of spatial modifications). This space-factor of the conception need not be further considered, for it has just been shown that, on the principles of Hobbes himself, space is either mere consciousness (a conclusion which Hobbes denies), or that it is the unknown cause of consciousness. The character which, added to spatial position, gives motion is succession. How then does Hobbes define succession? Has it that positive character which we are seeking, in order to give positive meaning to body? The words of Hobbes are these: "As a body leaves a phantasm of its magnitude in the mind, so also a moved body leaves a phantasm of its motion namely an idea of that body passing out of one space into another by continual succession. And this idea, or phantasm, is that . . . which I call *Time*."¹ Succession is thus defined by Hobbes as the reality which corresponds to the idea, time. As space was found to be the cause of the idea of space, so succession becomes that-whose-idea-is-time. And in the case of succession, as in that of space, the idea seems to be more important than the real succession, seeing that this latter virtually is defined in terms of the idea. Such a conclusion again runs counter to Hobbes's formal doctrine, and we are forced to decide that his concep-

¹ "Concerning Body," Chapter 7 (3), Works, I., p. 94²; Open Court edition, p. 46.

tion of succession — that character which, added to spatialness (place), gives motion — is entirely vague. The results of the teaching of Hobbes about motion may then be stated somewhat as follows: —

\ An essential attribute of body is motion.

Motion is a complex of spatial positions in a succession.

Succession can be defined only as 'cause of the idea of succession (time)'; and space only as cause of the idea of space.

Yet ideas of spatial position and of succession have no character except that of being effects of space and of succession.

There is no escape for Hobbes from the inconsistency of insisting that bodies only, and not ideas, have reality, and at the same time of conceiving body only as it is related to ideas. The difficulty could, to be sure, be avoided by admitting that ideas are realities and not mere appearances of something else. Often, indeed, Hobbes seems almost to embrace this view. He defines time — a most obstinate reality, it would seem — as an idea; he makes the 'impossibility of conceiving the opposite' a test of causality; thus setting up consciousness, the so-called phantasm, as test of physical causality; he calls place a 'phantasm' which is 'nothing out of the mind'; and he defines not only space, succession, and motion, but infinity, line, surface, and the like, in terms which presuppose the existence of consciousness. "Everything," he says, "is FINITE or INFINITE according as we imagine or do not imagine it *limited* or *terminated* every way."¹ "If a body which is moved be considered as long, and be supposed to be so moved, as that all the several parts of it be understood to make several lines, then the way of every part of that body is called *breadth*."² From these definitions, it would appear that our imagining and considering and understanding are essential features of reality, not mere unreal appearances.³

¹ "Concerning Body," Chapter 7 (11), Works, I., p. 98³; Open Court edition, p. 50¹.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter 8 (12), Works, I., p. 111; Open Court edition, p. 61.

³ The essential idealism of Hobbes's view of body is still further evident

Hobbes never realizes the significance of these idealistic implications of his teaching; he never yields the view that spirit is a subtle and invisible body and that consciousness is a bodily excitation; he never fails to conceive the universe as a totality of material things. And in spite of the objections to his system, he has certainly achieved two results: He has formulated, in the first place, a materialism more complete than any since the days of Demokritos — a materialism which embraces man, society, and God. He has suggested, in the second place, the argument which must be squarely met by all opponents of materialistic systems: the argument, still urged by materialists of our own day, that consciousness, because continuous with the unbroken succession of so-called physical and physiological phenomena, is itself a function of the body.

The main influence which Hobbes exerted was not, it must be confessed, upon strictly metaphysical thought. He is best known by the teaching of his ethics and his politics: the doctrine that all men are essentially selfish and that morality and government alike arise only after experience has shown that 'each man for himself' runs greater risks and gains less satisfaction than through coöperation. The ethical systems of Cudworth, Cumberland, and Shaftesbury — to name no others — are reactions against this teaching, and that of Mandeville was a variation upon it. Yet in spite of the predominance of practical philosophy among British thinkers, and in spite of the uncritical condemnation of Hobbes's metaphysics along with his loudly decried ethics and politics, his materialistic teaching none the less reappears. John Toland, best known for his 'deistical writings,' — in other

from the fact that in the earlier paragraphs of Chapter 7 (on "Place and Time") he uses the expression 'space,' without the limiting prefix, 'imaginary,' to refer to the idea or phantasm. Cf. Chapter 7 (2), Works, p. 94; Open Court edition, p. 45, where he defines 'space' thus: "space is the phantasm of a thing existing without the mind simply."

words for his defence of reasoned as contrasted with revealed religion,—teaches, as Hobbes had taught, that all reality is corporeal, “that thought is the function of the brain as taste of the tongue”;¹ and like Hobbes he lays stress on the essential activity of matter. To such a materialistic conclusion Harteley tends in his “Observations on Man,” arguing that soul no less than light may be material and that the traces or vibrations in the brain *are* our ideas. And later still Joseph Priestley asserts unequivocally the materiality of the soul and of God, using the arguments already outlined and insisting also on the difficulties of Cartesian dualism. All these British materialists, including Hobbes himself, are convinced of the existence of God,² and are hereby sharply contrasted with the French materialists of the eighteenth century; for these believe that God is logically *de trop* in a world which is purely material. La Mettrie, rejecting all the spiritualistic side of Descartes’s doctrine, reasons from the analogy of Descartes’s automaton animal body to the conclusion that man also is a mechanism, *l’homme machine*, as he expresses it in the title of his most important book. And Holbach and Cabanis with equal vigor insist that thought is a function of the brain and that God is superfluous in a world ruled by mechanical law. But even more important than the reassertion of materialism is the reaction upon it; to the consideration of this we must now turn.

¹ “Pantheisticon,” p. 15 (1710).

² Hobbes, indeed, and Toland (in his earlier writings) are theists, not mere deists, that is, they admit the authority of revelation, though they insist on interpreting it in accordance with reason.

CHAPTER IV

PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNIZ¹

"The great idealist who did not find individuality at all incompatible with universality." — WILLIAM WALLACE.

THE philosophy of Hobbes was a reaction against that dualistic pluralism of the Middle Ages which assumed the existence of God, finite spirits, and material bodies. Descartes had, it is true, challenged these doctrines, but he had too uncritically reinstated them all, by his teaching that the certain existence of myself implies the existence of a perfect God; and that God, because perfect, is incapable of deceiving us in our clear conviction that the world outside us exists. In spite of Hobbes, Cartesianism (the philosophy of Descartes) reigned supreme throughout the seventeenth century; even the philosophers who differed from Descartes built up their philosophy on his principles. Most important of these systems, supplementing and correcting that of Descartes, are the teachings of Geulinx and Malebranche. Descartes, it will be remembered, inconsistently asserts both the utter unrelatedness and, on the other hand, the interrelation of a spirit with a body. Geulinx seeks to avoid this inconsistency by his teaching that finite spirit and finite body do not really affect each other, but that God works changes in a given

¹ The full description of this system would be, by the title, numerically pluralistic, qualitatively monistic, and idealistic spiritualism. But spiritualism is a form of idealism, as idealism of monism, hence these terms are superfluous; and it has been agreed to imply the terms 'numerical' and 'qualitative' by the order of the words which they are meant to qualify.

It should be noted that the word 'spirit' and its derivative adjectives, especially current in the time of Leibniz and of Berkeley, are used throughout this book as synonyms for the terms 'self,' 'person,' or 'I,' and the corresponding adjective, 'personal.'

spirit on the occasion of changes in the corresponding body, and changes in a body to correspond with the changes in a particular spirit. Thus, he teaches, God is the real cause of all changes, spiritual and bodily, and the interaction of finite spirit and finite body is only apparent. Similarly Malebranche denies the activity alike of finite minds and of finite bodies, teaching that God is the only ground of activity and that we perceive, not things external to us, but the ideas of these same things in the mind of God. Unquestionably both these doctrines meet the particular difficulty in Descartes's teaching which they were framed to correct. They are powerless, however, against at least two other objections to qualitative dualism. In the first place, both Geulinx and Malebranche admit the existence of corporeal bodies without offering any sufficient reason or argument for their being; whereas it may well be argued that if, as they teach, God alone causes our perceptions, we need infer no objects corresponding with these perceptions.¹ And, in the second place, neither doctrine overcomes the difficulty of the relation of God to matter, since, if he be pure spirit, in Descartes's sense, it is difficult to understand how he created matter or how he can even have ideas of matter.

Hobbes, as we know, has another solution of the difficulty which Geulinx and Malebranche, without full success, have tried to meet. The relation between bodies and spirits is, according to his teaching, readily explained, since spirits are ultimately bodily in nature. But this teaching, though it would indeed meet the difficulty, has been found to be in itself objectionable. For Hobbes not only does not base the doctrine on valid argument, but when he tries to define body, he conceives it always in terms which apply solely to spirit. His philosophy, therefore, though an uncompromising assertion of materialism, really is an implicit argument for idealism — the doctrine that there is but one kind of reality, the imma-

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 464.

terial. Such a doctrine, no less than materialism, evidently meets the difficulty of the dualistic, two-substance doctrine.

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, first of the great German philosophers, adopts this idealistic solution of the problem involved in René Descartes's dualism.¹ In other words, Leibniz teaches that there is fundamentally but one sort of reality, the spiritual, or, as he would say, the soul-like. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to outline the argument by which Leibniz reaches his conclusion; and second, to summarize his doctrine in its different applications. These aims, however, are particularly difficult of attainment. For Leibniz never wrote a complete and systematic treatise on philosophy. In truth, philosophy was but one of his many intellectual interests. He was mathematician, jurist, and historian, as well as metaphysical thinker. More than this, he lived always the active life of the diplomatist and courtier, never the life of the academic or professional philosopher. He spent nearly ten years, after leaving the university, in the service of the elector of Mainz and in diplomatic journeys; and in 1676, when he was but thirty years old, he entered on his long service to the House of Hanover. So it came about that he was mainly occupied with practical, rather than with speculative, concerns; and his philosophical works were not written with the purpose of setting forth consecutively and logically the principles of his system, but for the most part each with some special purpose: to estimate some recent book, to outline the system for the use of a friend, to meet some special difficulty, or to answer some definite criticism. Only two of Leibniz's philosophical works — a thesis written during his university days, and the "Theodicy," written for the Princess Sophie-Charlotte, appeared, during his life, in book form. For the most part, therefore, his philo-

¹ It is perhaps best for the beginner in philosophy to omit this chapter on the first reading of the book. The immaterialism of Leibniz is later presented in Berkeley's philosophy, the subject of the next chapter, and Berkeley's writings are simpler and clearer, if less profound, than those of Leibniz.

sophical writing consisted of his correspondence, still largely unpublished, and of papers contributed to the *Acta Eruditorum* and to other learned journals of his day. To derive from these unsystematic, occasional writings a clear, consistent, and comprehensive account of Leibniz's philosophy is a task of greatest hazard and difficulty. Only, indeed, by verifying and supplementing one statement by many others, and by allowing for the particular attitude of the person for whom Leibniz was writing, is it possible to frame any such statement at all.¹

I. THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNIZ

The universe, that is, the all-of-reality, consists, in Leibniz's view, of an indefinite number of 'monads,' or soul-like substances dominated by one supreme monad, God. It will be convenient to expound this doctrine, at first without any save incidental criticism. This exposition will fall under two main heads: (a) the argument for the doctrine that the universe consists of immaterial and distinct realities, or monads; (b) the teaching about the nature and the classes of the monads. It will be followed by a critical estimate of the system.

¹ Cf. Appendix, pp. 483-4. The footnotes of this chapter indicate the sources on which it is mainly based. The student is advised to read (1) "The Discourse on Metaphysics," (2) "Letters to Arnaud," especially VI., IX., XI., and XIII. (both works obtainable in translation in a volume published by the Open Court Company), (3) "Monadology," (4) "The New System." Very useful, also, are (5) "Principles of Nature and Grace" and (6) the Introduction to the "New Essays." The section just cited of the Appendix indicates the different editions and translations in which these works may be found. When the references of the chapter are to numbered sections or paragraphs, *e.g.* of the "Discourse" or of the "Monadology," the pages of special editions are not given. Otherwise references are regularly to the paging of the Gerhardt edition, and occasionally to some one of the translations.

a. The argument for the doctrine that the universe consists of immaterial monads

Leibniz accepts without question Descartes's doctrine that I myself and other spirits, or souls, exist.¹ Thus, the fundamental problem of philosophy is for him the following: is the spiritual the only sort of reality or do ultimately — non-spiritual realities also exist? (Such realities, according to Leibniz, would be corporeal or bodily; he does not take into account the later conception of a kind of reality neither spiritual or corporeal, but fundamental to both.²) Now the attributes, according to Descartes and Hobbes, of corporeal reality are extension, or figure, and motion.³ The problem from which Leibniz starts reduces itself therefore to this: are figure and motion ultimately real? This question he answers in the negative. Every extension is, in the first place, he points out, infinitely divisible. There is no surface so small that it is not abstractly possible to break it up, in conception, into smaller surfaces. But endlessness, Leibniz holds,⁴ is an irrational conception, therefore that which is by nature endlessly divisible cannot be an ultimate reality. "It is impossible," he says,⁵ "to find the principles of a true unity in matter alone . . . since matter is only a collection or mass of parts to infinity." For, as he elsewhere says, "a continuum is not only divisible to infinity, but every particle of matter is actually divided into other parts different among themselves. . . . And since this could always be continued,

¹ The terms 'spirit,' 'soul,' 'mind,' 'self,' 'person,' 'I,' — with the adjectives corresponding to many of these expressions, — are used by Descartes and by Leibniz, and in general by the writer of this book, as synonyms.

² For discussion, cf. *infra*, Chapter 5, pp. 116 *seq.*; Chapter 6, pp. 179 *seq.*; Chapter 11, pp. 409 *seq.*

³ Of course Descartes regards motion as a form of extension.

⁴ "Material atoms are contrary to reason" ("New System," § 11). Cf. discussion of Descartes's arguments for God's existence, *supra*, pp. 50 *seq.*

⁵ "New System," § 3, cf. § 11; also, "Letters to Arnaud," XVI., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 97; XVII., Open Court edition, pp. 191-192.

we should never reach anything of which we could say, here is a real being.”¹ In other words, since by ‘ultimate’ is meant a further irreducible reality, that which is endlessly divisible cannot be ultimate.

It is even more obvious that motion is not an ultimate, a self-dependent, sort of reality. “Motion,” Leibniz says, “if we regard only its exact and formal meaning, that is, change of place, is not something entirely real, and when several bodies change their places reciprocally, it is not possible to determine by considering the bodies alone to which among them movement or repose is to be attributed.”² Evidently, that which is always relative to something else is not ultimately real.

As merely extended or moving, non-spiritual, or corporeal, things are not, Leibniz teaches, ultimately real. But it is possible, he suggests, to conceive of these non-spiritual things, not as static, but as dynamic realities, that is, as forces. “Motion,” he says, “that is, change of place, is not something entirely real. . . . But the force or the proximate cause of these changes is something more real.”³

Motion and extension are thus conceived as manifestations or expressions of an underlying force. According to this view, the universe would be made up not of spiritual realities together with non-spiritual, extended, and moving things but of spiritual realities together with non-spiritual forces. But when he seriously asks himself the question, ‘What is force?’ Leibniz finds that he has no definite conception of force except as spiritual. The thought of anything as a force is a conception of it as in some sense like a willing, striving,

¹ Cf. “Entretien de Philarète et d’Ariste,” Gerhardt edition, Vol. VI., P. 579.

² “Discourse on Metaphysics” (Gerhardt edition, Vol. IV., Open Court edition), Prop. XVIII. Cf. *ibid.*, XVII., which by showing that the motion is not always constant makes for the doctrine of the relativity and the ultimate unreality of matter.

³ “Discourse,” XVIII¹. Here, it should be noted, reality or substance is treated as a cause of phenomena.

working self. Thus, from the conviction that the nature of real unities "consists in force, it follows," Leibniz says, "that it would be necessary to conceive them in imitation of the notion which we have of souls."¹

Leibniz's result is the following: He began by assuming the existence of non-spiritual realities — bodies. He discovers that these alleged non-spiritual things are in their ultimate nature spiritual. He finds confirmation of this conclusion in Descartes's doctrine about the non-spatial qualities of so-called corporeal things. Descartes had admitted that hardness, color, sound, and the rest are not the qualities of ultimately real and non-spiritual things, but themselves the modifications or experiences of conscious minds; on the other hand, he had insisted that extension is the real attribute of non-spiritual objects. Leibniz argues that extension and motion are on a par with the other qualities of supposedly non-spiritual things, and that if color and the rest are modifications of spirit, so, also, are size and motion. "Size and motion," he says, ". . . are phenomena like colors and sounds . . . although they involve a more distinct knowledge."² Leibniz does not elaborate this teaching, but his meaning is clear. All that I know about color, sound, and odor, and similarly all that I know of extension and motion, I know through perception. I describe my perception of a supposedly non-spiritual thing in — let us say — the assertion, "I perceive a round, fragrant, red apple." But if the assertion be challenged,—if some one else assert that no round, red, and fragrant object is here, — then I find myself able to say with assurance only this, that I am conscious in definite ways which I describe as color, smell, and form consciousness. In other words, that which is indisputably real in the thing turns out to be a complex

¹ "New System," § 3.

² "Letters to Arnaud," XXII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 118²; XXII., Open Court edition, p. 222. Berkeley later reaches this conclusion, arguing more satisfactorily and in more detail. Cf. *infra*, pp. 119 *seq.*

modification of consciousness. And it is utterly arbitrary to hold with Descartes that, whereas the redness and the fragrance are modifications of spirit, the roundness is a non-spiritual character. "He who will meditate," Leibniz says, "upon the nature of substance¹ . . . will find that the whole nature of bodies is not exhausted in their extension, that is to say in their size, figure, and motion, but that we must recognize something which corresponds to soul, something which is commonly called substantial form."² "The essence of the body," he writes a little later in a letter to Arnaud,³ "cannot consist in extension, and we must necessarily conceive of something which is called substantial form." How Leibniz conceives this 'substantial form' is clearly shown in another letter. "Substantial unity," he says, "calls for a thoroughly indivisible being, naturally indestructible. . . . This characteristic cannot be found either in forms or motions, both of which involve something imaginary. . . . It can be found, however, in a soul or a substantial form, such as is the one called the I. These latter are the only thoroughly real beings."⁴

So Leibniz reaches the conclusion that the alleged non-spiritual, or corporeal, realities are in the last analysis spiritual. This he argues on the ground that a corporeal reality must be conceived either as extended and moving or as a force; that an extension because endlessly divisible and a motion because always relative are not ultimate; that extensions and motions accordingly are to be conceived as effects or expressions of forces; finally that a force is incon-

¹ Leibniz uses the terms 'substance' or 'substantial form' for what I have called the 'fundamental' or the 'ultimate' reality. The expression substantial form is a conscious paraphrase of the Platonic *εἶδος*, and refers to the substance realized-as-ideal, that is, to the monad.

² "Discourse," XII¹.

³ Letter IX., Open Court edition, p. 135. Cf. Letter XIII., *ibid.*, p. 154².

⁴ Letter XIV., Open Court edition, p. 161. Cf. "Système Nouveau (New System)," § 11, "Il y a une véritable unité, qui répond à ce qu'on appelle moi en nous."

ceivable except as spirit. He confirms the doctrine by the observation that our only unchallenged assertions about extensions and motions — as about colors and hardnesses — concern these qualities conceived as modifications of spirit.

The argument to show that ultimate reality is, all of it, spiritual should be followed by an attempt to prove the second of Leibniz's fundamental doctrines, the manifoldness, or numerical plurality, of the universe. Leibniz, however, never argues, he merely assumes, this fundamental multiplicity. It seems to him too obvious to need argument. Evidently, he holds, the universe, whatever its constitution, is composed of many realities.

b. Leibniz's doctrine of the classes of monads and of their nature

There are, Leibniz teaches, four main forms of monad, or soul-like reality. These are, the supreme monad, God, and, dependent on him, three types of finite monad: the rational souls; the sentient but irrational monads; the bare or simple monads, organic bodies and inorganic masses.¹

1. The supreme monad, God

By God, the supreme monad, Leibniz means, as Descartes had meant, an infinite, that is, utterly perfect spirit — a Person of absolute power, wisdom, and goodness. This is, of course, the traditional conception of God which Leibniz takes over from his predecessors. His arguments for God's existence closely resemble Descartes's, though Leibniz himself lays undue stress on certain points of difference. These arguments will be later discussed in more detail.

¹ Cf. "Monadology," 19-29; "Letter to R. C. Wagner," Gerhardt edition, Vol. VII., p. 528; "Principles of Nature and Grace," 4.

Fundamentally, they are these: (1) From the possibility of the conception of an absolutely perfect being follows the existence of this being. (2) From the fact that concrete things and abstract truths exist, it follows that there must be a God, a perfect being, as their source; else there would be no sufficient reason of their existence.

The supposed demonstration of God's existence has important consequences in Leibniz's system. For from God's perfection it follows both that the world of his creation is the best possible world, and also that all the finite monads must depend utterly on God. Leibniz's view of the nature of God will thus become more evident in the course of the discussion which follows, first of the nature of rational, of merely sentient, and of simple monads; and second, of their relations to God and to each other.

2. *The finite¹ monads*

(a) *The characters common to all finite monads*

By monad, Leibniz means, as has appeared, a soul-like reality — that is, a reality of the nature of the I. In my knowledge of myself, I have therefore, Leibniz teaches, the key to all reality. Accordingly, his method of discovering the characters of monads is mainly that of discovering the characters of the self. "In order to determine the concept of an individual substance,² it is good," he says, "to consult the concept which I have of myself."³ The characters which Leibniz attributes to all limited realities — or, in his terms, to 'individual substances,' 'monads,' — are the following: (1) dependence on the supreme monad, God; (2) activity; (3) separateness or isolation; (4) the unification of its own

¹ Cf. *supra*, note on p. 34.

² Cf. footnote on p. 78.

³ "Letters to Arnaud," VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 45²; Open Court edition, p. 116².

experiences; (5) the character of expressing the universe; (6) the character of being predetermined by God to harmony with other monads.

(1) *Every monad depends on God*

Every monad is, in the first place, Leibniz teaches, in conformity with his doctrine of God's perfect power, dependent on God, the supreme monad, as its creator. Creation is expressly likened to the production of thought; the finite monad proceeds from God 'by a kind of emanation'; he produces it "just as we produce thoughts." There are many individuals, simply because God "regards all aspects of the universe in all possible manners" . . . and "the result of each view of the universe as seen from a different position is a substance."¹

(2) *Every monad is active*

Leibniz always asserts, and seldom argues, the activity of the monads. "Substance," he says at the very beginning of the "Principles of Nature and Grace," one of the completest summaries of his teaching, "is a being capable of action." But though Leibniz does not supply a definition of activity or an argument for it, most of his readers will agree with him in assigning to the rational monad, the myself, an aspect of spontaneity, independence, or assertiveness which may well be called activity. And empirical observation makes it fairly easy to transfer, in imagination, to corporeal objects the activity originally realized as characteristic of a self. Leibniz's teaching is thus the common doctrine that our notion of activity is gained wholly by observation of ourselves; that in attributing activity to inanimate objects we

¹ "Discourse," XIV¹.; cf. XXXII. Cf. also, "Ultimate Origination of Things," paragraph 8, Gerhardt edition, Vol. VII., p. 302.

really endow them with the sort of activity which we perceive in ourselves; and that, in fact, there is no activity save soul activity.¹

(3) *Every monad is absolutely separate from every other*

The doctrine that "every individual substance is . . . a world apart, independent of everything else excepting God"² is reiterated in each one of Leibniz's formulations of his doctrine: "A particular substance," he says, in that earliest of his mature statements of doctrine, the "Discourse on Metaphysics," "never acts upon another particular substance nor is it acted on by it."³ "It is not possible," he writes, nearly ten years later, ". . . that any true substance should receive anything from without."⁴ "There is no way," he says, in one of the very latest of his philosophical works, "of explaining how a monad may be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing; . . . the monads have no windows by which anything may come in or go out."⁵

It will be admitted that introspection seems to testify to the fact that every self is isolated. Our

". . . spirits live in awful singleness,
Each in its self-formed sphere of light or gloom;"

I am myself, no one else, a unique self; in being myself I am what nobody else is or can be. I am conscious, indeed,

¹ For criticism, cf. summary of Hume's doctrine; for a contemporary re-statement of the doctrine, cf. Renouvier, "Le personnalisme," Chapter III., p. 11.

² "Letters to Arnaud," IX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 57; Open Court edition, p. 133.

³ "Discourse," XIV².

⁴ "New System" (1695), § 14.

⁵ "Monadology" (1714), § 7. This last quotation introduces the name by which Leibniz finally characterized his ultimate realities, which he had begun by calling 'substantial forms.' In calling them monads—that is, singles or units—he of course laid special stress on their uniqueness, their separateness, their incapacity of being directly influenced by anything outside themselves.

of a chasm separating me from all other selves; and nothing can affect me except what belongs to me or is a part of me. It appears, in truth, as Leibniz insists, that "nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions, and all our thoughts and perceptions are but the consequence, contingent it is true, of our precedent thoughts and perceptions, in such a way that were I able to consider directly all that happens or appears to me at the present time, I should be able to see all that will happen to me or that will ever appear to me. This future will not fail me, and will surely appear to me even if all that which is outside me were destroyed, save only that God and myself were left."¹

Besides asserting, on the basis of his knowledge of the 'myself,' the separateness and uniqueness of the monads, Leibniz argues for this character on the ground of the relation of the monads to God. Since each monad is, in truth, one of God's views of the universe, it must reproduce God's characters, including his self-dependence; it must, therefore, be "independent of everything except God." To this reasoning, Leibniz adds the wholly insufficient argument, that because a monad cannot have "a physical influence on the inner being of another," therefore the influence of one monad on another requires "the intervention of God."² Of course, the premise of this argument is true, since so-called physical reality has been proved to be spiritual; but the possibility of a non-physical influence of finite monad on finite monad is not thereby denied. An unexpressed argument at the base of Leibniz's doctrine of the isolation of the monads may, however, readily be discerned. It is this: multiplicity, if fundamental and not superficial, implies separateness. For things which influence each other are not really many realities, but rather parts of one reality, that is, members of a system or group. But one of Leibniz's

¹ "Discourse," XIV².

² "Monadology," 51. Cf. "Principles of Nature and Grace," 2; "Second Explanation of the New System," quoted *infra*, p. 89.

fundamental doctrines is that of the multiplicity of reality. In so far as he is justified in this teaching, he is correct in the logical inference from it — the doctrine that the fundamentally many realities are unique and separate. (It will be shown, however, that Leibniz assumes without proof the ultimate multiplicity.)

It follows from the isolation of the monad — as Leibniz does not fail to point out — that it is indissoluble and ingenerable. For if incapable of being affected by anything outside itself, it can neither be ended nor could it ever have been begun. “Only by a miracle,” Leibniz says, could “a substance have its beginning or its end.”

(4) *Every monad is a unity of its own states*

“The individual concept of each person,” Leibniz declares, “includes, once for all, everything that can ever happen to him.”¹ In the end, this assertion, like all others which concern the monads, is based on the knowledge which each one of us has of himself: I am, or include within myself, all that I experience; and I have none the less an identity in spite of change; the present I is, in a sense, identical with the I which endured certain past experiences; and my future experiences will be referred to this same I. In Leibniz’s own words, therefore, “it must needs be that there should be some reason why we can veritably say that . . . the I which was at Paris is now in Germany.”²

But Leibniz is not satisfied with this mere appeal to experience, and proceeds to explain the identity of the monad by a logical analogy. “My inner experience,” he says, “convinces me *a posteriori* of this identity, but there must also be some reason *a priori*. It is not possible to find any other

¹ “Discourse,” XIII.

² “Letters to Arnaud,” VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 43¹; Open Court edition, p. 112.

reason, excepting that my attributes of the preceding time and state as well as the attributes of the succeeding time and state are predicates of the same subject. . . . Since from the very time that I began to exist it could be said of me truly that this or that would happen to me, we must grant that these predicates were principles involved in the subject or in my complete concept, which constitutes the so-called I and which is the basis of the interconnection of all my different states. These God has known perfectly from all eternity.”¹ The identity of the self is further shown, Leibniz teaches, by an analysis of the concept of change. For, in order that there may be change, not mere succession, there must surely be something which changes; and this something must be one throughout its succeeding states.

(5) *Every monad mirrors or expresses all reality*

But Leibniz teaches not only that a monad is a unity of all its own experiences; besides these, “in its full concept are included . . . all the attendant circumstances and the whole sequence of exterior events.”² “There was always,” Leibniz says, “in the soul of Alexander marks of all that had happened to him and evidences of all that would happen to him . . . for instance that he would conquer Darius and Porus.”³ Therefore, “that which happens to each one is only the consequence of its complete idea or concept, since this idea already includes all the predicates and expresses the whole universe.”⁴

¹ “Letters to Arnaud;” cf. “Discourse,” VIII. Contemporary commentators have shown that Leibniz reached this conception of the monad, largely because of his occupation with the logical relation of subject to predicate. Cf. “Discourse,” VIII²: “The content of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that if one understands perfectly the nature of the subject, he will know that the predicate appertains to it also. This being so, we are able to say that this is the nature of an individual substance.” Cf. Russell, “The Philosophy of Leibniz,” § 17, p. 43.

² “Discourse,” IX.

³ *Ibid.*, VIII., end.

Ibid., XIV².

Leibniz teaches, it thus appears, not only that in a sense every substance is absolutely complete, but that it expresses all reality.

For this doctrine, Leibniz advances an argument like that on which he had based his doctrine of the isolation of the monads. Every monad is the emanation or effective thought of God. But God is absolutely perfect or complete, therefore that which expresses him must share in his completeness. "It is very evident," Leibniz says, in a passage already quoted in part, "that created substances depend upon God who preserves them and can produce them continually by a kind of emanation just as we produce our thoughts, for when God turns, so to say, on all sides and in all fashions, the general system of phenomena which he finds it good to produce . . . and when he regards all the aspects of the world in all possible manners, . . . the result of each view of the universe as seen from a different position is a substance which expresses the universe conformably to this view, provided God sees fit to render his thought effective and to produce the substance. . . . It follows . . . that each substance is a world by itself."¹ In other words, because every monad is one of God's ways of viewing the universe and because God is perfect, or complete, therefore every monad "expresses" — or, as Leibniz often says "mirrors" — "the whole universe according to its way."² By this statement, Leibniz explains, he means that every monad, in that it is an I, is conscious of the whole world — that, to a degree, it knows the whole universe.³ In my own person, therefore, I reconcile the separateness and the apparent harmony of the individual. I am my separate isolated self, incapable of getting out of myself, or away from

¹ "Discourse," XIV¹.

² "Letters to Arnaud," IX., Gerhardts edition, Vol. II., p. 57; Open Court edition, p. 133.

³ *Ibid.*, XXII., Gerhardts edition, Vol. II., p. 112, XXIII., Open Court edition, p. 212²: "Expression is common to all forms and is a class of which ordinary perception, animal feeling, and intellectual knowledge are species."

my own experience; and yet I find myself conscious of other selves and things. I mirror and portray the universe, in knowing it — and yet my knowledge never takes me outside my separate and distinct self.

This theory obviously involves two difficulties. It may be true that I express the universe by being conscious of it, but it is hard to see how an inanimate object — say a rock — expresses the universe in this way.¹ But if Leibniz has been successful in the proof that all realities are souls, it must follow that they are conscious.² A second problem is the following: How can Leibniz teach that a finite monad knows the whole universe? For is it not obvious that no single, finite self, or monad, can know the entire universe? Leibniz answers squarely by reaffirming that each soul “knows the infinite, knows all;”³ and he seeks to justify the teaching by insisting that we have an indistinct and confused consciousness of much that we do not clearly know. Of such a character, he holds, is our knowledge of that which we do not immediately experience or logically infer. To the consideration of both difficulties we shall later recur.

(6) *Every monad has been predetermined by God to be in harmony with every other*

The preëstablished harmony of the monads is a theory which Leibniz formulated in the face of the following difficulty: His doctrine that each monad expresses the entire universe seems to oppose his equally emphasized doctrine that each monad is separate from every other. He teaches, as has just appeared, that given Adam, all the events of the universe are given, or that given Alexander, the conquest of Darius is therewith assured. But if the existence of Adam is

¹ Cf. “Letters to Arnaud,” XIX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 105, XX., Open Court edition, p. 203² (from Arnaud to Leibniz), to show that this difficulty was felt by Arnaud.

² Cf. *infra*, p. 95.

³ “Principles of Nature and Grace,” § 13².

implied by my existence, it may well be urged that Adam and I are not absolutely separated and independent of each other. It may be urged, also, that the interrelatedness of minds, or spirits, with things is at least as obvious to ordinary observation as their separateness. I am not merely conscious of my isolation, I am equally conscious of my vital connection with the other spirits of my world. I live not only in 'awful singleness,' but in close relation to these other spirits; and this must mean, it is urged, that I affect them and am in turn influenced by them. To such mutual influence, not to a perfect isolation, all the facts of social intercourse—for example, question and answer, and coöperation in labor—seem to bear witness. So-called physical realities, also, are closely bound together in the relation of cause and effect, so that from the condition of one object we may actually infer that of another. All these commonplaces of observation tell against Leibniz's doctrine of the isolation of realities; and he himself admits this apparent interconnection, saying that "phenomena maintain a certain order conformably to our nature (from whence it follows that we can . . . make useful observations, which are justified by the outcome of the future phenomena)." ¹

Leibniz's way of reconciling these apparently opposed characters of monads, their isolation and their conformity of behavior, is by what is known as his doctrine of preëstablished harmony: God, from whom each of the created monads emanates, as a thought from its thinker, has so conceived, or created, each soul, that each of its thoughts and perceptions shall correspond with each of the changes in all the other monads which together constitute the universe as finite. "God," he says, "has first created the soul, or any other real unity, so that everything shall grow out of its own depth, by a perfect spontaneity on its own part and yet with a perfect conformity to outside things. . . . And so it comes

¹ "Discourse," XIV.

about that, though each of these substances exactly represents the universe after its manner and according to a certain point of view, . . . and though the perceptions or expressions of external things arrive in the soul in virtue of its own laws, . . . and as if there existed nothing save God and the soul — still, there will be a perfect accord among all these substances, which produces the same effect as if they communicated with each other. . . . It is this mutual relation, regulated in advance, within each substance of the universe, which brings about what we call their communication.”¹

In replying to the difficulties found by Foucher² in this system of preëstablished harmony, Leibniz made use of an illustration which at once associated itself with every statement of the theory. “Imagine,” he says, “two clocks and watches which keep exactly the same time. Now this may come about in three ways. The first is that of mutual influence; the second is to put them in charge of a clever workman who shall keep them in order and together, at every moment; the third is to make the two timepieces with such art and precision that one assures their keeping time together in the future. Now put the mind and the body in place of these two clocks; their accord may come about in one of these three ways. The theory of influence is that of the everyday philosophy; but since one cannot conceive of material particles which could pass from one of these substances to the other, this conception must be abandoned. The theory of the continual assistance of the Creator is that of the system of occasional causes; but I hold that this is to make God intervene, as a *Deus ex machina*, in a natural and ordinary situation where, according to reason, he ought to coöperate only as he does in all other natural phenomena. Therefore there remains only my hypothesis, that of harmony. From the beginning, God has made each of these two substances of such a nature that in following only its own laws, received with its

¹ “New System,” 14.

² *Journal des Savants*, 12 September, 1695.

being, it none the less is in harmony with the other, just as it would be if they mutually influenced each other.”¹ The relatedness of the different monads is thus, fundamentally, an “interconnection among the resolutions of God.”²

(b) *The classes of created monads*

(1) *The rational monads: conscious, moral selves*

By rational monad, Leibniz means such a self, or spirit, as any human being knows itself to be: Leibniz, Spinoza, or the Electress Sophia. Leibniz does not argue for the existence of the rational self, but asserts it on the unimpeachable testimony of consciousness. The existence of many human selves, other than the mere myself, Leibniz usually assumes, for it does not occur to him that this could be questioned. Yet his teaching that a varied, multiple universe follows from the infinite variety of God’s perfections offers a general argument for the multiplicity of selves. From all other finite substances, the rational monads are distinguished by the clearness and distinctness of their consciousness. This cardinal difference implies two contrasts. Rational selves alone have reason, in addition to perception and memory; and rational selves alone are morally free and responsible. The character of freedom involves such difficulty that it must be considered at more length.

Rational monads, Leibniz teaches, incline to “choices under no compulsion of necessity.” So far as this means merely that a rational being is under no compulsion from other finite beings, it is of course entirely consistent with

¹ “Second Explanation of the New System.” Note that Leibniz applies the theory explicitly to the relation of a soul to its body.

² “Letters to Arnaud,” VIII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 37; Open Court edition, p. 104. Cf. Letter IX., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 48; Open Court edition, p. 120. This form of words is a more accurate expression of Leibniz’s apparent meaning than that of the “Monadology,” which speaks of the “relationship . . . of things to each other.”

Leibniz's teaching. But Leibniz seems to mean more than this, namely, that the individual, rational soul, and not God, is author of its own choices.¹ The proof he offers for the theory is the attempted demonstration that the acts of the finite rational self are contingent acts, therefore not necessary, therefore free. To prove the acts of every rational being contingent, Leibniz makes and emphasizes the contrast between necessary truths, or truths of reason as he calls them, whose opposite is not possible, and contingent truths, whose opposite is possible.² The truths of geometry — for example, the theorem that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles or the theorem that alternate internal angles are equal — are examples of necessary truths: their opposite is inconceivable. On the other hand, the fact that Leibniz visited Spinoza in The Hague is a contingent truth; for Leibniz might 'possibly' have found Spinoza at Amsterdam, or he might have gone from Paris to Hanover without visiting Spinoza. From this justifiable distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz then draws the following conclusion: the acts of a rational being can be imagined as different from what they actually are, — that is, their opposite is conceivable, or possible; therefore these acts are contingent, and as contingent they are free, not necessary. But this conclusion is invalidated by the ambiguity of the word 'possible.' Leibniz uses it first as equivalent to 'conceivable,' that is, 'imaginable,' and second as equivalent to 'contingent,' that is, 'not necessary.' Now, in the first sense, the opposite of a given action certainly is 'possible' — that is, one may always imagine a given person as behaving otherwise than in the way in which he actually behaves; for example, one may imagine Leibniz as going not to The Hague but directly to

¹ "Discourse," XIII., XXX., XXXI.; cf. "Theodicy," *e.g.* Abrégé, Objections 4 and 5.

² Cf. "Discourse," XIII., and "Theodicy," cited above. Cf. "New Essays," Bk. I., for a discussion of truths of reason and truths of fact without special reference to this bearing of the doctrine on the freedom conception.

Hanover. But it is illogical to argue from the fact that one may imagine Leibniz as going to Hanover on a certain day, to the conclusion that it was really possible for him to go to Hanover on that day. In truth, this conclusion seems wholly inconsistent with Leibniz's teaching that both Leibniz and Spinoza were created by God, and that it was contained in God's conception of both philosophers that they should meet, in 1676, at The Hague.¹

It must be admitted, then, that Leibniz does not prove that the acts of rational beings are contingent, or free. Yet he holds to the doctrine of freedom, doubtless because only so can he reconcile the fact of moral evil with his doctrine of the goodness of God, and because, also, the belief in freedom and responsibility seems to him necessary to the moral life of rational selves.² In this mainly unargued conviction the force of Leibniz's doctrine of freedom really lies; and on the facts of the moral consciousness an argument for freedom, far stronger than his, may be based.

(2) *The sentient monads: irrational souls*

Leibniz sharply distinguishes the merely sentient, irrational souls of animals from the rational, self-conscious souls of human beings. Animals' souls, he teaches, have perception and memory, but they have neither explicit self-consciousness nor reason nor moral freedom. The difference is, he holds, a difference in clearness of perception: both animal and rational souls perceive, and thus express, the whole universe, but the animal souls only confusedly.³ This important distinction of clear from confused consciousness will be con-

¹ Leibniz himself seems to the writer virtually to admit this by his teaching that 'contingent' truths are certain. Cf. "Discourse," XIII., XXX., XXXI.

² Cf. *infra*, Chapter 7, pp. 259 *seq.*; and Chapter 11, pp. 446 *seq.* On the teaching of Leibniz, cf. Russell, *op. cit.*, § 118.

³ "Principles of Nature and Grace," 4 and 5.

sidered in discussing Leibniz's doctrine of the third group of created monads.

(3) *The simple monads*

Simple monads, according to Leibniz, constitute the reality, as distinct from the appearance, of what are known as organized bodies and masses of inorganic matter. Corresponding to my idea of my own body or of my hat there is something real — or, more definitely, a collection of reals. These realities are simple monads, perceptive, soul-like substances, each an active, complete, isolated expression of the universe. It is essential to the understanding of Leibniz to realize that he never teaches that to each animal or inorganic body, as it appears to us, there corresponds but one monad, or soul. Such a view, he holds, is contradicted by the fact that every material body is subject to division and to transformation: a block of marble, for example, may be split into smaller blocks, and animal bodies may be mutilated or even reduced to ashes.¹ If a body, as it appears to us, were a soul, it would follow then that the soul is divisible and destructible — for Leibniz, an impossible conclusion. Leibniz, in fact, regards every body, organic and inorganic, not as itself a monad, but as an idea in our minds to which corresponds a constantly changing collection of simple monads. These simple monads are in continual *flux*, forming part now of one body, now of another, and changing place either “little by little, but continuously,” as in nutrition, or “all at one time,” as in conception or in death.²

The only sense in which the particular, animal body, thus conceived, may be said to have *unity* is because of the subordination of the simple monads, which compose it, to the sentient soul, or dominating monad. With this meaning, Leibniz

¹ Cf. the detailed discussion of this subject in the “Letters to and from Arnaud,” XI., XIII., XIV., XVI., XVII., XX., XXIII.

² “Principles of Nature and Grace,” 6.

says, in the "Letters to Arnaud":¹ "A body is an aggregation of substances, and is not a substance, properly speaking." "Bodies by themselves, without the soul," he says in a slightly earlier letter,² "have only a unity of aggregation, but the reality which inheres in them comes from the parts which compose them and which retain their substantial unity through the living bodies that are included in them without number."³

It is not hard to assign a reason for Leibniz's teaching that inorganic and organic bodies represent a distinctive reality. There must exist, Leibniz argues, realities corresponding with our sense ideas or percepts. It is natural to believe that these realities behind sense ideas are things independent of consciousness, but Leibniz has argued that non-spiritual realities, whether conceived as extensions or as forces, are illusions, and that monads, soul-like substances, are the only realities. Berkeley, as will later appear, in face of this situation, boldly claims that God is the reality behind the external

¹ Letter XXVI., March 23, 1690, Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 135³; Open Court edition, p. 244².

² Letter XVII., April, 1687, Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 100¹; Open Court edition, p. 195.

³ In discussing with Des Bosses the dogma of the 'real presence' in the Eucharist, Leibniz develops another doctrine of the relation of the organic body to the soul. In this view, mind and body form together a substance which has unity. (Cf. "Epistolae ad Des Bosses," Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., pp. 291 *seq.*) Such a theory appears to the writer, and to many students of Leibniz, to be quite at variance with his fundamental teaching. It is certainly possible to regard it as an unintentional misrepresentation by Leibniz, of his own teaching, a misreading due to his constant impulse toward harmonizing diverse systems and to his special effort to persuade Des Bosses that Leibnizian metaphysics does not oppose Romanist theology. It is only fair to add, however, that two critics, Jacobi and Kuno Fischer, look upon this second theory as representative of Leibniz's real teaching; and that the "Letters to Arnaud" contain—side by side with the unequivocal expressions, already quoted, of the body-aggregate theory—certain apparent implications of the view that soul and body together make a unity. (Cf. Letters, Gerhardt edition, pp. 119, 75²; Open Court edition, pp. 223², 159².) The interpretation given in this chapter is that of Erdmann. For a clear statement of the issues of the controversy, cf. Russell, *op. cit.*, Chapter 12, § 89 *seq.*

thing, and regards the thing as *God's idea which he shares with me*.¹ But Leibniz, holding closer to the analogy of self-consciousness, preserves for the 'external' object a peculiar reality, a distinct soul of its own. The difference, he teaches, between the simple and the sentient monad, the so-called material thing and the self (animal or human), is simply in the degree of the consciousness possessed by each. The simple monad, like the sentient monad, is 'perceptive' — Leibniz never wavers in this declaration — else it would lose its soul-like character, but its perception is so indistinct, so confused, that the simple monad is fairly called insentient — a 'sleeping' monad, as Leibniz often says.²

To show the plausibility of this conception of the so-called inanimate world as peopled with very dimly conscious souls, Leibniz recurs again and again to the difference, observed by each one of us, between the attentive and the inattentive consciousness. "There are a thousand indications," he says, "leading to the conclusion that at every moment there are within us an infinity of perceptions, but without apperception and reflection, that is to say, that there are changes in the soul which we do not apperceive, because the impressions are too small or too numerous or too united, so that nothing distinguishes them. . . . So, habit prevents our noticing the movement of a mill or of a waterfall when we have for some time lived beside it. It is not that this movement does not always strike upon our organs and that there does not occur something in the soul corresponding thereto, . . . but these impressions are not strong enough to draw our attention and our memory."³ The perceptiveness of the simple monad

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 139. Leibniz admits the possibility of this conception, in the case of imagination. Cf. "Letters to Arnaud," XII., Gerhardt edition, Vol. II., p. 73²; XIII., Open Court edition, p. 156².

² It must be observed that modern psychologists would use the terms 'sentient' and 'perceptive' in a precisely reversed sense.

³ "New Essays," Preface, paragraph 6 *seq.*, Langley, p. 47³ *seq.* Leibniz complicates this sound psychological doctrine of the distinction between attentive and inattentive consciousness, by the untenable teaching

is parallel, therefore, to our own inattentive, sleepy, unremembered consciousness. In other words, Leibniz teaches that, corresponding with every so-called percept of an object that I have, there exists a confusedly conscious soul, or collection of souls. And, to say the least, he shows the possibility of other-than-human-and-animal souls.

We may well linger over the completed outline of Leibniz's picture of the universe. It is a living, spiritual world of active forces, or souls, each complete in itself and working out its own ends in obedience to its own laws, each distinct from every other, yet harmonized with all the rest in its purpose and in its capacity to mirror all the universe. The creator and harmonizer of all these spiritual forces is the supreme monad, God, a conscious being of absolute power, wisdom, and goodness. And closest to him in the scale of perfection are the free, self-conscious souls, forming, as Leibniz says, a 'republic of spirits' of whom, none the less, God is monarch.¹

II. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNIZ

From this summary of the principal teachings of Leibniz, it is evident that Leibniz agrees with Descartes and with Hobbes in conceiving the universe as made up of many individuals. The system of Leibniz is, in other words, numeri-

that there must be a consciousness, however faint, corresponding with every distinguishable part of a physical stimulus. "To hear the roar of the sea," he continues in the passage quoted above, "I must hear the partial sounds which produce it, that is, the noise of each wave." The tendency of modern psychology is to condemn this doctrine and to teach that a stimulus must attain a given strength before it is accompanied by any consciousness, and that perception due to a composite stimulus is not perception of every constituent of that stimulus. (Cf. James, "Principles of Psychology," I., p. 154.) The teaching of Leibniz on this subject has, it must be observed, contributed to the misrepresentation of his doctrine. For the comparison of the simple monad's perceptions with the sentient soul's relations to the indistinguishable parts of a physical stimulus has made it easy to regard the simple monad unconscious — a doctrine quite at variance with the teaching of Leibniz.

¹ "Discourse," XXXVI.

cally pluralistic; indeed, Leibniz lays far greater stress than Descartes, or even Hobbes, on the multiplicity of the universe and on the consequent uniqueness and separateness of the individuals who constitute it. In contrast with Descartes, and in agreement with Hobbes, Leibniz further teaches that there is but one kind of reality — in other words, his philosophy is qualitatively monistic. But in strong opposition to Hobbes, Leibniz holds that this one kind of reality is immaterial or ideal. Whereas Hobbes formulates a pluralistic materialism, Leibniz teaches a pluralistic idealism — and more definitely, a spiritualism. Both by his monism and by his idealism Leibniz meets real difficulties in the systems of his predecessors. His monism, that is, his teaching that all real beings are fundamentally of one sort, spiritual, avoids the absurdity of Descartes's doctrine that bodies and spirits, though unlike and utterly independent, none the less affect each other, and avoids as well the difficulty in Descartes's teaching that extension only, of all the qualities of corporeal bodies, is independent of mind. And Leibniz's idealism meets also the inconsistencies and difficulties of the materialism of Hobbes.

But Leibniz's system must be estimated, not only by a valuation of its results, in comparison with the conclusions of his predecessors, but by a scrutiny of the cogency of his arguments. Thus estimated, his philosophy is frankly disappointing, largely because of the unsystematic development of his thought and expression. Indeed, the value of Leibniz consists rather in the presentation of his own insights than in the organized argument for his conclusions. Here and there, it is true, for specific parts of his doctrine, he attempts detailed proof; but often serious argument fails altogether, often it is barely suggested, not sufficiently developed, often, finally, the validity of his argument cannot be admitted. This general comment must be made good by re-stating, summarizing, and supplementing the criticisms made already on Leibniz's arguments. It is perhaps unnecessary to remind the

reader that criticism at this stage of our study must be provisional only, and that it must wait for completion on a wider and deeper acquaintance with philosophical systems. Such criticism may be based on the following brief outline of the doctrine, which omits entirely the discussion of subordinate questions, even when they are intrinsically important.

According to Leibniz,

- A. The ultimately real is
 - I. Immaterial
 - II. Multiple
- B. The many, immaterial beings (monads) include
 - I. God, the perfect monad
 - II. Created spirits (sentient souls)

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a. \text{ Rational} \\ \text{and free} \\ b. \text{ Sentient} \\ \text{only} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Dependent} \\ \text{on God} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Active} \end{array} \right\}$
$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Harmonious} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Expressing} \\ \text{universe} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Separate} \end{array} \right\}$
$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{One} \end{array} \right\}$		
 - III. Simple monads (insentient but perceptive)

a. Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine of reality as immaterial and manifold

The first doctrine to be estimated is, it is evident, the teaching that the ultimately real is immaterial. The significance of Leibniz's adoption of idealistic doctrine is the greater, because Leibniz was no mere metaphysician. As he himself says, he "departed very young from the domain of the scholastics," charmed by the "beautiful way" in which the mathematicians and the physicists explained nature.¹ Both to mathematics and to physics Leibniz made contributions of the highest value; and to mechanical laws — which he conceived as ordered ways, in which 'material' reality, the mass of simple monads, appears to us² — he always attributed a great, though a subordinate, importance. Thus

¹ "New System," 2.

² *Ibid.*, 2 and 17.

Leibniz's deliberate conclusion that force, the physical ultimate, is spiritual in nature has peculiar value in that it is the conclusion of a man who is scientist as well as philosopher.

The writer of this book accepts Leibniz's doctrine, that the real is the immaterial, and accepts the assertions on which it is based: (1) the assertion that extension and motion are not ultimately real but manifestations of a deeper reality — either of force or of spirit; (2) the assertion that force can be conceived only as spiritual. But Leibniz barely indicates the arguments for these conclusions, leaving to later philosophers the detailed and explicit demonstration of his results. He might have argued in detail, as Berkeley did, for the doctrine that extension is on a par with color, sound, and the other non-spatial qualities admitted to be modifications of spirit. He might also have examined the current conceptions of force, and could then have shown that to the materialist 'force' really meant no more than either (1) motion, or else (2) the unknown cause of physical phenomena. In the first sense, however (as Leibniz might have proved), force would be, like extension, coördinate with the admittedly ideal qualities of color and the rest. In the second sense, 'force' would mean 'cause of ideas,' and therefore, because related to ideas, force could not be material in the full sense of the term, since it would not be unrelated to consciousness.¹ To recapitulate: though Leibniz might, in the opinion of the writer, have justified the idealistic monism of his system, though he might, in other words, have proved what he taught, that reality is through and through immaterial, yet he never carries out this proof with sufficient clearness and detail.

The second part of Leibniz's teaching is the doctrine that the universe consists, ultimately, of many distinct beings. This doctrine, also, is insufficiently established. For Leibniz bases it on superficial observation and on defective argument. He urges in its favor, first, the mere observation that

¹ For development of these arguments, cf. *infra*, pp. 128 *seq.*, 174 *seq.*

there are many different beings in the world ; and second, the argument that every finite being must be ultimately different from every other, since each is a distinct expression of the nature of God.¹ But the undeniable fact that we observe many people, things, and thoughts does not disprove the possibility that these are ultimately parts of one, including being. And the argument based upon the relation of each finite being to God is invalidated by the inconclusiveness, which will next be set forth, in Leibniz's arguments for God's existence. In technical terms, once more, the numerical pluralism of Leibniz, like that of his predecessors, is not satisfactorily demonstrated. He takes for granted and does not prove the existence of an ultimate multiplicity of monads — utterly isolated beings.

From this comment on the foundation of Leibniz's teaching, it is necessary next to consider his specific doctrines about the multiple, immaterial universe — in a word, to comment on the monad doctrine.

b. Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine concerning God

Leibniz's arguments for the existence of God must first be considered, for from the existence of God, the supreme monad, a being infinite, eternal, and perfect — that is, an all-powerful, an all-knowing, and an absolutely good spirit — follow, as has appeared, many of the characters of the other monads. Leibniz's arguments, it will be observed, bear so strong a likeness to those of Descartes that they need not be discussed in detail. Like those, they are of two sorts, ontological and cosmological, or, in Leibniz's terms, '*a priori*' and '*a posteriori*.'

Leibniz's statement of the ontological argument is the following: "God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 83 *seq.*

as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to establish *a priori* his existence.”¹ This statement of the ontological proof supplements that of Descartes by giving reason why the idea of God, alone among other ideas, contains the idea of necessary existence.² The reason is simply this, that no contradiction is involved in the idea of a perfect being.³ Leibniz’s meaning is clearly the following: We may rightly question whether there corresponds to our idea of a given limited reality any existing thing; for not only are some ideas obviously self-contradictory, — as, for example, the idea of a square circle, — but even such an idea of a particular thing as has seemed to involve no contradiction may prove self-contradictory, since some of its supposed characters may turn out to be incompatible with others. But I mean by God a perfect being, one possessed of all positive characters, therefore no character asserted of him can contradict another. In other words, the idea of God involves necessary, because uncontradictable, existence; hence — as Descartes had argued — God necessarily exists.

Leibniz adds nothing to the ontological argument save this reason for asserting that the idea of God includes that of necessary existence. There are difficulties in the teaching, but comment upon it is needless, for it after all leaves the ontological proof in essentials unchanged: Leibniz still argues from my idea of a necessarily existent, perfect being to the actual existence of that being; and the objection therefore holds against him which was urged against Descartes. What

¹ “Monadology,” 45; cf. “Discourse,” XXIII.

² Leibniz, however, is hardly justified in claiming this as an entirely novel teaching. For Descartes had clearly suggested it in his “Reply to the Second Objections to the Meditations.” Cf. *supra*, pp. 47 *seq.*

³ The context makes it clear that Leibniz uses the term ‘possible’ in this sense of ‘without self-contradiction.’ When therefore he goes on to say that God “involves no bounds, no negation,” he doubtless means that God includes all qualities or characters.

Leibniz claims to prove is that the idea of uncontradictable, and thus of necessary, existence belongs to God. What he does not and cannot prove is that God, though conceived as necessarily existing, does for that reason necessarily exist.

Besides this *a priori*, or ontological, argument for God's existence, Leibniz, like Descartes, lays stress on a causal or, as he calls it, an *a posteriori* argument. The argument is twofold: it is necessary, Leibniz teaches, to infer God's existence as explanation, first of contingent things, and second, of eternal truths. The assumption on which both these arguments depend is known by Leibniz as the "principle of sufficient reason." He lays great stress upon it throughout his writing, always treating it in connection with the "principle of contradiction" as a self-evident and unquestionable truth. "Our reasoning," he says, "is based upon two great principles: first that of contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction, and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false. And second, the principle of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise."¹ The principle of sufficient reason is thus identical with Descartes's postulate of an ultimate cause. Like that, it contains two parts: first, the teaching that every finite being has a cause — that no limited being can be conceived, except as linked to some cause of itself; and second, the unproved assumption that there must exist some ultimate, satisfactory — in Leibniz's term, sufficient — cause.

There are "two kinds of truth," Leibniz teaches,² which must have a sufficient reason. These are the truths "of reason and those of fact." By truths of fact, he means simply external things and ideas, "bodies and the representations of them in souls."³ And for the whole "sequence of

¹ "Monadology," 31-32; cf. "Principles of Nature and Grace," 7.

² "Monadology," 33.

³ "Principles of Nature and Grace," 8.

the things which extend throughout the universe,"¹ there must be a sufficient reason; in other words, it would be "possible to one who adequately knew to give a sufficient reason why things are as they are and not otherwise."² But no one fact, whether external or internal, can be sufficiently explained by another fact, for the alleged explanation will itself need explanation and will not be ultimate. In the words of Leibniz: "Though the present motion . . . comes from the preceding one, and that from the still preceding one, we gain nothing however far back we go, for there remains always the same question. Thus it is necessary that the sufficient reason, which has no more need of another reason, should be found outside the series of contingent things, in a substance, which is cause of the contingent things, — that is, in a necessary being carrying in itself the reason of its existence: otherwise there would still be no sufficient reason at which one could end. Now this last reason of things is called God."³ And God must be existent, Leibniz sometimes adds, since existent things demand an existent cause. (This last stage of the reasoning, from existent things to existent cause, is evidently based on Descartes's principle, already criticised, that the cause must contain at least as much reality as the effects.)

But God's existence is not merely necessary, Leibniz teaches, to explain the existence of concrete, finite things, 'truths of fact'; it is required, also, to account for the existence of necessary truths, 'truths of reason.' These truths of reason, truths for example of geometry or of arithmetic,⁴ are, he insists, actual facts of our experience; we are as truly

¹ "Monadology," 36.

² "Principles of Nature and Grace," 7.

³ "Nature and Grace," 8. Cf. "Ultimate Origination of Things," where, as in "Monadology," 39, Leibniz adds to this reasoning an argument, from the fact of the connection among finite beings, to prove that this 'last reason of things' is a single Being (*une seule source*). Cf., also, p. 51, footnote; and notice that Leibniz, like Descartes, often seems to confuse the conception of the temporally first cause and the ultimate cause.

⁴ Cf. "New Essays," Introduction, paragraph 3.

conscious that $3^3=27$ as that a room is cold. They are distinguished in two ways from contingent facts. The certainty of them is not, in the first place, derived from repetition of experience; the sum of the angles of a triangle is as certainly known to be two right angles in the first apprehension of the theorem as at any later time, whereas one's certainty of any sense-truth, as that the sun will set every twenty-four hours, is dependent on frequent repetition. It follows that one's certainties of fact are not universal: in Nova Zembla, for example, the sun does not set once in twenty-four hours; whereas the truths of reason are everywhere cogent. Truths of reason are distinguished, in the second place, Leibniz teaches, from truths of fact, on the ground that "they are necessary, and their opposite is impossible," whereas truths of fact "are contingent and their opposite is possible."¹ Now the peculiar reality of these truths of reason can be accounted for, Leibniz teaches, only if they are regarded as dependent in a special way on God. The peculiar reality which distinguishes, for example, my conviction that $2 \times 2 = 4$, from my belief that it will stop snowing, must lie in the truth that the former idea is a truth of God's mind. In this sense, Leibniz calls the understanding of God "the region of the eternal truths."² "It needs must be," he says, "that if there is a reality . . . in the eternal truths, this reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom essence includes existence."³

The difficulties with these causal arguments for God's existence have really been indicated in the criticism upon

¹ "Monadology," 33. Cf. "Discourse," XIII. It has been shown already (cf. p. 91) that the opposite of contingent truth is possible only in the sense of being imaginable.

² *Ibid.*, 43.

³ *Ibid.*, 44. In spite of this doctrine that eternal truths depend for their reality on God, Leibniz teaches that the eternal truths are not arbitrary and do not depend on God's will ("Monadology," 46). He never completely coördinates these two views. Cf. Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 178 seq.

Descartes. The postulate of both arguments, the assumption that things and truths must have not merely a cause, but an ultimate cause, has first to be questioned. For it is not proved by Leibniz, any more than by Descartes, that an ultimate cause, or sufficient reason, for everything must exist. Both Leibniz and Descartes show, it is true, that a reason is always sought, and that a finite reason must be insufficient; but neither proves, though in the view of the writer both might have proved, that a sufficient reason is inevitably to be found. But waiving this objection, and admitting the necessity for an ultimate cause, another difficulty must be pointed out. On Leibniz's principles, such a sufficient cause must be distinct from the finite things — in other words, must be possessed of the monad's distinctness — and must even be outside the series of finite things. This second character follows from the fact that an ultimate, a satisfactory, a sufficient, cause must be itself uncaused. But if the sufficient reason be both distinct from the finite things and out of the series of them, surely it cannot be related to them as their cause. The dilemma seems a hopeless one: if the ultimate cause be in any sense *in* the series of the finite things, it is itself in need of a cause, in other words, it is not really ultimate; if, on the other hand, the supposed cause be *outside* the series of finite things and distinct from them, it cannot be related to them at all, and evidently therefore cannot be the cause of them.¹

To this estimate of Leibniz's argument for God's existence should be added a criticism of his conception of God's nature. Like Descartes, Leibniz holds that the perfection, or completeness, of God involves his goodness. But this conception has peculiar difficulties, because God's perfect goodness, in conjunction with his absolute power, seems incompatible with

¹ The only escape from this dilemma is through the conception of God as the One Reality of which finite things are the partial expression. Cf. Chapters 8, 10, 11, pp. 286 *seq.*, 378 *seq.*, 418 *seq.* Cf. also Kant's attempt to escape the dilemma by the doctrine of the two causalities.

the flagrant misery and evil of the world. Leibniz tries in many ways to meet the difficulty. He suggests, for example, that the unhappiness of rational souls may be balanced by the happiness of a greater number of irrational souls, or that the unhappiness of any individual may be overbalanced by the higher quality of his happiness. He urges also that evil may be only partial, in other words, a transcended element in the good.¹ No one of these assertions, every careful reader of Leibniz will admit, is conclusively proved; and Leibniz in the end always gives up the task of explaining how unhappiness and sin may be reconciled with the goodness of an all-powerful God, contenting himself with the insistence that God must be good, because he is perfect (complete), and that his created universe, in spite of appearances, must be good at heart.²

The result of this criticism is to admit that Leibniz has not proved the existence of God. Yet it must be pointed out that he has at least a greater right than Descartes to the ontological and to the causal arguments. The 'ontological proof' argues from idea to reality; and for Descartes, who held that a portion of reality is non-spiritual, this inference from idea to reality is obviously less valid than for Leibniz, to whom the whole universe is ideal. Again, when the 'causal proof' maintains that there is a sufficient reason for each finite fact, Descartes's system leaves a loophole for the fear that this principle of sufficient reason may not apply to that foreign sort of reality, body. Leibniz meets no such difficulty, since it is at least likely that his spiritual world is a reasonable world. In a word, Leibniz's proofs of God's existence, though as they stand inadequate, are entirely consistent with

¹ Leibniz's discussion of evil is most complete in his "Theodicy." Cf., also, the "Abrégé" ("Abbreviation of the Theodicy"), Gerhardt edition. Vol. VI., pp. 376 *seq.*

² Cf. "Abbreviation of Theodicy," Objection VII., Reply: "One judges [the plan of the universe] by the outcome . . . ; since God makes it, it was not possible to make it better." For the fuller discussion of this problem, cf. Chapter 11, pp. 430 *seq.*

idealistic doctrine. Indeed, it well may be that philosophers after Leibniz will discover God as deepest reality and ultimate explanation of the universe.

c. Estimate of Leibniz's doctrine of the finite monads

The failure of Leibniz to prove the existence of God undermines the rest of his teaching, for to him the universe is a concourse of souls, ranging from rational to insentient, with the supreme soul, God, as its creator, preserver, and monarch. From God emanates each soul, rational or insentient; to God is due the completeness and the harmony of the souls, each utterly isolated from all save God; and to God's perfection is due the ultimate goodness of this often so evil-appearing world. In more detail: those characters, attributed by Leibniz to the finite monads, which he argues on the ground of God's existence, must be yielded as unproved. First of these, obviously, is the dependence on God: Leibniz's universe, with God left out, is a world of self-dependent and coördinate spirits. And the other characters which Leibniz attempts to prove, from the relation of the limited monads to God, are their perfect harmoniousness, their completeness, their capacity to express the entire universe, and even their isolation from each other.¹ It follows, if Leibniz has not succeeded in proving God's existence, that he has left these characters of his monads unsupported.

It must be noted, in the second place, that the doctrine of the activity and of the internal unity of each monad is unaffected by the failure to prove God's existence and the consequent relation of the monad to God, for these characters, as has been shown, are established by self-observation: I

¹ For the isolation of the monads he has also the insufficient argument which consists in the disproof of *physical* influence (cf. *supra*, p. 83); and the unexpressed argument from the (unproved) ultimate multiplicity of the monads.

know myself as an active self, a unit of all my own experiences. And so far as Leibniz has established a right to conceive the universe as ultimately spiritual, he is justified in conceiving every real being as active, and as internally a unity. It is possible on Leibniz's principles to rescue two more characters of the monads: their harmoniousness, and their isolation if that is not conceived as absolute. For both characters are established by the certainty I have of my own experience. The facts of my social consciousness — the observed sympathy, imitation, and loyalty, inherent in me — indicate that I am a related self, not a lonely self; and yet my aggressiveness, my independence, and my sense of responsibility mark the distinctness of myself from other selves. A monad, then, if it is a soul-like reality, must possess a relatedness, and a relative distinctness, as well.

The results of this commentary on Leibniz's doctrine concerning the nature of the monads is, then, the following: In the writer's opinion, Leibniz rightly holds, however ineffectively he argues, that each monad is one and is active; he rightly holds that it stands in relation to other monads and that it yet is unique among them; he fails to complete his proof that there exists a God on whom each monad is dependent; nor does he prove that each monad completely includes and expresses the universe, and that it is utterly separate from every other monad and unaffected by it. To have pictured in ineradicable outlines a universe of unique yet related spirits is thus the unassailable value of Leibniz's philosophy. He did not, it is true, complete the building of his city of spirits. It was left to succeeding philosophers to lift the breastworks of his argument and to bridge the chasms of his doctrine. More literally: Berkeley first among modern philosophers elaborated and expanded Leibniz's argument against materialism; and the idealists since Kant's day have at least approached more nearly than Leibniz approached both to the reconciliation, within the finite self, of uniqueness with related-

ness, and to a cogent argument for the existence of a complete Self. But we should be untrue to history if we failed to trace to its source in Leibniz's writings one of the most significant tendencies in contemporary philosophy—the emphasis upon the truth of personality.

CHAPTER V

PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM (*Continued*): THE SYSTEM OF BERKELEY

"Berkeley . . . the truest, acutest philosopher that Great Britain has ever known." — G. S. MORRIS.

THE problems of philosophy which have so far been considered are fundamentally these two: how many kinds are there of ultimate reality? and what are these kinds? The earliest answer of modern philosophy to both questions is formulated in the pluralistic dualism of Descartes, which teaches that there are two kinds of reality, spiritual and material. But the impossibility of accounting for the relation of two ultimately separate kinds of reality, and the equal impossibility of regarding them as unrelated, lead Hobbes and Leibniz to answer differently the first of the questions and to acknowledge but one kind of reality, instead of two. In other words, Hobbes and Leibniz replace Descartes's qualitative dualism by a qualitative monism. To the question, of what nature is this one reality, they offer different answers. The universe consists of corporeal bodies, says Hobbes. The universe is made up of conscious beings, soul-like substances, Leibniz answers.

All these philosophers, Descartes and Hobbes and Leibniz, despite their varying beliefs about the kinds of reality, — one or two, corporeal or spiritual, — none the less agree in the assumption that the universe, the all-of-reality, is, numerically considered, a plurality. They agree, in other words, that the universe is constituted by a multitude of individuals, spiritual and material, or only spiritual, or only material; and Leibniz,

indeed, lays especial stress on the plurality of the unique individuals. A radically new movement in philosophy might then be initiated by raising the question: is the plurality of individuals fundamentally real? or are they but the manifestations of an underlying One, of a single, ultimately real being?¹ But George Berkeley, the philosopher, whose system we are next to study, does not raise this new question. Nor has he any distinctively new answer to the question, how many and what kinds of reality? He assumes, as his predecessors have assumed, that the all-of-reality consists of a multitude of individuals; and he teaches that these individuals are immaterial. His system is, in other words, like those of all his predecessors, numerically pluralistic. Like that of Leibniz, it is qualitatively monistic and spiritualistic.

It has been the fashion of certain critics to undervalue Berkeley's speculative strength, to view his philosophy as the natural attempt of a churchman and bishop to establish the theology of his sect, and to regard his philosophical writings, like his political tracts, as effervescence of the missionary zeal of an orthodox and philanthropic Irishman. A careful reading of the works of Berkeley suffices to refute this estimate. His thought is indeed incomplete, but it is independent and creative. Historically his system is neither a reënforcement of Leibniz's teaching nor a reaction from the materialistic pluralism of Hobbes. It is, rather, a correction of the dualism of Berkeley's predecessor, John Locke. The philosophy of Locke need not be set forth in any detail, for in essentials it repeats Descartes's teaching. Like Descartes, Locke taught that the universe consists of a multitude of finite substances, spiritual and material, subordinated to one infinite spirit, God. Locke reached these conclusions much as Descartes did, though the emphasis of his teaching is sometimes different. The most significant of these differences is his analysis of material substance. Descartes had

¹ For discussion of the system of Spinoza, who had already considered this problem, cf. Chapter 8.

attributed to matter but the one quality, extension; Locke, on the contrary, teaches that the essential — or, as he calls them, the 'primary' — qualities of material substances are extension, with its modifications, and solidity.¹ Furthermore, Locke lays more emphasis than Descartes lays on the important teaching that all other so-called qualities of bodies — color, sound, odor, and the like — do not really belong to material substances. On the contrary they are, so he holds, mere sensations in us produced by the primary qualities of material things, "i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of [their] insensible parts."² That is, Locke teaches, as Descartes had taught, that real bodies, or material things, are without color or sound or fragrance: they are mere masses of colorless, extended, solid, and moving particles, which produce in us (1) ideas resembling these qualities — 'primary' ideas of extension, solidity, and motion; and (2) ideas unlike the qualities themselves, 'secondary'³ ideas of color, fragrance, and the like.

Berkeley's point of departure is this distinction between qualities and ideas. He takes issue with Locke mainly by teaching that even the primary qualities are ideal. In other words, Berkeley teaches that extension and solidity, as well as color and sound, are ideas of the mind. Thus, he reduces the material part of Locke's universe to immaterial reality, and turns things into thoughts, somewhat as Leibniz had transformed Descartes's corporeal bodies into simple monads.

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 493².

² "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Bk. II., Chapter 8, paragraph 10.

³ Locke himself does not speak of primary and secondary ideas, but of primary and secondary qualities. He calls the powers of the primary qualities to produce ideas unlike themselves the 'secondary qualities' of material things. It is, however, more in accord with his teaching to apply the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' (as this text does), not to qualities, but to ideas. (Cf. Locke's admission, "Essay," Bk. II., Chapter 8, paragraph 8, that he confuses the terms 'quality' and 'idea'.)

I. BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY IMMEDIATELY KNOWN: MYSELF AND MY IDEAS¹

"It is evident to any one," Berkeley says, at the beginning of his "*Principles of Human Knowledge*," "that the objects of human knowledge are ideas. . . . But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them . . . what I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, MYSELF." According to Berkeley, therefore, I know myself in knowing my ideas. He goes on to distinguish the I, or myself, from the mere succession of ideas. "I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates, about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and sounds: that a color cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a color: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from color and sound; and, for the same reason from all other . . . ideas."²

It is important to observe that Berkeley does not seek to establish the existence of a self deeper than its own ideas in any other way than by a direct appeal to consciousness. He holds that each man has an immediate, that is, an unreasoned, certainty of his own existence.³ And it should be added that whoever denies the existence of himself can go no step further

¹ This study of Berkeley's doctrine is based on his "*Principles of Human Knowledge*" (1710), and his "*Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*" (1713). One of these little books, or preferably both, should be read before entering upon this chapter. The relatively disproportionate length of this exposition of Berkeley's teaching is due in part to the peculiar fitness of these texts to introduce students to idealistic doctrine.

² "*Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*," III., Open Court edition, pp. 95-96.

³ It should be carefully noted that this doctrine does not deny the occurrence of a mediated, reflected-on, consciousness of myself. Such a reflective consciousness we all gain. The core and centre of it is, however, that immediate awareness of self which is the guarantee of its own validity. (On immediacy, cf. A. E. Taylor's "*Elements of Metaphysics*," pp. 30, 32.)

with Berkeley, for every other positive doctrine of his system rests upon the acknowledgment of the existence of this self. The writer of this book believes, with Descartes and Berkeley, that introspection testifies to the existence of such a self; that in every pulse of consciousness one is certain of a self which 'is conscious' or 'has ideas.'¹

Before discussing in greater detail the characteristics attributed by Berkeley to 'myself' (the subject of knowledge), it is necessary to consider his analysis of the 'objects of my knowledge,' my ideas. This discussion will involve certain rather barren technicalities, but these are necessary to a real understanding of Berkeley, and will form but a brief introduction to the discussion of more vital subjects. Berkeley seems to group ideas (in the sense of 'objects of knowledge') into two classes: first, ideas (in a narrower sense); and, second, notions. He further subdivides ideas, in the narrower sense, into two classes: (1) ideas 'actually imprinted on my senses,' without 'dependence on my will'; and (2) ideas excited by me 'in my mind' at pleasure, that is, ideas of imagination. The 'ideas of sense' he describes as 'more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination,' adding that "they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence."² Of 'notions,' also, Berkeley recognizes two classes: (1) notions "of our own minds, of spirits, and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas,"³ and (2) notions "of relations between things and ideas, which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related."⁴ This enumeration of the objects of knowledge may be summarized as follows: —

¹ For discussion of the opposition to this doctrine, cf. Chapter 6, pp. 179 *seq.*

² "Principles of Human Knowledge," § 30.

³ *Ibid.*, 89. Cf. *ibid.*, 27, and "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III., Open Court edition, p. 93.

⁴ Berkeley does not explicitly recognize this distinction, which, however, he everywhere makes between the wide and the narrow sense of the term 'idea.' The distinction, between ideas (in the strict sense) and notions, first appears in the second edition of the "Principles." For a suggestion of it in the first edition, cf. "Principles," 140. In the first edition, Berkeley included

Objects of Knowledge (Ideas, in the wide sense)

Ideas (in the strict sense)		Notions	
Passively received (Percepts)	Controlled by me (Images)	Of spirits and their operations	Of rela- tions

It would not be hard to criticise this summary of the objects of knowledge, for example, on the ground that notions of the first class are not coördinate with the three other groups of 'objects of knowledge.' Such criticisms do not, however, affect fundamental philosophical problems and need not be pressed. It is most important, on the other hand, to grasp clearly two of the characters which Berkeley attributes to ideas and to notions. He teaches, in the first place, that ideas and notions are, in a way, the copies of something else. Ideas, he holds, are copies of other ideas; and notions are, in some sense, 'like' the spirit which is known through them. This doctrine, as will later appear, has an important bearing on Berkeley's system.¹ In the second place, Berkeley lays stress on the inactivity of ideas. "All our ideas, sensations, notions, . . ." he says, "by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. . . . Whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity. . . . The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible

under the head of ideas both "ideas perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind," and "ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived . . ." ("Principles," § 1). Many of the statements of the first edition, like that just quoted, are left by Berkeley, side by side with the altered terminology of the second edition. In the remainder of this chapter the word 'idea' will be used in the narrower sense of 'percept or image,' unless specific mention of the wider use is made.

¹ "Principles," 8, 27, 89. See below, pp. 145 *seq.* Notions in the sense of 'ideas of relation' seem not to be treated as resemblances.

for an idea to do anything . . . : neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being.”¹ It will be easier to comprehend what Berkeley means by the passivity of ideas, after considering what he says concerning the correlative activity of spirits. But even at this point of the discussion, most readers will be inclined to agree with Berkeley that introspective attention to the train of ideas reveals no ‘activity’ of any one idea in its relation to another. This is the view already suggested by Bacon and later developed by Hume.² It should also be noted that in the section just quoted, the first in which the subject is considered, inactivity is attributed to ‘ideas’ in the wide sense of the term, including even ‘notions.’ Later, when Berkeley realizes the impossibility that a ‘passive idea’ should resemble an active spirit, we find him limiting the passivity to ideas in the narrow sense.

From this study of Berkeley’s doctrine of the nature of ideas, it is necessary to return to a discussion of the characters which he attributes to ‘myself,’ that is, soul or spirit. For to these three words he gives, as he explicitly and repeatedly says, precisely the same meaning. “What I am myself — that which I denote by the term *I* — is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.”³ The most significant negative characteristic of spirit has already been emphasized; the fact that it has a reality fundamental, and thus in a way superior, to that of ideas. This follows from the characteristic doctrine of Berkeley, the teaching that the whole reality of ideas “consists only in being perceived,”⁴ “whereas,” he goes on, “a soul or spirit is an active being whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking.” Positively, therefore, this unlikeness of spirit to idea consists in the *activity* of spirit. This is the aspect of spirit on which Berkeley lays most stress.⁵ Spirit is, indeed, never described, except as an ‘active’ being or substance,

¹ “Principles,” 25; cf. 27, 139.

² Cf. Chapter 6, pp. 163 *seq.*

³ “Principles,” 139; cf. 2 and 27. Cf. notes on pp. 70, 406.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 139; cf. 2, 8, 25, 137.

⁵ Cf. Leibniz’s teaching, p. 81.

an 'agent,' a 'power' or — more simply — as "that which acts," "which operates." In the ordinary use of the word, therefore, spirit is called 'active' just because it is the knower of ideas, whereas ideas are called passive, since their reality consists in their being known. In a more restricted sense of the word, the 'activity' of spirit is referred to its volitional or creative function. "It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active."¹ The mind, or I, is characterized, Berkeley teaches, not merely by activity, but by a certain sort of unity, contrasted with the 'variety' or 'succession' of ideas, and with a permanence opposed to the fleeting and transitory nature of the ideas. "I know," he says,² in a passage already quoted, "that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and sounds." The expression 'substance,' or 'support, of ideas,' which he constantly uses with reference to spirit, lays stress on this permanence of the self; the epithets 'simple' and 'indivisible' imply the unity.³ Berkeley further believes that the soul is immortal, but founds the doctrine rather on the traditional opposition between 'immortal' spirit and 'dead' matter than on any adequate discussion.⁴

II. BERKELEY'S NEGATIVE DOCTRINE: THE DISPROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER (NON-IDEAL REALITY)

Up to this point, nothing distinguishes Berkeley in a marked way from his predecessor, Locke, the dualist. For Locke and, in fact, Descartes taught that I may be immediately certain of the existence of myself, an active, unified

¹ "Principles," 28.

² "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III., Open Court edition, p. 95.

³ "Principles," 27, 89. Cf. "Dialogues," Open Court edition, p. 92.

⁴ "Principles," 141 *et al.*

spirit, and of the existence of my ideas. But closely interwoven with his positive doctrine, that I myself and my ideas exist, is Berkeley's negative teaching, the denial of non-ideal or non-spiritual reality. According to his view and that of Leibniz, the universe is, through and through, immaterial, a universe of consciousness, of spirit and idea. Alleged non-ideal reality is reducible, therefore, either to spirit or to idea.

Before discussing Berkeley's argument it is necessary to define precisely the nature of what he calls 'matter.' According to Berkeley so-called matter has two essential characters, both negative: it is in the first place conceived as independent of consciousness, that is, of mind. By this is meant that 'matter' would exist unchanged though every conscious being and every conscious process were annihilated.¹ In the second place, matter is other-than-consciousness, radically and essentially different-from-consciousness. It is thus obvious that Berkeley uses the term in a sense wider than that of the philosophy of our own day, including under it not merely physical phenomena of the world which we directly perceive but also whatever non-ideal reality may be inferred to exist. He argues against both these conceptions: the everyday view of matter as sum of the physical objects which we see, hear, and touch; and the doctrine of matter as unknown cause or background of our percepts. We must follow both arguments in some detail.

a. Berkeley's teaching that immediately perceived 'material' things exist only as ideas

Berkeley's doctrine, that no material reality exists, strikes us at first thought as utterly absurd, for it seems certain that we actually see, hear, taste, or touch material things — trees, thunder, apples, or chairs, for example. But Berkeley never for an instant denies the existence of these directly perceived

¹ Cf. Hume, *loc. cit. infra*, p. 172; and Royce, "The World and the Individual," First Series, pp. 97 *seq.*

external objects or things. He believes as firmly as Locke or Descartes or you or I that the trees and chairs which we perceive really exist, but he denies that they exist outside the mind; in a word, he denies that immediately perceived things are realities which would exist though no one were conscious of them. Positively, therefore, Berkeley teaches that things are ideas. "The table I write on," Berkeley says, "exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch."¹

Berkeley has, therefore, to prove that the immediately perceived thing is idea: to do this, it is necessary to analyze it into its parts. A given 'thing' is, let us say, perceived to be colored, fragrant, soft, and round: in other words, it is known as the sum of its qualities. If, now, it can be shown that each of the perceived qualities has no existence independent of perception, it will follow, Berkeley holds, that the perceived thing is itself a modification of consciousness, in a word, that it is idea, not matter. The question at issue is, therefore, simply this: do we directly perceive colors, odors, and forms as belonging to realities which would exist though there were no perceiver? Berkeley urges that, on the contrary, color, odor, and form as we directly know them vary with the condition of the perceiver.

In the "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," he argues this, in detail, for the different sense-qualities. "Suppose," he begins, "one of your hands hot and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand and warm to the other?"² But if, as the every-

¹ "Principles," 3.

² "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, p. 18. Philonous, the setter-forth of Berkeley's views, is the speaker.

day theory assumes, hot and cold were qualities belonging to an object existing independently of consciousness, then it would be necessary to suppose that a thing has at one and the same time two opposite qualities, heat and cold. This, Berkeley says, is 'to believe an absurdity.' On the other hand, though an object may not be at the same time hot and cold, a perceiving self may, he holds, at one and the same time have the ideas of hot and cold. Not merely perceived heat or cold, but taste, varies with the perceiver. "That which at other times seems sweet shall to a distempered palate appear bitter. And nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food, since that which one man delights in, another abhors." And how could this be, Berkeley asks,¹ "if the taste was really something inherent in the food?" Berkeley's meaning is clear. If in tasting food we directly perceived the quality of an object existing independently of us, then the same food must taste the same to different people eating it. But it is admitted that a given food 'tastes' differently to different people; it follows that these different tastes are different ideas of distinct people. Similar reasoning is applied by Berkeley to the other sense-qualities. Colored objects change their hue as we approach them; "the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds" are "only apparent colors." They are not really in the clouds, for these "have in themselves [no] other form than that of a dark mist or vapor."² And in the same way it may be shown that perceived odors and sounds vary with the perceiver. But all this would be impossible if, in tasting and seeing, hearing and smelling, we directly perceived the qualities of 'material things,' that is, of things existing independently of our consciousness of them.

So far, Berkeley has considered only what Locke called the

¹ "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," I., Open Court edition, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

secondary qualities. He has merely amplified and emphasized Descartes's and Locke's arguments to reach this conclusion, that what we know as heat, cold, odor, taste, sound, and color, are ideas in the mind, not qualities of things independent of consciousness. And herein, we must remind ourselves, Locke and Berkeley agree exactly with modern science. The physicists teach us that there is nothing in the physical world exactly corresponding to the different colors, sounds, degrees of heat and cold, flavors, and odors of the nature world as we know it. Colors and the rest, they teach, are mere ideas, and the 'real causes' of these ideas are forms of vibration. Thus the external world of the physicist is essentially the corporeal universe of Descartes and Locke, a silent, colorless world of form and motion. But Berkeley goes on to rob the material world, which we suppose ourselves to perceive directly, of even the so-called primary qualities of form and motion and solidity. For, he argues, the extension, motion, and solidity, which we directly know, vary with the perceiver as truly as heat and taste and color do. It is easy to multiply illustrations of his meaning: The figures which are like moving pigmies as I look down at them from a tower, turn out to be full-sized men; the nut which resists the pressure of a child's hand is crushed between a blacksmith's fingers; the trees which glide by me as I am swiftly rowed along the river's bank become immovable when I check the motion of the boat. Now if, in perceiving form, hardness, and motion, I were directly conscious of the qualities in an object existing independently of mind, it would follow that a given figure is both six inches and six feet high, that a nut shell is both hard and soft, that a given tree is in motion and at rest. The absurdity of such results drives Berkeley to the conclusion that the varying figures, hardnesses, and motions, which we directly perceive, are changing ideas in us. From the fact that "as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than

at another," it follows, he argues, that extension "is not really inherent in the object."¹

The doctrine of Descartes and Locke concerning the physical world — which is, as has been shown, the doctrine of modern science — is, thus, in Berkeley's view, utterly inconsistent. According to this familiar way of thinking, colors, sounds, tastes, and odors — the secondary qualities — are ideas in our minds, caused by 'real' material qualities of form and motion. But the argument which convinces Locke? that color, taste, and the rest are no real qualities, inherent in material things, is the fact that they vary with the perceiver; and form, hardness, and weight are variable in precisely the same way: they are, therefore, as truly as color and taste, ideas in the mind. There is, in a word, no reason for distinguishing this one group of thing-qualities — form, motion, and solidity — from the others.

Against this argument, so long drawn out by Berkeley, it may be urged that though unquestionably it proves that the primary qualities are no more 'real' than the secondary qualities, it nevertheless does not disprove that all qualities, primary as well as secondary, belong to objects independent of mind. There is no need of dwelling on this point, for Berkeley himself admits the force of the criticism, definitely stating that "this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or color in an outward object as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or color of the object."² But Berkeley has another and a more fundamental reason for the belief that the things and qualities, which we directly see, touch, and feel, do not exist independently of mind. It is this: When I ask myself what I am directly and immediately sure of, in perceiving, it is evident that I am immediately certain only of the fact of my being conscious in this or that way. The very simplicity of this consideration makes it hard to grasp. Let

¹ "Dialogues," I., Open Court ed., p. 33; cf. p. 34, end.

² "Principles," 15.

us make it concrete. I say, for example, that I am directly certain of the existence of a red rose. Exactly what is it of which I am evidently sure? I am sure that I have sensational experiences of redness, greenness, fragrance, thorniness, coolness. There is absolutely nothing in the 'thing' of which I am directly certain, save of this complex fact of my experience. I am perhaps certain of more than this, but my other certainties, if they exist, are inferences from this one direct certainty. The material thing then, as directly known, is proved by appeal to the consciousness of every observer to be a fact within consciousness, not independent of it. The 'thing' is, therefore, an 'idea.' In Berkeley's own words: — "It is an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained . . ., yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may . . . perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?"¹

It should be noticed that Berkeley has so far denied only the existence of those supposedly independent things which we suppose ourselves to perceive directly, to see, hear, and touch. Whether or not there exist, inferred by us but unperceived, things which would exist though no one perceived them and which cause our percepts — this problem Berkeley has not yet considered. He has shown, however, that we have no right to the argument: things exist independent of mind for I see, touch, and hear them; that, on the contrary, such things as I am immediately and sensorially conscious of are ideas.²

¹ "Principles," 4; cf. 22. Cf., also, "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, p. 48¹.

² Cf. "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, p. 12, "Sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense."

Two objections urged against this doctrine of Berkeley's should be considered before passing on to discuss the second of the conceptions of matter against which he argues. It is urged, in the first place, that Berkeley makes concrete, external things unreal. The real and solid world, of mountains, rocks, and seas, reduces, we are told, on Berkeley's principles, to a mere illusion, to a series of evanescent and unreal phenomena. Thus, Berkeley's doctrine that the thing is idea destroys the admitted distinction between reality and unreality. There is surely a difference between a real dollar and an imagined dollar,¹ a real castle and the palace of our dreams. But if, as Berkeley teaches, real dollar and actual palace are themselves ideas, then no room is left for the experienced distinction.²

Now, Berkeley clearly realizes the gravity of this charge, of annihilating the reality of the physical world and thereby destroying the distinction between real and unreal; but he very vigorously denies the accusation. He begins by stating the difficulty in terms as forcible as those of his opponents. "It will be objected," he says, "that by the foregoing principles, all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world: and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, . . . what, therefore, becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, and stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions of the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, . . . Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever and is as real as ever. . . . That the things which I see with mine eyes and touch with

¹ Cf. Külpe's "Outline of Psychology," § 28, 2), and the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 186 *seq.*, for discussion of the distinction between perception and imagination.

² Cf. Locke's argument, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," Bk. IV., Chapter 11; see also Chapter 2, *supra*, p. 36

mine hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question." ¹

Berkeley then goes on to show wherein consists the reality of these immediately seen and felt things, which — though real — are ideas. This reality which distinguishes 'real things' — namely, 'ideas imprinted on the senses' — from the 'mere ideas' of imagination, is, in truth, twofold. The "ideas imprinted on the senses . . ." have not (1) "a . . . dependence on my will," ² and they are "allowed to have more reality, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind." ³ In other words, the reality of perceived things consists, not in the fact that they are independent of any mind, but in the fact that they are ideas characterized by a superior vividness and regularity, and are independent of my own will,

In still another way (2) Berkeley teaches that real things — namely, ideas of sense — are distinguished from the ideas of imagination. They are not exclusively or primarily the ideas of a single, finite self, but are ideas of the infinite spirit, God, which may be shared by him with finite selves. In Berkeley's own words: "There are only things perceiving and things perceived; . . . every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom 'we live and move and have our being.'" ⁴ This aspect of the reality of things immediately perceived depends, however, for its validity on the certainty of God's existence; and Berkeley has not yet proved the existence of God. But he has shown that, if God exists, real things may plausibly be distinguished from images, as existing primarily in God's mind. And, in any case, the involuntariness, the regularity, and the order of ideas of sense give to them a peculiar reality as compared with ideas of imagination. "Be they never so vivid and distinct," however, Berkeley insists, "they

¹ "Principles," 34, 35.

² *Ibid.*, 29.

³ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴ "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 98.

are nevertheless *ideas*, that is, they exist in the mind or are perceived by it, as truly as ideas of its own framing."

b. *Berkeley's teaching that inferred material reality does not exist*

Berkeley has, so far, shown that we are wrong in the ordinary supposition that we immediately see and taste and smell things which exist independently of any mind. On the contrary, we must admit that the immediate objects of our perception are ideas, distinguished by superior coherence and vividness from the ideas of imagination. But this admission does not affect the possibility that non-ideal things do exist independently of consciousness, although we do not perceive them. For it is possible that we ought to *infer* the existence of things, or matter, independent of our consciousness. This possibility Berkeley, however, denies. He asserts not only that we do not perceive things, independent of consciousness, but also that we have no right to infer the existence of any independent and non-ideal (or, in his words, material) reality. The arguments for this conclusion must now be considered. Berkeley discusses this hypothesis of inferred matter¹ under many names and forms, as substratum, cause, instrument, occasion, and entity. Several of these forms of the doctrine have lost the significance which they had in the seventeenth century; and all may be grouped under two main heads, of which the second is again subdivided: first, the conception of material (non-ideal) reality as a world of 'real' things known to be like the percepts of them; second, the opposite conception of material reality as *not known* to be like our perceptions.

The first of these doctrines represents the least possible concession to idealism and is a very natural advance upon the theory that material things are immediately known. Granted that things as immediately perceived are ideas, why, it is asked, may there not exist a world of things, existing inde-

¹ This is not Berkeley's expression.

pendently of mind, but yet resembling precisely these perceptions of ours? If this be true, there exists a real world of unperceived yet colored, fragrant, extended things, and our perceptions are copies of these unperceived models of them, these 'real things.' Against such a doctrine, Berkeley urges two objections.¹ In the first place, he points out, this doctrine, that there exist real things like our percepts involves us in a new difficulty. Our ideas of the alleged external things are acknowledged to vary constantly, and it follows that the 'real thing,' if like the ideas of it, must exactly resemble several different ideas. But this is absurd: the real temperature, for example, cannot possibly be both warm and cold; yet according to one person's idea the room is warm, whereas according to another person's view it is cold. In the words of Philonous, the idealist, to his opponent, Hylas: "How is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant?"² Even more fundamental is the objection that reality independent of the mind cannot possibly resemble in any significant sense what is in its inmost nature mental, ideal, of the nature of consciousness. By 'material,' it will be remembered, is meant, the 'other-than-mental.' No material thing, therefore, can be like an idea.³ The opponent of Berkeley has to face the question, "How can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing in itself *invisible* be like a *color*; or a real thing which is not *audible* be like a *sound*? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea but another sensation or idea?"⁴

To the writer, as to Berkeley, it seems clear that a material world which is like our ideas of it cannot be proved to exist. But it is still possible, Berkeley's opponent will urge, that

¹ "Dialogues," I., last few pages; Open Court edition, pp. 52 seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 56².

³ Cf. *supra*, Chapter 3, p. 57.

⁴ "Dialogues," I., Open Court edition, pp. 56-57.

material reality which is not known to be like our percepts none the less exists. There are two important forms of this conception of matter as inferred reality, independent of mind and not known to be like it:¹ matter is regarded either (1) as the cause of our perceptions, or (2) as entirely unknown. These conceptions must be carefully analyzed and estimated.

It may be very plausibly argued, in the first place, that material reality, reality independent of consciousness, must exist to cause my perceptions. 'Ideas of sensation' — so-called things — are admitted to differ from the mere ideas of the imagination, precisely in that they are not creations of my mind, but 'impressed from without.' Thus, it is urged, there must exist a reality independent of consciousness, to cause regular and vivid and inevitable ideas of perception. In the words of Hylas:² "I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another . . . as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have, therefore, some cause distinct from me and them, of which I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas. And this thing, whatever it be, I call matter."

Against this doctrine Berkeley argues in the following manner: He admits the necessity of assigning some cause of our ideas of sense. But he points out that matter is not the only possible cause of them. It is at least possible (and he will later argue that it is necessary) to explain these ideas of sense as due to the influence, on the finite mind, of a mind greater and more powerful than itself. In the second place, Berkeley argues, matter cannot, in the very nature of it, be a cause of anything — least of all, of ideas of consciousness.

¹ The conception of 'matter' as substratum is, possibly, a third conception of this sort. As discussed by Berkeley, however, the substratum really turns out to be either the 'extended' or the 'unknown'; whereas, in its defensible meaning of 'relation of the qualities' the substratum would reduce to an 'idea of relation.'

² "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 70.

For by 'matter' is always meant, Berkeley says,¹ a 'passive,' 'inert,' 'inactive,' substance. But "how," Berkeley asks, "can that which is *inactive* be a *cause*; or that which is *unthinking* be a *cause of thought*?" By this question Berkeley indicates two reasons for denying that matter, as mere unknown cause of ideas, exists: (1) as inactive it could not be a cause at all; and (2) even if it were active, and thus a cause, as unthinking it could not be the cause of thought.²

Both arguments demand careful scrutiny. To begin with the second: it will be admitted that matter is 'unthinking,' that is, non-conscious. By definition, 'matter' is precisely that which is other-than-consciousness. But it is not so evident that a non-conscious being could not be cause of a phenomenon of consciousness. We know far too little of the relation between cause and effect to assert dogmatically that the two must be of the same nature.³ In fact, among observed cases of causality the difference between cause and effect is often very striking, as when mechanical causes produce thermal effects, or electrical causes physiological effects. Of course these differences are not so great as distinctions between supposed 'matter' and consciousness, yet Berkeley gives no adequate reason for the assertion that the non-conscious could not be the cause of consciousness.

We are thrown back, therefore, to the more general argument that matter, since inactive, cannot be cause of anything. Given the inactivity of matter, this will presumably be granted, since causality in the usual sense does involve activity.⁴ But the student of Berkeley will object, fairly enough, that Berkeley has no right to assume, without argu-

¹ "Principles," 9, 67, 69 *et al.* "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 71.

² This is a repetition of Locke's doctrine. Cf. "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Bk. IV., Chapter X., paragraphs 14 *seq.*

³ Cf. the criticism of Descartes's conception of causality, *supra*, Chapter 2, pp. 48 *seq.*

⁴ But cf. Hume's doctrine, as discussed, pp. 163 *seq.*

ment, that matter is 'inactive,' 'passive,' or 'inert.' Modern science expressly challenges this view conceiving of external reality as energy rather than as matter. Yet a study of contemporary scientific conceptions will reveal the fact that 'energy' is treated either as motion (kinetic energy) or as 'further irreducible cause of motion' or — still more indefinitely — as 'that whose form changes while its quantity remains unchanged.'¹ Against any one of these conceptions Berkeley's arguments might be directed. For energy conceived as motion reduces to sensible quality, and conceived as 'cause' or as 'permanent quantity' is an inferred reality of indefinite content. And just as Berkeley showed that we cannot perceive any sensible thing outside our consciousness, so, with equal force, he might have argued that the object of our inference is *ipso facto* an idea, object-of-consciousness, a mental fact. Thus matter, inferred to exist as cause of ideas, whether regarded as active or as inactive, would still be object of our inference and, therefore, in Berkeley's language, an 'idea.'² The result of our consideration of his doctrine, that matter as cause of percepts does not exist, is then to discredit his express arguments, but to accept his conclusion as a consequence of a truth which he has established.

But granting that the cause of our percepts cannot be material, or, in other words, independent of consciousness, there is a final possibility that matter, conceived in a perfectly negative way, exists. It has been shown that color, fragrance, texture, even form and motion, are within the world of consciousness, not independent of it; that even causality is mental, not material. Matter, then, if it exist, has no shape or color, is no form of motion, is not cause of anything. And yet, the opponents of idealism urge, one cannot disprove the existence

¹ Cf. W. Ostwald, "Natural Philosophy," pp. 149 *et al.* The theory of Boscovitch, that matter is made up of points possessed of inertia and of the powers of attraction and repulsion, was published in the middle of Berkeley's own century.

² For discussion of similar views, cf. later chapters on Hume, Kant, Hegel.

of some perfectly unknown reality, which is none the less independent of consciousness.¹

The proof just outlined, that an inferred reality must be mental, would hold against this hypothesis of an unknown reality which is "neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but something entirely unknown."² Berkeley does not urge this argument, but offers, in place of it, two other objections. He urges, in the first place, that this conception of matter is not consistently maintained by those who uphold it. The philosophers who allege the existence of an absolutely unknown reality are constantly, he says, assuming to know something, however little, about it.³ And herein it must be confessed that Berkeley clearly is right. Both the philosophers of his time and those of our day, who urge that the ultimate reality must be unknowable, none the less claim it as, in a certain way, known. Herbert Spencer, to take a modern instance, teaches the unknowableness of the ultimate, but at the same time defines the unknowable as an 'ultimate cause' and as "that through which all things exist;" and this means that the alleged unknowable may at least be known to be cause.⁴ If, on the other hand, the hypothesis of matter as 'unknown' be rightly held, if, in other words, it be seriously maintained that matter is that which has absolutely no qualities or predicates whatever, then, Berkeley points out, the hypothesis turns into a mere form of words to which no reality corresponds. That which is neither conscious nor unconscious; that which is not extended, colored, fragrant, or possessed of any sense-quality; that which is

Locke

¹ It should be noted, once more, that the term 'matter' is not nowadays applied to this unknown-reality hypothesis. Modern upholders of this theory spurn the epithet 'materialist.'

² "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, pp. 78 seq. Cf. "Principles," 80.

³ This is the probable meaning of Berkeley's objection to the substratum hypothesis, in the non-literal sense of the word 'substratum.' Cf. "Principles," 16 *et al.*

⁴ "First Principles," § 31.

not active, nor inactive, cause nor effect; that of which no assertion can be made,—is nothing; it does not exist. The hypothesis of matter as unknown is, in other words, self-contradictory, for if it really is unknown, it cannot be known to be material, non-ideal. "So," Berkeley concludes, "matter comes to nothing."¹

The hypothesis of ultimate reality as unknown yet non-ideal is the last fortress of the opponents of idealism. In his argument against them, Berkeley has long since proved beyond a peradventure that the objects immediately perceived are ideas. He has now concluded his examination of the three conceptions of matter, as reality which though unperceived may yet be inferred to exist. And (1) he has shown that material objects like our ideas of them may not be inferred to exist; he has (2) asserted, what on his premises he might validly have proved, that matter, conceived as mere inferred cause of sense-idea, does not exist; and finally, (3) he has shown that absolutely unknown material reality is a mere fiction of the mind. Herewith, the opponents of idealism are, as it seems to him, finally repulsed.²

The issue between idealism and non-idealism (materialism, as Berkeley calls it) is of such crucial importance that it justifies us in considering, at this point, a form of argument against it which has grown in importance since Berkeley's day. As will, it is hoped, appear, the objection has already been met by Berkeley, but not in the persuasive form in which it has been urged since his day.³ In brief it is pointed out that the physi-

¹ "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 80. Cf. "Principles," 80. This doctrine of unknowable reality is again brought forward by Kant. Cf. Chapter 7, pp. 236 *seq.* See also Hegel's discussion, Chapter 10, pp. 365 *seq.*

² Not till the student is familiar with post-Kantian philosophy will he fully understand why these three conceptions are exhaustive. Cf. *infra*, Chapter 11, pp. 398 *seq.*

³ Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 63² *seq.*, for a statement of this argument as it is implied by Hobbes, and Chapter 11, pp. 398 *seq.*, for a reference to nineteenth-century materialists.

ologists have shown that all phenomena of consciousness depend on nerve-excitation; and this, it is urged, proves that consciousness, so far from being ultimately real, is itself a function of a material process. In order to present this objection with utmost force a passage may be quoted from a materialist of relatively recent date. "If," says Karl Vogt, "I cut off entirely the flow of blood to the legs of an animal, the function of the muscles is entirely destroyed by the loss of nourishment, the animal cannot move its legs, its muscles are lamed. . . . If I let the blood back before the decomposition of the muscles has begun, the function is restored; . . . but if I do not let back any more blood, the muscle dies . . . and there is an end to every exercise of the function. . . . Now suppose that we take as object of our experiment not the legs but the head. We cut off the flow of blood to the brain. Immediately consciousness ceases, thought is utterly annihilated, sensation vanishes, motion is checked, every function of the brain has simply stopped.

"If I promptly enough let back the blood to the brain, motion, sensation, consciousness, and thought return again, the function reinstates itself. But if I wait till the organ can no longer perform its function, sensation, motion, consciousness, and thought are forever vanished. . . . I reach quite the same conclusion in the case of this experiment as in that of the foregoing: that because of failing blood supply the brain could not perform its function, that through continuance of this condition the organ has died, that the function has come to an end with the organ itself. . . ." ¹ The implication is, of course, that since the brain is material, its function, consciousness, must also be material. ²

Berkeley's reply to this argument for materialism is, in part, suggested in the beginning of the second of the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," and is in part to be supplied

¹ "Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft," II., Second Edition, 1855, pp. III-III2.

² Cf. Vogt, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

from the general purport of his teaching. Blood and muscle, nerve and brain, are — he holds — sensible objects; in the last analysis each reduces to a sum of sensible qualities, each is hard or soft, fibrous or cellular, grayish or red. But sense qualities have been abundantly shown to be ideal. Hence brain and nerve are not, as is claimed, 'material substratum'; and consciousness, if described as function of the brain, is the function of an idea. And if it is claimed that brain and nerve are not mere compounds of sense qualities, that they are also the necessarily inferred causes of ideas, then Berkeley might answer that the cause of consciousness, as inferred, is itself an object of thought and thus within the domain of consciousness.

The force of this objection lies, in truth, first, in the highly probable correspondence of one class of so-called physical phenomena with facts of the human self's consciousness; second, in the unjustified assumption that the physical phenomena are ultimately distinct from psychic phenomena, material in the sense of being non-ideal. The grounds for such a prejudice are removed by Berkeley's demonstration that the physical object is itself psychic, and that the distinction between the alleged material reality and the admitted idea must be a distinction between ideas of a less and of a more limited self. To the persuasive form of materialism founded on physio-psychology, Berkeley's answer is, therefore, the following: brain and nerve process, to which it is proposed to reduce consciousness, are themselves ideal, that is, psychic.

III. BERKELEY'S POSITIVE DOCTRINE OF INFERRED REALITY

a. The infinite spirit, God

The conclusion that there is no reality independent of mind seems to leave Berkeley certain only of the existence of himself and of his own ideas. But the discovery that certain of

his ideas are impressed upon him without his volition, and indeed in opposition to his wishes, has already suggested to Berkeley that some spirit other than himself is the cause of these unwilled ideas of sense. In truth, Berkeley widens his universe to include, besides himself, a creative spirit, God, and other created spirits as well. I am conscious of these other spirits, Berkeley teaches, not as I am conscious of myself with primarily immediate certainty, but because I necessarily infer their existence. "We comprehend," he says, "our own existence by inward feeling or reflection and that of other spirits by reason."¹ "My own mind and my own ideas," he elsewhere says, "I have an immediate knowledge of; and by the help of these do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas."²

This reasoning by which we infer the existence of a spirit, other than my own, which causes my percepts, or ideas of sense, is summarized by Berkeley in an early section of the "Principles": "I find," he says, "I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure. . . . It is no more than willing and straight-way this or that idea arises. . . . Thus much is certain and grounded on experience. . . . But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no . . . ; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is, therefore, some other will or spirit that produces them."³

This argument for the existence of a spirit, other than myself, as cause of my percepts, presupposes the demonstration, already given, of the truth that spirit alone is a cause. The argument in full may be summarized in the following

¹ "Principles," 89. Cf. the doctrines of Descartes and of Locke, as discussed on pp. 27 *seq.*

² "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 93.

³ "Principles," 28-29.

manner: (1) I am immediately certain of the existence of my ideas of sense. (2) These ideas must have a cause. (3) There are three, and only three, possible causes for an idea of sense: first, a spirit or spirits; second, another idea; third, matter, that is, reality independent of and other than spirit and idea.

(4) (a) But matter, Berkeley believes, does not exist, hence it is not cause of ideas of sense; and (b) these ideas cannot cause, or explain, each other, since they are passive — that is, dependent for their existence on being known by a self;¹ therefore (c) a spirit, or spirits, must be cause of the ideas of sense. And (5) this conclusion is supported by the immediate experience which I, a spirit, have of causing ideas.

(6) But though (a) it is thus proved that a spirit causes my ideas of sense, I am immediately certain that I am not the cause of them, but that I experience them in spite of myself. Therefore (b) some spirit other than myself must exist as cause of my percepts.

The existence of the sense ideas 'impressed on the mind' is thus, Berkeley teaches, the guarantee of the existence of a will or spirit other than our own. And the nature of the sense ideas is, he holds, the basis for our reasoning about the nature of this other spirit. The creative spirit must be first of all, Berkeley argues, eternal; for only if it is can we account for the continued existence of sense impressions and their acknowledged independence of any and all individual perceiving selves. "Sensible things," he says, ". . . have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is, therefore, some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them; as likewise they did before my birth and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with regard to all other finite, created spirits it necessarily follows that there is an *omnipresent, eternal*

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 115.

Mind which knows and comprehends all things and exhibits them to our view."¹

The character of these ideas of sense seems, furthermore, to Berkeley a sufficient argument for the ~~infinite~~ (or perfect) power, wisdom, and goodness of that eternal spirit which is inferred as their author. For sense experience, the sum of the ideas of sense, thus regarded as independent of my particular mind and more permanent than my special ideas, is what is meant by the world of nature. And nature is characterized by phenomena, such as the movements of the stars, or the flow of rivers, so stupendous that only a more than human power could produce them; by phenomena, such as the growth of plants from the seed or of animals from the embryo, so intricate, that only more than human wisdom could produce them; finally, by a uniformity and regularity so advantageous that only more than human goodness could have caused them. "If," Berkeley says, "we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller, parts, of the creation, together with the exact harmony . . . of the whole, but above all, the never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say, if we consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning . . . of the attributes one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, *who works all in all, and by whom* all things consist."²

Berkeley, it is evident, does not argue God's existence after Descartes's and Leibniz's fashion, from the completeness of the idea which I have of God;³ nor as Descartes and Locke had argued, from the necessity that God exists as cause of me;⁴

¹ "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 91.

² "Principles," 146; cf. 151-153, and "Dialogues," II., Open Court edition, p. 62 seq.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 46 seq.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 47 seq.

God

nor like Descartes from the necessity that God exists to cause the idea of God within me.¹ He argues simply that God must exist as cause of external objects.

b. Other created spirits

The existence of created spirits other than myself is also argued from my percepts — in particular from my percepts of bodily movement. "It is plain," Berkeley says, "that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several . . . combinations of ideas that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. . . . When, therefore, we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry, distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves."² The argument is twofold, from cause and from analogy. I have certain ideas, say, of a moving figure, waving hands, and loud sounds; these ideas resemble others which I myself at times produce, yet I am not the cause of these ideas. I infer, therefore, the existence of other finite spirits 'accompanying and represented by' ideas which resemble those produced by my own agency. Berkeley is at pains to add that the existence of finite spirits is inferred with far less certainty than that of God. For, he says, "whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men."

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 49

² "Principles," 145, 148.

c. The world of nature

Berkeley conceives God as creator, not only of lesser spirits, but of the world of nature. Nature is thus, he teaches, a system of ideas—"the visible series of . . . sensations, imprinted on our minds,"¹ by God, which corresponds to the system of ideas eternally present to God's mind. The laws of nature are God's uniform and regular ways of calling up these sense ideas in our minds. In Berkeley's own words, "The set rules or established methods wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense are called the *laws of nature*: and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things."²

This conception of nature will become clearer by analysis. I may regard the world of nature as composed, roughly speaking, of (1) the sense things, trees, sky, and flowers, at which I am at this moment looking; (2) the sense things, for example, the Mer de Glâce and the Pyramids, which either I have seen or have heard described by others; (3) the nature phenomena, for example, the motions of the stars, whose present reality I infer in order to explain the things I immediately experience; and (4) the nature events whose past existence I infer to account for phenomena immediately perceived in the present. To this last class belong early stages of the development of the universe, the whirling of the nebular mass or the glacial epoch, for example. Berkeley regards all four sorts of nature phenomena both as immediate ideas of God, and either as immediate percepts or as ideas of imagination of my own. The first group, that of the things I see, consists of ideas which God shares with me by impressing them on my mind. The second, that of the things I remember seeing or

¹ "Principles," 150.

² *Ibid.*, 30; cf. 105; and "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 108.

imagine from another's description, have been ideas of sense impressed on me, or on some other finite being, and are now ideas of my imagination. The third is a group of nature phenomena beyond human perception, but inferred as now existing. When we say that the earth moves, Berkeley observes, we mean "that if we were placed in . . . such a position and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets."¹ Our assertion that the earth moves is thus our image of the moving earth, and we know this idea of ours to conform to an idea in God's mind, and to be regularly connected with other sense ideas, for instance, with those known as sunrise and sunset. The fourth class of nature phenomena includes the objects which, arguing from nature uniformities, may have existed, we suppose, before the appearance of finite spirits on the earth. These evidently neither are, nor have been, the sense ideas of any finite selves, nor can they even be considered as such. They are ideas of our scientific imagination, and they are the eternally present, direct objects of the consciousness of the eternal spirit. "When things are said to begin or end their existence," Berkeley says, "we do not mean this with regard to God, but his creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in his mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are by a decree of God perceptible to them; then are they said to begin a relative existence with respect to created minds."² In other words, the nature world has a double existence. It is, on the one hand, a closely connected system of ideas eternally present to God, and, on the other hand, a uniform series of ideas in finite minds, corresponding to the system of God's ideas. Of these finite ideas, some are ideas of sense directly impressed by God on a succession of finite minds; others are necessary inferences, ideas of imagi-

¹ "Principles," 58.

² "Dialogues," III., Open Court edition, p. 121.

nation, corresponding to phenomena existing in God's mind and never directly impressed by him on finite minds.

It is interesting to contrast this conception of nature with that of Leibniz. Both Berkeley and Leibniz teach that nature has no existence independent of mind — in a word, that it is immaterial. Both teach also that my knowledge of nature is through my acquaintance with my own sense ideas. But whereas Berkeley teaches that nature consists in these sense ideas of mine together with a complete system of corresponding ideas in the mind of God, Leibniz teaches that my sense ideas indicate, as the reality behind them, monads, soul-like substances, undeveloped spirits. Thus Berkeley argues from his experience of certain sense ideas of motions and bodily features like his own, the existence of created selves. In a parallel fashion, Leibniz argues from all sense ideas the presence of active souls.

IV. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF BERKELEY'S SYSTEM

It is necessary, in conclusion, to attempt an estimate of the positive results of Berkeley's system. It is evident from the outline that his philosophy is essentially a theology — a doctrine about God. Naturally, therefore, the criticisms to be made regard in the first instance Berkeley's arguments for God's existence and his conception of God's nature.

a. Criticism of Berkeley's doctrine about God

Against Berkeley's argument for God's existence, it may be urged that it proves at most merely the existence of *a spirit great enough and wise enough to produce nature as we know it*. Berkeley's argument, as has been shown, consists simply and solely in the inference that a spirit must exist as cause of those ideas which I myself do not produce. But it is far from evident that a spirit adequate to produce nature should be 'eternal, infinitely wise, good and perfect.'

Berkeley argues the eternity of God on the ground that 'sensible things'¹ exist before the birth and would exist after the annihilation of all 'finite created spirits.' Therefore, Berkeley concludes, in a passage already quoted,² there is an omnipresent, eternal mind which knows and "comprehends all things." It will be observed that, by this argument, the eternity of God is as sure as — but no surer than — the eternity of physical objects. But concerning physical objects I know only that they exist independently of me; I infer with the highest probability, but I do not directly know, that they are more permanent than my ideas. And certainly I do not know that the series of physical phenomena is eternal.³ Berkeley has thus a right to argue: since things are the ideas of some spirit, therefore as surely as objects exist and have existed, when no human self has perceived them, there exists a spirit greater-than-human, with as great a permanence as the series of things. But farther than this Berkeley cannot go. He cannot, in other words, prove the eternity of the creative spirit, for he cannot prove that there is an eternity of sensible things.

(2) Berkeley's proof of the infinite perfection, that is, the utter completeness of this creative spirit, is even more inadequate. He argues, it will be remembered, from an 'attentive observation' of the 'order,' the 'harmony' and the 'infinite contrivance' of nature that only an absolutely wise and good God could have created them. It is obvious that such a conclusion can be reached only by the most one-sided observation of nature, only in truth by a persistent refusal to regard all that is inexplicable or evil. One may indeed find, in the nature world, 'order' and 'exquisite contrivance'; but besides organs adapted to use there are rudimentary organs which are useless and even harmful to the organism; subor-

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 119. 'Eternal,' is here used in the sense 'everlasting.'

² Cf. *supra*, p. 125.

³ Cf. Karl Pearson's expression of this doubt, "The Grammar of Science" (Second Edition), Chapter 4, especially § 7.

dinate to the surviving forms of life are 'smaller parts of creation whose life has no end save destruction'; side by side with the 'never enough admired laws' of the 'pain and pleasure' which make for physical and moral perfection are the suffering and anguish which seem to avail nothing. It is evidently, then, illegitimate in the face of the waste and the destructiveness of nature — the carelessness of type and of individual alike — to argue, as Berkeley does, that the character of our sense percepts evidently shows the existence of an infinitely wise and good God. It is possible, to be sure, that the wisdom and goodness of God may be otherwise demonstrated; and if this can be done it is certainly true as Berkeley suggests that the 'mixture of pain and uneasiness which is in the world' may be reconciled with the truth of God's wisdom and goodness.¹ But it is a different thing to reconcile the apparent defects of nature with the kindly wisdom of its creator, after that has been proved, and to argue, as Berkeley argues, precisely from the character of the nature world to the goodness and wisdom of God. Such an argument is obviously based on defective observation.

(3) A more fundamental difficulty, and yet one which is more readily avoided, concerns Berkeley's conception of creation. The hypothesis of God as creator is expressly based by him on my alleged immediate knowledge of myself as creating ideas. But my creativeness may well be questioned. In what sense, one may ask, do I create ideas? Is there any trace in my experience of that 'making out of nothing' in which creation is supposed to consist? I call myself creative in certain moments of imagination and thought. But what do I actually experience in thinking out a mathematical demonstration or in striking out the plot of a story? I turn my mind toward the general topic of my interest; I regard the topic steadfastly from all sides; idea after idea dawns upon me, and — of a sudden — there arrives on the scene that

¹ Cf. Chapter 11, p. 430.

particular idea which I recognize as the solution of my problem or the satisfaction of my æsthetic impulse. Berkeley would say that I create the idea, yet it certainly is also true that I did not make it, that it merely appears suddenly here within my consciousness. But if we conceive the greater spirit, as Berkeley (rightly) does, on the analogy of our own spirits, it will be truer to our own experience to speak of it as the 'possessor' or the 'subject' of ideas rather than as their cause. Such a rereading of the Berkeleian conception does not essentially alter it and indeed contributes, as will be shown, to the solution of still other difficulties.

(4) A similar though greater difficulty is the inadequacy of Berkeley's conception of the relation of the creative spirit to myself. This conception is never clearly outlined, but the implication of Berkeley's teaching, that God is inferred from ideas which he gives us, not directly known, is that God is radically distinct from us, a God, as it were, outside us. But if this be true, it may well be urged that it is impossible to understand how God can be conceived as affecting us at all — let alone as 'exciting' ideas in us. We certainly have no direct knowledge of such excitation on the part of God. The sense ideas, like the so-called products of our own imagination and thought, simply 'are here' and we are conscious of them. The relation between God and the limited spirits is indeed, in the opinion of the writer, comprehensible only on the supposition that the lesser spirits are, in a sense, parts of the greater spirit so that his ideas are at the same time their ideas. This conception contradicts Berkeley's, in so far as it implies, on our part, a direct and no longer a mediate knowledge of God. But there are certain indications that, in an obscure way, inconsistent with his own main teaching, Berkeley did conceive of God as including rather than as creating spirit. In one passage, at least, he speaks of God as "a spirit . . . intimately present to our minds"¹ — an

¹ "Principles," 149. Cf. "Dialogues," III. (passage quoted *supra*, p. 125³).

expression which implies the futility of inferring God, by teaching that he is immediately present. More than this, the double definition of external things — on the one hand, as my sense percepts, yet at the same time as God's ideas — is unintelligible unless God's ideas may be mine, unless I possess them in so far as I, the limited self, am included within the unlimited spirit. Such a conception, as will be shown, does away with two of the further objections to Berkeley's system.¹

b. Criticism of Berkeley's theory of knowledge

It has been shown that Berkeley conceives of knowledge as a copy of something. As has also been indicated, this doctrine leads him to the admission that we have no ideas of spirit. For ideas, he argues, are passive and inert; and cannot therefore resemble active spirit. He has had recourse, therefore, to the theory that one may have 'notions' — though not ideas — of spirit. And yet by his teaching about 'passivity,' Berkeley tacitly admits that 'notions' no less than ideas are passive. The activity of a spirit, he himself has shown,² consists simply in being a conscious subject, and the passivity of the ideas is nothing more than 'being perceived.' Now 'notions' as well as ideas are certainly passive in this sense: they are not conscious subjects and they are perceived objects of consciousness. Thus a 'notion of spirit' is as inherently impossible as an idea of spirit.

This is doubtless the most serious of all the criticisms on Berkeley's teaching; for it shows that, on his own principles, he has no right to that knowledge of his own existence on which his whole system is based. Berkeley's conclusions are, therefore, rescued only by abandoning his theory of

¹ The conception of the finite spirits as included within the Infinite Spirit was held in Berkeley's time by Malebranche and his English disciple, John Norris. (Cf. Appendix, pp. 464, 491.) For a fuller discussion of this difficult subject, cf. *infra*, Chapter XI, pp. 435 seq.

² Cf. p. 116.

knowledge and by admitting — as already we have seen reason to admit — that one knows at least one's own spirit directly, without interposition of those abstractions, the ideas. Berkeley himself, as has been shown, implicitly teaches that we have this direct knowledge. The truth is that to say "a self has successive ideas" is simply another way of saying that a self is conscious. But the idea-conception, even were it adequate to represent the conscious experience of a single self, is distinctly unequal to the representation of the relations of selves, and should not be employed with reference to them. Love and hate, sympathy and contempt, are personal attitudes and cannot be adequately described as series of psychic phenomena.¹

The conception of knowledge as direct and not mere copy encounters, as must frankly be confessed, greater difficulty when applied, not to my knowledge of myself, but to my knowledge of other selves — God, and finite spirits. The subject cannot fairly be discussed in any detail at this stage of our advance, but the following preliminary and so far dogmatic statement may be made: In being directly conscious of myself I am conscious of myself as related to other-than-myself. But, as Berkeley and Leibniz have shown, all reality is ultimately spirit, or self. Therefore that other-than-myself, which I know in knowing myself as related to it, must be other self (or selves). The characters and extent of such another self are, of course, matters of inference, not of direct knowledge. The difficulty in this conception is, it is needless to say, the following: how, if a self is other-than-I, can I directly and certainly know it; since that which has given to my consciousness of myself its peculiar certainty is the fact that it is just myself and no other of whom I am conscious? The solution of the difficulty must consist in the attempt to show that there is a certain sense in which the other self is ultimately *not* another. For if all finite selves are

¹ Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 263 *seq.*

expressions of the infinite self, then in one way each is what the other is, so that direct knowledge of one by the other is conceivable.¹ Thus, Berkeley's 'copy theory' of knowledge, as the mere possession of ideas resembling either spirits or else other ideas, must, it seems, be rejected. For, on this theory, as has appeared, a knowledge of spirit is impossible. But Berkeley has no need of this invalid hypothesis of passive notions which resemble active spirit, since knowledge is no mere possession of mechanical copies, but is, essentially, the immediate presence of spirit to spirit.

It would not be difficult to add to these criticisms of Berkeley's system. In particular, it should be noted that the proof just given, that he overemphasizes the idea-as-such, makes it likely that his view of external nature, as a system of ideas, is less probable than Leibniz's conception of nature as an assemblage of spiritual beings. It could also be shown that Berkeley, in spite of his accurate conception of nature uniformity, undervalues scientific study.² It is evident, finally, that he does not critically examine the non-sensuous factors of knowledge. No one of these criticisms, however, affects the fundamental positions of Berkeley's system; therefore, no one of them need, for the present, be emphasized.

With these criticisms, the consideration of Berkeley's system is completed. It has been shown that Berkeley teaches negatively (1) that so-called 'material' things are really the ideas of some mind, or minds; and (2) that matter, as unknown cause or background of these material things, does not exist. The first of these positions, in the writer's opinion, he makes good; for the second he does not offer, but he plainly suggests, a proof. Berkeley teaches posi-

¹ For further discussion, cf. Chapter 11, pp. 416 *seq.*

² Cf. the rank scientific heresy of "Principles," 109: "As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense . . . rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language . . . so in perusing the volume of nature it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them."

tively (1) that the universe consists of spirits and their ideas (or notions); (2) that these spirits include myself, other finite selves, and God — an infinitely wise and good spirit; (3) that finite spirits create certain of their own ideas and notions and receive certain others from God; (4) that external nature is to be conceived as made up of the ideas of God, often shared by finite selves, and ordered in accordance with the laws of his being—that is, of the laws of nature. The main criticisms on this doctrine have consisted, first, in pointing out that Berkeley's argument for the existence of God cannot prove more than the existence of a greater-than-human spirit, and is utterly inadequate to demonstrate the eternity or the perfect wisdom and goodness of this spirit; second, in showing the unnecessary flaws in Berkeley's doctrine of knowledge.

Important contrasts between Berkeley's idealism and that of Leibniz have disclosed themselves in the course of this chapter. The differences in the two arguments for the existence of God and in the two doctrines of nature have already been pointed out. But the fundamental contrast is the following: Leibniz is no less interested in the unique individuality and — as he holds — the consequent ultimate plurality of spirits, than in their common spiritual, non-material character. Berkeley, on the other hand, though he accepts without question the doctrine that ultimate reality consists of a plurality of distinct spirits, does not emphasize or concern himself greatly with this doctrine and its implications. But Berkeley makes a distinct advance upon Leibniz in the strength and detail of his argument against materialism. Leibniz asserts the unreality of alleged matter, but he nowhere adequately substantiates his conclusions; Berkeley, on the contrary, devotes himself to the painstaking refutation of the claims of materialism. Yet the most significant of Berkeley's positive results is, as has been said so often, no other than the most important of Leibniz's conclusions: the conception of the universe as a community of spiritual beings.

CHAPTER VI

PLURALISTIC PHENOMENALISTIC IDEALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HUME

"Hume . . . had neither any twist of vice nor any bias for doing good, but was a philosopher because he could not help it." — T. H. GREEN.

CLOSE upon the idealistic system of that genial Irish churchman, Bishop Berkeley, follows an idealism of a very different sort — that of the Scotchman, David Hume, who was sceptic, critic, diplomat, historian, and man of the world, as well as philosopher. Like Leibniz and Berkeley, Hume teaches that reality is through and through immaterial, but he does not conceive of this immaterial universe after their fashion, as a society of related selves. Rather, he believes the universe to consist of a great complex of ever shifting sensations and images, or, to use his own words, of impressions and ideas. In technical terms, Hume's philosophy, while numerically pluralistic, is qualitatively an idealistic, but a phenomenalistic monism. The many individual beings of his universe are not selves or spirits, but psychic phenomena, impressions, and ideas. It is difficult to overemphasize the historical importance of this new direction in idealism. Up to Hume's time no modern philosopher had doubted that an immaterial, an ideal, universe must mean a universe composed of spiritual beings, of selves. Hume challenges this belief, denies the existence of spirit no less than that of matter, and conceives the universe as immaterial indeed, but as composed not of selves, but of ideas.

This account of Hume's doctrine is, in a way, misleading,

in that it lays the emphasis on his positive conception of the universe, whereas Hume's teaching is, above all, negative, and Hume himself was sceptic, not constructive philosopher, was destroyer of traditional beliefs rather than founder of a new system. The truth is, however, that one cannot tear down without at the same time heaping up, and accordingly Hume, in questioning both materialism and idealism, really formulated a new doctrine.

I. THE FOUNDATION PRINCIPLES OF HUME'S METAPHYSICS¹

The positive doctrine to which Hume's scepticism committed him has two foundation principles. One of these is his teaching about impressions; the other is his causality doctrine. Before proceeding to the consideration of Hume's conclusions, it is therefore necessary to understand and to estimate these two underlying conceptions.

a. The derivation of idea from impression

"The perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves," Hume says, "into two distinct kinds which I shall call **IMPRESSIONS** and **IDEAS**. The difference betwixt these," he continues, "consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the percep-

¹ The outline which follows is based mainly on Bk. I. of Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature" (published 1739), and on the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding" (1748). The student is urged to read the "Inquiry" entire, and Pt. I. entire, Pt. III., §§ 1-3, and especially 14, and Pt. IV., §§ 5 and 6, of the "Treatise." Page references in what follows are to the Green and Grose edition of the "Treatise," and to the Open Court edition of the "Inquiry."

tions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion."¹

This introductory statement makes evident that Hume recognizes two groups of sensations: impressions of sensation, as he later names them — of sight, touch, and the rest; and impressions of reflection, pleasure and uneasiness, the affective experiences, as modern psychologists have called them.² The quoted paragraph further indicates the three main differences which Hume makes between impressions and ideas. The impressions are (1) livelier, more forcible, more vivid, than ideas; and (2) in occurrence, prior to ideas. From this last-named character it follows, Hume teaches, (3) that impressions are the necessary cause or source of ideas, and conversely that ideas are the mere effects and copies of impressions: "All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions — which they exactly represent. . . . The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions is a convincing proof that the one are the cause of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof that our impressions are the causes of our ideas."³

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § 1¹; cf. "Inquiry," § II. (Here, and in what follows, the term "Inquiry" is to be understood as referring to the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." "The Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals" will be referred to by the last three words of the title.)

It is imperative to note the distinction between the use which Hume makes and that which Locke and Berkeley make of the word 'idea.' To the latter the word stands for any fact of consciousness or psychic phenomenon as object of knowledge — for percept, image, or emotion. Hume, on the contrary, employs the term 'perception' in this general sense, and uses 'idea,' as will be shown, to designate one class of 'perceptions,' the less vivid. Modern usage vibrates between these two extremes. The writer of this book prefers to use the term 'idea' in the more general sense of Locke.

² This division is expressly made in the "Treatise" (Bk. I., Pt. I., § 2), and is implied in the "Inquiry" (§ II., paragraph 3). Hume includes 'desire and aversion, hope and fear,' among the impressions of reflection, but he later admits that these are not simple reflections.

³ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § 1, paragraphs 7 and 8, end. Hume qualifies this by the teaching (*ibid.*, paragraph 4) that only simple impressions and ideas, not complex ones, resemble each other.

It must be noted finally that Hume often supplements his description of impressions as more vivid than ideas by crediting them (4) with still another character: their correspondence with external objects independent of consciousness. This distinction is suggested in the following passages: "The simple impressions," Hume says, "always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas. . . . To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, *I present the objects*, or in other words, convey to him these impressions."¹ This alleged character of the impressions need not, however, be considered, spite of the fact that it lends a certain plausibility to Hume's teaching. For Hume later denies the very existence of these 'external objects' and has, therefore, no right to distinguish impression from idea on the ground that the impression corresponds to an object.

It is evident that the account just given corresponds roughly to an ordinary psychological distinction between 'presentations' and 'representations.'² But we are mainly concerned with the philosophical use which Hume makes of the doctrine thus outlined. It is the following: We know the real, he teaches, only through impressions or ideas. Indeed, since ideas imply preceding impressions, to know is to have impressions. But impressions are either sensations or affections, therefore we know only what we 'sense' or what we 'feel.'³

Evidently the validity of this important teaching depends not only on the accuracy of Hume's enumeration of impres-

¹ "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 8. (Italics mine.) Cf. "Inquiry," § II., paragraph 7: "If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. . . . The case is the same if *the object, proper for exciting any sensation*, has never been applied to the organ." (Italics mine.)

² It is, to be sure, admitted even by Hume that his first and fundamental difference between impressions (as lively) and ideas (as faint) does not hold invariably. ("Treatise," *loc. cit.*, end of paragraph 1.)

³ Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. II., § 6; Pt. II., §§ 5 and 6; Pt. IV., §§ 2 and 6; and *infra*, pp. 167 and 180², for Hume's specific applications of this doctrine.

sions but on the ... at ideas, the faint and later appearing perceptions of the mind, are mere copies of these impressions. Now Hume may well be right in the belief that our vivid and our primitive experiences consist exclusively of sensations and affections (impressions), but he is clearly wrong in the opinion that we have no experiences excepting sensations and affections and their copies. There is no guide save that of our own introspection in the enumeration of our different kinds of consciousness, and Hume's own introspection elsewhere testifies that he has distinct experiences which are neither sensational nor affective. Thus, he admits our consciousness of causality, identity, and succession; yet these are neither colors nor sounds nor pleasures nor uneasinesses. He is accordingly in face of the following dilemma: he has declared that every experience is impression or copy-of-impression, yet he has admitted the occurrence of experiences not included in his list of impressions. Evidently he must either increase the number of impressions, or he must admit the existence of ideas which are not mere copies of sensation or affection.

b. The doctrine of causality

From the time of Aristotle, until Hume wrote his "Treatise," no philosopher had offered a close analysis of the conception of causality. Descartes and Leibniz, it will be remembered, had without discussion assumed the necessity of certain causal principles;¹ Berkeley had distinguished between causality, the creativeness of spirit, and the regular sequence of idea on idea which, incorrectly as it seemed to him, is called causality. But it was left to Hume, among modern philosophers, first to study carefully the causal relation; and his doctrine forms the most permanently valuable part of his philosophy. Hume is chiefly interested in the "relation of *cause and effect*"

¹ Cf. pp. 48 seq., 103 seq.

because "by means of that relation" we are said to "go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses."¹ By reasoning that ideas or objects or events must have a suitable cause, all Hume's predecessors argue for God's existence, and all save Leibniz and Berkeley infer the existence of matter independent of mind. And everyday people as well as philosophers reach conclusions about past and future events by assuming that events must have effects and causes. As Hume says, "it is constantly supposed that there is a connection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it." This connection, the causal relation, Hume proceeds to analyze in detail.

According to the everyday view, there is a power in a moving billiard ball which strikes a second resting ball; this power forces the second ball to move; the motion of the second ball follows necessarily on that of the first. Hume's account of this occurrence is the following: There is no power in the moving ball and no necessity in the movement of the second ball. The movement of the second ball has, however, as a matter of fact, followed repeatedly on that of the first; and our minds, therefore, anticipate the movement of the second ball, on seeing the movement of the first; that is, our minds infer that the movement of the second will follow that of the first. In precise terms, according to the everyday view, the causal relation has two important characters: it is (1) a necessary connection between antecedent cause and following effect, such that (2) the cause is a power or force. Hume, on the other hand, defines causality as (1) a customary conjunction of events, involving (2) a 'determination of the mind.'² By the first of these teachings, he denies the necessity ordinarily attributed to the causal relation, and by the second, he interprets power as a purely mental character.

¹ "Inquiry," § IV., Pt. I., paragraph 4; cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 6, paragraph 7.

² "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., especially §§ 2, 14.

I. *The conception of causality as a customary, not a necessary, connection*

Two kinds of necessity are involved in what is called the causal connection of events. The first of these is the necessary or inevitable connection between cause¹ and effect regarded merely as events in time; it is formulated in the proposition, "Every present has a past and has a future." This sort of necessary connection is common to succession and to causality. The second sort of necessity is expressed in the proposition, "A given event, *b*, is so connected with a preceding event, *a*, that no other event could have occurred in the place of *b*."² Hume's main concern is with the strictly causal principle: the effect could not have been other than it is. He denies the truth of this principle, arguing on several grounds that the causal relation is not necessary.

The first argument by which Hume seeks to show that the causal relation is not necessary is the fact that, given any causal succession, one may always conceive of it as different; that is, one may imagine the cause to have had a different effect, or the effect to have had a different cause. Only by repeated experience, Hume points out, is it possible to discover what we call the real cause or the real effect. But a necessary relation, he urges, is one whose negation is inconceivable and which is known to us at once and without repeated

¹ It should be noted that the term 'cause' is not by all philosophers applied exclusively to an event. By 'cause' has been meant, also, non-temporal 'ground' or 'explanation,' and many philosophers have confused the two meanings (cf. *supra*, Chapter 2, pp. 51 *seq.* and Chapter 4, pp. 103 *seq.*), or else have distinguished these uses, yet retained the word 'cause' for them both (cf. *infra*, Chapter 7, pp. 210 *seq.* and 259 *seq.*). Because other terms may be found to express 'non-temporal causality,' modern writers tend to follow Hume and to ascribe causality to events only.

² It should be noted that the causal principle does not assert that a given event is uniformly preceded by the same cause. A given event may, on the contrary, follow from one of several causes.

experience.¹ For example, it is inconceivable that the relation between 3×2 and $3 + 3$ should be other than that of equality; and so soon as I know the meaning of the terms, unaided by repeated experience, I know this equality. On the other hand, I do not know without trial that a drop of acid will turn a blue fabric red: it is conceivable that the acid should turn the cloth black or that it should stiffen the fabric instead of eating it. The causal relation, in other words, is not necessary, whereas the mathematical relation is.

This teaching is of such importance to the development of Hume's system that it must be considered in detail. It will be well to begin with Hume's own illustrations of the doctrine, just stated and briefly illustrated, that the opposite of any cause or of any effect is conceivable, and that consequently only repeated experience enables us to assign an effect or a cause. Hume's first examples are from unfamiliar cases of causality, for, as he truly says, our inability to know effects or causes, without trial, is most readily admitted "with regard to such objects as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us. . . . Present two smooth pieces of marble," he continues, "to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure."² It is equally true, though we seldom realize it, that familiar effects and causes whose opposite now seems impossible to us had to be learned by repeated experience of them. "We are apt to imagine," Hume says a little later,³ "that we could discover . . . by the mere operation of our reason, without experience," the familiar effects of well-known causes. "We fancy that were we brought on a sudden into

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 1. Cf. "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., paragraph 7 (Open Court edition, p. 64⁴). Cf. Leibniz's doctrine, summarized *supra*, pp. 91 *seq.*

² "Inquiry," § IV., paragraph 7 (Open Court edition, p. 26²).

³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 8.

this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it." But this conviction of the necessary, and therefore immediately realized, connection between cause and effect is an illusion. "When I see . . . a billiard ball moving in a straight line toward another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line or leap off from the second in any line or direction? . . . All our reasonings *a priori*," Hume concludes,¹ "will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference." In other words, Hume is sure that the connection between a given event — say, the movement of a billiard ball — and the event which follows it is not a necessary connection, precisely because a different succession of events is conceivable.

This argument for the lack of necessity in the causal connection is emphasized by the teaching that only relations whose opposite is inconceivable are necessary. Thus, he would admit that there is a necessary relation, that of unlikeness, between white and black, because one knows the likeness "at first sight without any enquiry or reasoning," and because it is inconceivable that white should be like black. His enumeration of necessary relations is the following: relations of "resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number."² *That the square of the hypotenuse*," Hume says, "*is equal to the squares of the two sides* is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. . . . Propositions of this kind are discoverable

¹ "Inquiry," § IV., paragraph 10.

² "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 1, paragraph 2. Cf. Pt. II., § 4.

by the mere operation of thought. . . . Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and evidence."¹

So, to recapitulate: Hume's first argument against the necessity of the causal relation is through the discovery that one cannot, without repeated experience, predict the effect which a given event will have. But a really necessary connection, he teaches, is such that its opposite is inconceivable: it is, therefore, immediately known. The causal relation, accordingly, lacks necessity, since its opposite is conceivable and since it is known only through accidental and inadequate experience. Causality, in other words, is customary conjunction, not necessary connection.

It will be well, before going further, to attempt an estimate of this reiterated argument against the necessity of the causal relation. A careful re-reading of the text can hardly fail to convince one that the argument falls short of its purposed result. It shows that we gain, through accidental experience, not our conviction that a cause must be uniformly followed by a similar effect but merely our knowledge of the precise nature of that effect. The argument has to do, in other words, not with the necessity of the occurrence of a uniform effect, but with the alleged necessity that the effect be of just such or such a nature. (Hume sometimes recognizes this limitation of the argument, though he often loses sight of it.²) In other words, Hume argues (1) that only through repeated experience may one know, for example, that fire will be the result of friction; and argues (2) that because such experience is inevitably incomplete, the connection which it discovers cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary. And up to this

¹ "Inquiry," *ibid.*, paragraph 1. In the "Inquiry," Hume teaches that all mathematical relations are necessary. In the "Treatise" (Bk. I., Pt. III., § 1, paragraph 4), he questions the necessity of geometrical propositions. (For detailed comparison of the teachings, on this point, of "Treatise" and "Inquiry," cf. Elkin's "Hume's Treatise and Inquiry," pp. 111 *seq.*)

² Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 2.

point Hume is unquestionably correct both in his premises and in his conclusion. We do gain our knowledge of the exact nature of the effects of given causes by repeated experience; and repeated observation, varying with individual and with circumstances, cannot guarantee the universality and the necessity of the causal connection. Hume may be said, then, to have proved that we have only practical persuasion, never absolute certainty, that a given event has precisely such or such an effect. But this result falls far short of Hume's conclusion, (3) that there is no necessary connection between events. Granted that I do not know what, precisely, will be the effect of a given event, I may yet know that it had some cause and that it will have some effect. I may know, in other words, that every cause has an effect and that every effect has a cause. This is the same as saying that my inability to know with certainty the precise nature of cause and effect prevents neither the necessary existence of cause or effect, nor my certainty of that necessary relation.

A second argument which Hume employs to refute the alleged necessity of the causal relation is the following: Every event, he says, is a fact utterly distinct and therefore separable from every other; evidently there is no necessary connection between events thus inherently separable. In his own words: "All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle."¹ "The mind," he says elsewhere, "can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny. . . .

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 3, paragraph 3. Cf. Pt. I., § 7, last two paragraphs, for a correction of the doctrine of the separateness of the distinguishable. Cf. also Pt. IV., § 6 (and *infra*, p. 180), for a further application of the doctrine. Note that if Hume were consistent with his teaching about the separateness of ideas, his own effort to derive idea from impression and his constant references to the past would be alike illegitimate. 'Here it is,' would be the utmost to be said of any idea.

For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. . . . In a word . . . every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause."¹

This argument is peculiarly important, for, if it holds, it annihilates not merely the causal necessity of inevitable effects, but the temporal necessity as well, the necessity, in other words, of the connection between past and present, present and future. Present is distinct from past or future in the way in which cause is distinct from effect, and if this distinctness is incompatible with necessary connection, then there is neither temporal nor causal necessary connection. But in this conclusion Hume is utterly and obviously in the wrong. It is true that one event, the cause, is distinguishable from another, the effect; but to be distinguishable, by attention, is different from being separable. And it is a matter of immediate observation that no effect is separable from its cause; and that to be an event means precisely: to be a temporal reality with a past and a future. Granted that one thinks of an event at all, one must think of it as having some antecedent and some consequent. One is not certain that this past or this future is of this or that especial nature, but one is quite certain that every event has necessarily some past and some future. Thus, we know the necessity of the temporal relation just as we know the necessity of mathematical relations, because the contrary is inconceivable. In other words, at least the temporal connection, and for all that has so far appeared, the causal relation, really are what Hume calls relations of ideas, and are therefore necessary. Hume, indeed, tacitly admits the failure of this argument, for he makes

¹ "Inquiry," § IV., Pt. I., paragraphs 9 and 11 (Open Court edition, pp. 27, 28).

constant use of the assumption that past and present are connected with each other. He teaches, as has appeared, that the idea is an effect or copy of the antecedent impression, and that cause and effect are themselves 'customarily conjoined.' Such relations would be impossible if Hume were justified in the teaching that distinguishable perceptions are separable.

But Hume has still a third argument directed, like the first, against the purely causal principle: No other than the actual effect could possibly have occurred. He argues that even if the present effect were necessarily connected with the past cause, it would not follow that this cause, if *repeated*, should in turn be followed by the same old effect. For "past *experience*," he says, "can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance; but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects . . . this is the main question. . . .¹ It is impossible that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future."² Of course Hume does not dream of denying the practical probability that recurring causes should be followed by exactly repeated effects. Indeed, he himself searches for a cause of 'the tendency to pass' from cause to effect, after showing that we have no reason for assigning a necessary cause to anything;³ and he perfectly realizes that all scientific theories and all practical reasonings

¹ "Inquiry," § IV., Pt. II., paragraph 3, Open Court edition, pp. 32-33.

² *Ibid.*, paragraph 8, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³ This is often accounted an inconsistency on the part of Hume. In the opinion of the writer Hume may, however, here be supposed to use the term 'cause' in the sense which he has himself given to the word. The real inconsistencies in Hume's causality doctrine are (1) his teaching that past, present, and future are independent of each other; and (2) his teaching that volitions are necessary. He reaches the conclusion last stated on the ground of the uniformity observed as well in the actions of men as in nature changes; and in the course of his argument he implies and occasionally asserts the necessary connection of cause with effect. The entire portion of the "Inquiry" (§ 8) in which he sets forth this doctrine is, indeed, distinctly inconsistent in

about conduct are founded on the expectation of the uniform connection of effect with cause. (He denies not the practical certainty but the philosophical necessity of the relation.) We cannot, he teaches, know absolutely that the event which, in the past, had one effect will, in the future, have a precisely similar effect. For such an assertion is based solely on our experience of the past; and the past is no positive guarantee of the future.

By this argument Hume attempts to disprove causal necessity by disproving the absolute uniformity of it. He rightly assumes that if event *b* inevitably followed on event *a*, then, supposing that event *a* should recur, event *b* would necessarily recur also. He then denies the necessity of this uniformity, that is, the necessity of the recurrence of *b*, maintaining that if *a* should recur, it yet might conceivably be followed by an event other than *b*. He concludes that therefore *b* did not in the first place necessarily, that is, inevitably, follow upon *a*. It is obvious that this is a valid inference from Hume's premises. But upholders of causal necessity (though not all of them believe that events can recur¹) assert, in opposition to Hume, that if event *a* should recur then event *b* would inevitably follow. In the opinion of the writer of this book, Hume is — none the less — justified in this teaching that to-day's event, though 'the same as' yesterday's does not *necessarily* have an event 'the same as' yesterday's as its consequent. And this would prove indirectly that some event other than *b* might originally have followed on *a*.

The results of this discussion may be restated in a slightly different order. If this exposition is accurate and this criticism well founded, it has been shown, first, that Hume unsuccessfully assails the necessity of that connection between past and present, present and future, which is involved in the aim with the remainder of his philosophical writings since it implies that necessity belongs to the will of man.

¹ Cf. H. Rickert, "Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis," 2^{te} Aufl., pp. 212 seq.

very conception of time; second, that Hume offers an unsuccessful argument against necessary causal connection when he urges that we are unable to predict the exact nature of effects; but, finally, that Hume is right in his teaching: it is impossible to argue from particular experiences to universal laws, and it is, so far as has yet appeared, unjustifiable to assert that a recurring cause must uniformly be followed by the same effect.

2. *The reduction of causal power to a 'determination of the mind'*

The popular conception of causality not only regards it as a necessary connection of cause and effect, but explains necessity as the power of the cause over the effect — a force exerted upon the effect. Hume denies *in toto* the existence of power in external causes, but he also identifies power with necessity, and attributes power — not at all, as will appear, in the usual sense of the term 'power' but with a widely altered meaning¹ — to the mind.

(a) *The denial of the alleged power in external objects*

If we really were conscious, Hume argues, as we claim to be, of the power of an object over another, we should have an impression of this power; for "all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words . . . it is impossible for us to *think* of anything which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal senses."² But "when we look about us towards external objects . . . we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power. . . . We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball," for example,

¹ In this sense, 'power' is, for Hume, perfectly synonymous with 'necessity.'

² "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., paragraphs 4 and 6 (Open Court edition, pp. 63², 64²). Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14.

"is attended with motion in the second." To disprove the validity of our idea of the 'power' of an external cause, Hume therefore simply denies the possibility of directly observing any such power. Select, he says in effect, any instance you please of external 'power,' and a careful analysis of your experience will convince you that you observe — see, have an impression of — only the sequence of the effect on the cause; you may observe the size and shape and direction and color of the 'cause,' but you will never observe any distinct attribute which you may call its power. In this teaching Hume is unquestionably right. We observe, not power, but merely the sequence of external events on each other. We suppose ourselves to be directly conscious of the power of one object over another. We say that we 'see' that acid has the power to discolor cloth, or that a lighted match has the power to ignite gunpowder. But as a matter of fact we do not see the 'power' of the match at all. We see that one event, the lighting of the match, is followed by another, the explosion of the powder, but we do not perceive any quality in the gunpowder — any characteristic beyond its blackness, powdery texture, and the like — which we can call its 'power.' Hume is perfectly justified in this contention that we are not immediately conscious of the power of objects; and since the usual ground for asserting the existence of this power consists in the supposition that we see and feel it, Hume so far proves his point.¹

There remains, it is true, the possibility that though we do not directly perceive the power of external objects, we none the less are justified in inferring or reasoning that it exists. This difficulty is implicitly recognized in an argument already intro-

¹ It will be observed that in this exposition of Hume's argument against the occurrence of what he calls the 'impression of power' stress has not fallen on his use of the word 'impression.' He has been interpreted as saying, not that we have no sensational or affective consciousness of the power of external things, but that we have no direct consciousness whatever of such power; and he has been justified in this opinion.

duced by Hume in a slightly different connection. We get the notion of causality, he has argued, solely by observing the regular and repeated sequence of events. "'Tis not," he says, "from any one instance, that we arrive at the idea of cause and effect, of a necessary connexion of power. . . . Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects, entirely different from each other, we shou'd never be able to form any such ideas. But . . . 'tis certain," he proceeds, "that this repetition of similar objects in similar situations *produces* nothing new either in these objects, or in any external body. For 'twill readily be allowed, that the several instances we have of the conjunction of resembling causes and effects are in themselves entirely independent."¹ Hume's reasoning may then be recapitulated as follows: we cannot infer that power exists in an external cause, for (1) a cause is merely a repeated event; and (2) an event on its first occurrence has no power, for it has been shown that no power is *directly observable* in it; and (3) the mere repetition of an event adds nothing to its qualities. In the opinion of the writer this denial that causality is a relation independent of the mind is the most important and the most irrefragable of Hume's negative conclusions. Some of the premises by which he reaches it are, it is true, of questionable cogency — in particular, it might still seem possible, if one questioned Hume's doctrine of impressions, that an external event might possess a power not directly observed. But Hume might have made his point by insisting simply that the causal relation is an object of consciousness, and that it cannot, as such, belong to an alleged world of reality existing independently of consciousness.² Whatever the force of his arguments, Hume does not waver in his declaration that "necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects. . . . Either," he adds,

¹ "Treatise," Pt. I., Bk. III., § 14, paragraphs 15, 18, Green and Grose edition, I., pp. 457³, 458³. All references are to Vol. I, unless otherwise described.

² Cf. *supra*, Chapter 5, on Berkeley, pp. 130 *seq.* and *infra*, Chapter 7, on Kant. DD. 212 *seq.*

"we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but [a] determination of the thought."¹ To the consideration of this positive conception of causality as a 'determination of the thought,' we must now turn.

(b) *The conception of power as a 'determination of the mind'*

Granting that there is no discoverable 'power' in an external object, it may be that, as Leibniz and Berkeley teach, we do know a power of the mind. This is, in some sense, Hume's view, for he distinctly says: "Tho' the several resembling instances which give rise to the idea of power . . . can never produce any new quality *in the object* which can be the model of that idea, yet the *observation* of this resemblance produces a new impression *in the mind*. . . . For after we have observ'd the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant. . . . This determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy. . . ."²

Hume's conception of this 'power,' which he attributes to mind, differs utterly, as must next be observed, from the traditional view of 'power.' For Hume denies both the alleged power of mind over body and the alleged power of the mind to create ideas. These negative teachings must be separately considered.

(1) The common belief that mind exerts a power over body is based, Hume declares, on an inaccurate account of our introspection. It is "said that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel that by the simple command of our will we can move the organs of our body."³ But

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14, paragraph 22, Green and Grose edition, I., p. 460³.

² "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 20, Green and Grose edition, p. 459³.

³ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., paragraph 9, Open Court edition, p. 65³ *seq.* Cf. "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 12, Green and Grose edition, p. 455³.

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Hume answers that we are directly conscious of a sequence of bodily motion on conscious volition: "The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious." But of any power or energy in the volition, he adds, "we are far from being immediately conscious." He supports this counter appeal to experience by a more questionable argument. If we were conscious, he urges, of the mind's power over body, we ought to be able to explain it; and, as a matter of fact, we cannot explain it: there is, indeed, "no principle in nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body."¹ This argument is inconclusive, for the inability to explain 'how' mental power acts cannot be accepted as a disproof of the mere fact 'that' it does act. But the ineffectiveness of the argument does not, in the view of the writer of this book, prejudice Hume's conclusion. For observation here sustains Hume's initial assertion that I simply am not conscious of a 'power' in my mind which affects my body. In other words, Hume is right when he teaches that, in my consciousness of willing a bodily movement, I do not immediately know the mind as exerting power over the body. I am directly conscious of a sequence of bodily change upon volition and of a determination of my mind to pass from one to the other; but I am not directly conscious of my mind as *influencing* the object.²

(2) From the consideration of the alleged power of mind over body, Hume turns to a study of the problem of the power of

¹ In more detail, Hume urges that the power of volition over movement is distinctly circumscribed and that we do not know why the will "has . . . an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart and liver." Nor, finally, have we even an apparently direct consciousness of a connection between the will and 'the immediate object of its power,' the nervous system ('certain . . . nerves and animal spirits,' to use Hume's expression).

² This agreement does not carry with it acquiescence with Hume's positive conception of the will. (Cf. *supra*, p. 161, note.) It should be observed that Hume's argument leaves open to those who do not accept his impression test of knowledge the possibility of inferring, without directly experiencing, a power of mind over body.

mind over ideas. This had been ordinarily conceived, as by Berkeley, as the mind's power to create ideas. Again, Hume denies the existence of any such power. We are not conscious, he insists, of creating ideas; "we only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea consequent to a command of the will."¹ . . . Volition," he adds, "is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find anything in it," he demands, "like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a new idea . . . with a kind of *Fiat* . . . ?"² In this appeal to experience lies the strength of Hume's position. He has other inconclusive arguments from the limitation of the power of mind over ideas, and from our inability to explain this power; but in this challenge to be conscious, if we can, of ourselves as 'creators' of ideas, he certainly scores a point against Berkeley,³ since we are rather the recipients and possessors than the creators of our ideas—even the most novel of them.

In spite of Hume's belief that in our use of the expressions 'power' and 'force,' as ordinarily applied, "we have really no distinct meaning and make use only of common words without any clear and determinate ideas," he none the less insists, as has been shown, that we have an 'impression' of mental 'power.' To make clear this conception of Hume and to estimate it is the main concern of this section. It will be recalled that Hume's argument for the existence of mental power or necessity is, briefly, the following:⁴ Repeated instances of a given cause followed by its effect do produce the 'impression of power'; but the repetition can neither discover nor produce anything new in an external object;

¹ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. I., ninth paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 70¹.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71¹, sixth paragraph from end.

³ Cf. p. 143, above.

⁴ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 14, paragraphs 14 *seq.*, pp. 457²-460⁴. The treatment of this subject in the "Treatise" is fuller and more adequate than that of the "Inquiry."

therefore the power of which we have the impression must be mental. This reasoning is confirmed by the fact that we "immediately feel a determination of the mind . . . to carry our thoughts from one object to another."¹

In this 'determination of the mind,' Hume teaches, 'power' consists. It is evidently then of importance to know exactly what he means by the term 'determination.' We are tempted to think that he uses it as we might use the words 'will' and 'decision.' If this were true, Hume would be rightly interpreted as upholding what in the view of the writer is the correct doctrine of will. He would be saying, in effect: Though we cannot know that the mind affects bodily movements or that it 'creates' ideas, yet we do know that it is capable of an active and dominating attitude toward external things and toward its own ideas.² But such an interpretation is, for several reasons, impossible. In the first place, Hume is here discussing power as it is manifested in the consciousness of all forms of causal relation, so-called external as well as internal causality, and he could never mean that my will affirms, for example, the sequence of sound on vibration. In the second place, the synonyms used by Hume for the expression 'determination of the mind' show conclusively that he does not refer to the will, however conceived. For in place of the expression 'determination of the mind' he repeatedly uses the terms 'transition of the imagination'³ and 'inference.'⁴ Thus, in teaching that causality involves mental power and that this power is a 'determination' or 'transition' of the mind, Hume means simply the following: We are unquestionably conscious of what we call cause and effect, for example, of the motion of a ball as cause of the

¹ "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 19, p. 459³ *et al.*

² Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 307 *seq.*

³ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. II., paragraph 3 and last paragraph; "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 6 from end, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

⁴ "Inquiry," *ibid.*, paragraph 3; "Treatise," *ibid.*, paragraph 7 from end, *op. cit.*, p. 463³.

motion in another ball. This consciousness first of moving ball *a* and then of moving ball *b* is a transition of the mind, and my consciousness of my mind as moving from one to the other is an impression of power. This is the sum and substance of the mental 'power' involved in causality, as it is expressly defined by Hume. It is evident that such a definition of power does not conform to the ordinary usage of the term. But it is equally evident that a mental transition, under whatever name, is involved in tracing cause and effect. This is the important truth of Hume's teaching, later strongly emphasized and amplified by Kant. The significant defect of the teaching is its failure to distinguish the mental transition in the causal relation from that which is involved in every relation.¹ There may be, for example, as much mental transition in realizing that the uprising in Russia is like the French Revolution as in recognizing that a bell stroke is the cause of a sound. It follows that though Hume's teaching, that mental transition is involved in causality, is correct, it is also inadequate, for it does not suffice to distinguish causality from other relations.

A brief restatement of Hume's doctrine of causality with the more important of our comments on it will conclude this section. Hume teaches negatively that causality does not involve the necessary connection of past with present and of present with future; that causality does not involve the uniform relation of cause and effect; and that causality is not an external relation — that is, a relation existing independently of consciousness. The first of these assertions Hume cannot make good; the second and third, in the opinion of the writer, are sound doctrine, though Hume's argument is at certain points defective. Positively, Hume teaches that causality is a customary conjunction of events, namely, the mental habit of inferring one event from another. This positive teaching is significant and is

¹ Cf. Hume's discussion of personal identity, *infra*, pp. 187³ seq.

true as far as it goes, but it is inadequate in that Hume fails to distinguish causal inference from other forms of mental transition. The doctrine is well summarized in the following passage: "We say that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We . . . mean, *that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds*: [that is,] *that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of the one, the mind . . . forms immediately an idea of the other.*"¹

II. HUME'S DOCTRINE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS, INDEPENDENT OF THE MIND

a. The teaching that external objects cannot be known by the senses

This discussion of Hume's basal theories, the impression test of knowledge and the conception of causality as a mental connection of experienced facts, is an essential prerequisite to the study of his theory of reality. For by these standards Hume measures all metaphysical conceptions. He admits the existence of those realities, and of those only, which meet his impression test of knowledge and which do not seem to him to invalidate his conception of causality. Through these tests, then, he proceeds to gauge the reality of bodies, or external objects, and of souls, or selves. With the first of these topics this section is concerned.

By 'body' Hume understands what we have expressed by the awkward term 'non-ideal reality'; a reality which is, in the first place, 'independent' of our perceptions, and, in the second place, 'entirely different from them.'² To describe

¹ "Inquiry," § VII., Pt. II., second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 80¹. The meaning has been slightly changed, to correspond, however, with Hume's own teaching, by replacing Hume's 'either . . . or' with the bracketed words, 'that is.'

² *Ibid.*, § XII., paragraphs 9 and 11, Open Court edition, pp. 161³, 162².

this non-ideal reality, Hume uses the expressions, 'matter,' 'body' or 'bodies,' 'external objects,' and 'objects.'¹ The character of these objects on which Hume lays most stress is their independence of our perceptions. "An external universe," he says, "depends not on our perceptions, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated."²

Hume's arguments to disprove the existence of such an external universe closely resemble, as he does not fail to indicate, those of Berkeley.³ He argues, first, that external objects cannot be known by the 'senses' — that they are not, in Berkeley's term, perceived directly. In favor of this conclusion, he urges, first, that our senses are known and admitted to be fallacious. Of this 'imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs' we have, he says, numberless instances: 'the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aspects of objects according to their different distances; the double images which arise from the pressing one eye.'⁴ This fact, that some of the objects which seem to us external are mere illusions, makes it impossible to trust to our direct sense-consciousness of externality. Nor may we (after Descartes's fashion) "have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses."⁵ This, Hume rightly observes, "is making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity," he continues, "were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive." In other

¹ Cf. especially "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, and "Inquiry," § XII., Pt. I. The terms are enumerated in the order of the frequency with which Hume uses them, beginning with that which Hume least often employs.

² "Inquiry," § XII., Pt. I., paragraph 7, Open Court edition, p. 160³. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, paragraphs 3, 10, and *passim*.

³ "Inquiry," *ibid.*, second paragraph from end, Open Court edition, p. 164, note.

⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 6. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, thirteenth paragraph from end, Green and Grose edition, I., p. 498³.

⁵ "Inquiry," *ibid.*, paragraph 13, Open Court edition, p. 163².

words, Descartes's argument proves too much. Our senses certainly do sometimes 'deceive' us, and it follows either that the veracity of the supreme Being is no guarantee against such deception, or else that there is no veracious, supreme Being.

Besides arguing from the experienced fallaciousness of our senses that we have no sense knowledge of objects independent of mind, Hume reaches the same conclusion by considering the nature of the alleged 'external' object of the senses. Such an object, he observes, is believed to be made up of primary and of secondary qualities. But, as he points out, "it is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, etc., are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external . . . model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity."¹

Finally, Hume, like Berkeley, appeals to our introspection to assure us that we really are not directly conscious of things outside us, but that our immediately certain consciousness is of our own experience. "Nothing," he says,² "can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception . . . ; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted that the existences, which we consider, when we say *this house* and *that tree* are nothing but perceptions — in the mind . . . "

b. The teaching that objects external to the mind cannot be known by reason

In addition to the everyday conviction that objects external to the mind are known to sense or directly perceived, Hume

¹ "Inquiry," *ibid.*, second paragraph from end. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, paragraphs 12 *seq.*, Green and Grose edition, p. 482⁴.

² "Inquiry," *loc. cit.*, paragraph 9. Cf. "Treatise," *loc. cit.*, paragraph 21, p. 487¹, *et al.*

recognizes the 'philosophical hypothesis' that we must infer the existence of objects distinct from our directly known perceptions.¹ The doctrine is familiar to us through Berkeley's arguments against it. Admitting that the colored, extended things which we directly know are merely our own percepts or thoughts, it teaches that there none the less exist real things, very probably unlike these percepts, and in any case independent of them and distinct from them; and that we know the existence of these things by reason or inference. Hume argues, as Berkeley has argued, that we have no right to make this inference, no basis for the conclusion that these 'external' objects exist. His argument is worthy of attention. Those philosophers, he points out, who teach that external objects, realities independent of consciousness, must be inferred to exist, base this inference on the fact that our impressions (or perceptions of things) require a cause; and argue that 'real, distinct existences' must cause these sense impressions. But Hume believes that he has shown that causality is not a power inherent in an external object, that it is, on the contrary, an experienced connection between successive facts, — a connection known by the mind. Now if causality be mental, the facts connected by causality must be mental facts; in other words, the causal relation, being through and through mental, cannot extend beyond the mind. This argument is clearly implied in the following paragraph: "The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shows that there is a connection betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other. . . . But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the

¹ "Treatise," *loc. cit.*, twelfth paragraph from end, p. 498⁴.

existence . . . of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter. . . ."¹

There is no escape from this argument, if Hume's conception of causality as a mental relation be admitted. If causality is a purely mental connection, it surely cannot be a bridge between the mental and the non-mental. The only reason to question Hume's use of the argument is the doubt of his having proved satisfactorily this purely mental nature of causality. (The position taken in this chapter is that he might fully have proved the point, but has actually left certain parts of his argument unguarded.)

It must be noticed, however, that Hume implies, in the passage quoted, a more fundamental argument against the existence of material reality, as inferred to exist — an argument which does not depend on the validity of his conception of causality. Objects inferred to exist are, he says, none the less objects of consciousness, objects 'present to the mind.' But nothing which is present to the mind can possess an existence independent of mind. It is then a contradiction in terms to teach that the mind must infer (whatever be the principle of inference) the existence of external objects; for it is the nature of such objects to be independent of consciousness. By the use of this reasoning, Hume advances a far stronger argument than Berkeley's in opposition to the doctrine that matter (reality independent of mind) must be inferred as cause of perceptions. Berkeley has urged, in objection to this view, that matter is by common consent 'passive or inert' so that it may not be conceived as cause of anything, still less as cause of active spirit. This

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, eleventh paragraph from end, p. 499. Cf. "Inquiry," *ibid.*, paragraph 12, Open Court edition, p. 162³. The "Treatise" alone discusses this subject in detail, in the section from which quotation is made. The section is long and involved: it discusses both the continuity and the independence of alleged objects external to the mind; and it introduces many irrelevant, though often significant, considerations. In "Inquiry," *loc. cit.*, paragraph 11 and last paragraph, two subordinate arguments against the inferred-matter-conception are suggested.

objection, it was pointed out,¹ is ineffective against the dynamic conception of matter as energy or force. Hume's argument does not encounter this difficulty, for he argues against the inferred existence of material reality not on the disputed ground of the passivity of matter but on the ground of its basal character, namely, its existence independent of consciousness.

Hume's position, therefore, is one of great strength; it is, indeed, in the opinion of the writer unassailable. Descartes and the other dualists had taught that matter, namely, reality independent of consciousness, must exist as cause of our perceptions. In reply to this Hume asserts, first, that causality is a relation within consciousness and consequently cannot assure us of the reality of anything outside consciousness; and second, that, whatever the basis of the inference, inferred objects must be known objects, objects present to the mind, and cannot therefore be 'possessed of independent existence.' Hume has thus followed Berkeley in despoiling the universe of material reality, reality independent of mind. He teaches that we neither perceive nor justly infer the existence of 'external objects.' In their place we have simply perceptions which are 'present to the mind.'

c. The inconsistent assumption that 'external objects' exist

It is not possible to turn from the contemplation of Hume's disproof of the existence of material reality, without taking account of the extraordinary inconsistency with which he none the less implies in every part of his works the existence of these objects independent of mind. This discovery of inconsistencies in Hume's teaching is not surprising. Already it has been shown that he is untrue to his impression test of knowledge, since he admits the occurrence of relations,² and

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 129.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 154, 169.

that, while denying necessity in the scientific experience, he affirms it in the case of so-called voluntary actions.¹ Nowhere, however, is Hume's inconsistency more marked in itself and more insidious in its consequences than at just this point. There can be, as has appeared, no remotest doubt that he denies the possibility of either perceiving or inferring the existence of objects other than perceptions. Yet the discovery of this idealistic doctrine comes as a revelation to one who reads Hume for the first time. For throughout "Treatise" and "Inquiry" alike, Hume has persistently implied the 'real' and 'independent' existence of objects. ✓

These implications are especially frequent in the exposition of his two basal doctrines: the impression test of knowledge and the theory of causality. For example, he opposes causality to the mathematical relations on the ground that causality has to do with matters of fact or objects, whereas the mathematical principles are 'relations of ideas.'² But the distinction evidently has no force if, as Hume believes, the objects are themselves perceptions present to the mind. Again he teaches, as will be remembered, that impressions are distinguished from the corresponding ideas mainly on the ground that these impressions are occasioned by the stimulation of the sense organs through external objects.³ The distinction certainly loses its intended significance if sense organs and external objects alike are themselves perceptions of the mind. I say, for example, that my impression of red differs from my idea of red, because a red object stimulated my retina when I received the impression, and was absent when I had the idea. The implication is this: because a real object occasioned the impression, therefore the impression differs from the idea and indeed becomes a criterion of reality. But if, as Hume teaches, the real red object is itself a perception, it cannot endow the impression with any reality superior to

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 161, note.

² "Inquiry," Pt. IV., § 1. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 1.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 152.¹

that of the idea.¹ Hume, none the less, wins the assent of many readers to the impression test of knowledge, because his language lends itself to the everyday theory that impressions have a superior certainty due to their dependence on supposedly 'real' material objects — sense organs and the physical things which stimulate them.

In many other passages, more or less significant in relation to his argument, Hume implies or asserts that independent existence of matter which he ends by discrediting. "It is universally allowed," he says (when teaching that voluntary actions are necessary),² "that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force." This sentence is surely misleading as used by a writer who a little later argues that the "opinion of external existence . . . [is] contrary to reason."³ Contradictory statements or implications of this sort are found cheek by jowl within a single paragraph or even sentence. The paragraph,⁴ for example, quoted above, in which Hume asserts that "nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception," defines perceptions as "copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent." But precisely this independent existence is what Hume later insists that we neither perceive nor rightly infer.⁵ Of course, these inconsistencies in no wise invalidate the force of Hume's argument, if that is cogent, against the existence of realities independent of the mind; but they rightly shake the reader's confidence in Hume's good faith and lay Hume open to the suspicion of trying to gain, by implication, the benefit of everyday convictions which, by right of logic, would oppose his doctrines.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 173³; and cf. Green's Introduction to the Green and Grose edition of the "Treatise," Vol. I., paragraphs 195-201, 303 *seq.*

² "Inquiry," § VIII., Pt. I., paragraph 4, p. 84².

³ *Ibid.*, § XII., Pt. I., p. 165¹.

⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 9, p. 161³. The definition of the 'senses' in this paragraph is similarly inconsistent.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 164; and "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, quoted on p. 174.

III. HUME'S DOCTRINE OF SELF

Hume's metaphysical doctrine is, up to this point, a mere reassertion of Berkeley's immaterialism, an idealistic conception of the universe. To Leibniz and to Berkeley, and indeed to all idealists before Hume, this means simply that the universe is a society of interrelated spirits, or persons. Hume's originality consists in his teaching that the universe, though immaterial, is yet not spiritual, that it is made up of mental facts or ideas — 'perceptions,' as Hume calls them — with no spirits or selves to which the perceptions belong. A certain complex, or group, or series, of these ideas may, indeed, on this principle be called a mind or self; but this self has no identity or permanence or character of its own: it is a mere heap of distinct ideas, each of which exists for itself. Hume's reasons for denying the existence of selves, as distinct from these mere bundles of perceptions, are somewhat arbitrarily divided into arguments against the existence of any 'spiritual substance' and arguments against the existence of any self. The division may be disregarded, for spiritual substance really means nothing if not 'self.'¹

a. Hume's arguments against the existence of a self

By self is meant, Hume rightly supposes, that which is conscious, which is fundamental to its ideas (its perceptions, as Hume calls them), which is relatively permanent, or better, identical, in the flux of ideas. Hume argues against the existence of a self, so conceived, first on the ground that ideas (perceptions) exist independently and that there is, thus, no need of a self in which the ideas may inhere; second, on the ground that I am not conscious of myself, whereas if there

¹ The terms have been differently used, but never plausibly or justifiably. Cf. Locke's distinction of spiritual substance, or soul, from person, or self. ("Essay," Bk. II., Chapter 27.)

were an I, I must be conscious of it. These considerations must be discussed in order.

The most important argument, Hume believes, brought forward to prove the existence of a self, is the following: since ideas exist, there exists also a somewhat more permanent than they in which they inhere or to which they belong. Now Hume denies this premise. Our perceptions, he says, have no need of anything in which to inhere, because each is independent, each exists for itself, inheres in itself as it were, in fact, fulfils for itself the alleged requirement of a substance. ". . . All our perceptions," he says, "are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe; they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence."¹

But this argument, if it is valid, proves only this: that from the existence of ideas it is not necessary to infer the existence of any self. In other words, it proves at most that a self does not necessarily exist, and is far from proving that a self does not exist. Hume's second argument is farther reaching. If, he teaches, there is an I fundamental to my perceptions, then it is self-conscious. In other words, I must be conscious of myself if such a self exist. But, he proceeds, I am not conscious of myself, therefore no self exists. In two ways Hume seeks to make good the assertion that I am not conscious of myself. (1) He reiterates, in the first place, the statement that one never has an impression of a self. In Part I of the "Treatise" this teaching occurs in its most general form, the assertion that one never has an impression of substance. "I would fain ask . . . philosophers," he says, ". . . whether the idea of *substance* be deriv'd from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceiv'd by the eyes, it must be a color; if by the ears, a sound;

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 5, paragraph 5. Cf. § 6, paragraph 3.

if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a color, or sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities."¹ In Part IV. of the "Treatise," Hume urges the same argument with reference no longer to the existence of 'substance' in general, but to that of the spiritual substance, or self.² It is impossible, he holds, that a self should exist; for there never can occur an impression of a self, because impressions are, one and all, fleeting and evanescent, perishing with the instant which gives them birth, whereas a self is supposed to be identical through succeeding moments. "It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations, succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea."³

The argument just outlined presupposes the validity of Hume's impression test of knowledge and would fall far short

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. I., § 6. It should be noted that this argument is directed against the existence of substance in general. If it were valid at all, it would therefore tell against the existence of material substance, as well as against that of spirit.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6.

³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.

of convincing any one who denied this doctrine of impressions. For the benefit of such a reader, Hume reënforces his position by a direct appeal to introspection. He begins by a clear and forcible statement of his opponents' teaching. "There are," he says, "some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *SELF*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence. . . . The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on *self*. . . . To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be deriv'd from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there anything of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this."¹ This assertion of our consciousness of self Hume flatly denies. "Unluckily," he continues, "all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of *self*, after the manner it is here explain'd." In supposed self-consciousness, on the contrary, one is really only conscious of a particular collection of impressions and ideas. "For my part," he asserts,² "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception. . . . When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself* and may be truly said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated. . . . If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. . . . We are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraph 1. ² *Ibid.*, paragraph 3.

and continu'd, which he calls *himself*; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me." Hume concludes, accordingly, that "setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind," he may venture "to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."¹ "What we call a *mind*," he says in another passage, "is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity."²

It is necessary now to estimate with utmost care each of these arguments against the existence of a self. According to the first of them, a self need not be inferred as substratum of ideas, since an idea is self-sufficient, independent, separate from all other reality. But this assertion of the self-dependence, the isolation, of ideas flatly contradicts the teaching of psychology. It is a commonplace of psychologists, from Plato to St. Augustine, and from Hobbes to Wundt, that ideas are associated and interrelated. There is little need to argue this point, for Hume himself makes the admission, damaging as it is to his system. In the significant Appendix which he added to Volume III. of the original edition of the "Treatise," there occur these memorable paragraphs:—

" . . . All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable . . . and may exist separately. . . .

* * * * *

"But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective. . . .

"In short there are two principles, which I cannot render

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraph 4.

² *Ibid.*, § 2, paragraph 39, Green and Grose edition, p. 495².

consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.* Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case."

It is evident from these paragraphs that Hume himself admits a 'principle of connexion' binding perceptions together; and he certainly, therefore, is not entitled to argue, from the independence of perceptions, that we must not infer a self to exist.

But the more significant of Hume's arguments remains for consideration. The presupposition of this second argument is unassailable. Certainly, as Hume throughout assumes, if a self exists, then I am conscious of it, for self means self-conscious being. But now, according to Hume, I am as a fact not conscious of a self; therefore no self exists. Hume's denial of self-consciousness is, thus, the significant part of his argument. As has appeared, he makes the denial on two grounds: (1) He urges that I have no impression of myself and that without impression there is no knowledge. Against this argument it may be claimed, in the first place, that Hume is not justified in denying impressions of myself. To be sure, I have no sense impressions of myself,—in other words, I do not see or feel or hear myself,—yet I may be said to have an emotional consciousness of myself; and emotions, it will be remembered, are included in Hume's class of 'impressions of reflection.' To this an advocate of Hume might answer: Hume's special point is that a 'self' is supposed to have permanence, and that there can be no impression of permanence. But precisely this last assertion is incorrect; Hume could not make it save for the inadequacy, already pointed out, in his impression theory of consciousness. Either we are not even conscious of permanence at all, do not know what is meant by the word (but not even Hume asserts this); or

we have an idea of it without having an impression of it (which is quite contrary to Hume's teaching); or we do have an impression of it. Whichever statement of the case be true, Hume is clearly wrong when he teaches that to know one must have an impression; that to know the self one must know it as permanent; that one has no impression of permanence; and, therefore, finally, that one does not know any self.

We have so far discredited Hume's attempt to prove from the independence of perceptions that it is needless to infer a self as the substratum in which they inhere. We have seen, furthermore, the weakness of Hume's first reason for denying the direct consciousness of self. There remains his denial of self-consciousness through the mere appeal to introspection. And with this we have reached the crucial point of the discussion. The failure of the preceding reasoning is unimportant if now Hume can convince me that I am, after all, not directly conscious of a self — that I am, in fact, conscious only of perceptions, impressions and ideas. Descartes had reasoned: I exist, for to doubt or to deny my existence requires a doubting or denying I. Hume answers: Doubt or denial requires not an I, but an idea, not a doubter, but a doubt; and, as a matter of experience, I am conscious not of the self or doubter but of the idea, the doubt.¹

The first comment to be made upon this teaching is this, that it does not follow from the premise. As has appeared, Hume reaches the conclusion from the observation that he is never conscious of himself except as perceiving. But I may

¹ The best of the contemporary arguments, known to the writer, against the existence of the self are those of G. S. Fullerton ("A System of Metaphysics," Chap. V.) and of C. A. Strong ("Why the Mind has a Body," Chap. IX. Cf. W. K. Clifford's "On the Nature of Things in Themselves," in "Essays," Vol. II., 80 ff.). The essential feature of these arguments is the assumption that the self is an illicitly inferred occult being, separate from experience. The critics of the self-doctrine lay stress on the reality of percepts, thoughts, and feelings and argue triumphantly that we have no right to infer a self behind and apart from experience. It is evident that these arguments may be disregarded by all who hold that the self is directly experienced not *apart from* consciousness but *in* consciousness.

readily grant that I am never conscious of myself except as conscious in some particular way — that is, as having a perception of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or pleasure — without thereby denying that I am at the same time conscious of a self which perceives. In other words, it is certainly true that a self without perceptions is never experienced, but it does not follow that there is no self; on the other hand, it well may be that the perceptions are those of a self.

b. The inconsistent assumption that a self exists

In favor of this view that in being conscious of perceptions one is also conscious of a self, it should now be observed that Hume, spite of his denial of a self, constantly presupposes its existence. On every page of "Treatise" and of "Inquiry" alike, he alludes to 'mind or myself' as more than a mere bundle of perceptions, and attributes to it characters — in particular, activity and continuousness — which cannot possibly belong to mere perceptions. Thus, he speaks of 'the operations of the mind';¹ he says, in another place, that "imagination has the command over all its ideas";² and he teaches, even more explicitly, that "the mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases."³ Hume's assertions of the relative permanence, or continuity, of the mind are equally unambiguous. "The mind . . . naturally continues," he says.⁴ "The imagination," he has observed, just previously, "when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 8, paragraph 2. Cf. "Inquiry," § V., Pt. I., second paragraph from end, *et al.*

² "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. III., § 7, second paragraph from end.

³ Appendix to Vol. III. (original edition) of the "Treatise"; Green and Grose edition, p. 555².

⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 2, paragraph 22, Green and Grose edition, p. 488¹.

the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse." But a mere bundle of evanescent perceptions could neither "separate, unite, and mix ideas," nor yet continue in a train of thinking. This inconsistency is made especially evident by the effort to replace Hume's personal pronouns, in his very argument against the self, by some form of his exacter definition of self. The passage quoted on page 182 would read, thus translated, ". . . when a bundle of perceptions enters most intimately into what it calls this bundle of perceptions it always stumbles on some particular perception or other of heat or cold. . . ." Thus expressed, without inconsistency with Hume's doctrine, the passage loses all that persuasiveness which it actually possesses because of its virtual implication of that self which it ostensibly denies.

These implications, it must be observed, of the existence of minds or selves, underlying the succession of ideas, are not mere unessential lapses from Hume's central teaching. On the contrary, this conception of a self is fundamental to no fewer than four of Hume's explicit doctrines or arguments. The first of these is his conception of causality.¹ It has already been shown that he defines causality as 'transition' and 'inference' of the mind. But the occurrence of a transition implies the existence of a permanent being within which the transition occurs; fleeting perceptions can replace or succeed each other, but there can be no transition in them.²

A second teaching of Hume which is based on the assumption of the very self which he denies is his doctrine of personal identity, that is, his method of accounting for what he terms the false supposition of personal identity. For, though Hume argues against the fact of personal identity, he none the less has to admit our 'great . . . propension . . . to suppose ourselves possesst'³ of it. He goes on to explain the alleged consciousness of personal identity as the easy 'transition of

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 166 *seq.* ² Cf. Kant's teaching, *infra*, p. 227 *seq.*

³ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraph 5.

the mind from one object to another, the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas.¹ But this 'transition of the mind' involves, as has just appeared, a continuous mind, a self distinct from series of resembling and connected ideas. So, Hume actually opposes what he calls the false conception of personal identity by an explanation which assumes the existence of what is virtually the same — a continuous self.

The remaining doctrines which require the assumption of a self fundamental to ideas belong to Hume's psychological and ethical teaching, not to the metaphysical system which, in this chapter, is mainly considered. One important form of his doctrine of the passions — that is to say, his psychology of the emotions — is based upon the doctrine of a self in social relation with other selves. Not the impression or idea, but the self, is — Hume teaches — the unit of the affective consciousness.² Thus, pride is defined³ as "a certain satisfaction in ourselves"; love or friendship is said to be⁴ "a complacency in another"; "self" is described⁵ as "ever intimately present to us." In his moral philosophy, finally, Hume assumes explicitly the existence of selves in social relations. 'Good' and 'bad' resolve themselves, for him, into 'useful' and 'harmful,' or 'pleasant' and 'painful'; but pleasure and pain arise, he teaches, through sympathy with others as well as through personal experience;⁶ the utility which is object of virtue is that of society no less than that of the individual;⁷

¹ "Treatise," Bk. I., Pt. IV., § 6, paragraphs 6, 16, Green and Grose edition, pp. 535³, 541¹.

² This is perfectly evident in the "Dissertation on the Passions." Book II. of the "Treatise," on the other hand, attempts in many passages to reduce emotions to ideas of pleasure and pain; but its classification of emotions and its significant discussions are based throughout on the conception of emotions as personal relations.

³ "Dissertation," § II. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. I., § 2, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II., p. 77 *et al.*

⁴ "Dissertation," § II.; "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. II., § 1.

⁵ "Dissertation," § III., 2. Cf. "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. I., § 2.

⁶ "Treatise," Bk. III., Pt. II., § 2. Cf. "Principles of Morals."

⁷ "Treatise," Bk. II., Pt. III., § 61; "Principles," § V., Pt. I.

indeed, the very "notion of morals implies," Hume says, "some sentiment common to all mankind . . . the 'sentiment of humanity.'"¹ But sympathy and society and humanity imply inevitably actual selves, distinct though inseparable from their ideas, and in vital relation with each other.

After the outline and the estimate of Hume's doctrine of the self, it is necessary at the end to review the bearing of the doctrine on the question fundamental to all philosophy: is there a self which underlies evanescent psychic phenomena? Hume's arguments to prove the self non-existent are fundamentally two. He argues that a self need not exist, on the ground that our perceptions, independently existing, have no need of a subject in which to inhere; but he fails to prove even to his own satisfaction that perceptions do exist independently. Then he argues that a self does not exist, on the ground that our alleged self-consciousness is, after all, a mere consciousness of perceptions; but his very argument refutes itself and implies the truth that a consciousness of different perceptions is also, inevitably, a consciousness of a perceiving self. It is thus evident that Hume's arguments are incapable of disproving the existence of a self, and it is fair to add that no essentially new arguments have been advanced since the "Treatise" was published. The case for the self is immeasurably strengthened, also, by the discovery that Hume's own philosophy, from start to finish, implies the existence of a self. Against the force of these considerations, it may, however, be objected that Hume's inconsistency is not *ipso facto* an argument for the existence of a self; and that the disproof of Hume's arguments leaves undisturbed the proofs which future philosophers may conceivably bring forward. This abstract possibility is not to be denied, but — in the view of the writer — does not affect one's conviction of an existing self, a unique and identical reality which underlies and unifies distinct perceptions. For this conviction is not,

¹ "Principles of Morals," § IX., Pt. I., paragraph 5.

primarily, an argued conclusion; it is a direct and therefore an unproved certainty contained in every conscious experience. Of course this initially immediate assurance is later reflected on; and it is immensely strengthened by the study of Hume and the other philosophers who refuse to recognize a self. For such a study shows that the arguments are invalid which are urged against the existence of a self; and that the existence of a self is constantly assumed by those who deny it. In the last resort, however, I can only assert, without proving, my direct consciousness of my own existence.

IV. HUME'S TEACHING ABOUT GOD

It has already appeared that Hume argues against the existence of objects independent of the mind, and yet that he tacitly assumes that ideas correspond to external objects; that he has said "there is no self," and yet that his doctrines of causality and identity — to name no others — imply the existence of a self. It will not be surprising, therefore, to discover that Hume everywhere assumes the existence of a 'Supreme Being,' or 'Deity,' although it is evident that on Hume's principles we have no right to believe that there is a God. It is true that Hume never argues definitely against the existence of God, for even the sceptic Philo, in the "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," never questions 'the *Being* but only the *Nature* of the Deity.'¹ But Hume's arguments to disprove the existence of substance, material or spiritual, apply as well to God as to finite realities. In the first place, if God is conceived as a causal being, totally distinct from human experience, then the argument by which Hume proves that we may not infer the existence of external

¹ "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," Pt. II., paragraph 3. On this question of Hume's philosophical doctrine about God, and of his personal attitude toward religion, cf. especially the "Dialogues"; but see, also, Elkin, "Hume's Treatise and Inquiry," § 47, pp. 266 *seq.*, and the works there cited, including Huxley, "Hume" (pp. 151 *seq.*), and Windelband, "History of Philosophy" (Eng. trans., p. 494).

objects tells equally against the existence of God. For causality is a relation within experience, and God cannot, therefore, be conceived as infinite cause and at the same time as existing independently of experience. If, on the other hand, God be conceived as infinite spirit, or greater self, then Hume's arguments against the existence of selves would also tell — if they were valid arguments — against God's existence. We have questioned their cogency, but Hume employed them; and it follows that there is no place in his philosophy for God.

In the eyes of the uncritical reader, Hume's conclusions gain plausibility by his unjustified appropriation of the God, the external objects, and the finite selves whom he has elaborately annihilated. In the mind of the rigidly logical thinker, on the other hand, this procedure awakens a suspicion, not indeed of Hume's personal sincerity, but of his intellectual honesty and of the value of his teaching. No one, however, can deny the significance of two portions of Hume's doctrine, — his conception of causality, and his denial of the existence of a self. Important features of his causal doctrine had, indeed, been suggested by Berkeley;¹ but Hume first elaborated and fused the significant teachings that causality is not an immaterial power; that it is rather a sequence of events or, more clearly scrutinized, a mental continuity or transition. These elements of his doctrine have become inwrought in the fibre of modern philosophical thinking; his equally emphasized denial of the necessity of the causal sequence is, on the other hand, chiefly important because it initiated Kant's defence of causal necessity.²


Even more significant among philosophical doctrines is Hume's reduction of all selves to mere 'bundles' of fleeting and unconnected ideas, and his consequent conception of the universe as nothing more than a mass of loosely connected perceptions, momentary sensations, for example, of red,

¹ "Principles," 53, 65, 66.

² Cf. *infra*, p. 211 seq.

sweet, soft, and fragrant, and equally fleeting emotions of love and hate and avarice and the like. The importance of this conception is not due to its validity; on the contrary, as it has been the effort of this chapter to show, the doctrine is argued from invalid premises and contradicts our most immediate certainty. Yet Hume has rendered a service to philosophy in setting forth this theory, erroneous as it is. An error never can be refuted till it has been clearly stated; and an unformulated and unrefuted error may work incalculable injury from the shadowy recesses of the mind which vaguely holds it. Now Hume's annihilation of the self is obviously a doctrine of vital consequences. If the supposed self is a mere parcel of perceptions, replaced a moment hence by another kaleidoscopic complex of sensations, plainly there is no ground for belief in personal immortality, no philosophic basis for a conviction of personal responsibility. Precisely because of its practical significance, therefore, Hume's denial of the self tends to incite his readers to a closer analysis of the conception of a self, a more careful study of the relations of selves. This effect of Hume's doctrine the succeeding chapters will consider.

A CRITICISM OF PRECEDING
SYSTEMS



CHAPTER VII

AN ATTACK UPON DUALISM AND PHENOMENALISM: THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

“Das Zurückgehen auf Kant [kann] für uns nur bedeuten: die Fragen, die er gestellt hat, nicht bloss aufs neue zu stellen, sondern sie auch weiter und schärfer zu fassen, die Antworten die er gegeben hat, aufs neue zu prüfen, zu ergänzen, zu berichtigen.” — ZELLER.

MODERN thought had passed, in the early eighteenth century, by way of the dualism of Descartes and of Locke, through two phases of a qualitative monism. Under the lead of Hobbes, philosophy had meant materialism; in the hands of Leibniz and Berkeley, it had turned idealistic and spiritualistic. Hume, finally, though as much an idealist as ever Berkeley was, converted the spiritualistic form of idealism into phenomenalism, by conceiving of the universe no longer as a world of spirits but as a world of evanescent psychic phenomena: impressions and ideas.

Roughly coterminous with Hume's philosophy is the system of the German philosopher, Christian Wolff. Instead of being a modification of idealism, Wolffian doctrine reverts in a curious way to the old dualistic type. Wolff, to be sure, purports to follow Leibniz; but he ignores all the significant teachings of Leibniz, retaining little save the terminology and the inconsistencies of the system. Leibniz teaches that the universe is a community of through and through spiritual beings. Wolff, on the contrary, holds that the ultimate all-of-reality is a double universe: a world of reality independent of and distinct from any and all consciousness, which would exist if there were no mind or minds to know it; and a parallel world of conscious beings. Thus to every part of the world independent of consciousness, there corresponds, he

holds, the consciousness of just this particular reality. Wolff teaches, in other words, as Descartes has taught and as most people uncritically believe, that it is possible to know realities which are yet independent of the consciousness of them.

Wolff's system is, in the second place, rationalistic. His rationalism follows, as must be admitted, from an inconsistent teaching of Leibniz. For though Leibniz insists on the continuity of consciousness and teaches that sense and thought differ, not in kind, but in degree of consciousness, he none the less exalts reason over sense; and Wolff emphasizes and perpetuates the distinction, really subversive of Leibniz's teaching. Thus, Wolff teaches that there are two distinct kinds of consciousness: sense and thought. Sense he conceives as the relatively superficial, which only confusedly corresponds to the reality independent of consciousness, and which is unable to fathom the deeper realities of the universe; thought, on the other hand, he believes, may attain the knowledge of the independent realities, or substances, and of causality, space and time, unity, and the other rational principles.

It has been necessary to outline Wolff's system, though it is unimportant in itself considered, for the most influential of modern doctrines, that of Immanuel Kant, is directly derived from it. Kant's philosophy, in its essential development, is a progressive exploitation of the world of independent reality in favor of that of consciousness. In other words, he discovers, point by point, that forms of thought have no exact parallels in a world of reality independent of them. Corresponding with the sensational consciousness, however, he persistently assumes the existence of independent realities — of realities which are, to be sure, despoiled of all describable characters, a ghostlike world of shadowy objects, whose only quality is the negative one of being other than consciousness and independent of it. Kant's relation to Wolff is thus comparable with the relation of Leibniz to Descartes. Yet

though, like Leibniz, Kant modifies dualism in the direction of idealism, unlike Leibniz, he fails to complete his idealistic reconstruction of the universe. This incompleteness follows, doubtless, from Kant's conservatism. He was himself a precise little university professor of fixed habits, and his intellect was of the 'slow and sure' order, which turns and twists traditional doctrines in the effort to gain all their meaning, instead of throwing them rashly away at the first suspicion of their inadequacy. In Kant this reluctance to discard old forms was combined with an unsparing criticism of doctrines which had not stood the test of prolonged scrutiny. The result of this curious combination of the conservative and the critical tendencies is a system marked by great internal inconsistencies.

Kant's system must not, however, be described solely by its affiliation with that of Wolff. For Kant is profoundly influenced also by his study of Hume. From Hume, he derives, in the first place, the suggestion for his criticism of dualism and of rationalism; with Hume he emphasizes the perceptual nature of space and time, and the ideal character of the forms of thought. But quite as important as the agreement is the opposition between Kant and Hume. Kant, imperceptibly influenced no doubt by Diderot's and by Rousseau's individualism,¹ reinstates the spiritualistic — or personalistic — form of idealism. He replaces Hume's view of the universe as mere conglomerate of impressions and ideas, by the older conception of the known universe of conscious selves. Only, as has been pointed out, he retains the dualistic doctrine that there are still realities beyond these selves.

But even those who believe, with the writer of this book, that Kant's system includes no teaching new to philosophy, admit its historical importance. It turned back rationalistic philosophy in Germany from the path of dualism reëntered

¹ Cf. Appendix, pp. 505, 506.

by Wolff; and it rescued idealism from the sheer phenomenalism of Hume. The student of philosophy, therefore, reads Kant, not because his works embody teachings which occur nowhere else; on the other hand, there is little which he taught that cannot be discovered better stated in the doctrines of predecessors or of successors. Nor does one study Kant for the intrinsic worth of his system as such; on the other hand, it must be admitted that his doctrine is incomplete and inconsistent, that the arguments by which he reaches his conclusions are often invalid and still more often unnecessary. Yet the student of modern philosophy must study Kant because nineteenth century philosophy of every order has been influenced by Kant's teaching. Post-Kantian idealistic philosophy, both British and continental, is indeed born of the Kantian system; the blood of Kant flows in its veins. And the most antagonistic forms of British thought have at least been influenced by Kant in the sense that they have been most vigorous in their onslaughts upon him. Thus the systems of friend and of foe alike presuppose on the student's part an acquaintance with Kant.¹

A. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWN OBJECT (A REFUTATION OF WOLFF'S DUALISM AND OF HUME'S PHENOMENALISM)

The dualistic doctrine of Wolff forms the starting-point of Kant's own thought and, for many years, the basis of his

¹ The summary and estimate of Kant's system contained in this chapter are based on the study mainly of his "Kritik of Pure Reason," and the most important of his ethical works, the "Metaphysik of Morality," and the "Kritik of Practical Reason." References are made to the first and second editions (A and B, published respectively in 1781 and 1787) of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," and to the first editions of the other works. The pages of Watson's "Extracts from Kant" (cited as W.) are also referred to. Serious students will precede or accompany the reading of this chapter by a study of Kant's text. They will be assisted by the more detailed discussion of many sections of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," in the Appendix of this book (pp. 513 *seq.*). This chapter departs widely from Kant's order, and

teaching at Romberg. It may be roughly outlined as follows:—

WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS

WORLD OF REALITY INDEPENDENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Sense	{ Sensations of Color Sensations of Sound etc.
Thought	{ Conception of Substances Conception of Cause Conception of Space Conception of Time etc.
	{ Real Substances Real Causality Real Space Real Time etc.

It will be noticed, from this scheme, that the real world of Wolff resembles that of Descartes: it contains not only substances, but relations: space, time, causality, and the rest. These, Wolff teaches, are independent of consciousness — that is, they would remain real though every conscious being were annihilated. They are known in a twofold way: first, inaccurately and confusedly by the senses; and second, adequately and clearly by thought. Thus, sensations of color, sound, and the like are confused and inadequate representations of the world of independent reality, which itself has no color, sound, or odor. On the other hand, the concepts, or thoughts, of substance, space, time, and causality, are correct representations of real substance, space, causality, and so on.

In opposition to Wolff and in agreement with Hume, Kant teaches that all known objects are phenomena of consciousness, ideas, and not realities independent of mind. In opposition to Hume, on the other hand, he teaches that the known object is not a mere complex of sensations, but that it includes unsensational characters, namely, relations. These two features of Kant's teaching — its divergence from traditional dualism and its opposition to sensationalism — will appear throughout the summary which follows. The first and

lays little stress or none on certain teachings which he emphasizes; but, in the opinion of the writer, it presents every important feature of Kant's doctrine.

earliest part of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," Kant's most important work, considers the known object as spatial and temporal.

I. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWN OBJECT AS SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ¹

a. Kant's teaching in opposition to Hume that space and time are unsensational and a priori.

Kant sharply distinguishes space and time from mere sensations, those of color, odor, and the like. These mere sensations Kant does not discuss at length, but he attributes to them, explicitly or implicitly, four characters. They are (1) many; Kant refers to them as a sense manifold.² They are (2) un-ordered and chaotic, conglomerate sense material, without form.³ They are (3) individual; that is to say, in the same circumstances, one person has one sense experience while a second person has quite a different one.⁴ Finally, (4) the mind in being conscious of sensations is wholly passive; and sensations are therefore due, in some unexplained way, to the reality independent of consciousness. This last character attributed to sensations indicates, of course, the unconquered dualism of Kant.⁵

Now, Kant denies that space and time are on a par with these chaotic, individual, sense qualities. There are, he teaches, important differences between the changing color of the sky and the spatial relations of the planets, or between the

¹ Kant's teaching about space and time is contained in two portions of the "Kritik of Pure Reason": in Pt. I., the "Æsthetic"; and in the first and second Antinomies of Pt. III., the "Dialectic." (Cf. Appendix, pp. 516 *seq.*, for a more detailed and technical discussion of these sections.)

² "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, p. 20 *et al.*; B, pp. 34, 68 *et al.* (The first edition of the "Kritik of Pure Reason" is cited as A, the second edition as B. The references of the early sections of this chapter are almost exclusively to this work, and the title will, therefore, ordinarily be omitted.)

³ A, 20 *et al.*; 34, 68 *et al.*; W., 22. (The references are to pages.)

⁴ B, 60 *et al.* Cf. the discussion, p. 231, *infra*.

⁵ A, 19, 68; B, 33, 93; W., —, 47. Cf. *infra*, p. 237.

increasing heat of a star and the times of its successive temperatures. These differences reduce to two. Space and time are distinguished, Kant teaches, from the 'sense manifold,' in that the mind is active, not passive, in the consciousness of them.¹ Space and time, he holds, are further differentiated from sensations, on the ground that both are *a priori*, whereas sensations are *a posteriori*. By *a priori* Kant means universal and necessary.² An *a priori*, that is necessary, truth asserts of something that it could not be otherwise; to a universal proposition no exception is possible,—it applies, in other words, to every member of a given class. In this sense, Kant teaches, space and time are *a priori*: there is a necessary relation of every moment to its past and to its future as well; and, similarly, spatial quantities—for example, the circumference and the radii of a circle—are necessarily related.³ It follows, according to Kant, that space and time are not mere sensations; and since an object, whatever else it may be, is always spatial and temporal, it follows also that the known object is no mere sensational complex.

It should be added that Kant, even while he asserts the unsensational nature of space and time, none the less regards both space and time as 'forms of perception.' But sensation is admitted to be an essential element of perception, and the wholly unsensational is therefore improperly named perception. It is, however, easy to explain Kant's error in this regard. His account of the space and time consciousness would, indeed, naturally have led him to regard each as a form, not of perception, but of thought—what he later calls a category. But Kant also believes, for reasons which

¹ Cf. note on p. 205, *infra*.

² "Kritik of Pure Reason," Edition B, Introduction, § II., p. 4; W., 9. Kant's frequent definition of '*a priori*' as 'independent of experience' is not quoted because of the ambiguity in Kant's use of the term 'experience.'

³ The argument here summarized is that of the so-called Transcendental Deduction, A, 25, 31, 32; B, 40, 47, 48; W., 26, 30. For more detailed exposition of Kant's doctrine of space and time, cf. Appendix, pp. 516 *seq.*

will later appear, that space and time belong to consciousness and not to a reality independent of consciousness; and he still believes with Wolff that if they were objects of thought, they must be independently real. In a word, he has a dilemma on his hands: space and time seem to him to be forms of perception and not of thought; and yet they seem to him to be too fixed and too certain to be sensational. He attempts unsuccessfully to solve the problem by creating an imaginary middle state, between perception and thought, distinguishing sharply between sensations, and space and time — the necessary forms, as he calls them, of perception.

b. Kant's teaching in opposition to Wolff that space and time are subjective

From the *a priori*, the universality and necessity, of space and time Kant argues their ideal character. He denies, in other words, that they belong to a world independent of consciousness. The self-conscious being, he argues, knows itself only; and if it makes assertions which have universal validity, in other words, which are *a priori*, these assertions must be about consciousness, not about any reality independent of consciousness — divorced from it, unknown by it. But there are, Kant teaches, universal space and time truths, wherefore space and time have to do with consciousness, not with the independent reality.¹ (Conversely, it is simply because mere sensations have, in his opinion, nothing *a priori* about them, — because he cannot make universal propositions about the sensible qualities of things, — that Kant supposes sensations to be due to an unknown, independent reality.)

For a second reason Kant argues that space and time are ideal or subjective. Roughly summarized, his argument is

¹ Cf. "Inferences," A, 26 and 31; B, 42 and 49; W., 27 and 30.

the following: The so-called real, or absolute, space and time, belonging according to Wolff to the world of independent reality, would be fixed, immutable, and absolute. Space and time, on the other hand, are full of paradoxes. In remembering, for example, one makes the past present; and in drawing lines through the base of a triangle one discovers that, according to the principles of mathematics, as many lines can converge in the apex as can be drawn through the base. And the greatest of these paradoxes is the necessity of conceiving space and time both as complete and as endless: we can always, on the one hand, imagine space beyond space; as mathematicians we must, indeed, regard space as infinite: and every past moment must be conceived to have its past behind it, just as every future must be thought of with a future beyond it. On the other hand, space and time, conceived as absolute, must be complete and fixed and immutable. Now such contradictory assertions could not be made, Kant holds, about space and time if they were realities independent of consciousness; such paradoxes would, indeed, be impossible with reference to a space and a time which are unaffected by our thoughts about them.¹ On the other hand, consciousness is noted for its contradictions and its paradoxes; and, thus, all the contradictions involved in space and time are accounted for by regarding both as mere forms of consciousness, ways in which we are conscious. Kant concludes that space and time behave like conscious experiences, not like fixed realities, and that they are, in this sense, subjective. "The world," he says (meaning not the universe independent of consciousness but the world of concrete, extended things and successive events) — "the world does not exist in itself independently of the series of my ideas."² "Space," he says, elsewhere, "is nothing except the form of all

¹ Newton's definition of absolute space is the following ("Principles," Bk. I., Definition VIII., Scholium): "Spatium Absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet simile et immobile."

² A, 505; B, 533; W., 171.

phenomena of outer sense."¹ This ideality he adds, is no bar to the reality of space and time, for both spatial objects and temporal events have 'empirical reality'² and are 'sufficiently distinct' from dream realities.

It is unnecessary to discuss at length Kant's arguments for the subjectivity of space and time, since Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume had gone so much farther by their demonstration that all characters of the known object — sensations along with space and time — are ideal. The importance of Kant's teaching is in its historical relation to the revived dualism of his immediate predecessor, Wolff. Kant deprives the supposed world of non-conscious reality of that character, spatialness, with which Descartes and Locke had endowed it, of which Leibniz and Berkeley had robbed it, with which Wolff has again enriched it. Kant's other teaching about the known object — that certain of its characters are *a priori*, or universal — has a less important bearing on the main problem of metaphysics, the nature of the all-of-reality; but is of cardinal importance to Kant's method of attack on the metaphysical problem. This will appear more clearly in the next division of this chapter.

II. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES³ (THE RELATIONS OF KNOWN OBJECTS)

a. Kant's teaching, in opposition to Hume, that the known object includes categories, necessary relations

Hume has insisted that there is nothing in an object save only that which is perceived, remembered, or imagined; in

¹ A, 26; B, 42; W., 27. The argument here outlined, for the subjectivity of space and time, is found in the first and second Antinomies (summarized, Appendix, pp. 521 *seq.*). The first set of illustrations in the text are not those of Kant.

² A, 28, 491; B, 44, 520; W., 29. This is substantially Berkeley's teaching, though Kant never recognizes the affiliation.

³ This teaching is contained in the "Kritik of Pure Reason," in two portions of Pt. II., the "Analytic": first, in the sections numbered 9 to 14 (with the one immediately preceding § 9); second, in the division entitled "System of all Principles of the Pure Reason." (Cf. Appendix, pp. 525 *seq.*)

other words, he has taught that an object is a compound of 'impressions'¹ only. Yet Hume has virtually admitted the occurrence of experiences which are not impressions;² and Kant is therefore taking the part of Hume against Hume in the teaching that every object contains unsensational as well as sensational elements, that even in perceiving objects we are conscious of them as more than sensational.³ The unsensational elements of the known objects (not including the spatial and temporal elements) Kant calls categories, and he recognizes twelve of them — four groups of three each — to correspond with the classes of judgments treated in formal logic.

The categories, Kant teaches, are results of the mind's activity — or better, they are activities of the mind, and are thus distinguished from sensation, for in sense-consciousness the mind is merely passive.⁴ The categories are furthermore, like space and time relations, *a priori*, that is, independent of sense-experience, universal and necessary. According to Kant this seems to mean that one may make universal and unqualified assertions and predictions about them. We do not know what will be the sensible qualities of the

¹ It should be observed that Hume's term 'impressions' and Kant's term 'sensations' cover both sensations proper and affections of pleasantness and unpleasantness.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 169 *seq.*

³ Occasionally Kant is disposed to admit that some objects are merely *given* — in other words, that uncategorized, purely sensational, objects of experience do occur, though they are not *known*. (Cf. A, 90; B, 123.) Usually, however, he holds the correct view that every object, even of perception, is a related object.

⁴ Kant lays great stress on this contrast (following Leibniz, through Wolff. Cf. "Æsthetic," § 1, A, 19; B, 33; "Logic," Introduction, I., A, 50; B, 74; W., 40; A, 67-68, B, 92-93; W., 46-47). Kant has been widely followed in this distinction; yet, in the opinion of the writer and of many students of psychology, accurate introspection does not bear out the contrast. The distinction of 'active' and 'passive' is not indeed properly made, for, in one sense, all consciousness is activity; and, in another sense, every finite self is passively conscious. The overdrawn distinction of sense from thought is, it should be added, responsible for certain fundamental errors of Kant's philosophy.

physical universe three billion years from now, but we do know that, whatever its constituents, it must be a totality, that it must be like or unlike the physical universe of this year 1906, and that its present condition is causally, though indirectly, connected with that future condition of it. Or, to take a simpler instance, we cannot predict *a priori* the sensible character of the event to follow on a present event. A sound or a flash of light may follow on the contact of the wires, but whatever happens will be like or unlike something else, will be the result of what has gone before, and will always be so regarded. In other words, the sensible qualities of future things and events cannot with assurance be predicted; but the unsensational characters of future events and things are predictable, and in that sense universal and necessary. Both because they are predictable and because they imply mental activity, the categories, Kant teaches, are subjective. He argues their occurrence and their unsensational character against Hume, and their subjectivity against Wolff.

As so far outlined, Kant's analysis of the world of known objects and, in particular, of perceived objects, has consisted in the teaching that an object is made up (1) of sensations — chaotic, individual experiences, passively received by the mind, and due to unknown things-in-themselves; and (2) of space and time relations, unsensational 'forms,' or constructions of the mind itself, corresponding to nothing beyond consciousness, but endowed with a peculiar universality. The chief purpose of his category doctrine — the Transcendental Logic, as he calls it — is to discuss the remaining characters of known objects, the categories. Among these, however, he lays especial stress on four, degree, totality, causality, and reciprocal connection, which are relations of a known object within itself or with other objects and, as such, unsensational factors of experience. In the course of his discussion of the categories Kant also restates his doctrine of space and time, so that these sections of the "Kritik"

contain Kant's full doctrine of relations. In this chapter, only Kant's conception of the four categories just named is discussed.¹

Kant's procedure throughout the category discussion is the following: He considers objects as perceived, on the ground that these, if any, might be supposed to be purely sensational. And he points out that, even in perceiving objects, we are conscious of them as involving categories. This general statement must be amplified by a consideration of the different categories.

1. *The category of totality*²

In perceiving any object, Kant argues, we are conscious, not merely of its sensational characters, — its color, texture, spatial qualities, and all the rest, — but we are also conscious of these qualities as belonging together, as combined, fused, unified. And this consciousness of totality, or combination, is an essential feature of the consciousness of an object; in Kant's terms, in perceiving an object, we unify the manifold of impressions of which it is made up.³ This unity, or totality, may be spatial, but it may conceivably be non-spatial; for example, we are conscious as well of a union of sound, smell, and taste, as of a union of top and bottom, right and left. Kant, however, uses a case of spatial totality to illustrate this truth that a consciousness of unity is a constituent of every percept. "I cannot," he says, have the consciousness of any line, however short, "without drawing it in

¹ For critical summary of Kant's doctrine of the categories (including those which are not considered in this chapter), cf. Appendix, pp. 525 seq.

² Kant discusses the categories of quantity, of which totality is most important, in "Analytic," Bk. I., §§ 10-12, and in Bk. II., under the head of "Axioms of Perception," A, 80 seq., 161 seq.; B, 106 seq., 202 seq.; W., 51 seq., 92 seq.

³ A, 162; B, 203; W., 93. For a criticism of Kant's statement 'we unify' as compared with the statement 'we are conscious of unity,' cf. James's "Principles of Psychology," II., p. 2, note; and the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," p. 177.

imagination — that is, without producing it, part by part, from a point.” The illustration is unfortunate, for ordinary observation contradicts its statement of fact. We are most often conscious of small figures, not as connected parts but as simple units; though we sometimes construct complex spatial figures in exactly the slow, reflective way which Kant describes, — for example, in imagination we combine geometrical figures into a larger whole, or construct, part by part, some complicated design. But though Kant has pitched on a defective example of perceptual complexity, he is none the less correct in his doctrine that perception, the experience of a complex of sense qualities, does include an unsensational consciousness of the holding together, the totality, of these qualities. And he is unquestionably right in the teaching that the relatedness, or totality, of the parts of an object is *a priori*, necessary, in the sense already indicated: in other words, that without exception and inevitably an object must be conceived as totality of its parts. It should be added that spatial totality is one of the spatial relations already treated in the first division of the “Kritik,” and that it is not easy to account for Kant’s failure to recognize the present discussion as in part a repetition of what has preceded.¹

2. *The category of degree (implied in the discussion of the category of reality)* ²

Every perceived object includes, Kant teaches, besides the relation of totality, some relation of degree, involving, as is evident, comparison. Kant means that every sensation has a degree of intensity; that is, it is more or less bright or loud or fragrant than other sensations with which it is always

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 524³.

² Kant discusses the ‘categories of quality,’ among which is his category of ‘reality,’ in Bk. I., §§ 10–12 of the “Analytic,” and in Bk. II., under the head of “Anticipations of Observation.” He only incidentally refers to the category of degree. Cf. A, 80 seq., 166 seq.; B, 106 seq., 207 seq.; W., 52 seq., 96 seq.; and Appendix, p. 528.

compared. In Kant's own words: "The real, which is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree."¹ That is to say, an object may always be known as being sensationally 'more' or 'less' intense than other objects. Thus, Kant has again established the point which he is making against Hume: the truth that the known object (the phenomenon, as Kant calls it) includes relations, as well as impressions (sensations). For he shows that, in being conscious of the sense qualities of an object, we are conscious always of its degree, that is, of the more-or-less-ness of its color, fragrance, and other sense qualities. He asserts, furthermore, that the degree, the relation of more or less, is *a priori*, must invariably and inevitably be predicated. "There is something which has to do with . . . sensation," Kant says, "which may be known *a priori*. . . . [The sensation has] intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. . . . Every color, for example, red, has a degree which, however small, is never the smallest possible; and so it is with warmth, with weight, etc."² I cannot tell how bright may be the red of this evening's sunset; but I may know that every red sunset will be more or less bright than other sunsets (if not equally bright); in other words, every sensational object involves an *a priori* relational category of degree.

It should be added that these categories of degree are one class only of a larger group, the categories of comparison, on which Kant lays little stress. To this group belong also the categories of sameness and likeness and their opposites. All these categories of comparison are necessary and universal; and, as a class, it must be noted they are different from the connective relations of spatially related objects and temporally related events.³

¹ These words form the heading of the "Anticipations of Observation," in Edition B, 207; W., 96.

² A, 169; B, 211; W., 97.

³ Kant refers to the 'sameness' of recognized objects in the so-called "Synthesis of Recognition" (A, 103; W., 60). This consciousness of same-

3. *The category of (phenomenal) causality*¹

Every object is known, Kant teaches, not merely as a totality and as comparable with other objects; it is known, also, as causally related. In opposition to Hume, Kant therefore recognizes as constituent of every known object the *a priori*, that is, necessary and universal, category of causality. "Experience," he says, "is possible only through the consciousness of a necessary connection of percepts."² The essential features of Kant's conception are clear. We know an ordered world of physical phenomena in relation to each other. The world which we know is not composed of isolated objects or of unconnected events. Just as certainly as we experience the color and sound of it, we know the interconnectedness of it — the relation of one object, or event, to the others. Moreover, we know this relation as necessarily and as universally predicable. We cannot, it is true, Kant seems to say with Hume, assert with absolute certainty that any given event is necessarily the effect of any other particular event,³ but we do know that some effect, whether or not we discover the nature of it, follows necessarily upon a cause. It could never be admitted, Kant insists, that the causal relation is purely imaginary or that the effect must not be 'everywhere perceived' as determined by the cause.⁴ On the contrary, the effect follows 'without

ness is there treated as an argument for the unity of consciousness, but is not explicitly named category. Cf. the discussion of these categories in Chapter 11, on Hegel, pp. 369 *seq.*

¹ Kant discusses the relation of phenomenal causality in Bk. I., §§ 10-12, of the "Analytic," and in Bk. II., in the second and third "Analogies of Experience," A, *loc. cit.*, and 189 *seq.*; B, *loc. cit.*, and 232 *seq.*; W., *loc. cit.*, and 110 *seq.* For Kant's conception of cause, in the other sense of 'explanation' or 'ground,' — intelligible cause, as he calls it, — cf. *infra*, pp. 259³ *seq.*

² This is the heading of the "Analogies of Experience," in Edition B (p. 218; W., 101). Cf. also A, 189; B, 234; W., 110.

³ A, 196; B, 241; W., 115².

⁴ B, 234.

exception and necessarily¹ upon the cause. And from the necessity inherent in the nature of the causal relation Kant argues the subjectivity, or ideal character, of causality. "We are concerned," he says, "only with our own ideas; the being of things-in-themselves [realities independent of consciousness] is entirely outside our sphere of knowledge."² We cannot possibly predicate of them any universally admitted relation. The circumstance that we find ourselves universally and necessarily asserting the causal relation is a proof that the causality belongs to the ideal world and not to a world independent of consciousness.

The full force of Kant's conception of phenomenal causality is gained only by comparing it with Hume's teaching. It will be remembered that Kant's study of Hume's doctrine of causality formed, as he himself assures us, the point of departure for his own critical philosophy. Hume, he says, "awaked me from my dogmatic slumber";³ and the "*Kritik of Pure Reason*," he elsewhere says, "was inspired by this Humian doubt."⁴ That is to say, Kant's study of the category of causality led to his discovery of the other categories; and this, as will appear, brought him to the formulation of his most important doctrine, that of the transcendental self. The gist of Hume's teaching about causality is, it will be remembered, the following: There is, in the first place, no power or causality in objects existing independently of our consciousness. On the contrary, causality is the anticipated, or inferred, regular sequence of events, or — more precisely — it is a transition or inference of the imagination. There is, in the second place, no necessary relation between cause and effect. Hume argues this (a) because cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, are distinguishable ideas and therefore not necessarily related;

¹ A, 198; B, 244.

² A, 190; B, 235; W., III.

³ "Prolegomena," Preface.

⁴ "Kritik of Practical Reason," p. 56 (Hartenstein Edition, 1867).

(b) because we gain our knowledge of causes through accidental experience and are never able to predict the effect of a given event; (c) because past experience is no guarantee of the future.¹

Kant's agreement with Hume is much farther reaching than is ordinarily supposed. He subscribes without reserve to the first stated of Hume's teachings; and though he denies the second, he admits at least one of its premises. To begin with the most fundamental agreement: Kant is as sure as Hume is, that causality is no character or relation of things independent of consciousness, and that, on the contrary, causality is a transition of the mind, a mental connection. What is meant, both philosophers would declare, when it is asserted that the rubbing of sticks together is the cause of a spark, is simply that we, conscious beings, mentally combine the two phenomena in a certain way, that we regard the spark as effect of the friction. The only difference — an important one, to be sure — between Kant and Hume, at this point, is that while Hume describes this mental transition as 'imagination' or 'belief,' Kant calls it 'thought.'

The second of Hume's teachings about causality is the denial of a necessary connection between succeeding events. This doctrine is indeed already implied by Hume's account of the causal consciousness as imagination; and as Kant has denied the uncertain character of the causal consciousness, so he disputes the contingency of the connection between phenomena.² The causal connection between succeeding events is, he holds, a necessary connection. This important

¹ The order of treatment of the chapter on Hume is here altered.

² Whereas Hume argues that causality, just because it is mental, is not objective and therefore lacks necessity, Kant teaches that causality is subjective because it is necessary. In other words, both teach the subjectivity of causality, but Hume deduces the contingency from the admitted subjectivity, while Kant infers the subjectivity from the admitted necessity. With the one, subjectivity is the starting-point; with the other, it is the conclusion.

divergence of Kant from Hume must be discussed at some length.

Hume argues that events are not causally and necessarily connected on the ground that each event is a separate, self-sufficient phenomenon and therefore unconnected either temporally or causally with any other. In justified opposition to this Kant points out that "the preceding time necessarily determines the following."¹ We may add: an event means precisely a somewhat which is necessarily connected with its past and with its future, and it is a contradiction in terms to deny the connectedness of one event with another.²

Kant thus vindicates the necessity of the purely temporal connection. But though the causal connection implies the temporal, it is, as Hume and Kant both recognize, more-than-temporal. In other words, the doctrine of causal necessity is the teaching that, given a necessary connection between two events, *a* and *b*, the second event, *b*, could not have been replaced by any other. Against this sort of necessary connection Hume, it will be remembered, has two arguments. There is, he urges, no necessary — that is, uniform — connection between events, for we gain our knowledge of causality through specific experience. So far from denying this, Kant admits that the 'logical clearness' of the causal principle is only then possible when we have made use of it in experience. He does not dispute "the accepted doctrine" that "we are led to the concept of cause by the harmonious relation of many events."³ But though Kant accepts this, the premise of Hume's argument, he denies the validity of the conclusion which Hume draws from it. Kant teaches, in other words, that the impossibility of knowing with certainty just what will be the nature of a given effect does not impair the certainty that there will be

¹ A, 200; B, 246; W., 116.

² Cf. *infra*, pp. 214 *seq.*, to show that Kant means more than this.

³ A, 195; B, 241; W., 115.

some effect.¹ It is true, he would admit, that the contact of one billiard ball with another may not have as its effect the event which we have foreseen, the motion of the second ball. But it still may be necessarily, that is universally, true — in other words, I may have at any time to admit — that some definite effect follows uniformly on the motion of the first billiard ball.

Hume has a second argument: Upholders of necessary connection admit that if a cause recur it must be followed by a recurring effect. Hume denies this uniformity of the causal relation. A past or present experience, he insists, can offer no guarantee for the future: for example, one may not argue from the present relation of spark and flame to the future sequence of one upon the other. Presumably to meet this argument, Kant urges the following consideration: It is admitted, he says, that we know a succession of objects, that is, distinguish an objective from a subjective succession. But objectivity, he holds, is constituted by causality, that is, by necessarily uniform succession. Therefore our knowledge of succeeding objects or events is a guarantee of the causal succession of phenomena. Kant has a well-known illustration of our ability to distinguish objective from subjective succession:² When I look at a boat drifting down-stream, I must see the boat at the source of the river before I see it at the river's mouth. When, on the contrary, I look at a house, I may successively see the parts in any one of several orders: I may see first the roof and last the cellar, or first the cellar and last the roof. I could not possibly, however, Kant asserts, distinguish the objectivity of the successions of the boat's positions from the subjectivity of the series of ideas of the house, were not the boat's positions linked in a necessary uniform connection which is lacking to the successive ideas.

¹ This doctrine is implied in A, 193-194, B, 238-239, W., 113-114 — a passage written with another purpose, namely, to emphasize the irreversibility of the causal relation.

² A, 191-195; B, 237-240; W., 112-114.

The fatal flaw in this argument was indicated twenty years later by Schopenhauer.¹ It is not true that the successive ideas of a 'subjective series' are uncaused. To take Kant's example: there is certainly some cause for that position of my head and eyes which results in my first looking upward to the roof or downward to the cellar of the house, and every successive movement is conditioned by the bodily position or movement which preceded it. Even in the case of a purely imaginary series of ideas, the image of any moment has a cause — physiological or psychical or both — in the preceding moment. But since, thus, subjective as well as objective series are causally bound together, it follows that causality though a character of objective series is not their distinguishing mark.²

Kant cannot therefore prove a necessary and uniform connection of events by use of the distinction between objective and subjective succession. But in another section of the "*Kritik*,"³ he argues in more justifiable fashion for the necessity of causal connection. "If cinnabar," he says, "turned sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, and sometimes heavy; if a man were transformed now into the shape of this animal and now of that; if on the longest day the earth were covered now with fruits and again with ice and snow, — then my empirical imagination would never have occasion on observation of the red color to think of the heavy cinnabar. There must therefore be something which, as *a priori* ground of a necessary synthetic unity of phenomena, makes this very reproduction of phenomena possible." Kant's

¹ "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," § 23; cf. *infra*, p. 345.

² It should be added that Kant himself elsewhere formulates another and a justifiable criterion of objectivity. Cf. "Second Analogy," B, 234; also *infra*, pp. 231 *seq.*

³ A, 100 *seq.*; W., 58 *seq.*, "Transcendental Deduction, Synthesis of Reproduction." Cf. Benno Erdmann's use of this argument in a very important paper on "The Content and Validity of the Causal Law," in Report of Congress of Science and Arts at St. Louis, Vol. I., also in the *Philosophical Review*, XIV., 1905. Cf., also, A. E. Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," pp. 165 *seq.*

meaning is clear. Hume had argued somewhat as follows: the heat of this June is an event distinct from next June's heat; why then must heat be followed by luxuriant vegetation next June as well as this? Kant replies: our experience would not be what it is — in other words, we should not know the world as a connected whole of regularly recurring phenomena — if the causal uniformity were not absolutely universal. The writer of this book, like some other critics of Kant, challenges this conclusion. It is obvious, of course, that we expect such uniformity and that this expectation is implied in our constant assumption of the regularity of nature. But there seems no cogent reason to doubt that we should assume the uniformity, on the basis of our past experience, even if a future exception to the uniformity were possible — and even if we were sure of such a possibility. There seems, in other words, no reason to deny that our consciousness of the world as a connected whole might be built up as well on the basis of an ordinarily uniform experience as on the assumption of an inevitably uniform experience.

If this criticism of Kant be admitted, it follows that he has not disproved Hume's assertion: the causal and uniform connection of events has not been shown to be absolutely necessary. Yet as will appear, the failure to demonstrate this necessity does not invalidate the argument based by Kant on his category doctrine. And more than this, in two features of his causality doctrine, Kant has scored against Hume. He has shown, in the first place, the invalidity of that argument in which Hume denies necessity on the ground that one learns specific causal connections through accidental experience. And he has emphasized, in the second place, the unquestioned necessity, denied by Hume, of the temporal connection of events — the necessity, in other words, of the link between before and after, past, present, and future.¹

¹ This is, of course, a virtual repetition of Kant's teaching about time. Incidentally, the inclusion of it with the discussion of causality shows the artificiality of the separation of space and time from the categories. It should

4. *The category of reciprocal connection*¹

At least one other relation is discoverable in the experienced world. — Besides knowing every object as a totality and as a comparable thing, and besides knowing temporal events as causally connected, we are aware of a necessary connection between untemporal phenomena. This relation has already been implied by that of totality. The line is the whole of its parts; but the parts are necessarily connected one with the other, indeed, their connection is as necessary as that of a cause with its effect. Similarly, the first term in a binomial series is necessarily connected with the middle term or the last. This form of necessary connection is distinguished, Kant teaches, in the following way from the causal connection. The causal and the temporal series are irreversible: the past is inevitably over before the present, the result may not precede the cause. On the other hand, a reciprocal connection is reversible: reciprocally connected phenomena may be apprehended in reversible order. One may look from right to left or from left to right of the line, from west to east or from east to west of the spatially related scene. Right and left, east and west are connected, but their order is, none the less, reversible. In its application to spatial and to other mathematical quantities this is evidently the category, emphasized in modern mathematics, of order.

be added that certain paragraphs of the "Second Analogy" consider neither causal nor temporal connection, but rather the reciprocally necessary relation of parts within an object (a topic which is elsewhere appropriately considered; cf. Appendix, p. 527).

¹ This category is only incidentally referred to by Kant in the "Third Analogy" (which is mainly occupied with the consideration of a form of causality — mutual causality — which Kant calls reciprocity). Cf. A, *loc. cit.*, and 211 *seq.*; B, *loc. cit.*, and 256 *seq.*; W., 118 *seq.* Cf. also, Appendix, p. 531.

b. *Kant's teaching, in opposition to Wolff, that the categories are subjective*

This discussion of Kant's category doctrine has so far emphasized mainly his opposition to Hume, that is to say, his teaching that the world of known objects includes not merely sensible qualities but *a priori*, that is necessary and universally predicable, relations. But Kant opposed with equal vigor Wolff's doctrine that these relations occur outside the mind, as links between realities independent of consciousness. In other words, Kant insisted — in agreement now with Hume and the other idealists — that the categories, no less than the sense forms, space and time, and the sensible qualities, color, hardness, and the rest, are themselves subjective or ideal. But the world of known objects consists, it will be admitted, of sense qualities, of the sense forms, space and time, and of the categories, totality, causality, and the rest. Therefore the known or experienced object is an idea, or, to use Kant's term, a phenomenon; and the known world is a world of ordered phenomena, of subjective realities.

Kant's main argument for the subjective, or ideal, character of objects as known has been indicated in the discussions of space, of time, and of causality. He has discovered that these relations are *a priori*, that is, universally predicable. But of reality independent of consciousness no universal predication may, he says, be made. For realities independent of our consciousness, things-in-themselves, as Kant calls them, could not affect us, or stand in any relation to us, therefore, they must be, as Kant always teaches, unknown. And obviously, since we do not know them, we can make no universally predicable assertion about them. Whatever is known to be universally true must then, as Kant says, be subjective. In his own words, "Relation (*Verbindung*) does not lie in objects and cannot, so to speak, be borrowed from them by sense perception and so first be taken up into

the understanding; on the other hand, connection is exclusively an achievement (*Verrichtung*) of the understanding."¹ This doctrine of the subjective character of the categories, or relations, is of course in exact opposition to Wolff's teaching. According to Wolff there is a 'real' world independent of consciousness — a world of spatial things and temporal events linked by relations of unity, causality, and the like. We have, Wolff teaches, thoughts about these things and their relations, but things and relations exist unaffected by our thought. Kant has now plundered this supposed world of things-in-themselves, not merely of space and time, but of all the relations as well. We know nothing about unity-in-itself or causality-in-itself, he teaches: unity and causality are mental activities, ways in which we think.²

Kant has thus answered the preliminary questions of his metaphysics, — questions concerning the nature of objects and of our knowledge of them. Known or experienced objects simply are, he says, complexes of related sensations. For example, a grape is a complex of blueness, smoothness, coolness, flavor, resembling yet differing from other fruits³ and necessarily related to the vine on the one hand and to *Rothwein* on the other. But sensations and relations are mental experiences. Objects are, therefore, through and through mental, they are ideas; we know them, as Kant says, because we make them. And yet, though ideal, these known objects are, Kant insists, empirically real;⁴ they are no

¹ "Analytic," Bk. I.; B, § 16, p. 134; W., p. 66.

² This doctrine, it may be noticed, is pretty generally admitted by scientific thinkers who, holding to the existence of 'physical forces' independent of our thought, none the less believe that the relations — unity, difference, and the like — are purely mental affairs with nothing corresponding to them in the world of physical energy.

³ Resemblance and difference are not numbered by Kant among the explicitly named categories.

⁴ In the end of the "Æsthetic" (A, 28, 36; B, 44, 52; W., 29, 35) Kant contrasts this 'empirical reality' with 'transcendental ideality.' Both of these terms last mentioned are employed in an unusual sense, to indicate that

visions and illusions, but real, concrete things, everyday trees and tables and books.¹

In this teaching of the known object as ideal, or phenomenal, Kant, as has been said so often, merely agreed with Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume. His significance, at this point, was in his opposition to Wolff, who had gone back to the dualistic standpoint, teaching that there are two kinds of reality, mental and non-mental. Kant himself, as will later appear in more detail, never wholly abandoned Wolff's dualism. He admitted the existence of realities independent of consciousness (things-in-themselves), and in fact he seems to have regarded our sensations as due to them; but he insisted that these things-in-themselves are unknown and that the characters of objects-as-known are, on the contrary, subjective. The inconsistency and difficulty of the thing-in-itself doctrine had already been exposed by Hume and by Berkeley, and will, later in this chapter, be discussed.

*c. Criticism of Kant's doctrine of the necessity of the categories*²

Before proceeding to the exposition of Kant's teaching of the subjectivity of the categories, it is best to review and so far as possible to estimate the main results of the category doctrine up to this point. As will appear, Kant's most significant achievement is his emphasis upon the fact that we have not merely sensations but unsensational and, in particular, relational experiences. In the strict sense he does not demonstrate this truth, since it depends for its acceptance on every man's introspection. But he may be said successfully to

known objects are unreal (ideal) so far as the world transcending consciousness is concerned.

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 231 *seq.*, for Kant's distinction between real objects and mere ideas.

² The untrained student will perhaps best omit this section on the first reading of the chapter.

challenge us — Hume included — to deny the occurrence in our experience of the categories.

Now Kant's main contribution to philosophy — the doctrine of the transcendental self — depends, as will later be shown, on no wider conclusion about the categories than precisely this: that our experience includes categories as well as sensations. Kant, however, treats the categories in a far more exhaustive fashion, and in particular attempts to explain the distinction between categories and sensations. As has appeared, he finds that the distinction consists in the universality and the necessity of the categories. The writer of this book believes that Kant does not make good this account of the difference, for though there is indeed a universality in the categories, the same universality and necessity may be predicated of sensations. The main purpose of this section is to formulate this criticism.

By 'the necessary' Kant of course means 'the inevitable,' and he recognizes two sorts of necessity, — 'logical' necessity and necessity of another kind, nowadays called 'epistemological.'¹ Now, there unquestionably is necessity — logical or, in Kant's terms, analytic, necessity — involved in our meanings, conceptions, and definitions. Even Hume admitted the necessity in the case of arithmetical propositions, holding that the square of 3 is necessarily 9, because we mean by the square of 3 what we mean by 9. And similarly, though Hume did not always admit this, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles because we mean by triangle a figure such that the sum of its angles is the sum of two right angles; and the future is necessarily connected with the present because by future we mean that which is connected with the present. If, then, by necessity

¹ H. Rickert ("Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss," pp. 125 *seq.*, especially p. 129) has shown that the fundamental form of epistemological necessity is the necessity that of two contradictory judgments one must be true. This he names *Urteilsnotwendigkeit*. Cf. F. C. S. Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," in "Personal Idealism," p. 70, note (5).

is meant the impossibility of not-meaning-what-we-do-mean, in other words, the impossibility of self-contradiction, Kant is clearly right in asserting the necessity of the categories. But he is as clearly wrong in holding that such necessity distinguishes the categories from sensations. For logically necessary statements may be made as well about sensations as about relations. It is as necessary that what-I-mean-by-white is not-black as it is necessary that what-I-mean-by-two-times-two is four; and it is as necessary that what-I-mean-by-rose is fragrant as that a triangle is the sum of two right angles. The necessity in both cases is that of my identical meanings.¹

It should be noted that this denial of Kant's distinction between category and sensation does not involve the admission that the two are indistinguishable. On the contrary, sensations are well marked off from the categories. If the passage of this chapter be reread in which the effort is made to give a plausible meaning to Kant's assertion that the categories, as distinguished from sensations, are universal and necessary,² it will be discovered that all which is shown is (1) the greater observed variety of sensations, and (2) the fact that there are greater observed differences between individuals in their sense experience resulting in an indisposition to make universal judgments about sense facts; finally, and most important, (3) the fact that while sensations imply relations, relations do not in the same way imply sensations. I cannot, for example, be conscious of 'red' without being conscious of it as less or more bright, but I can well be conscious of 'more' without having a consciousness of 'red.' It

¹ This statement about the necessary appears in two forms, one positive and the other negative: the self-contradictory is not true; and, the true is self-consistent. These are known as the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Identity; are implied in our certainty of the fact of our own consciousness; and are employed by philosophers of every stamp not, as is often erroneously stated, by rationalists only. Of course, necessity — whether predicated of sensation or of category — is itself a category.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 205² seq.

follows that I must predict certain relations in predicting any sensations, whereas I am unlikely to predict these particular sensations in asserting relations. Thus, to summarize Kant's teaching about sensations and categories: he has rightly taught that the categories are necessary, if by necessary he means 'inevitably self-consistent'; but he has wrongly treated this necessity as a distinction between sensations and relations. In truth, logically necessary statements may be made about sensations; and their actual distinction from the categories is to be found mainly in what may be named their greater variableness.

But it must now at once be pointed out that Kant does not mean by the necessity of the categories the merely logical — or, as he calls it, analytical — necessity of which we have so far spoken. In attempting to justify Kant's assertion of the necessity of space, time, and the categories, we have in fact conceived this necessity in an un-Kantian fashion. It is true that Kant recognizes logical necessity, but he expressly teaches that space, time, and the categories have a necessity of another sort. To make clear Kant's meaning it will be necessary, first, to state his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

"Analytic judgments," Kant teaches, "add nothing through the predicate to the subject, but merely analyze the subject into the partial concepts (*Teilbegriffe*) which are already thought in it though confusedly. . . . Synthetic judgments add to the conception of the subject a predicate which was not at all contained in it and which could not have been extracted from it by analysis." As example of analytic judgment Kant gives "all bodies are extended," holding that extension is a constituent of my conception of body. The judgment "all bodies are heavy" is, on the contrary, according to Kant, a synthetic judgment, for heaviness, he says, does not belong to the concept of body.¹ To this distinction

¹ "Æsthetic," Introduction, § 4, A, 7 seq.; B, 11 seq.; W., 13 seq. It may

of the synthetic from the analytic judgment Kant now adds the distinction of the *a priori* from the *a posteriori* judgment — the judgment which is universal and necessary from that which is individual and contingent. He attempts, moreover, to coördinate the two sets of distinctions—to decide, in other words, whether analytic and synthetic judgments respectively are *a priori*, *a posteriori*, or of both kinds. Now, analytic judgments are one and all *a priori* and, therefore, it is everywhere and without exception true that the characters which a concept includes may be predicated of it. This is the sort of necessity which in this book, and especially in this chapter, has been defended as valid necessity. A more important question in Kant's view is the following: are synthetic judgments, judgments of discovery, ever necessary, *a priori*? It is evident at first blush that one whole class of synthetic judgments lack this necessity.¹ These are the judgments which one makes through one's particular experience, which are one and all contingent or *a posteriori*. From the fact that I have, for example, found that metals are heavy I may not rightly infer that without exception all metals are heavy. Kant admits, in other words, that most synthetic judgments are *a posteriori*, contingent. He insists, however, that besides these contingent synthetic judgments of experience there is another class of synthetic judgments — those which are *a priori*, or necessary. These, he asserts, are the judgments about space, time, and the categories. In other words, Kant supposes that causality and the other relations have a necessity quite different from the logical, or analytic, necessity.²

be noted that Locke, who believed that solidity is an essential quality of body, would have named this judgment also analytic.

Cf. Fichte, "Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre;" L. Couturat, "Les Principes des Mathématiques," Appendix, pp. 235 *seq.*; E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," I., pp. 267 *seq.*; and F. Paulsen, "Immanuel Kant," *transl.*, pp. 136 *seq.*, for criticism of Kant's principle of distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

¹ A, 9; B, 13; W., 14.

² A, 10; B, 14; W., 15.

For a thoroughgoing estimate of this teaching there is not time; but the following comment may be made: Kant never justifies his assertion that the necessary (*a priori*) judgments, which may certainly be made about space, time, and the categories, are synthetic as well as necessary. In other words, Kant rightly asserts the necessity of such judgments as " $5 + 7 = 12$," "the future follows on the present," but he never proves the truth of his assertion that these *a priori* judgments are synthetic.¹ It must be confessed that he only once—in the case of causality—even attempts the proof; and the truth is that the causal principle loses necessity whenever it becomes synthetic—whenever, in other words, it seeks to prophesy uniformity.

And yet it may be pointed out that Kant suggests the occurrence of necessity other than the purely logical necessity of analytic judgments. His teaching about the *a priori* implies the doctrine that, since we undeniably have knowledge (or experience) of some sort, therefore the invariable constituents of knowledge are necessary. Now the categories, or relations, are in this sense epistemologically as well as logically necessary, since they belong to experience and thus "make it possible." In precisely similar fashion, however, sensations may be said to be necessary since they, too, are always a constituent of our experience.²

A brief restatement of this critical section will conclude it. In the view of the writer, Kant has (1) proved that relations are parts of our experience—and this is all which the main argument of the "Kritik" requires of his category doctrine. In the attempt (2) to distinguish categories from sensations he has (a) rightly attributed necessity to space, time, and the categories, but (b) wrongly denied the same sorts of necessity to sensations. He has made this mistake because (3) he

¹ For justification of the statement about the failure of Kant's argument for the *a priority* of causality, cf. *supra*, p. 216. For assertion of the analytic character of mathematical judgments, cf. Couturat, *op. cit.*, pp. 262 seq.

² Cf. H. Rickert, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 129 seq., 166 seq.

wrongly regards the necessary judgments about space, time, and the categories as synthetic, that is, as involving a necessity other than the logical impossibility of self-contradiction.

B. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE SELF, AND OF THE OBJECT AS RELATED TO THE SELF (IN OPPOSITION TO HUME)

I. KANT'S ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A SELF

According to Kant the universe of reality includes not merely unknown things in themselves and known objects but includes also a self, or knower. This teaching of Kant is of extreme significance in that it directly opposes Hume's teaching that a self, or knower, does not and cannot exist and that the universe is a mere kaleidoscopic succession of ideas.

Kant founds his doctrine, — that a self exists, — in the first place, on simple introspection. Hume argues that the succession of ideas makes up the whole of what we know. But these ideas, Kant points out, may at any moment be claimed as 'my' ideas.¹ In truth, I am never conscious of ideas which are nobody's ideas: that is to say, in knowing the existence of ideas, I know the existence of a self or of selves. But besides asserting, as a fact of immediate experience, the existence of the self, Kant proceeds to argue that certain characters, which we attribute to ideas, really belong to a self and therefore imply its existence. In more detail Kant's argument is as follows: —

We are, in the first place, conscious of the identity of certain experiences with others. The consciousness of the identity of the present with the past is, in truth, the essence of recognition. Kant lays stress upon this 'synthesis of recognition,' as he calls it. We have, as he points out, the "consciousness that what we think is the same as that which

¹ "Analytic," Bk. I., § 16, sentence 1: "Das : Ich denke muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können."

we thought a minute ago.”¹ Now this identity cannot, Kant insists, belong to the ideas themselves. For, as idea of a particular moment, each idea is distinct from every other, far from being identical with it. If, therefore, as Hume contends, there were no self, — if the word ‘self’ were merely a name for a succession of ideas, — then one idea never could be looked upon as identical with another which had gone before; and no one even could say, “This is the same view, or bird note, or conclusion.” For to-day’s landscape, or sound, or reflection is a different idea, a distinct experience, from yesterday’s. Yet we do have the experience of identity — in other words, we do recognize; and the fact that identity may not be attributed to ideas leaves us but the one way to account for the existence of identity. The consciousness of identity is really, thus, the consciousness of the one and identical self.²

In the second place, Kant argues the existence of the self from a more general character of the series of ideas. Not merely the one relation of identity, which we attribute to ideas, but all relations of ideas to other ideas, that is, the general fact of the relatedness of ideas implies, Kant says, the existence of a relating or unifying self. In his own words: “The consciousness of relation can be created only by the subject, for it is an act of its self-activity.”³ Kant is content with this assertion that relatedness implies a self as relater. The proposition is, however, so important, that it must be dwelt upon with more than Kant’s emphasis on it. Kant has established the fact that the known world is a

¹ “Analytic,” “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,” in Edition A (A, p. 103; W., p. 60). Kant shows that the consciousness of identity is involved also in perception. Cf. A, 98.

² Cf. F. C. S. Schiller, on “Axioms as Postulates,” in “Personal Idealism,” p. 97. “The felt self-identity of consciousness . . . is the ultimate psychological basis for raising the great postulate of logical identity.” Cf. J. S. Mill, note 33 to Vol. II., Chapter XIV., § 7, of his edition of James Mill’s “Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.”

³ “Transcendental Deduction” of Edition B, B, p. 130; W., p. 64.

world of related objects, that is, of related ideas. But, as Hume has shown, an idea, in itself considered, is an isolated and self-sufficient fact. The idea of one moment is indeed over before that of another begins, so that there is nothing in one idea which may relate it to a second. It follows that relations do not exist as parts of ideas; and yet it has been shown already that all relations are subjective, that they exist in the world of consciousness, not in a world independent of reality.¹ But since ideas are, as a matter of experience, in relations of causality, identity, and the like, to still other ideas,² these relations, which belong neither to objects independent of consciousness nor to objects as known (ideas) must be characters of a self; and a self must exist because ideas are related, because they cannot relate themselves, and because no reality independent of consciousness relates them.

Kant's argument for the existence of a self has real value. Before Hume's time, philosophers, once they have established the reality of consciousness, do not need to argue for the existence of selves; for consciousness is simply assumed to mean selves who are conscious. Hume, however, challenges this assumption. He teaches, to be sure, that the universe consists, through and through, of consciousness; but he conceives of consciousness as mere succession of ideas. Kant now restores selves to their rights. A world of consciousness must be, he insists, the world of a conscious self which has ideas; for the ideas, and in particular the identity and the relatedness of the ideas, imply the existence of an identical and unifying self. No self — no ideas; if ideas — then a self: such, in brief, is Kant's answer to Hume. And the universe of reality, as so far formulated by Kant, contains (1) related objects which have turned out to be com-

¹ This argument lays no stress on the relation of the parts within an idea. For consideration of the implication of relation in general, cf. *infra*, Chapter 10, pp. 369 *seq.*, and Chapter 11, pp. 418 *seq.*

² Cf. quotation on p. 218² above.

plexes of sensations and relations; (2) the self which knows them; and (3) unknown things-in-themselves.

II. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE NATURE OF THE SELF

The existence of known objects, that is, of ideas, has thus been shown by Kant to imply the existence of a conscious self. Kant does not, however, — for a reason which will later appear, — make use of the words 'self' or 'spirit.' In their place, he employs such expressions as 'the subject,' 'the I think,' and still more often the awkward expression 'unity of apperception,' doubtless chosen in order to emphasize the self as contrasted with the evanescent plurality of the successive, momentary ideas. In this chapter the non-Kantian term 'self' is retained, for the sake of brevity and clearness.¹ No part of Kant's philosophy has more constructive value and none has had more historical significance than his doctrine of the nature of the self. The most characteristic feature of this doctrine is the distinction which he makes between the 'transcendental' self, as he calls it, and the 'empirical' self.

a. The transcendental and the empirical self

Heretofore, philosophers have distinguished only between finite selves and infinite self. Kant finds the conception 'finite self' too crude to do justice to the complexity of self-consciousness, but the distinction by which he seeks to enrich it — the distinction between transcendental and empirical self² — is, as will appear, vague and indecisive.

¹ The terms 'Gemüth' and 'innerer Sinn (inner sense)' as used in the first part of the "Kritik," the early written "Æsthetic," probably refer to the self as contrasted with the thing-in-itself. Occasionally these terms creep into the "Analytic" — usually as synonyms for 'empirical self,' in some one of its meanings.

² Cf. "Analytic," "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding," of Edition B, §§ 16-19, pp. 132 *seq.*; W., pp. 65 *seq.* Even the beginner in philosophy should read these sections, containing, as they do, the core of Kant's teaching.

(1) He first distinguishes the transcendental self, as *identical*, from the empirical self, as *momentary*. Already, in the argument for the existence of a self, Kant has shown how the self, as identical, is contrasted with the idea, as momentary. Now the momentary idea may be idea-of-a-self; as such, it is empirical self and is distinguished from the transcendental, the identical, self. At any particular instant there are present to my consciousness not only the varying complexes of ordered sensations constituting my percepts of desk and book-shelves and window and road, but a certain complex, chiefly of organic sensations, affectively toned, which makes up my this-moment's-idea-of-myself. This way-that-I-feel-at-this-particular-moment is contrasted both with the percept of outer object and also with the experienced self that cannot be broken up into moments — with the identical, more-than-momentary, one self of which each of us is conscious — the self which remembers and feels and intends instead of consisting of memory image or feeling or purpose. Now the identical self is what Kant means, primarily, by his transcendental unity of apperception; and his empirical self is, from this point of view, the shifting self which varies with every change of environment, which alters in the process of youth to age and in the progress of disease. The empirical self is, in fact, Kant says, "a many-colored self," or rather, it is a series of selves, each one a distinct idea,¹ whereas the transcendental self is my own deeper, underlying, identical self.

(2) The transcendental as contrasted with the empirical self is, in the second place, a *thinking*, categorizing, active, not a sensationally conscious, passive, self. This is evident from the very name which Kant applies to it, synthetic unity of apperception, and from the nature of the argument which he advances for the existence of a self. It is the transcendental, more-than-momentary, self for which he argues, and he establishes the truth of its existence — it will be remem-

¹ B, § 16, paragraph 2, sentence 5 (p. 134), freely paraphrased.

bered — solely on the ground that there must be a unifier, a relater of the sense-manifold. Such a unifying, relating self is a thinking self.

(3) A final important character is attributed by Kant to the transcendental I: it is not merely an identical, and a thinking, but a *universal*, self, 'one universal self-consciousness,' as he declares.¹ We have next, therefore, to discover how he argues that the self is universal and what he means by its universality. Both problems will be found to involve us in difficulty. In brief, he argues its universality from the discovery that there are 'things outside me,'² and our study of his conception of the self leads, therefore, to a discussion of his conception of the 'thing outside me,' and of his argument for its existence. There is a sharp distinction — so Kant teaches, quite in harmony with everyday philosophy — between my private ideas (*Vorstellungen*) and the 'things outside me,' or 'things in space.' It is true that, according to Kant, these 'things outside me' are known objects, and as such that they are themselves ideas, or related sensation-complexes,³ but they differ utterly from the ideas peculiar to a single self — the ideas of a self-as-particular. Between 'an object in space' and the ideas (percepts or images) called up in different minds by this same object, there is, Kant thus insists, a difference, though the 'thing outside me' is itself idea.⁴ For example, between my own particular sight or percept of a stone, or your percept of it, and the 'stone outside me' there must be a distinction, else we could not, Kant observes, make general

¹ "Analytic," § 16, B, 132; W., 65.

² Kant's reason for believing the existence of a universal self thus resembles Berkeley's reason for asserting that there is an infinite self, though, as will appear, Kant is far from meaning by transcendental self what Berkeley means by infinite self.

³ Conversely it is, as Kant says, true that "every . . . idea may be called an object, so far as one is conscious of it" ("Second Analogy," B, p. 234; W., 110).

⁴ "Analytic," Bk. I., B, § 18; 139-140; W., 70-71.

assertions about objects: we could not say "the thing is heavy," but merely "the thing feels heavy to me,"¹ nor could we distinguish imagination from perception. Thus, generalization and perception both imply, Kant teaches, 'a thing outside me and not the mere consciousness of a thing outside me':² in other words, "to our percepts (*äusseren Anschauungen*) there corresponds something real in space."³

This 'thing outside me' or real 'object in space' is not, we must once more remind ourselves, an object independent of consciousness, in the sense of the dualists, Locke and Descartes, — in Kant's own terms, it is not a 'thing-in-itself.' Such a view, however tempting, is impossible. For the thing in itself, Kant always teaches, is unknown; whereas the real 'object in space,' though it is not your or my exclusive possession, yet is a thing that you and I know, and is therefore an idea. The problem is to reconcile these two conditions: to discover an idea, or phenomenon, which yet is a 'real thing' in a sense in which our percepts, as particular, are not real. Kant's solution of the problem is the following: he conceives of the 'real things in space' as objects of the *transcendental* self and contrasts them with the mere ideas, the ideas of *empirical* selves. The real things are, thus, external to the empirical self, but they are the ideas, or objects, of the transcendental self.

The pressing question of Kantian interpretation is then the following: what, concretely, is the self whose object is no mere percept or image, but a real thing, though at the same time an idea? It is very difficult to find Kant's answer to this question. Berkeley has answered it by the doctrine that it is God whose object or idea is the external thing.

¹ "Analytic," Bk. I., B, § 19, B, 142; W., 71-72.

² "Refutation of Idealism" of Edition B, B, 275. For outline and criticism of the arguments which Kant presents, cf. Appendix, pp. 530, 533. In brief, he argues that consciousness of myself demands a permanent in perception; and that the "perception of this permanent requires a thing outside me."

³ "Dialectic," Paralogism 4, of Edition A, A, 375, 374 *et al.*

Fichte and Hegel are yet to answer it by the teaching that the transcendental self is an absolute, or including, self. The universal self, they hold, whose object is a real thing, must be a self which is greater than the finite selves, and which in some sense includes them. Thus interpreted, the transcendental self is a more-than-finite self; the empirical selves are particular, finite selves, related to the including self as the momentary states to the finite, yet identical, self; and real things, objects of the transcendental or including self, are in one sense external to the finite selves, and yet are known by them in so far as they, the finite selves, share in the consciousness of the greater self which includes them.¹ In the view of the writer, this post-Kantian doctrine truly offers the only answer to the question which Kant himself has raised: how account for the existence of real things distinguished from the ideas of finite selves? But Kant, though he states the problem and, indeed, by the distinction between greater and lesser self, provides terms for this Hegelian solution of it, never himself reaches this result. By transcendental self he seems to mean not an absolute self which includes finite selves but any finite self — you, I, he, or Friedrich der Grosse — in its universalizing consciousness of real things. Thus, besides being a particular self and as such possessed of percepts and imaginations of my own, I am also, Kant seems to teach, a transcendental, universal self which perceives objects realer than those of the particularizing, momentary, empirical self — objects which are in a sense outside that empirical self. Thus, for example, Immanuel Kant, as empirical self, may stand at his window imagining his lecture-room and even having his own special percept of the view before him, but Kant as transcendental self is conscious also of 'objects' — of the real Königsberg street and church and Rathhaus; and these objects might be facts in the experience of all human beings, instead of being, like the image

¹ For more detailed discussion of this doctrine, cf. Chapters 9, 10, 11, pp. 321 *seq.*, 382 *seq.*, 435 *seq.*

of the lecture-room, an idea belonging to one self only. In a word, Kant seems to imply that the different transcendental selves overlap each other — that you and he and I, as conscious of the same object, have somehow a common experience. He seems never to realize that such common experience is impossible if there be not an including self — that, in truth, a universal self is of necessity absolute self.

b. The subject and the object self


Besides the distinction between identical and universalizing, or transcendental, self and momentary and particular, or empirical, self Kant recognizes a contrast between subject self and object self, a difference indicated by the words 'I' and 'me.' When I say, "I am conscious of myself," I seem, at least, to make a difference between the self as subject and the self as object. Kant fails to observe that this distinction is not a primary or a fundamental one. It seems to arise through carrying back into the domain of self-consciousness the relation which first exists between the self and the thing. "I know the thing" through contrasting it with myself; and so, by a later abstraction, I believe myself to know myself by distinguishing a subject from an object ego. Really, self-consciousness is a single unified experience, and subject self and object self are 'poles within consciousness.'

The greatest difficulty in Kant's exposition of the self is now the fact that he sometimes treats the distinction between subject self and object self as if it were identical with the contrast between transcendental and empirical ego: that is to say, he sometimes identifies the transcendental with the subject ego, and less constantly the empirical with the object ego.¹ He teaches, in other words, that the self is knower only and not itself known; that, on the other hand, the self as known is the lesser, the empirical, self.


It will be well to summarize the results, already outlined,

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 244 seq.

of Kant's positive teaching, before going on, as we must, to the study of his negative doctrine. Kant started, it will be remembered, from the standpoint of the Wolffian dualism; he conceived the universe as consisting (1) of things-in-themselves, realities independent of consciousness, substances spatially and temporally ordered and causally related, and (2) of conscious minds which know these things. This dualistic view may be symbolized thus:—




But Kant, partly through the influence of Hume, little by little discovered that space, time, substance, and causality — all the positive characters of the world independent of consciousness — really are subjective and ideal. Thus he taught that known objects are simply sensations 'ordered' by certain relations. These relations, he argued further, require and imply the existence of a self. In place, therefore, of the old distinction between consciousness and things, Kant now recognized a double opposition: first, that of 'self' to 'object' or 'thing' (each regarded as within the world of consciousness); and second, that of consciousness, including both self and object, to reality-independent-of-consciousness, that is, to things-in-themselves. The teaching of this stage of Kant's idealism may be represented, thus:—



Kant's positive philosophy is thus the doctrine of the self and the known thing. But his conception of the self becomes complex. He contrasts (1) the self as knower, or subject, with the self as known, or object (thus attributing to the self the term, object, heretofore reserved for the thing or the idea). He also (2) contrasts the self as identical and

universalizing with the self as momentary and particular, indicating the last two distinctions by one pair of terms, transcendental and empirical. Corresponding with this complexity of the self, Kant recognizes a distinction in the class of known objects according as they are ideas of the self as transcendental, or of the self as empirical. These distinctions are included in the following rough summary, but it is not possible to indicate, by the summary, the relations between self and thing, subject and object, namely, that the transcendental self is knower both of the empirical, or evanescent, self, and of its own categorized sense objects, the 'things outside me'; and that the empirical self may be regarded as conscious both of itself and of its ideas:—



C. KANT'S NEGATIVE TEACHING THAT ULTIMATE REALITY IS UNKNOWN

From this summary of Kant's positive teaching, it is necessary now to turn to the negative doctrine on which he seems to lay equal stress. He teaches unambiguously that not only a world of things independent of consciousness, but also the transcendental self and God are unknown. These teachings must be separately summarized and estimated.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES AS UNKNOWN

From the earliest years of his teaching to the very end Kant clings to the belief, in which he has been bred, that there

exists a world of realities independent of and unaffected by our consciousness of them. He diverges, however, from the traditional doctrine in insisting that we cannot know these objects-as-they-really-are, the things in themselves. "Not the slightest statement," he says, "is to be made *a priori* concerning the thing in itself which may lie at the basis of . . . phenomena."¹ This doctrine involves a conception of the nature of things-in-themselves, an argument for their existence, and a proof that they are unknown.

Three essential aspects must be emphasized of the things-in-themselves as Kant conceives them. They are, first, by hypothesis, independent of consciousness, other than consciousness, and out of relation with it. This is the force of the predicate 'in themselves' — which indicates the self-sufficiency, the utter independence, of these non-mental realities. The things in themselves are regarded, in the second place, as ultimately real.² The objects of experience, the objects which turn out to be the ideas of a mind, are called phenomena — that is, appearances — in contrast with them. And because of their supposedly superior reality it seems to Kant a serious loss not to know the things-in-themselves. Finally, the things-in-themselves, as conceived by Kant, lack all characters save that of mere existence. Space and time, substantiality and causality, attributed by Wolff to the reality independent of consciousness, have been regained by Kant for the objects of experience; the alleged world of things-in-themselves is thus despoiled of all positive characters.

The discovery that the things-in-themselves are thus empty

¹ "General Remarks," A, 49; B, 66, § 8, I., end.

² In the sense of 'reality as opposed to appearance' the term 'thing-in-itself' has been retained by philosophers who deny utterly the existence of reality independent of consciousness — by Schopenhauer, who applies it to the Will, by Clifford who applies it to the momentary feeling, and by Strong who differs from Kant mainly in insisting on the mental, though entirely unperceived, nature of the things-in-themselves. (Cf. citations on p. 185, and cf. M. Prince, "The Nature of Mind," Chapters III.-IV.)

of positive reality raises the question: Why does Kant hold so unswervingly to the bare and useless existence of them? The truth seems to be that, on the basis of the dualism in which he has been bred, he simply takes for granted, without argument, that things-in-themselves exist. The only arguments which he suggests are the following: He says, to begin with, that in order that there may be appearances, there must be something real of which they are the appearances.¹ He suggests, in the second place, that sensations, since they are arbitrary, must be caused by things independent of us.² The truth, however, is, as has been said, that Kant assumes and hardly attempts to argue the existence of these things-in-themselves.

Kant's teaching that the things-in-themselves, thus conceived and argued, are unknown is most vigorously stated in his section on "Phenomena and Noumena."³ It begins with a forcible metaphor. "We have now," Kant says, "travelled through the land of pure understanding. But this land is an island and is confined, by nature herself, within unchangeable bounds. It is the land of truth (an alluring name), surrounded by a wide and stormy sea, the very domain of illusion, where many a fog-bank and many an iceberg, soon to melt away, falsely suggest new lands. . . . But before we venture out on this sea . . . it will be wise to cast a glance upon the map of the land which we are ready to abandon, and first to ask whether we might not be content with what it contains — whether in fact we must not be content with this land, if there be nowhere else a footing." It at once appears that spite of the existence of the sea of unexperienced reality we must indeed be content with this island of experience, for — dropping his metaphor — Kant argues, as he has so often

¹ A, 250.

² It is not certain that this teaching is intended by Kant. It is suggested in the "Aesthetic," Sec. I., A, 19, B, 33, and more definitely in his "Prolegomena." (Cf. note on p. 240, *infra*.) For refutation of such an argument, cf. especially chap. 4, on Berkeley, pp. 128 *seq*.

³ "Analytic," A, 235 *seq.*; B, 294 *seq.*; W., 129 *seq*.

argued, that our knowledge is by its constitution incapable of apprehending ultimate reality. The reason which Kant assigns for this restriction of knowledge to the world of appearance is, briefly, the following: that our knowledge always includes sensation,¹ and that sense knowledge cannot reach (what it none the less implies) ultimate reality.

This teaching is reiterated throughout the "Kritik." One whole section, ostensibly devoted to the discussion of the categories of modality,² is really given over to the teaching that what is 'actual' is always, for us, sensational. And the section now under consideration says emphatically: "The understanding can never overstep the limits of sense;"³ "only through its sense condition can a category have a definite meaning . . . for a category can contain only a logical function . . . through which alone [without sense consciousness] nothing can be known."⁴ And because of this inevitable sense factor in knowledge, the mind, so Kant teaches in the second place, should never "make a transcendental use" of any of its concepts, that is, it should never "apply its concepts to things-in-themselves."⁵ It follows that Kant's gallant rescue of the categories — the unsensational factors of experience — from Hume's attack has not, in his own opinion, any bearing on the problem of the knowableness of reality. According to Wolff relational or thought consciousness guarantees the independent reality of its object, whereas sense consciousness is, in its nature, illusory. But Kant points out that thought is always mixed with sense, that our knowledge always has the sensational taint; and, accepting Wolff's doctrine that the object of sense is mere phenomenon, he concludes that the reality independent of our consciousness is unknown.

¹ Cf. p. 254 for reference to Kant's doctrine that knowledge might be purely intellectual.

² A, 218 *seq.*; B, 265 *seq.*; W., 122 *seq.* ³ A, 247; B, 303; W., 131.

⁴ A, 244-245. Cf. A, 254; B, 309; W., 131-132.

⁵ A, 238; B, 297-298; W., 129³.

This brief exposition of the doctrine of the unknown things in-themselves must be supplemented by an estimate of it. From the start, suspicion has attached to it, for it has been discovered that Kant himself does not consistently hold it. The things-in-themselves belong, by his definition, to reality independent of consciousness; and such reality cannot be known because the categories cannot be applied to it. Yet Kant conceives it sometimes as 'things,' sometimes as 'object' — thus implying either its plurality or its unity; and he speaks of it either as actual, or at least as possible, thus applying some one of his categories of modality. More than once also he treats this independent reality as causally related to sense experience: thus he says,¹ "The word 'appearance' . . . indicates a relation to something . . . which must exist in itself, that is to an object independent of sense." And in another passage he refers to a "transcendental object which is the cause of the phenomenon."² Truth to tell, this inconsistency is rooted deep in a fundamental difficulty of the thing-in-itself doctrine. Things-in-themselves are, by hypothesis, independent of consciousness, yet they must be talked about and thought about if they are to be inferred as existing. They are drawn, thus, into the domain of the self, they become objects of consciousness, no longer independent realities.³

The self-contradiction of Kant's teaching that things-in-themselves must exist is thus so evident that the comments on his specific arguments may without harm be abbreviated.

¹ A, 252; cf. 249-250.

² A, 288; B, 344; cf. for even more explicit statement, Kant's "Prolegomena," § 13, Remark II.; "I admit . . . that there exist outside us bodies, that is, things which though . . . in themselves altogether unknown to us, we know through the ideas which their influence upon our sensibility supplies." (Note, however, that the "Prolegomena" was written in a mood of exaggerated opposition to idealism. Cf. Appendix, p. 510.)

³ Cf. Berkeley's virtual proof of this in his arguments against the existence of matter conceived as unknown (*supra*, pp. 131 *seq.*) and Hegel's discussion of the same hypothesis in his chapters on "Essence" and "Appearance" (*infra*, pp. 365 *seq.*).

In support of the existence of things-in-themselves, he first argues, it will be remembered, that they must exist to cause sensations. But this implies, what Kant denies, that they are categorized objects. Another argument for the existence of things-in-themselves is by the assertion that mere phenomena, or manifestations, require a something to manifest, a reality of which they are appearance. Upon this reasoning, two criticisms may be made. On the one hand, the argument is illicit, for it applies a category, that of substance, to the things-in-themselves, which, by hypothesis, are uncategorized; in the second place, the argument is insufficient, for it proves only the existence of some reality more ultimate than phenomena, and leaves open the possibility that this more ultimate reality is no thing, but a self.

Kant's proof that things are unknown may be even more briefly treated. It rests on the two propositions: that knowledge involves sensation, and that the object of sensational consciousness is, *ipso facto*, unreal. Both propositions are mere assumptions; and for the second, no proof can be found.¹ As a whole, then, Kant's thing-in-itself doctrine breaks under its own weight. He has not proved that things-in-themselves if they exist are unknown; he has not proved that they exist; and — most important of all — he has not even a right to the bare conception of them, since it involves him in a logical contradiction.

II. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE REAL SELF AS UNKNOWN

To the world of ultimate reality which Kant contrasts with that of appearances or phenomena, there may belong, he teaches, not merely things-in-themselves, that is, realities independent of consciousness, but also real, or transcendental, selves.² These selves, he adds, like the things-in-themselves,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 239.

² This conception of the selves as like the things-in-themselves in being possessed of ultimate reality is an advance on Kant's earlier, Wolfian view (cf. p. 199).

must be unknown. This assertion that the real or transcendental selves are unknown is, it must be observed, more important than the parallel teaching about things-in-themselves. For by the teaching that beyond the domain of self and its object there exist realities which may not be known, Kant simply indicates that the world of selves and their objects is a part only of reality. But by the doctrine that the transcendental ego, the real self, the permanent I, is unknown, Kant narrows the world of the known, subtracting from it the only ultimate realities which it contains.

Kant does not, it will be observed, deny the existence of the transcendental selves (or self), nor does he, like Hume, deny the possibility of self-knowledge. But he insists that only the empirical, the lesser and fragmentary self, can be known; teaching that the true self, though unquestionably existing, cannot constitute an object of knowledge. It is true, he admits, that we infer its existence as the necessary unifier of experience, but the only self which we ever catch, so to speak, the only describable, known self, is just a sum of percepts, feelings, and memories — a momentary, particular, empirical ego. In Kant's own words: "I, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as thought object, . . . not as I am . . . but as I appear to myself."¹ More unequivocally: "I am conscious of myself . . . in the synthetic, original unity of apperception, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself: [I am conscious] only that I am."²

This doctrine, it is obvious, is of grave import, for it takes away our knowledge of the only significant self — the only self which has permanence, the only self to which moral worth or immortality might be attributed.³ The known, empirical self reduces, indeed, to an ego closely resembling

¹ B, "Analytic," § 24, 155 end: §§ 24 and 25 taken together contain the most detailed formulation of this argument.

² B, § 25, 157.

³ Cf. note on p. 266, *infra*.

Hume's mere bundle of perceptions. The heavy consequences, thus foreshadowed, of this doctrine, predispose one to a critical examination of Kant's arguments for it. These are two. The first is derived from Kant's conception of knowledge and from his conception of the nature of the transcendental self. On the one hand, he teaches (1) that all knowledge must include sensation; yet (2) that knowledge, just because it contains sensation, is incapable of attaining unphenomenal reality. And, on the other hand, he teaches that the transcendental self is a categorizing, unifying self, not a complex of sensations; and that it is therefore a more-than-phenomenal reality. It follows that the self, just because it is the deepest kind of reality, cannot be known, since knowledge includes sensation and since sensation cannot reach the non-phenomenal. This means that all objects of knowledge — including even the self-as-known — must be phenomenal objects, that is, mere appearances, in comparison with the realities independent of consciousness. In Kant's own words: "the consciousness of oneself is far from being a knowledge of oneself. . . . Just as I need for the knowledge of an object distinct from me not merely thought . . . but also a perception, . . . so also I need for the knowledge of myself . . . besides the fact that I think myself, a perception also of the manifold within me."¹

Before going on to outline Kant's second argument for the unknowableness of the transcendental ego, it will be well to estimate the value of the first. The implicit assumptions of this argument have been enumerated; and a brief consideration will make clear that, while several of them may be admitted, one at least will be sharply challenged. It may be admitted, in the first place, that the transcendental self is a more-than-fragmentary and an ultimate reality.² It is also

¹ B, § 25, 158.

² Yet this admission is, on Kant's part, inconsistent with the doctrine that the deepest, the ultimate, reality is independent of consciousness. Cf. pp. 236 *seq.*

true that we have always found not merely what we call our knowledge but all our consciousness to contain sensations; in other words, we have never found ourselves conscious without at the same time seeing or hearing, smelling or tasting or feeling (singly or together). To be sure, the sensational factor of our experience often is unemphasized and unattended to, but — as far as our past and present experience goes — it is always present. But this fact offers no warrant for Kant's conclusion that because our knowledge is, in this meaning, sensational, therefore it may not have as object any ultimate reality. Of course it is true that my consciousness of myself is much more than sensational (and this is doubtless the foundation of Kant's doctrine); but this fact does not hinder my being both sensorially conscious and conscious of myself. The two experiences are not irreconcilable; the sensations are either coincident with the self-consciousness or even unemphasized parts of it. When Dante, for example, first saw Beatrice he was conscious of her red robe, but the presence of the sensational consciousness did not prevent his soul meeting hers — in a word, did not affect Dante's knowledge of Beatrice. Thus, to recapitulate, Kant's first argument to prove the transcendental self unknowable is invalid mainly because it argues, without adequate foundation, that where sensation is there ultimate reality is not.

Kant's second argument for the doctrine that the transcendental self is unknown, is formulated in a later part of the 'Kritik.'¹ In brief, this argument is the following: Knowledge involves the distinction between subject and object, that is, between the 'I' and the 'me'; but if the transcendental self were known, it would itself be both subject and object, both 'I' and 'myself'; and this is impossible, for so the necessary distinction between subject and object would be lost.

¹ "Dialectic," Paralogisms of Edition B (B, 404; W., 148). Here Kant also argues, very successfully, that the soul, if distinguished in Locke's fashion from the self, must be unknown.

Kant sees in this contradiction a support for his doctrine that the transcendental self is pure subject, or knower, without being object, or known. "Through this I or He or It (the thing) which thinks, nothing except a transcendental subject of thoughts is represented (*vorgestellt*), = *X*, . . . of which, in abstraction, we can have no slightest idea. (About this *I* we revolve in an inconvenient circle since we must have a consciousness (*Vorstellung*) of it to come to any conclusion about it.)" Twenty-five years later, Herbart restated just this difficulty in great detail. "Who, or what," he asks, "is the object of self-consciousness? The answer must be . . . 'The I is conscious of *Itself*.' This itself is the I itself. One may then substitute this concept of the I, and then the first proposition will be transformed into the following: 'The I is conscious of itself as being conscious of itself.' Let the same substitution be repeated, and there results: 'The I is conscious of that which is conscious of that which is conscious of itself.' . . . This circle will run on forever . . . and it follows that the question is unanswerable and that the I is a never complete but always to-be-completed problem."¹

It has already been shown that Kant's solution of the difficulty consists in assuming that the necessary distinction between subject and object self is obtained by regarding the subject self as transcendental, or identical and universal, and the object self as empirical, or changing and particularizing. The self which I know is always, in other words, the self of the moment, the way-I-feel or imagine or decide at this particular moment; and I do not know, I am merely conscious, of the identical, universalizing I, which knows, but is not known, which is subject, not object. It must at once be admitted that this doctrine meets the difficulty which was stated. As Kant says, both the suggested conditions of self-knowledge are, in this way, fulfilled: self

¹ "Psychologie als Wissenschaft," § 27.

knows self and yet there is a distinction between self as knower (the transcendental self) and self as known (the empirical self).¹ Yet this conception of the transcendental self as knower and not known has its own insuperable difficulty; it is clearly self-contradictory. In the very act of saying that the transcendental self is knower, not known, subject, not object, Kant admits the necessary existence of such a self; and anything which must be said to exist is surely known — at least as existing. Kant's doctrine that the transcendental self exists implies, therefore, the admission that it is known.

So Kant is left with the alleged contradiction of self-consciousness, subject-objectivity, on his hands. He has brought the contradiction forward as proof of his doctrine that the transcendental self is subject only, never object or known; but it appears that an existent, transcendental, self must be, to some degree, a known self. If then a self is necessarily conceived as known self, and if the conception of a known self involves hopeless contradiction, Kant's whole doctrine of the transcendental self is endangered. In this extremity, the critic of Kant may point out that the difficulty which this discredited conception was framed to meet is itself artificial, in other words, that self-consciousness is not in its essential meaning subject-objectivity. Our awareness of self is in truth a fundamental experience, a primarily immediate certainty, and it is but inadequately expressed in terms of the later and more artificial opposition of object and subject — a distinction borrowed from the contrast of self with external things. There is thus no need of proving that I know a transcendental, that is, a universalizing and an

¹ It should be observed that this difficulty would be as well met in the opposite way; that is, if the empirical self were conceived as subject, or knower, and the transcendental self as object. The considerations just summarized in the first argument for the unknowableness of the self (*supra*, pp. 243 *seq.*) prevent Kant from reaching this conclusion. Either hypothesis, as this page tries to show, is at best an artificial and unnecessary attempt to meet an imaginary difficulty.

identical self, for I am immediately aware of such a self; and the opposition of object to subject self is an addition of later reflection. This refutation of the last of Kant's arguments for the unknowableness of the transcendental self sends us back with renewed confidence to his own arguments for the existence of this self, and restores to his universe of reality the significant figure which he himself has tried to banish.

III. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF GOD AS UNKNOWN

By his doctrine that only sense objects and empirical (or changing) selves can be known Kant has implicitly taught the impossibility of knowing God. In the first section of the "Dialectic," however, he argues explicitly that the existence of God cannot be proved. By God, he says, is meant a being which "includes all reality in itself," a 'supreme being' to whom "everything is subject." The unknowability of God, thus conceived, is argued by Kant through a destructive criticism of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God.¹ Of these the first is the ontological proof.² Kant states it in the form in which Anselm held it: "The real-est of all beings contains all reality; and one is justified in assuming that such a being is possible. . . . But existence is included in all reality: therefore existence belongs to the concept of a possible being. If, now, this thing does not exist, the inner possibility of it is denied, and this denial is a contradiction."³ More simply: The concept of an absolutely real being,

¹ Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 25 *seq.* and Chapter 4, pp. 100 *seq.* for discussion of Descartes's and of Leibniz's forms of these proofs.

² In the chapters to which reference has just been made it has been pointed out that the term 'ontological' may be applied, as by Hegel, to a wider argument for the existence of God. Hegel's objection to Kant's criticism of the ontological argument consists essentially in the contention that the argument should be stated in this larger fashion, hence the objection does not materially affect Kant's criticism of the old form of the argument.

³ A, 596; B, 624; W., 207.

that is God, is possible. But absolute reality includes existence. Therefore the absolutely real being must be conceived as existing. Therefore, finally, he does exist. Kant makes short and easy work of this argument. It depends, as he shows, on the false supposition that 'conceived' existence' and 'real existence' are synonymous. As a matter of fact, not everything which is conceived is real. To be conscious of one hundred thaler is surely not the same as to possess the hundred thaler: in other words, one may be conscious of the existent, and yet that-which-is-thought-of-as-existing does not necessarily exist. Thus, the fact of our representing to ourselves an all-perfect being is not any guarantee for such a being's existence.

The cosmological is the causal argument for God's existence.² Kant states it very clearly, in the passage which follows: "If anything exists," he says, "an absolutely necessary Being must exist, . . . [for] every contingent thing must have its cause, and this cause — if contingent — must have its cause till the series of subordinate causes end in an absolutely necessary cause, without which the series would have no completeness. . . . Now, at least I myself exist, therefore an absolutely necessary being exists."³

The argument is familiar, for Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, and even Hobbes have employed it. It is based on two principles: the first expressed in the proposition, "Every limited or contingent reality must have a cause;" the second formulated in the statement, "Every limited reality must have, not merely a partial, but a completely explanatory, an ultimate

¹ Observe that 'conceived' here means merely 'conscious-ed,' 'reflected on.'

² The argument is contained in two portions of the last division, the "Dialectic," of the "Kritik": most appropriately in Bk. II., Chapter 3, on the "Transcendental Ideal," but also in Chapter 2, third and fourth Antinomies. Cf. Adickes, notes to his edition of the "Kritik," pp. 461, 491.

³ "Dialectic, Transcendental Ideal," A, 604 or B, 632, *with note*; W., 211. Cf. the theses of the third and fourth Antinomies, taken together, A, 443 *seq.*, 452 *seq.*; B, 472 *seq.*, 480 *seq.*; W., 162-166.

cause." To the first of these principles Kant, as we know, assents, teaching unequivocally that everything or — to be more exact — every event has a cause.¹ But the universality of this causal principle does not, Kant insists, imply an ultimate cause. All that it requires is that the causal series of contingent beings never at any particular point came to an end — in other words, that every contingent cause, however far back in the series, should itself have a cause. But Kant is not content with arguing that the first and incontrovertible causal principle does not imply the second — that is to say, that the universality of the causal relation does not imply the existence of an ultimate cause. In addition, he directly opposes the second of the principles, on which the cosmological or causal argument for God's existence rests, by the teaching that a cause must be contingent and that an ultimate, or necessary, being cannot, therefore, be a cause. For cause, he points out, is precisely that which stands in necessary relation both to its effect and to its own cause as well. That is to say, the supposedly ultimate being, if it *were* a cause, would need to *have* a cause; and so would cease being ultimate. In Kant's own words: "Every beginning presupposes a state of . . . its cause. But a . . . first beginning would presuppose a state which had no causal relation with a preceding cause."² The ordinary way of meeting this difficulty is by the teaching that the supreme being, as necessary, is not subject to the law of contingent causality. But this ejection of the ultimate cause from the series of contingent phenomena destroys the whole cosmological argument, for

¹ Cf. p. 212.

² "Antinomy III., Antithesis, Proof," paragraph 1, A, 445; B, 473; W., 163, a free rendering. It is evident that Kant here uses 'cause' in the Humian sense as belonging to time. The cosmological argument, as has before been observed, really confuses this temporal conception of cause (implied in the expression, First Cause) with the other view of cause as explanation or ground (implied in the expression, Ultimate or Necessary Cause). Cf. *supra*, p. 103. Kant uses the term 'cause' in this second sense, but applies it only to the moral self. Cf. *infra*, pp. 259 *seq.*

that infers the existence of God precisely as the highest term of the series of the contingent. "Were the highest being," Kant repeats, "to remain in the chain of conditions," it would itself be a member of the series; and like the lower members of which it is the presupposition, there would be need of investigating its higher ground. If, on the other hand, he adds, "the highest being be separated from this chain; and if — by virtue of being a merely intelligible being — it be not conceived in the series of nature causes: what bridge can reason build in order to reach the nature series [*i.e.* in order to connect the alleged necessary cause with the contingent things which it is inferred to explain]?"¹

Besides showing in this fashion that the cosmological argument is invalid, Kant points out² that it is incomplete. It attempts to prove only the existence of an ultimate cause and — in this respect inferior to the ontological argument — "it cannot teach what sort of attributes the necessary being has." The last of the traditional arguments for God's existence arises to supplement the causal argument in this particular. It is known to Kant as the physico-theological argument, but is more commonly known as the teleological argument, or the argument from design. Toward this reasoning Kant has a temperamental regard, due to his interest in natural science; for the physico-theological argument finds in the order and majesty of nature a reason for inferring the existence of an absolutely necessary, an all-perfect creator. Kant states the argument thus:³ "(1) In the world are found everywhere clear tokens of an order which follows a definite purpose; and this purpose is carried out with great wisdom and in a whole of indescribable manifoldness. . . . (2) This purposed order is utterly foreign to the things in the world and belongs to them only accidentally, that is to say, . . . different things could not . . . unite to

¹ A, 621; B, 649.

² A, 606 *seq.*; B, 634 *seq.*; W., 212 *seq.*

³ A, 625 (cf. 622); B, 653 (cf. 650); W., 219.

definite ends . . . were they not chosen and disposed through an ordering, reasoning principle. (3) Therefore, there exists a sublime and wise cause (or several of them) — which as intelligence and freedom must be cause of the world.” . . . “This proof,” Kant says, “deserves ever to be named with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest proof — and most suited to ordinary human reason. It vivifies the study of nature — and itself has its source and the renewal of its strength through nature study. It supplies purposes and aims where our observation had not of itself discovered them and widens our knowledge of nature through the guiding thread of a special unity.”¹

Yet though the reasonableness and the utility of the argument appeal to Kant so strongly that they rouse him to one of his rare enthusiasms, he none the less insists that this method of proof carries with it no absolute certainty. For the argument is, after all is said, an argument from the nature of an effect — the well-ordered world — to a cause. In other words, this argument from design is a case under the cosmological argument,² and since it has been proved unjustifiable to reason from any effect to the existence of a ‘necessary cause,’ any particular case of this reasoning must be discredited. And even if one had already granted the existence of a first cause, this effort to show that the creator is a free intelligence would fail of convincing force, since it is but an argument from “the analogy of certain nature products with that which human art creates.”³ Because a human being would need thought and will in order to create objects comparable to the ‘wonders of nature and the majesty of the world,’ we have, Kant argues, no right to argue that the unknown cause of nature is intellect and will.

So Kant concludes his discussion of the three traditional arguments for God’s existence. “Outside these three paths,”

¹ A, 623; B, 651; W., 218.

² A, 629; B, 657; W., 221.

³ A, 626; B, 654.

he says, "no other lies open to the speculative reason;" and he questions "whether any proof be possible of a proposition so sublimely above all empirical use of the understanding."¹ The reader of Kant will echo his doubt, if once he admits that these are the only arguments for God's existence. For Kant's strictures on them surely are justified. From the observation of ordered nature it is, indeed, impossible to argue demonstratively to the existence of an infinite intelligence as its creator; no empirical argument can suffice to establish the existence of a logical contradiction, namely, a first cause; and, finally, the mere consciousness which I possess of a perfect being, logically possible though it is, cannot guarantee the existence of such a being. If there be, then, no other argument for the existence of God, the conception truly must be viewed after Kant's fashion, as an ideal of the speculative reason. But Kant himself, as will appear elsewhere, suggests — what later philosophers amplify — another and, in the opinion of the writer, a valid proof of God's existence. And in this proof, when it shall disclose itself, we shall find no negation, but rather a transformation, of these discredited arguments. My consciousness will be shown to imply the existence of God as its deepest reality (and this is the soul of the ontological argument); my consciousness will be shown, furthermore, to imply the existence of God as its explanation (and this it is which the causal argument has tried to express), finally, even the adaptations of nature may serve to illuminate our conception of God (and thus the teleological argument shall find its rightful, though subordinate, place).

In conclusion certain general comments on Kant's negative teaching must be made. It should be noted, in the first place, that his three negative doctrines have a varied bearing on his positive theory. The first, the doctrine that the things-in-themselves are unknown, makes no inroad whatever on

¹ A, 630; B, 658; W., 221-222.

the world of known reality: its effect, if accepted, would be merely to impress upon us that there exists unknown reality, more ultimate than any which we know. On the other hand, the doctrine that we may not know either permanent selves or God seriously narrows the supposedly known world.

In the second place, it must be emphasized that Kant asserts the existence of all three of these unknowns: things-in-themselves, selves, and God. With reference to God this statement has later to be proved. But it has already appeared that Kant argues for the existence of the more-than-individual self; and every section of the "*Kritik*" bears witness to his constant assumption that things-in-themselves exist. The consequences of these admissions are elsewhere considered.¹

D. KANT'S CORRECTION OF HIS NEGATIVE DOCTRINE

Kant's negative doctrine of the limits of knowledge, his teaching that the ultimate realities may not be known, is very variously estimated by different critics. To certain students of Kant, for example, to Heine and to Herbert Spencer, the teaching that ultimate reality — and, in particular, God and immortal selves — are unknown, seems to be the significant and the final result of Kant's teaching. The present writer, however, holds with many other students and commentators that this negative doctrine of the limits of our knowledge is neither an essential nor a permanently significant teaching of Kant. The reasons for this conclusion have been indicated in the criticism of Kant's teaching that the transcendental I is unknown, and that objective reality independent of consciousness exists. But a further reason for rejecting Kant's negative doctrine is found in the fact that he himself corrects and thus virtually retracts it, by his teaching concerning the noumenal object and the moral self. In other words, though unquestionably he

¹ Cf. pp. 255, 261.

teaches that ultimate realities, whether things or selves, are unknown, he none the less suggests the possibility of known things-in-themselves; and with glorious inconsistency he implies and even asserts that the moral self is known. This correction of his metaphysics by his ethics carries with it, as will appear, a most significant extension of his positive philosophy.

I. KANT'S ADMISSION THAT THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES MIGHT BE KNOWN (THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE NOUMENA)

In the very chapter on "Phenomena and Noumena," in which Kant most definitely formulates his teaching that the ultimately real things-in-themselves are unknown, there is contained a curious qualification of this doctrine of the limits of knowledge. This corrective teaching, ignored in the preceding summary of the thing-in-itself doctrine, is as follows: (1) the reason why things-in-themselves are unknown is that all our knowledge includes sense; and that sense-consciousness is incapable of apprehending reality. Were there, then, Kant says, an immediate knowledge untainted by sense — it might know even ultimate realities; and these known realities, or things-in-themselves, would be *noumena* (things thought about).¹ Now (2) such unsensuous knowledge is, Kant admits, conceivable. "The concept of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which shall be thought wholly through a pure understanding, not as an object of the senses but as a thing in itself, is not at all contradictory: for one surely cannot assume that sensibility is the only possible form of intuition (*Anschauung*)."² But, Kant adds, (3) we do not possess this unsensuous yet immediate knowledge; our con-

¹ Kant's words are these, "If I assume things which are mere objects of the understanding, and which as such could yet be presented to intuition, though not to sense intuition, such things would be called noumena." (A, 249; cf. B, 306 *seq.* The second edition lays more emphasis than the first on the problematic character of this hypothesis.)

cepts are mere forms of thought for our sense perceptions, and, therefore, (4) the bare idea of *noumena*, namely things-in-themselves as objects of thought, is no guarantee of the existence of these knowable things-in-themselves, but is a mere *Grenzbegriff*,¹ a 'limitative concept by which to check the presumption of the sense consciousness.'

So Kant ends by reaffirming the doctrine that the ultimately real things in themselves are unknown. But he has gone so far as to suggest that they might be known — that there is nothing contradictory in conceiving them as known. He has done more than this: he has clearly implied that the ultimate realities, if known, would no longer be independent of consciousness. They would be objects of thought, and therefore related to mind; and yet they would be ultimate. Thus, in two directions, by suggesting that ultimate reality might be known and by implying that, as known, it would no longer be independent of consciousness, Kant has made, by his hypothesis of the noumenon, at least a move toward the correction of the thing-in-itself doctrine,

II. KANT'S ADMISSIONS THAT THE REAL SELF IS KNOWN

a. *The teaching that I am 'conscious of' the real (or transcendental) self*

Far more significant than this only half-serious suggestion that things-in-themselves might be known, is Kant's restoration of the real self to the domain of the known. It is fair to say that the things-in-themselves, empty of all predicates, would have been no great loss to us; but the denial of our ability to know selves deprives us of our most valued certainty. With distinct relief, therefore, a reader who takes his Kant seriously finds the real self not only restored to the world of known reality but enriched with new and significant character.

¹ A, 255; B, 310-311; W., 132.

It has been shown already, by repeated quotations,¹ that Kant admits the fact that I am *conscious of* my real self — not merely of the complex feeling of the moment, but of my underlying, my permanent, my real self. He has, it is true, withheld the name of 'knowledge' from this mere consciousness of self; but this doctrine that we do not know a self of which we are and must be conscious is, as has appeared, an absurdity due wholly to Kant's artificial and unjustifiable conception of knowledge. He denies that the consciousness of the transcendental self is a knowledge of it, purely because he holds (1) that knowledge is sensational, and thus of the momentary, and (2) that knowledge involves an actual opposition between subject and object. But it can neither be maintained that sensational knowledge is inherently illusory, nor yet that knowledge requires an absolute subject-object contrast.² There is consequently no force in Kant's contention that the consciousness of self is not a knowledge of self. It must be true, on the other hand, that the consciousness of the transcendental self is the knowledge of at least one undoubted and more-than-momentary reality. But besides this unacknowledged implication of the known self, the "*Kritik*" contains Kant's definite teaching that the moral self is an object of knowledge. The consideration of this teaching follows.

b. Kant's teaching that I know the moral self as real

Up to this point we have concerned ourselves exclusively with what Kant calls his theoretical philosophy, and have taken no account of his ethical doctrine. Kant himself intends to make a sharp distinction between metaphysics and ethics, theoretical and moral philosophy; but an absolute line of cleavage is not possible. Ethics, like metaphysics, involves a doctrine of the human self and — in Kant's view —

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 242.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 245 *seq.*

a theory, positive or negative, of God. Therefore ethics cannot be divorced from metaphysics; and what Kant and his critics call his moral philosophy is really, in the main, an integral part of his metaphysical system.¹

The core of Kant's ethical system is his doctrine of obligation; and this doctrine involves the teaching that the real self, as a moral self, is known. His teaching may be summarized as follows: In the consciousness of obligation, a man knows himself, not as mere phenomenon, but as a reality, deeper than all phenomena, a self which is more than a mere series of temporally linked feelings; in the moral consciousness, in a word, a man knows himself as absolute reality. Kant's meaning will become clearer by a closer scrutiny of his doctrine of obligation. It contains four main articles: (1) the consciousness or feeling of obligation is a fact of our experience; (2) the feeling of obligation differs radically from every sensational or affective experience; (3) the feeling of obligation cannot be accounted for by a preceding succession of phenomena; therefore, (4) the consciousness of obligation implies the existence of a free, that is, a transcendental, an ultimately real, self. These different teachings must now be repeated in Kant's own words.

(1) The consciousness of obligation exists. I am, Kant says, 'immediately conscious of the moral law.'² "How this consciousness of moral laws is possible cannot," he says,³

¹ This doctrine, here outlined, of the nature of obligation and its implication of the free moral self and of God is found, it should be noticed, not only in Kant's ethical works, but in the third and fourth Antinomies of the "Kritik of Pure Reason." Of the ethical works the more important are the "Kritik of Practical Reason," published in 1788, and the "Metaphysik of Morality (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*)," which appeared three years earlier, and which is sometimes cited as "Metaphysics of Ethics."

² "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chapter 1, § 6, Problem II., Remark, H., 31. (The page references, both to the "Kritik of Practical Reason" and to the "Metaphysik of Morality," are to the Hartenstein edition of 1867); W., p. 268.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. I., Chapter 1, I. "Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason," H., 49.

"be further explained," for the feeling of obligation is "an inexplicable fact."¹ "The moral law," he says, a little later,² — meaning by moral law the consciousness of obligation — "is given as a fact of pure reason of which we are *a priori* conscious and which is apodictically certain. . . ."

(2) The feeling of obligation differs absolutely from the 'desire' or the 'impulse.' It is a distinct experience, a consciousness *sui generis*. The 'I ought' feeling, in other words, is not equivalent to the 'I wish' or to the 'it would be pleasanter — more expedient — more advantageous.' Kant makes use of many expressions to sharpen this distinction. He contrasts the feeling of obligation, under the name 'categorical imperative,' with the desire, as 'hypothetical imperative';³ and he further distinguishes the 'moral law' from the 'subjective maxim'. "Obligation," Kant says, "expresses a sort of necessity . . . which occurs nowhere else in nature. It is impossible that anything in nature *ought to be* other than in fact it is. In truth, obligation — if one has before one's eyes only the succession in nature — has simply and solely no meaning. We can as little ask what ought to happen in nature as what attributes a circle ought to have."⁴

From the assertion of the absolute difference between the feeling of obligation and empirical desires or wishes, Kant proceeds (3) to the doctrine that the feeling of obligation cannot be adequately explained as due merely to preceding phenomena of the inner life or of the outer world. The preceding facts of our mental condition may serve to explain for us why we wish such and such an end, or act in such and such a way, but they can never explain our sense of duty. "There may be," he says, in the paragraph following that last quoted, "never so many nature causes or sensuous impulses which

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," H., 46, W., 273². Cf. H., 32, 45; W., 268³, 272².

² *Ibid.*, p. 50. Cf. "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 546-547; B, 574-575; W., 186.

³ "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 263 *seq.*; "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chapter 1, Definition 1, Remark, H., 21; W., 259².

⁴ "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 547; B, 575.

drive me to volition: they cannot create obligation." "The objective reality of the moral law," he says elsewhere,¹ "can be proved by no . . . *a posteriori* deduction, and none the less it stands fast on its own merits (*für sich selbst*)." "The moral law," he says again,² "is a fact absolutely inexplicable by all data of the sense world."

(4) But just because the feeling of obligation is inexplicable from the standpoint of temporal causality, it is seen inevitably to imply the existence of a self which is deeper, realer, than the phenomena. The feeling of obligation is, in other words, no mere phenomenon, no purely momentary consciousness. It is rather the expression of a self which is conscious of obligation, and which, just because it knows it *ought*, also knows that it *may*. Thus the consciousness of obligation is "inextricably bound up with the consciousness of the freedom"³ of the willing self. One knows "that one can act because one is conscious that one ought, and thus one knows in oneself the freedom which — without the moral law — had remained unknown."⁴

From this ethical standpoint, therefore, Kant restates the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental ego, as that between the temporally caused and the free self, or as that between the phenomenally caused and the intelligibly causal self. From the first, the empirical, point of view, I am the complex feeling of this particular moment, and this complex feeling is the result of the inner feeling and of the outer phenomenon of the preceding moment: in a word, I am the product of my experience and of my environment. But, regarding myself — as I may and must — not merely as a series of conscious experiences, but as the self which ought and can, I am 'outside the series'⁵ of temporal feelings.

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," *loc. cit.*, H., 50; W., 275⁴.

² *Ibid.*, H., 46; W., 273².

³ *Ibid.*, H., 45, W., 272². Cf. below, pp. 265⁴ *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 6, Problem II., Remark, H., 32.

⁵ A, 537; B, 565; W., 184, "Eine solche intelligible Ursache . . . ist, sammt ihrer Kausalität ausser der Reihe." Cf. A. 493; B, 522.

This means that the self which, superficially regarded, is a series of facts of consciousness is, from a deeper point of view, an active subject (*handelndes Subjekt*).¹ The 'empirical character' is, in fact, — Kant says, — 'the mere manifestation (*Erscheinung*) of the intelligible.'² Thus, the same action which "from one point of view is a pure nature result," may "from another standpoint, be regarded as a manifestation of freedom."³ For "with reference to the intelligible character . . . there is no 'before' or 'after,' and every act, without regard to its temporal relation to other phenomena, is the immediate working of the intelligible character . . . which consequently acts freely without being dynamically determined in the chain of nature causes, either through external or internal antecedent grounds."⁴

The teaching about the real self of the ethical experience is well summarized in the following statement:⁵ "Man is one of the phenomena of the sense world, and he, too, is in so far one of the nature causes whose causality must stand under empirical laws. As such, he must have an empirical character. . . . But man, who knows all the rest of nature only through sense, knows (*erkennt*) himself also through mere apperception⁶—and indeed in activities and inner determinations which he cannot count among sense impressions. He is certainly, therefore, on the one hand, phenomenon to himself, but on the other hand — in consideration of a certain

¹ A, 539; B, 567. Cf. "Kritik of Practical Reason," *loc. cit.*, II., H., 59; W., 279.

² A, 541; B, 569.

³ A, 543; B, 571; W., 184.

⁴ A, 553; B, 581. In the paragraph from which the first quotation of p. 260 is made Kant contradicts himself by saying that the intelligible character "begins" the series of its phenomenal manifestations. This is, of course, to let the intelligible self fall back into the temporal world of the phenomenal self from which it has been rescued.

⁵ A, 546; B, 574; W., 185-186.

⁶ Note that this bare statement is made without specific application to the moral consciousness, though the context certainly refers to the moral experience.

capacity — he is a purely intelligible object.” The last words of the quotation show unequivocally that Kant regards the moral self both as known self and as absolute reality — yes, as ‘thing-in-itself.’ For this exact expression, heretofore reserved by Kant to describe the ultimate reality independent of consciousness, is applied in these sections to self in its moral activity. ‘Intelligible causality’¹ is designated as the activity of a ‘thing-in-itself’; and later the ‘intelligible character,’ that is the character of the moral self, is explicitly called ‘the character of the thing-in-itself.’

The comparison of these conclusions with the negative results of Kant’s philosophy leads almost inevitably to a reconstruction. Kant has argued, before he comes to the consideration of the moral experience, that the true or transcendental self is unknowable, and that beyond the reach of knowledge lie certain unattainable realities. In the course of his argument he has, it is true, been guilty of extreme inconsistency; he has really implied that the transcendental self is known and that the ultimate realities are objects within, and not beyond, consciousness. Yet he has clung persistently to the existence of the unknowable world beyond experience. Now, in the study of the moral consciousness, Kant suddenly discovers that here, at least, in the consciousness of duty and the knowledge of freedom, the true self comes to know itself. And this true self — no mere series of events dependent one on another — is, Kant sees, an ultimate reality. But if both assertions be admitted, if the self is an ultimate reality and if this reality can be known, then it is no longer possible to hold that ultimate reality is, of necessity, beyond our knowledge. On the other hand, it becomes probable that ultimate reality will turn out to be a self or a related system of selves. Kant himself implies, though he does not prove,

¹ A, 538; B, 566. Here Kant expressly uses the term ‘causality’ in a non-Humian sense. The intelligible cause is indeed expressly opposed to the phenomenal cause, the temporal event. It is cause in the sense of being ultimate reality, or ground.

the truth of this Berkeley-like hypothesis by the further teachings of his ethics.

c. Kant's teaching that the free, moral self must be member of a society of blessed and immortal selves

Kant's starting-point, as has been shown, is the immediate certainty of a feeling of obligation distinct from desire. The impossibility of deriving this from temporal or empirical causes has led him, in the first place, to insist on the existence of a self deeper than phenomena. In the second place, the fact that no empirical derivation of the feeling of obligation can be found has convinced Kant of its validity. The foundation of the greater part of the positive philosophy, constructed by Kant from the ethical standpoint, is therefore, as should be noted, not the initial assertion of the bare existence of a feeling of obligation, but the later inference of its validity. Or — to state this differently — Kant believes, not merely in the feeling, but in the fact, of obligation; not merely that there is a *feeling* of obligation, but also that there is *obligation*, independently of the purely individual admission of it. The existence of the feeling of obligation must imply, Kant teaches, the existence of a more-than-phenomenal self. The *validity* of the feeling of obligation — the existence, in other words, of obligation — implies, Kant goes on to show, the freedom, the blessedness, and the immortality of selves who are members of a kingdom of related selves.

This acknowledgment that the world of the moral self is a social world of interrelated individuals is made by reason of Kant's study of what he calls the content of the moral law. A consideration of his specifically ethical doctrine is, therefore, necessary, as a means to the understanding of his doctrine of the ultimately real and related selves. After Kant has established the existence of obligation, and after he has taught that a self is free to do what it ought, the question arises: *what* then, ought I, the moral self, to do? What, definitely, is my

duty? In what terms is the 'categorical imperative' expressed? Now Kant adopts, at different times, two attitudes, which he does not clearly differentiate, toward this problem. When he is chiefly concerned to establish the utter distinctness of the ought-feeling from desire, he defines the object of obligation in almost negative terms. The object of desire is the pleasurable, but the feeling of obligation is utterly opposed to desire; hence — Kant teaches — that which one ought to do cannot be pleasurable. "The pure idea of duty" must be "unmixed with any foreign ingredient of sensuous desire."¹ Furthermore, because the object of desire is always some definite object, and because obligation is opposed to desire, therefore — so Kant teaches, in this phase of his ethical doctrine — obligation has no definite object. "The single principle of morality," he says, "consists in independence of all matter of the law — that is, of every object of desire, and in the determination of the Will (*Willkühr*), by the mere universal form of law (*gesetzgebende Form*)."² This means that the fundamental principle of duty, the basal formulation of the moral law, is simply this: Do whatever you are conscious that you ought to do. Whether or not you can formulate your duty beforehand, whether or not you can *a priori* define that which is right — so much is certain: you ought at any time to do that which you think that you ought.

Empty as it is, this mere 'form of a law' does supply a principle for moral action. Critics of Kant have, however, rightly laid stress on the unsatisfactoriness of this purely formal law, and have claimed, with reason, that a system of 'absolute' ethics should define a specific object of obligation

¹ "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 258; W., 233. It should be observed that Kant sometimes recognizes (*ibid.*, 245; W., 227) that the object of acknowledged duty may be coincident with desire — in a word, that one may like to do what one consciously ought to do.

² "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chapter 1, § 8, H. 35; W., 270¹. Cf. §§ 3-6. Cf. a statement with a parallel meaning: "The moral law must alone determine the pure will, and its sole object is to produce such a will." (*Ibid.*, Bk. II., Chapter 1, H., 114; W., 291¹. The translation is Watson's.)

in order to justify the validity of obligation.¹ As a matter of fact, Kant does elsewhere suggest a positive content for the moral law, a positive definition of duty. This is the second form of Kant's ethical doctrine. In brief, he teaches that the object of obligation is the good of humanity; and by this teaching he, of course, implies the existence of a society of selves. This positive form of Kant's moral doctrine is well summarized in the "Metaphysik of Morality," by the two successive statements of the moral law, or imperative.² The first of these is the following: "Act in conformity with that maxim . . . only, which thou canst . . . will to be a universal law."³ And by this Kant means: a right action is an action which every man might repeat without thereby injuring society.⁴ The positive content of the moral law, thus formulated, is evidently, then, the preservation of a society of related selves. This is more clearly indicated in the second statement of the 'practical imperative,' which, though it still leaves undefined the nature of the personal end, yet unambiguously conceives of this end as social, never purely individual. This second and more concrete form of the practical imperative is the following: "Act so as to use humanity both in thine own person and in the person of another, always as an end, never merely as a means."⁵ Kant's meaning is that the moral action no longer regards the desires and needs of the individual, except as the individual belongs to the related whole of selves which he

¹ See Kant's express admission of this, "Metaphysik of Morality," H. 76; W., 245.

² The third formulation of this 'law' is merely a repetition of the first.

³ "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 269; W., 241. Cf. "Kritik of Practical Reason," *loc. cit.*, § 7, H., 32; W., 268.

⁴ Kant's illustrations make this very clear: My individual wish is to increase my fortune in every possible way. A trust fund is left in my hands by a friend who dies without leaving a will. To appropriate this money may be in accord with my individual advantage, but cannot possibly be in accord with the moral law, for if every one betrayed his trust, there would be no trust funds — in other words, social honor and union would be impaired.

⁵ "Metaphysik of Morality," H., 277; W., 246.

calls 'humanity (*Menschheit*),' and describes as ¹ 'a kingdom — the systematic union of different reasoning beings through common laws.'

It should be added in qualification of the social nature of this ideal that, in Kant's view, the "universal system of laws," to which each member of society is subject, are "laws which he imposes upon himself and . . . he is only under obligation to act in conformity with his own will."² This teaching is of great significance. For to say that the common laws of society are laws self-imposed by the individual is simply to say that the individual is of necessity a social self constituted by its relations to others, so that the existence of one individual presupposes the existence of related individuals.³ At this second point, therefore, Kant's study of the moral consciousness leads him to widen his conception of reality. He has already seen that the moral consciousness implies the existence of the more-than-phenomenal self; he now discovers that the validity of the moral consciousness, the fact of obligation, requires him to conceive of this self as no isolated individual, but as a related self, a member of humanity, a citizen of the kingdom of rational human beings.

To these interrelated moral selves, Kant attributes three chief characters, freedom, immortality, and blessedness. These must be further discussed.

(1) It has been shown already (by quotations from both "Kritiks"), that Kant teaches the freedom of the self; it must now be pointed out that he seems to use this term in at least two ways. On the one hand, he shows that in the consciousness of obligation one is aware of a self which is deeper than any series of feelings and which is, therefore, ontologically free — in other words, free from, or inde-

¹ *Ibid.*, H., 281; W., 248.

² *Ibid.*, H., 280; W., 247. Watson's translation.

³ Cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 152 seq.

pendent of, the laws of phenomenal relation.¹ It is a moot point whether Kant believes in 'freedom' in a second, the merely ethical sense, that is to say, whether he teaches that the moral self has the choice between good and ill. In the opinion of the present writer, Kant does, in certain passages, unequivocally teach that the fact of obligation implies that the moral man 'is free' to do good or ill. This is the most obvious meaning of the passage, already quoted,² "Man affirms that he can because he is conscious that he ought;" it is still more plainly implied in the well-known words "*Du kannst denn du sollst.*" The implication of these statements certainly seems to be: obligation is impossible unless there be responsibility — a power to act in one way or in the other. Kant's occasional references to a will which is 'not good'³ — or to a will 'influenced by sensuous desires'⁴ — imply even more clearly that the real self, the unphenomenal self, has the 'freedom' to be good or bad.⁵

To sum up: Kant teaches that the individual selves in the kingdom of selves are free, in the sense of being selves, not mere complexes of ideas, and that this is implied by the mere consciousness of obligation. At times, also, Kant seems to teach that the fact of obligation implies the ethical freedom of these individuals to work good or ill.

(2) The immortality of human selves, Kant teaches, is a second implication of the fact of obligation. For the very

¹ "Kritik of Pure Reason," A, 538 *seq.*; B, 566 *seq.*; W., 184 *seq.*; "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., H., 45 *seq.*; W., 272 *seq.*; "Metaphysik of Morality," § III., H., 294 *seq.*; W., 250.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 259².

³ "Metaphysik of Morality," § I., H., 241; W., 225.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III., H., 302; W., 255.

⁵ This doctrine seems to be contradicted by other passages which teach, apparently, that the free self always acts in accordance with the moral law, and that the actions of the evil self belong to the world of phenomena, as distinct from that of the noumenal self. (Cf. "Metaphysik of Morality," III., H., 301; W., 254.) Such a view, however, is certainly in opposition to Kant's fundamental doctrine that a given act may be viewed both as phenomenal and as expression of a real self.

first requirement of the moral law is complete conformity with the law, action in accordance with the feeling of obligation. Now this "complete conformity . . . to the moral law," Kant says, "is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sense world is capable at any point of time of his existence. Since, however, holiness is demanded as practically necessary, it can be found only in an infinite progress toward that full conformity; and . . . it is necessary to assume such practical advance as the real object of our will."¹ Thus Kant teaches the necessity of immortality as requisite to the fulfilment of obligation.

The conception is certainly invigorating. Is it, however, logically necessary? The question which at once suggests itself is this: Does Kant here contradict his own conception of the moral self as out of the temporal series,² by the suggestion that it fails of its aim at a particular moment? To this it may be replied that according to Kant, every action is part of a temporal series as well as a manifestation of the timeless self. Now it is only of the temporal self that one may say: it must be immortal as surely as it has obligation, or duties. For duties must be capable of fulfilment and cannot be fulfilled in a finite time.³ Thus the self which, as timeless, is eternal is, as temporal, moral self, immortal.

(3) Still another implication of duty — or obligation — is named by Kant in a section preceding that just summarized.⁴ Kant calls it the implication of a 'highest good.' The

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H. 128; W., 294. Cf. on immortality, Kant's "Träume eines Geisterseher's," 2^{ter} Theil, 3^{ter} Hauptstück, end; *infra*, Chapter XI., pp. 453 *seq.*

² Cf. *supra*, p. 259³.

³ Of course it must on no account be forgotten that Kant teaches that God would see 'in the series' or indefinite progress of the individual, a whole that is in harmony with the moral law. ("Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H., 129; W., 295.)

⁴ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*, Chapter 2, and I. and II., H., 116 *seq.*; W., 291 *seq.*

existence of the highest good follows, Kant says, from the fact of obligation, simply and precisely because the 'highest good' is the object of obligation, the content of the moral law. "The highest good," he says, "is necessarily the supreme end of a morally determined will."¹ "We ought," he says later, "to seek to further the highest good — and the highest good must certainly, therefore, be possible."²

Kant thus attains a further definition of the object of duty. As conceived in the "Metaphysik of Morality" the object of the moral law is regarded, first, as conformity with consciousness of obligation (whatever its content) — a state to which the argument for immortality seems to refer as 'holiness'; and is, second, defined simply and vaguely as the end shared by humanity, the kingdom of selves related by common laws. In the section now considered Kant goes farther and describes duty as the obligation to attain the highest good. Now the highest good, Kant teaches, must be both supreme and complete. The supreme good is evidently virtue, or holiness, the conformity with the sense of duty. As complete, however, the highest good must include not merely virtue, but happiness also. "Virtue . . . is the supreme³ good. . . . But it is not, for that reason, the whole and complete good, as object of the desire of rational, finite beings. The complete good demands happiness also — and that not only to the prejudiced view of the person who makes an end of himself, but in the judgment of unprejudiced reason which regards happiness in the world as an end in itself. For if we imagine . . . a reasonable and at the same time all-powerful being, it cannot accord with the complete will of such a being that there should be those who are in need of happiness and are worthy of it yet who do not possess it." Such happiness, Kant insists, in the effort to coördinate this teaching with the earlier sections of the "Kritik," though it is part of the object

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, IV., H., 121²; W., 294.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. I., Chapter 2, V., H., 131; W., 296².

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. II., Chapter 2, H., 116; W., 291-292.

of duty, is not its determining motive or *Bestimmungsgrund*. For only the moral law, the obligation to be true to one's sense of obligation, can determine the truly moral will.¹ Reflection upon the tendency of moral actions and upon the explanation of the sense of obligation does, it is true, lead to the conclusion that the object of the moral consciousness, the ideal whose existence it implies, is the 'highest good.' But every single moral act follows upon consciousness of obligation, not upon a calculation of the 'highest good.'

But this reasoning, spite of its guarded outcome, is even less cogent than the argument for immortality. For Kant urges the existence of the highest good only by an appeal to what he calls unprejudiced reason, and has no weapon with which to meet the opponent who should challenge his conviction. The failure of this argument, as will appear, invalidates Kant's practical proof of the existence of God.

III. KANT'S TEACHING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS POSTULATED BY THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The search for the implication of the moral consciousness not only leads Kant to the doctrine that a society of free and immortal and finally blessed selves exists, but assures him also of the existence of God. Kant argues that God must exist in order that the highest good be possible — that is, in order that happiness should follow upon virtue. A finite moral being cannot order events so as to secure happiness, therefore God must exist to supply that happiness which is a factor in the 'highest good.' All this is very clearly and simply stated by Kant: "It has been admitted that it is our duty to promote the highest good, and hence it is not only allowable, but it is even a necessity demanded by duty, that we should presuppose the possibility of this highest good. And as this possibility can be presupposed only on the condition that God exists, the presupposition of the highest

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter I, H., 114, W., 291¹.

good is inseparably bound up with duty, that is, it is morally necessary to hold to the existence of God."¹

There is certainly nothing more surprising in all that Kant has written, nothing more inconsistent with his rigorous temperament and his severe outlook upon life, than this argument for a God who is needed in order to give mere happiness. The argument, as has been shown, depends upon the preceding demonstration that happiness must coexist with virtue. And since this last assertion was unproved, the 'practical argument' for God's existence goes with it. Yet the failure of this argument is no disproof of the wider proposition that the facts of the moral life demand God's existence. Fichte, and especially Hegel, later take up Kant's argument at this point and argue that a moral self and — the more surely — that a kingdom of related moral selves presuppose the existence of an all-including self who is himself the highest good, to share whose reality is immortality and life.

In conclusion there is need to remind ourselves that Kant makes a curious and — as will be argued — an unwarranted distinction between the assurance based on the facts of moral experience and that which has what he calls a 'theoretical' basis. The latter alone he names 'knowledge,' whereas assurance of the former kind he calls postulate or faith.² For to Kant knowledge always includes sense perception; and, therefore, the awareness of self, of friend, of God, must needs bear another name. "Through practical reason," he says, "we know neither the nature of our soul, nor the intelligible world, nor God as they are in themselves. We have only the conceptions of them united in the practical conception of the highest good as the object of our will." It is however of utmost importance to realize that though Kant taught what Tennyson later sung,

"We have but faith, we cannot know,
For knowledge is of things we see,"

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chapter 2, V., H., 131; W., 297.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit., VI.⁴, H., 139-140; W., 299-300.

he none the less attributes to the believed or postulated objects of the practical reason all the reality of known objects. Over and over again he says this. "Freedom, Immortality, and God," he declares, ". . . gain objective reality through an apodictic practical law, as necessary conditions of the possibility of that which the law commands shall be its object." He even adds ¹ that "theoretical knowledge . . . has been extended" by being "forced to admit that there are supersensible objects," though nothing definite is theoretically known of them. Only, therefore, his arbitrary limitation of the term 'knowledge' prevents Kant from applying the word to our consciousness of self and of God. The critics who represent Kant as teaching merely that there is a moral 'probability' that God exists, or as teaching that we should act as if we knew that God exists, wholly misrepresent Kant's position. For Kant asserts positively and not doubtfully that a universe of moral selves and a God exist.

Thus, to review Kant's ethical doctrine, it is evident that he rightly teaches that the facts of the moral consciousness presuppose the existence of a society of real and interrelated selves. But it is evident, also, that, though his main conclusions are thus justified, he does not succeed in demonstrating either the immortality and the blessedness of the individual, or the existence of God. For his arguments, in all three cases, are of a traditional and empirical nature, and he does not satisfactorily prove that immortality and happiness and God are implications of the moral consciousness. His main defect is, in truth, the failure to see that the argument from obligation is not the only one: that not merely the will, but the thought, the memory, — yes, even the emotion and the sensation of the conscious experience, — imply a self fundamental to ideas, which does not merely will, but which thinks, remembers, feels, and perceives. Such a self presupposes — as Kant clearly realized, though he argued it in so ineffective

¹ "Kritik of Practical Reason," H., 141; W, 300².

a way — a world of things which are mere objects for the self,¹ a world of related finite selves, and a God who is the sum of all reality, — who is, in truth, intelligence and will.

These results so closely resemble those of the pre-Kantian idealists, Leibniz and Berkeley, that it is fair to ask ourselves, Does Kant represent any significant advance upon their doctrine? Has he, in truth, done more than correct Hume's sensationalistic phenomenalism and Wolff's intellectualistic dualism, so as to swing philosophy back from Hume and Wolff to Berkeley and to Leibniz? Measured by the standard of its progress toward idealism, is not Kant's system, indeed, a retrogression, since he asserts the existence of things-in-themselves? Or, if it be assumed that Kant finally interprets the things-in-themselves as free selves, — the postulates of the practical reason, — is not his system less simply self-consistent than Berkeley's? And, if all these questions are affirmatively answered, a practical question will doubtless next be asked: What use is there, it will not unreasonably be urged, in the study of a text so intricate, so difficult, and so contradictory as Kant's? To this question there are, however, three answers, that is, there are three ways of justifying our study of Kant.


Kant's influence has, in the first place, been far greater than that of Leibniz or of Berkeley. Berkeley had very little effect on continental or even on British philosophy, and Leibniz's doctrine was distorted by Wolff before it was fairly understood; whereas the post-Kantian German schools are built up on Kant's philosophy, and all philosophical works, up to our own day, presuppose an acquaintance with Kant's terms and with his argument.

There is, in the second place, a certain methodological value in the hard-won character and in the very slowness and incompleteness of Kant's thinking. The idealistic stand-

¹ Cf. the teaching of the "Kritik of Judgment."

point is opposed to that of our traditional doctrine, so that there seems to be something almost like sleight-of-hand in Leibniz's and in Berkeley's lightning-like transformation of the world of independent things into the world of monads and souls. Kant's more grudging method is, for one type of mind at any rate, more convincing. He does not wish to yield the world of independent reality and yet — bit by bit — he finds himself compelled to give up space, time, substance, causality; and at the end the very things-in-themselves threaten to turn into real selves.

But, finally, there is in Kant's teaching a distinct advance, or at the very least the material for a distinct advance, both on Leibniz and on Berkeley. The great defect of each of these systems is, as was shown, its failure to show the relation between infinite and finite monads, or selves. Berkeley, for example, never explains how the Infinite produces ideas in the finite mind, nor how the finite knows either the Infinite or other human selves. But Kant, by his distinction between the empirical and the transcendental self which are yet the same self, by his teaching that the moral consciousness presupposes related selves, recognizes the problem and suggests its solution. A completely satisfactory solution, it must be admitted, philosophy has never yet found.



SYSTEMS AND INTIMATIONS OF
NUMERICAL MONISM

CHAPTER VIII

MONISTIC PLURALISM:¹ THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA

“Es giebt keine andere Philosophie, als die Philosophie des Spinoza.”
—LESSING, *as quoted by* JACOBI.

WE have followed, thus, the history of modern thought on the problem of ultimate reality, from its initial dualistic opposition of spirit to matter, through two forms of qualitative monism, first, the materialism of Hobbes, which reduces spirit reality to matter, and second, the idealism of Leibniz and of Berkeley, which admits only spiritual reality. We have analyzed also the Humian form of idealism, a denial of the existence of self-conscious selves or spirits and a consequent reduction of reality to the succession of fleeting and evanescent states of consciousness; finally, we have considered Kant's refutation of this system of phenomenalism — in other words, Kant's restoration of the conscious self to its rightful position as a reality implied, necessarily, by the fleeting ideas themselves. Kant's successful criticism of Hume's position seems thus to throw us back into the Leibnizian or Berkeleian universe of the many conscious spirits; for Kant's own conviction of an unknown reality, behind the world of the self, has proved to be an inconsistent and unjustified remnant of dualism.

Yet the study of Kant makes it impossible to accept uncritically the doctrine of Berkeley. For Kant plainly realizes,

¹ This statement of Spinoza's philosophy runs counter to the usual conception of it as a purely monistic system. It is indeed true, as will appear, that the most significant teaching of Spinoza is his numerically monistic conception of the one substance; but his doctrine of the many attributes constitutes the system qualitatively pluralistic as well.

though he does not definitely formulate, a difficulty utterly neglected by Berkeley, and realized but inconsistently met by Leibniz: the problem of the relation of the many selves to each other. Both Leibniz and Berkeley, as has appeared, conceive the universe as composed of immaterial, spiritual substances, of which one — the supreme monad or God — is infinitely superior to the others. Neither Berkeley nor Leibniz, however, explains the relation of the spiritual substances to each other; still less, does either of them reconcile the infiniteness, perfection, absolute completeness of the divine self with the existence of these lesser selves.¹ Their systems of philosophy, in other words, though qualitatively monistic, are numerically pluralistic. They teach that there is but one kind of reality, spiritual, in the universe, but that there are many spirits; and they fail to reconcile the independence of the spirits with their existence together in the universe and with the existence of a supreme spirit.

It has already been shown that Kant realizes the difficulties inherent in a numerically pluralistic idealism; and indeed his doctrine of the transcendental self can be interpreted — as has been indicated — in such a way that it becomes a monistic doctrine of one, all-inclusive self, not a pluralistic doctrine of many independent selves. Such a reading, however, probably is not in the spirit of Kant himself. He is rather a critic of pluralistic idealism than the creator of a monistic system. But a century earlier — before the time of the idealists, earlier, therefore, than Berkeley or even Leibniz — there had appeared a constructive critic of numerical pluralism, a great thinker who conceived of reality as ultimately one being, or substance, and of the so-called many realities — whether things or thoughts, bodies or spirits — as modifications of this one substance. This teacher of numerical monism was Baruch Spinoza, born in Amsterdam of Jewish parents in 1632, expelled from the synagogue in 1656,

¹ For detailed criticisms of Leibniz, cf. *supra*, pp. 100 seq.; of Berkeley, *supra*, pp. 144 seq.

dying at The Hague in 1677 after a life of high courage, blameless honor, tranquil industry, and lofty thought. The completest expression of his metaphysical thought, "The Ethics," was published in 1677, after his death, but exerted literally no influence on contemporary philosophy, because of the prejudice against Spinoza, aroused in great part by the publication of an earlier work, the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," which promulgated unorthodox views of biblical criticism and ecclesiastical freedom. Spinoza's philosophy was decried — for the most part, unread — by theologians and philosophers as atheistic, and was attacked, also, on the ground that it undermined morality. The justice of these charges can be fully estimated only by a study of Spinoza's writings. That he was pantheist and necessitarian will become evident, but it will appear that his system presents a foundation for religion and that his ethical teachings inculcate a high and vigorous morality. But the contemporary prejudice, though rooted in misunderstanding and ignorance, effectively isolated Spinoza's teaching. His criticism of the numerical pluralism of the scholastic and Cartesian doctrines did not influence either Leibniz or Berkeley. Both these philosophers corrected the qualitative pluralism of Descartes and Locke, by substituting one for two kinds of reality; but they failed to see the difficulty inherent in the doctrine of the many substances, and peopled their universe with many spirits, without considering Spinoza's great conception of a single ultimate reality, one substance. But Spinoza's conception did not remain forever unfruitful. When idealism, rescued by Kant from Hume's phenomenalistic interpretation, seemed about to reassert itself, — just over a century, therefore, after Spinoza's death, — there occurred a revival of Spinozism which, applied to traditional forms of idealism, transmuted the doctrine of the one substance into the conception of the absolute self, manifested in the finite selves, not externally related to them.

Lessing, the poet thinker of the later eighteenth century,

restored Spinoza to his right as master-mind; and historians, poets, and philosophers alike — Herder and Goethe, no less than Schelling and Hegel — were profoundly impressed and influenced by Spinoza's doctrine of the one substance and of the consequent subordination of lesser realities to the All-including. This influence of Spinoza on the philosophy of the eighteenth and of the early nineteenth century is the more remarkable since, as will be shown, the teaching of Spinoza did not fall in line with the personalistic idealism which characterized most of these post-Kantian systems. Spinoza's assumption of the equal value of thought and extension had been successfully challenged by Leibniz and by Berkeley. His realistic and uncritical assumption of the possibility of knowing the ultimate had been opposed by Kant; and even if, with the writer, one believe that Kant did not prove his point, one must admit that he made impossible an epistemology so uncritical as that of Spinoza.

But in spite of these anachronisms and in spite also of the rigid Euclidean form of his "Ethics," strangely contrasting with the inchoate romanticism of most works, philosophical as well as literary, of this period in German literature, Spinoza's "Ethics" laid its impress on the thought of this period. And this effect it wrought through its central conception, the doctrine of numerical monism, the theory that reality is ultimately one being which underlies the manifold realities of the phenomenal universe.

Spinoza's "Ethics," his most important work, is divided into these five parts: "Of God," "Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind," "Of the Nature and Origin of the Emotions," "Of Human Bondage," and "Of Human Freedom." As its title indicates and as Spinoza repeatedly says, the "Ethics" is written with a practical purpose: the whole book and not merely the last division of it "is concerned with the way leading to freedom."¹ But Spinoza's discovery

¹ Pt. V., Preface, first sentence. (All references are to the "Ethics," unless another title is expressly named.)

of the path to freedom is by way of an investigation of ultimate reality; and this reality turns out to be both the guarantee of freedom and the incentive to it. "The results," he says, "which must necessarily follow from the essence of God . . . are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness."¹ We are chiefly concerned with the fundamental metaphysical teaching of Spinoza.²

In each of the divisions of the "Ethics" Spinoza begins, after the fashion of the geometry books, with a series of definitions, supplemented by a set of axioms (in one case, postulates), and then followed by propositions with their proofs, corollaries, and scholia. The explanation of this formal method is not far to seek. Spinoza shared with his contemporaries a profound reverence for mathematics, and with Descartes in particular the hope of lending to metaphysical investigation the certainty possessed by mathematics. This seems to have suggested to him that there must be some special virtue in the technical forms in which mathematical demonstrations are made. In this, however, Spinoza — as every modern critic admits — was mistaken.³ Mathematics and philosophy are, to be sure, allied in that both involve, on the one hand, insight, and, on the other hand, reflection. But mathematics with its restricted subject-matter is likely to differ, in method, from philosophy with its unhampered range; and Spinoza's choice, among mathematical methods, of the deductive procedure of Euclidean geometry is especially unfortunate, since it obscures the fact that his system rests, after all, on immediate observation. This unfortunate setting of his doctrine is responsible, indeed, for the most frequent misinterpretation of it: the

¹ Pt. II., Preface.

² The metaphysical teaching is developed mainly in Pt. I., in the Definitions, Axioms, and first thirteen Propositions of Part II., and in Propositions XV. through XXIII. of Pt. V. The student is urged to read at least so much of the "Ethics"; he will do well to read it entire.

³ Cf. F. Pollock, "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy," pp. 147 *seq.*

charge that Spinoza's definitions and axioms are far from self-evident, that on the contrary he summarizes his beliefs, without establishing them, in his introductory definitions, and that he then, with great show of logic, elaborately proves them by propositions based on these very definitions.¹ This criticism, as will appear in the following sketch of Spinoza's system, is not justified by his teaching, but it is readily explained by the misleading frame in which his doctrine is set. Even Spinoza must have realized at times that his method hampered him, for he adds to each Part of his "Ethics" a Preface or an Appendix or both, and in most of these, as well as in very many of his letters, he sets forth his meaning in direct and forcible fashion. To the analysis of his teaching it is necessary now to turn. This chapter attempts to give both an exposition of Spinoza's teaching, and a critical consideration of his arguments and their conclusions. No attempt is made in the expository part of the chapter to follow Spinoza's order of propositions, which indeed often obscures his real meaning.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ONE SUBSTANCE: GOD

a. Exposition

1. *Substance as totality of reality*

The traditional philosophy, it will be remembered, as formulated just before Spinoza's time by Descartes, conceived of substance as independent reality. Most of the definitions with which Part I of the "Ethics" begins are an amplification of this traditional doctrine, and a statement of its corollaries. 'By substance,' Spinoza says, "I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any

¹ Cf. Berkeley, "Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher," Dialogue, VII., Clarendon Press edition, Vol. II., p. 334.

other conception;"¹ and he contrasts substance, thus conceived, with the mode, or modification of substance, which "exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself."² This definition of substance clearly suggests Descartes's: "By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence."³

But Spinoza advances beyond Descartes in defining substance not only as that which exists in itself (without dependence on the external) but as that which is conceived through itself. For substance, if conceived through itself only, is of necessity all-inclusive; since, if anything existed outside it, substance would have to be conceived as limited-at-least-in-extent by that other existent, and would not therefore be conceived through itself alone. To be conceived through itself substance must, therefore, be unlimited. The bare existence of anything outside itself would be a limitation, a derogation from its completeness, and substance must consequently itself be *all that there is*. This doctrine is stated in the early propositions of the "Ethics," in which Spinoza argues, first, that a substance, a reality in itself and conceived through itself, can neither be produced⁴ nor in any way limited⁵ by another substance; and, second, that therefore "there can only be one substance."⁶

¹ Pt. I., Def. 3 (*Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur*).

² Pt. I., Def. 5 (*Per modum intelligi substantiæ affectionem, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur*).

³ "The Principles of Philosophy," Pt. I., Prop. 51.

⁴ Pt. I., Props. 2, 3, 6 ("one substance cannot be produced by another").

⁵ Pt. I., Props. 4, 5, 8 ("every substance is necessarily infinite"). The actual argument of Props. 2-8 is unnecessarily intricate, involving both the admitted doctrine of the relation of attributes to substance and the temporary supposition (at once shown to be absurd) that there are several substances unrelated to each other. Really, however, as Spinoza recognizes in a parallel case (cf. Prop. 8, Schol. 2, *infra*, p. 285), the isolation and thus the exclusiveness of substance follows from the definition of it as 'in itself and conceived through itself.'

⁶ Pt. I., Prop. 8, Proof, first clause.

The most important difference between Spinoza and the Cartesians is brought out by the words just quoted. Descartes sees nothing inconsistent in his assertion of the existence of subordinate realities, or substances, outside that substance which stands "in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence"; but Spinoza realizes that only the all-inclusive can be absolutely independent, or self-dependent. By insisting not only that substance exists in itself, but that it is conceived through itself, he emphasizes this truth; for no reality existing along with another, however superior to this other, is conceived purely through itself; on the other hand, it is necessarily conceived as not-that-other, that is, it is in part conceived through the other. Spinoza, therefore, conceives the alleged subordinate realities as manifestations, or expressions, of the one substance.

But Spinoza's doctrine, as so far discussed, offers no argument for the existence of substance thus regarded as absolute totality. Granted that substance, if it exist, must be totality, how is it proved that there exists, actually and not merely in conception, any such unlimited, one substance? It is often said that Spinoza merely takes for granted, without any effort to establish his conviction, the existence of the one substance. Such a charge is not unnatural, for the very first sentence of Part I,¹ readily lends itself to this interpretation. "By that which is self-caused," Spinoza says (and this, of course, is substance),² "I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent." This proposition, it will be admitted, asserts and does not justify the doctrine that the existence of substance follows from the conception, and is thus a mere repetition of Descartes's form of the discredited ontological argument. But this criticism overlooks the probability that these introductory definitions claim to be nothing more than

¹ Def. 1.

² Cf. "De Intellectus Emendatione" (Vol. I., p. 28, of Van Vloten and Land edition of Spinoza): *Si res sit in se sive, ut vulgo dicitur, causa sui.*

a restatement of traditional doctrine; it further disregards the fact that the early Propositions of Part I. do imply a justification, impossible on Descartes's system, for the doctrine that the existence of substance follows from the conception of it. This justification is found in the teaching, already outlined, that there can be but one substance. For the one substance, so far as we have yet seen, means no more than "all that exists"; and of the "all that exists," every one must certainly admit that it does exist. The very emptiness and indeterminateness of substance, thus regarded, make it possible to assert its necessary existence. For whereas it might be necessary to establish the existence of this or that particular reality,—of God conceived as one reality among others or of a world of material things,—it is certain that *all that there is* (it may turn out to be of this or that sort or of many sorts) exists. "If people would consider the nature of substance," Spinoza says, ". . . this proposition [existence belongs to the nature of substance] would be a universal axiom and accounted a truism."¹ The existence of substance, in so far as substance means the all-of-reality, follows, thus, from its utter completeness. In other words the conception carries with it the certainty of the existence of substance, precisely because it is a conception of a so far undetermined All. Such a guarantee of existence Descartes's conception of infinite substance does not possess, because that is a conception of a particular sort of reality—good, wise, powerful—and because the actual existence of these special characters does not immediately follow from the thought of them. The existence of *something* is, however, immediately certain (the existence, in the last analysis, of this thought about existence);² and it is equally certain that whatever is, namely all that there is, exists.³

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 8, Schol. II. Cf. Letter II. (The Letters are cited as numbered in the translation of Elwes and in the edition of Van Vloten and Land.)

² This statement is not made by Spinoza.

³ Besides implying this justification of the doctrine that substance exists,

This one substance, which exists necessarily, Spinoza calls God. "By God," he says, in Definition 6, "I mean a being absolutely infinite." But he proceeds, as we know, to prove that "there can be only one substance,"¹ and that "substance is necessarily infinite."² Evidently, then, 'God' and 'substance' are for Spinoza synonymous terms; and the demonstrations, later introduced, of God's existence, are, to say the least, unnecessary,³ since substance, the all, is admitted to exist.

2. *Substance as manifested in the modes, not the mere sum of them*

Spinoza does not, however, conceive of substance as the mere aggregate, or sum, of all that exists. So regarded, substance would be an infinite composite constituted by the bare existence of all the particular finite realities which exist, or have existed, or will exist. But Spinoza, so far from teaching that substance is constituted, or made up, of finite realities, insists that the finite phenomena are parts of the one substance, that they are real only as partaking of the nature of this substance. In fact he calls the finite phenomena 'modes' of substance⁴ and says plainly, "By mode I mean the modification of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself." Obviously, then, Spinoza holds that substance has a reality deeper than that

Spinoza gives evidence of sharing the incorrect Cartesian doctrine, characteristic of the seventeenth century, that clear thought implies the existence of substance as its object.

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 8, Proof.

² Pt. I., Prop. 8.

³ Of Spinoza's proofs, the first is a mere reaffirmation of the existence of substance; the second involves the questionable assumption that anything exists if no reason can be given for its non-existence; and the third carries with it the non-Spinozistic conception of the existence of more than one substance.

⁴ The term 'phenomena' is not used by Spinoza. For his conception of finite things as related to each other, see this chapter, § II., *infra*, p. 300.

of the modes of finite phenomena. Otherwise, he must have said, substance exists as the sum of the modes, instead of saying (as he does repeatedly), the modes exist in substance.

Throughout the "Ethics," the modes are thus subordinated to substance, or God. "Whatsoever is," Spinoza says distinctly, "is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived. . . . Modes can neither be, nor be conceived, without substance, wherefore they can only be in the divine nature and can only through it be conceived."¹ This conception of finite phenomena as constituted through the fact that they partake of the divine nature underlies all the special doctrines of the "Ethics." Thus Spinoza says of the human mind that it "is part of the infinite intellect of God," that, indeed, "he constitutes the essence of the human mind."² Again, he says that "all ideas are in God."³ In Part III. he argues for the truth that "everything endeavors to persist in its own being," from the admitted proposition, "individual things . . . express in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts."⁴

The last statement is one of those in which Spinoza goes beyond the assertion of the subordinateness of modes to God, and directly asserts the independent reality of God. Similar to the statement that "God is and acts" is the repeated teaching that God is the cause of the modes, or finite phenomena. "God . . . is and acts," Spinoza declares, "solely by the necessity of his own nature; he is the free cause of all things . . . ; . . . all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived."⁵ "God," he says, a little earlier, "we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 15, and Proof. Cf. Prop. 25, Cor.; Prop. 29, Schol., end; Pt. II., Prop. 45, Proof.

² Pt. II., Prop. 11, Cor.

³ Pt. II., Prop. 36, Proof.

⁴ Pt. III., Prop. 6, and Proof.

⁵ Pt. I., Appendix, first paragraph.

their existence.”¹ It is true that Spinoza means by cause something more than that which Descartes meant, an immanent as well as an efficient cause;² but whatever his conception of cause, Spinoza’s God, or substance, which he calls free cause of all existent things, is in some sense more real than the aggregate of finite realities. It is not made up of them, but constitutes them; they are its modifications, its expressions.³

But this conclusion leads inevitably to the question: what, then, is the nature of substance — that nature which is expressed in the modes? If substance were the mere sum of the modes, then an exhaustive study of these modes — an investigation of the facts of science — would yield a sufficient account of substance. But since the modes must be conceived and explained through substance, an independent investigation of its nature becomes necessary. Spinoza attempts to describe substance by his doctrine of attributes.

3. *Substance as constituted by the attributes: God as thinking and extended thing*

“By God,” Spinoza says, “I mean a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.”⁴ Spinoza has just defined attribute to be “that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.”⁵ His conception of God is then that of an infinite Being, infinitely manifold in nature, manifested in the many finite phenomena.

Spinoza argues for his reiterated doctrine of the infinite number of God’s attributes from the absolute infiniteness of God. “The more reality, or being, a thing has, the greater,”

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 33, Schol. II., end.

⁴ Pt. I., Def. 6.

² Pt. I., Prop. 16, Cor. 1-3, Prop. 18.

⁵ Pt. I., Def. 4.

³ Pt. I., Prop. 25, Cor.

he says, "the number of its attributes."¹ But of these attributes he admits that we know only two,² thought and extension.³ Thought must be an attribute of God, for it is certain — from immediate introspection, though Spinoza does not point this out — that particular thoughts exist, and since particular thoughts are modes expressing the nature of God, thought must be a character of God. In Spinoza's words:⁴ "Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God. God, therefore, possesses the attribute of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God which expresses God's eternal and infinite essence. . . . In other words, God is a thinking being (*res*)."

For the parallel assertion that "extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing," Spinoza does not argue.⁵ "The proof of this proposition," he says, "is similar to that of the last." It will appear later that Spinoza is mistaken in this implication that extended things, like thoughts, are immediately known to exist. He seems to be proceeding in this enumeration of the known attributes of God, in more or less uncritical accord not only with Cartesian philosophizing but with everyday observation. The ordinary observer finds that finite phenomena are of two sorts, thoughts and extended things. And if from the existence of the thoughts it be argued that God must have the attribute of thought (since all phenomena merely express his attributes) it seems to the untrained thinker evident that, from the existence of the things, one must argue to extension as attribute of God.

¹ I., Prop. 9. Cf. Prop. 10, Schol.

² Cf. Letter 66 (Elwes' translation), 64 (Van Vloten edition).

³ Pt. I., Prop. 10, Schol.

⁴ Pt. II., Prop. 1 and Proof.

⁵ Pt. II., Prop. 2.

It would be unjust to Spinoza's teaching to omit, even from so brief an outline of it, a reference to the way in which he guards his assertion that "God is a thinking being," even though this consideration must involve us in a difficulty of interpretation. The problem may be stated in this form: Is Spinoza's God, or substance, self-conscious? Or, in more technically Spinozistic terms, does the attribute of thought, defined as 'expressing the essentiality' of God, carry with it the conception of God as self-conscious? A decisive answer is probably impossible. Many, perhaps most, careful students of Spinoza hold that by his doctrine of the thought-attribute of God, Spinoza means merely that God is the sum or system of the finite consciousnesses.¹ The upholders of this view support it mainly by reference to Spinoza's repeated assertion that "neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature"² and by reference also to certain propositions of Part V., in which Spinoza qualifies the statement "God loves himself,"³ by the express assertion that "the intellectual love of the mind [the finite mind] towards God is that very love of God wherewith God loves himself."⁴ This statement, it is argued, regards God's love of himself as the totality of the finite emotions of intellectual love towards God; and in accordance with this teaching, God's consciousness can be no other than the sum or system of finite consciousnesses.

In opposition to the second of these arguments it may be pointed out that Spinoza's expression is ambiguous. When he says that the love of the finite mind toward God "is the very love" or "is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself," he may be supposed to mean, not neces-

¹ Cf. Jacobi, "Briefe an Mendelssohn," 1785, p. 170: "Spinozismus ist Atheismus."

² Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol. Cf. Pt. V., 40, Schol.

³ Pt. V., Prop. 35 (*Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat*).

⁴ Pt. V., Prop. 36. The end of the proposition makes the conception more explicit by stating that "the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself."

sarily that the love of the finite mind is one of a sum of emotions which together make a composite called God's love, but that each finite love is partial expression of the deeper and wider love of God. In other words, the finite love may be part of God's love as well if it is constituted by God's love as if it helps to constitute God's love. Equally ambiguous is Spinoza's refusal to attribute intellect to God. His words must obviously be interpreted in relation to his reference, in the previous proposition,¹ to 'infinite intellect' within which "all things can fall." Thus interpreted, Spinoza evidently denies to God not intellect, but restricted, or human, intellect.² In truth, then, neither of the arguments is decisive which is urged against the view that Spinoza's God is self-conscious.

In support of the view that Spinoza's God is, in some sense, self-conscious, there are, on the other hand, expressions of the most varied sort scattered throughout the "Ethics." The very first proposition, already quoted, of Part II., is the assertion, vitally related to the entire argument, "thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing."³ The third proposition of Part II. makes the conception more explicit by the statement, "In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all things (*omnia*) which necessarily follow from his essence;" and Spinoza adds in the scholium to this same Proposition 3, "it follows . . . that God understands himself (*ut Deus seipsum intelligat*)."⁴ It is difficult to understand by God's idea of his own essence as contrasted with his idea of the *omnia* which follow from it, anything less than a self-consciousness which underlies and includes but is more than the sum, or system, of all finite consciousnesses.⁴ Spinoza's references to

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 16. For further references, cf. the passages cited *infra*, pp. 297 seq.

² Cf. *loc. cit.*, Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol., paragraph 3.

³ Pt. II., Prop. 1 (*Cogitatio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans*).

⁴ Cf. Chapter 10, pp. 378 seq., Chapter 11, pp. 419 seq.

infinite intellect must be construed in the same way. He constantly teaches that finite phenomena are subordinate to infinite intellect. "From the necessity of the divine nature," he says,¹ "must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways, *i.e.* all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect (*omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt*).” By these words, Spinoza certainly seems to contrast things, as they appear to the finite mind, with these same things, as they are viewed by the infinite intellect. That he does not mean by infinite intellect any mere sum, or system, of finite intellects is made evident also by the scholium, already cited, of the following proposition. Spinoza there asserts that "intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, must differ by the width of heaven (*toto cælo*) from our intellect and will, and except in name would not resemble them; any more than the dog, a celestial constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, resemble each other.”²

This quotation indicates that Spinoza, however firmly he holds that God is self-conscious being, not a mere sum of conscious beings, nevertheless lays stress on the utter contrast between human and divine consciousness. The consciousness which Spinoza attributes to God is, in truth, intellectual—and intellectual, as has been said, in another than human fashion. Will, in the sense of temporal volition, and emotion, in the sense of passive affection, Spinoza denies to God. Purposes for future attainment, that is, 'final causes,' are, he says,³ 'mere human figments.' And later he asserts that "God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of joy or sorrow.”⁴ With especial emphasis also Spinoza insists that "God does not act according to

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 16.

² For a criticism of this statement from another point of view, cf. *infra*, p. 297. For Spinoza's conception of infinite intellect as infinite mode, cf. Letter 66, Elwes (Van Vloten, 64).

³ Pt. I., Appendix, Elwes' translation, p. 77².

⁴ Pt. V., Prop. 17.

freedom of the will,"¹ if by freedom be meant arbitrariness and caprice. "It follows," Spinoza consistently teaches, "from [God's] perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are."²

b. Critical estimate of Spinoza's doctrine of substance ✓

Spinoza thus conceives of the universe as a necessarily existing,³ unique whole-of-reality; which is expressed in partial realities subordinated to the whole;⁴ which has, however, a reality deeper than that of the parts;⁵ which is indeed self-conscious, but with a consciousness widely different from that of the human selves.⁶ From this exposition of Spinoza's doctrine, it is necessary now to turn to an estimation of it; and a critical estimate must take account both of the internal consistency of the system and of its independent value. The first criticisms which suggest themselves concern Spinoza's argument for the existence of substance.

1. The inadequacy of Spinoza's argument for the existence of substance

The most significant feature of Spinoza's monism is his insistence, emphasized in the preceding outline of his doctrine, on the absoluteness and uniqueness of God, or substance; and on the subordination of the finite modes, or phenomena, to the one God. The most fundamental of all the criticisms on Spinoza's doctrine is, therefore, this, that he never establishes; what he so clearly conceives, this absoluteness of

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 32, Cor. 1.

² Pt. I., Prop. 33, Schol. 2. Cf. Pt. I., Prop. 17, Schol.; Pt. I., Appendix; and Letter 32, Elwes (Van Vloten, 19).

³ Pt. I., Def. 1; Prop. 11.

⁴ Pt. I., Def. 5; Prop. 23.

⁵ Pt. I., Def. 3; Pt. II., Props. 1, 2, etc.

⁶ Cf. *supra*, pp. 290 *seq.*

God. Spinoza's only argument for the existence of substance is that which is outlined in the first section of this chapter; and this argument, as has been pointed out, depends for its cogency on the utter emptiness of the conception of substance as the totality of all that exists. What this argument establishes is simply this: the all-that-there-is exists. From this conclusion it is not justifiable to infer directly: the necessarily existing All is more-than-a-sum, it is a One manifested in its parts. Spinoza, however, makes this direct and invalid inference, and fails, therefore, to establish his most characteristic doctrine. Later philosophical systems, the following chapters of this book will try to show, supply the missing demonstration.

2. The inconsistency of Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes of substance

The remaining criticisms of Spinoza's monism concern not its logical basis but its inner consistency. The fundamental difficulty may be stated as follows: the conception of the many attributes of God, or substance, is inconsistent with the teaching that God is fundamentally one.¹ The conception of the unity of God is, of course, reconcilable with that of the multiplicity of the modes, or finite realities, for these are admitted to be merely partial expressions of God. But *each* of the attributes is defined by Spinoza as 'constituting the essence' or expressing the essentiality of substance; and surely that which has many essentialities, or natures, cannot be truly one. If then an attribute does, as Spinoza says, constitute the nature of substance, it also exhausts that nature, so that given, as Spinoza insists, only one substance, there would have to be only one attribute.²

¹ Cf. Camerer, "Die Lehre Spinozas," p. 9 *et al.*

² This result follows even more unambiguously from a statement made by Spinoza in a letter written, as appears from an expression in it, when he had already completed the first part at least of the "Ethics." In this letter (Letter 2),

This conclusion is immensely strengthened by the discovery that Spinoza's argument for an infinite number of attributes is faulty, and that he does not, therefore, establish this teaching, so subversive of his own fundamentally monistic doctrine.¹ As has appeared, he argues the infinite number of attributes solely on the ground of the absoluteness and completeness of substance. "The more reality, or being, a thing has," he says,² "the greater the number of its attributes. . . . Consequently," he adds in the scholium of the next proposition, "an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence." But it must be remembered that Spinoza has proved the existence of infinite substance, or being, only in so far as infinite substance means "all that there is," the totality of reality. From this totality, it certainly follows that no existing attribute can be lacking to the infinite substance; but it does not at all follow that the actually existing attributes are infinite in number.³

Besides discrediting this *a priori* argument for the infinite number of the attributes, it is necessary now to challenge Spinoza's assertion, on the basis of alleged experience, that there are two attributes, thought and extension. The diffi-

which is the reply to one, dated August, 1661, from his correspondent, Oldenburg, he defines the attribute exactly as he later defined substance: "By attribute I mean everything which is conceived through itself and in itself, so that the conception of it does not involve the conception of anything else." Cf. also an expression in Letter 4, "an attribute, that is . . . a thing conceived through and in itself." For a recent restatement of Spinoza's position, cf. Ebbinghaus, "Grundzüge der Psychologie," § 27, 3, p. 41 *seq.* For criticism and discussion of modern parallelism, cf. Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," Bk. IV., chapter 2, § 5, pp. 320 *seq.*

¹ Cf. Letter 65.

² Pt. I., Prop. 9.

³ One of the keenest contemporary critics of Spinoza, Von Tschirnhausen, objected that if there are infinite attributes, the two attributes, consciousness and extension, should not be the only ones known to the mind. Cf. Letters 65 and 66 (Van Vloten, 63 and 64). In reply Spinoza supposed that there are other-than-human minds to whom the other attributes are known. Cf. Letters 66 and 68 (Van Vloten 64 and 66), and Camerer, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2.

culty is, of course, with the so-called attribute of extension; for no one will deny the one truth evident in the very denial of it, that reality, whatever other character it possesses, has the attribute of thought, that is, consciousness. But Spinoza's teaching that extension is known in the same way, as a second, independent, character of reality — this is based on mere assumption, is never argued, and cannot withstand such arguments as Leibniz and Berkeley later brought against it.¹ Not only, then, has Spinoza failed to prove an infinite number of attributes; he has not demonstrated the existence of any attribute save thought.

This conclusion is fortified by reference, in the "Ethics" itself, to certain indications of an unavowed idealism. The first of these occurs in the introductory definitions of Part I. Definition 3, for example, defines substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself"; and similarly, Definitions 1, 5, and 8 successively define *causa sui*, mode, and eternity, by two parallel clauses of which the second is in terms of conception. In the definition of 'attribute' the first of the parallel clauses is omitted; and Spinoza says, "By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance."² The conceivableness of mode and attribute is thus, for Spinoza, a feature essential to the definition of each. But nothing could be conceivable if there were not a conscious mind to conceive it, and the definitions thus imply the existence, fundamental to mode, attribute, and even to substance, of a

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 75 seq.; 121 seq.

² Def. IV: *Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens*. Spinoza does not seem to intend a contrast between the expressions, 'perceive' and 'conceive.' Erdmann, followed by other critics — Busolt, for example — interprets Spinoza's 'attribute' idealistically, making it closely parallel to Kant's 'category.' (Cf. Erdmann, "History of Philosophy," translated by Hough, II., pp. 67 seq., and Busolt, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 seq., who holds that the conscious intellect implied in these definitions is the divine intellect.) Such an interpretation seems to ignore the realistic aspect of the attribute. Cf. "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 9.

conceiving mind. In similar fashion, the conception of the modes (modes of extension and not merely of thought) as 'all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect' clearly suggests that the reality expressed in the modes is mental.¹ Spinoza, it is needless to add, did not realize this idealistic implication of his definitions. He is apparently proceeding on the rationalistic assumption, hardly analyzed or criticised till the time of Kant, that the existent must *ipso facto* be known.

3. *The inconsistency of Spinoza's conception of God's consciousness, as radically different from the human consciousness*

The conclusion of this chapter is that Spinoza taught the self-consciousness of God.² But it is past dispute that he thought God's consciousness to be utterly different from that of man — as widely different, he says, in a passage already quoted,³ as "the dog, a celestial constellation, and the dog, a barking animal." It must now be shown that the radical and qualitative difference between God's consciousness and man's, which is supposed by this illustration, is inconsistent with Spinoza's own conception and with his argument as well. He conceives of the mind of a man as a modification of the divine attribute, thought; and he justifies the doctrine that thought is an attribute of God, or substance, by the appeal, already quoted, to finite experience: "Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which . . . express the nature of God. God, therefore, possesses the attribute of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, . . . that is to say, God is a thinking being."⁴ But

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 16, already cited *supra*, p. 291. Cf. "Ethics," Pts. II. and III., for cases of an inexact parallelism, in which the physical is really conceived in terms of the psychical.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 291 *seq.*

³ Pt. I., Prop. 17, cf. p. 292 above.

⁴ Pt. II., Prop. 1, Proof.

that thought of which the finite mind is merely a fixed and definite expression,¹ which is argued from the existence of finite thoughts, cannot differ in kind from human consciousness.² It must indeed differ as the whole differs from the part, the complete from the incomplete; and this doubtless is Spinoza's meaning. His denial of the likeness of the infinite to the human intellect is a reaction from the crude and literal anthropomorphism of that traditional theology which attributed to God narrow ends, and human passions. Spinoza vividly describes, in the Appendix to Part I, the tendency of such anthropomorphism. Men "believe," he says, "in some ruler or rulers of the universe, . . . who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They . . . estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature and, therefore, they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. . . . Consider, I pray you, the results. Among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, and diseases, so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done them by men." It is in his passionate aversion to this unworthy form of anthropomorphism, that Spinoza denies the likeness of divine and human intellect. Such denials are inconsistent with Spinoza's own teaching that finite phenomena are expressions of the divine nature.

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 25, Cor.

² The doctrine that God's intellect is unlike that of man is attacked by Spinoza's keen critic, Von Tschirnhausen, on the basis of Spinoza's own doctrine of causality. In Letter 65 (Van Vloten, 63), Von Tschirnhausen says: "As the understanding of God differs [on Spinoza's view] from our understanding as much in essence as in existence, it has, therefore, nothing in common with it; therefore (by "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 3) God's understanding cannot be the cause of our own." Spinoza seems never to have attempted a reply to this objection. He had, however, in the Scholium of "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 17, departed from the causal theory implied by the axioms of Pt. I.

II. SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF THE MODES (EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM)

The first section of this chapter has offered an outline and a criticism of Spinoza's fundamental teaching that God is the one substance manifested in all finite realities.¹ These finite phenomena have been considered only so far as the discussion of them is necessary to an understanding of Spinoza's conception of God, or substance. To complete the view of Spinoza's metaphysics it is therefore necessary to attempt a more detailed discussion of these finite realities. Such a discussion of the modes in its turn will illuminate the doctrine of God, or substance. It has been shown already that Spinoza includes among the 'modes' minds and bodies, ideas and physical phenomena, in a word, all finite phenomena whether psychical or physical. His most fundamental grouping of the modes is into modes of thought (meaning modes of consciousness) and modes of extension. He also distinguishes in Part I.² between 'infinite' and 'finite' modes, but of this distinction he virtually makes no further use and it need not here be discussed.³ Spinoza's doctrine of the modes as causally related claims our first consideration.

a. The causal relation of God to the modes, and of the modes to each other

The relation of the modes to substance has already been discussed in our consideration of the nature of God. Minds and bodies, ideas and physical changes, — all finite phenomena or modes, — are manifestations of the one under-

¹ Spinoza usually, if not invariably, contrasts the finite as the 'included' with the Infinite as the 'all-including.'

² Prop. 21 and Prop. 22.

³ For consideration of the difficult problem here involved, cf. Appendix, p. 468.

lying reality. They stand to God in the relation of parts to a whole which is prior to them — which expresses itself in the parts instead of being made up of them. Spinoza sometimes describes this as the relation of the modes to an immanent (not a transient) cause; and this immanent cause he sometimes calls *natura naturans* in distinction from *natura naturata*, or the sum of the modes.¹ In quite a different sense of the word 'cause,' he conceives each mode as cause of, and in turn as effect of, some other. That is to say, Spinoza, like Kant, recognizes and does not confuse two sorts of causality. The first, the immanent causality of God, or substance, is for Spinoza the relation of organism to member, of constituting whole to part. The second is the temporal relation of mode to mode; and it is this which we have now to consider. Spinoza teaches, in the first place, that the modes of each attribute are causally related to each other, in such wise that each is the temporal, or phenomenal, cause, of one that follows and in the same sense the effect of one that precedes. "Every individual thing (*quodcumque singulare*)," he says, "that is, everything which is finite and has a determined existence cannot exist, nor be determined to act (*ad operandum*) unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is finite and has a determined existence; and in its turn this cause also cannot exist nor be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another which also is finite and has a determined existence, and so on *ad infinitum*." He argues this, on the ground that a thing *as finite* cannot be regarded as if caused by God. "That which is finite and has a conditioned existence cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God."² Therefore, Spinoza concludes (assuming that for every character, even finiteness, there must be a cause), the modes, as finite, are caused by each other. This argument for phenomenal causality is not beyond

¹ Pt. I., Prop. 29, Schol.

² Pt. I., Prop. 28, Proof.

criticism — for it might well be objected that it contradicts God's infinity, to admit a character, even finiteness, which does not follow from his nature.¹ But the truth, that finite things and events are causally connected with each other, will be denied by no one. For, as Kant has shown, causal connectedness is an essential feature of the finite phenomenon.²

One comes almost with surprise, in the very midst of Spinoza's theology, upon this doctrine of the causal connection of the finite modes, one with another. It marks the greatness of the thinker, Spinoza, that he should thus unite with his rigid doctrine of the dependence of all things on divine necessity, a truly scientific doctrine of the strict dependence of event on event. Every natural event, he teaches, every mechanical change of position, every chemical reaction, and, no less truly, every thought, wish, and intention is determined by some preceding event. Yet Spinoza carefully subordinates the temporal, or finite, relation of the modes with each other to the deeper, the eternally necessary relation to God. Thus, in the scholium to this very proposition which defines phenomenal causality, he insists on the truth of the eternal causality, in the words, "All things which are, are in God (*omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt*) and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived (*sine ipso nec esse, non concipi possunt*)."³ The causal dependence of the modes on each other is in fact, itself, a result of the divine necessity.³

¹ Cf. Camerer, Chapter 3, p. 50.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 210, on Kant's discussion of causality.

³ This truth is often expressed in Part II., by saying, *not* that one thought or motion depends on another thought or motion, but that it depends on "God not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a particular, actually existing thing" (Pt. II., Prop. 9). When Spinoza speaks of the contingency of finite phenomena he, therefore, refers in the first instance, not to the fact that everything in the universe is conditioned by some other thing, but to the truth "all things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain way." (Pt. I., Prop. 29.)

Setting aside its occasional inconsistencies, we may therefore formulate Spinoza's doctrine of the two causalities, infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, as follows: every thing or event in the universe may be looked at from two points of view. It may be regarded in relation to similar finite facts, or phenomena, and, as thus regarded, it will be found to be necessarily connected with them, determined by them, and in turn determining them. But the finite thing is also to be regarded in another way, as related to the underlying one reality. As thus regarded, in its relation to God, it is an expression, a necessary manifestation, of this divine nature.

┌ *b. The independence and the parallelism of the two mode series*

A second feature of Spinoza's doctrine of the modes is the teaching that the causal relation of the finite modes to each other holds only between the modes which manifest a single attribute of God; in other words, that a thought mode is causally related only to other thought modes, and that an extension mode is causally related only to other modes of extension, whereas thought and extension modes are not interrelated. This doctrine follows logically from Spinoza's teaching that the attributes are independent, one of the other. The first complete statement of it, in the "Ethics," occurs in the sixth proposition of Part II.¹ "The modes of any attribute of God, have God as their cause, in so far as he is regarded (*consideratur*) under that attribute of which they are modes; and not in so far as he is regarded under any other attribute." Spinoza argues this by reference to that proposition of Part I.² which asserts that "every attribute of the one substance should be conceived by itself." The implied argument for this assertion is presumably to be found in the definitions of attribute and of substance. Attribute is what

¹ Cf. Pt. II., Prop. 5; Pt. III., Prop. 2.

² Prop. 10.

is perceived as constituting the essence of substance, and since substance is that which exists through itself, therefore (Spinoza implies) the attribute, the essence of substance, must exist through itself.¹ There is indeed no gainsaying this argument on the basis of these definitions. And granting the existence of a plurality of attributes and of the two known attributes, thought and extension, it follows from the definitions just quoted that each attribute is conceived through itself, and that, therefore, the modes of one attribute are unaffected by the modes of any other: in particular, that ideas follow from ideas only, and that physical phenomena follow from physical phenomena only, so that idea is unaffected by physical change or physical phenomenon by idea.

The objection which at once suggests itself is that this denial of an interrelation between the modes of the attributes, based as it is on the conception of the self-dependence of each attribute, really militates against the doctrine of the unity of substance. If, on the one hand, the essence of substance is constituted by thought and extension, and necessarily manifested in thought modes and extension modes; and if, on the other hand, the attribute, thought, is independent of the attribute, extension, and thought modes independent of extension modes — it seems difficult to conceive of the universe as fundamentally one. Spinoza supposes himself to rescue the unity by insisting on the perfect parallelism of the attributes and of the mode series. Because substance is one and the same, he argues, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, . . . that is,"² he adds in a corollary, "whatsoever follows in extension (*formaliter*) from God's infinite nature, follows in thought (*objective*) in the same order and connection, from the idea of God."³ In other words, a thought mode corresponds with every extension mode in such wise that finite minds are paralleled by finite bodies, and thoughts by changes

¹ Once more, cf. Letter 2.

² Pt. II., Prop. 7 and Cor.

³ For this use of 'formaliter' and 'objective,' cf. Chapter 2, pp. 29 seq.

in the physical world. It will, however, still be urged that Spinoza has not by this device reconciled the unity of substance with the independence of the mode series and of the attributes; parallelism itself — it will be argued — implies the separateness of the two parallels. Spinoza never meets this difficulty, but he doggedly asserts the unity of substance. "Conscious substance (*substantia cogitans*) and extended substance are," he says,¹ "one and the same substance which is comprehended (*comprehenditur*) now under the one attribute and now under the other. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing but expressed in two ways." So far as the modes alone are concerned, one might accept this doctrine, and regard the opposition of thought to extension as an illusion of the finite consciousness. But this is not Spinoza's meaning. For he teaches that thought and extension are attributes and not mere modes; that each "is conceived through itself and in itself" and constitutes the essence of substance. The difference between the attributes is, in other words, ultimate; and it is utterly unjustifiable in view of it to assert that extended substance and thinking substance are one and the same thing.

To recapitulate: (1) Spinoza's teaching that ideas and physical changes are not interrelated is based on his conception of the independence of the attributes; but this latter conception contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the unity of substance. (2) Spinoza's theory that the mode series are parallel presupposes this undemonstrated independence, each from each, of the attributes, and thus of the mode series, and is therefore an inadequate attempt to reconcile the independence of the attributes with the unity of substance. From a metaphysical standpoint there is thus no sufficient defence for parallelism. As a scientific hypothesis, a formulation

¹ Pt. II., Prop. 7, Schol. Cf. Pt. III., Prop. 2, Schol.: "*Mens et corpus una eademque res. . .*"

of the apparent concomitance of physical with psychical, it is none the less a harmless — possibly even a useful — hypothesis.

With the account of Spinoza's doctrine of the modes the outline of his metaphysical doctrine is completed. It may be briefly summarized in the following statements: The ultimate reality is a being, God, or substance, which is manifested in, not made up by, all finite realities. God has an infinite number of attributes each expressing his essence, and of these attributes two — consciousness and extension — are known; in other words, God is infinitely self-conscious¹ and infinitely extended. The groups of modes express the different attributes and are independent each of each; but within each group the different modes are related by a temporal necessity. The outcome for Spinoza of this metaphysical system is a conception of man's nature culminating in an ethical doctrine of profound practical worth. The rational man, Spinoza teaches, will look on all the course of history, all the events of life, as necessary expressions of God's nature, and he will therefore acquiesce in them. He will know himself also as sharing with all other men the prerogative of manifesting God's nature. Freed, by this adequate knowledge of himself and of all nature, from the dominion of regret, of anxiety, and of passion, a man "lives in obedience to reason" and attains to blessedness which is "love towards God."

The discussion, at this point, of Spinoza's practical philosophy would be an unwarranted digression.² There is need, however, for a recapitulation of the criticisms to be made on his metaphysics. It may be shown that these criticisms reduce to three. The doctrine of the independence of the attributes, one of another, is, in the first place, inconsistent

¹ Cf. p. 291.

² For a summary, based on Pts. II.-V., of the "Ethics," cf. Appendix, pp. 469/seq.

with Spinoza's monism. The doctrine that extension is an attribute of substance is not, in the second place, established. Purged of this inconsistent pluralism and of the unsupported admission of the ultimate reality of extension, Spinoza's system would obviously reduce to a numerically monistic, qualitatively idealistic philosophy in which Spinoza's God would become a conscious self inclusive of all lesser realities—of the so-called physical as well as of the psychical. Against this conception may be urged the final and most fundamental criticism on Spinoza's system. Spinoza, as we have seen, does not demonstrate the existence of his absolute substance, God. His basal certainty is that "all that exists," and he illicitly interprets this truism, significant yet in itself empty, in the sense of his great doctrine: ultimate reality is a single, self-manifesting being.

It does not follow from this radical criticism that the philosophy of Spinoza is of slight value; nor even that its value consists in the adequacy of its scientific conceptions, the accuracy of its psychological analysis, and the nobility of its ethical teaching. It has all these virtues, but, in addition, great metaphysical significance. For the first time in the history of modern philosophy, Spinoza formulates in definite outlines a strictly numerical monism, the conception of an all-of-reality which is also a One, of a whole of reality which is more-than-a-sum, of a unique being which expresses itself in the many finite phenomena. The mere conception, though insufficiently established, is of real value. Idealistically interpreted, it becomes the central truth of the post-Kantian philosophy, for Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and, above all, Hegel attempt the demonstration, lacking in Spinoza, of the existence of an absolute substance, and conceive this substance as absolute self.

CHAPTER IX

THE ADVANCE TOWARD MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEMS OF FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND SCHO- PENHAUER

"Während in Frankreich eine Philosophie aufkam die den Geist verkörperte, . . . erhob sich in Deutschland eine Philosophie die . . . nur den Geist als etwas wirkliches annahm." — HEINE.

THE philosophical systems of Kant and of Spinoza, widely as they differ in purpose, in teaching, and in emphasis, do yet lead to advance in the same lines. The fundamental errors and inconsistencies in Spinoza's doctrine are, as has just appeared, his failure to argue cogently for the absolute numerical oneness of reality; and his qualitatively dualistic teaching that the absolute One, or substance, has the two attributes, thought and extension. Kant, on the other hand, supplies the first steps of a valid argument for the absolute oneness of ultimate reality, but apparently he does not hold, and certainly he does not systematically formulate, the conception. And Kant, as well as Spinoza, is a dualist, though his dualism, following as it does on the idealistic teachings of Leibniz and of Berkeley, is not of so crude a sort as Spinoza's. Yet Kant's things-in-themselves, though despoiled of all positive characters, are forms of an alleged reality independent of consciousness, so that Kant unquestionably holds a dualistic doctrine.¹ Advance upon Kant as upon Spinoza is naturally, therefore, in these two direc-

¹ It must be admitted that here and there a critic disputes this assertion, on the ground of Kant's statements (cf. *supra*, pp. 261) that the free moral self is thing-in-itself. In the opinion of the writer, however, Kant's predominant doctrine should be construed from his far more frequent assertions of the distinction between things-in-themselves and consciousness, rather than from this uncharacteristic teaching, significant as it is. Cf., on this subject,

tions: the formulation of a demonstrated numerical monism, and the supplanting of an inconsistent qualitative dualism by a complete, idealistic monism.

The German philosophers of the waning eighteenth and of the dawning nineteenth century were predominantly influenced both by Kant and by Spinoza, though in slightly varying proportion. And it is noticeable that their systems correct those of their great predecessors in precisely the two directions already named. Each one of them formulates, and attempts to base on valid argument, the doctrine that the all-of-reality is an absolute One, and that this One is, through and through, a reality of consciousness. The idealism of these post-Kantian teachers for the most part takes the form of an attack on Kant's things-in-themselves. Their conception of the absolute One of consciousness allies it both with Spinoza's substance (in its thought attribute), and with Kant's transcendental self, in its relation to the empirical selves. Ostensibly, therefore, each of these systems is an idealistic monism and teaches that ultimate reality is constituted by an absolute self. Three of the four systems, however, are marred by a logical contradiction: while insisting on the conception of ultimate reality as absolute self, they virtually yield either the absoluteness or the selfhood — in other words, either the numerical monism or the qualitative and idealistic monism of the system. Hegel is the first to formulate a complete and consistent monistic idealism; and the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer must be regarded, therefore, as advancing toward a goal of which they just fall short.

A. THE TEACHING OF FICHTE

The temptation to interest oneself in the personality of the philosopher as a preliminary to the consideration of his argu-

Windelband, "Die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre vom Ding-an-sich," *Vierteljahrschr. f. wissensch. Philos.*, 1876.

ment has nowhere greater justification than in the case of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He himself has said that a man's philosophy is the story of his heart, and though this may well be questioned as a statement of universal validity, it is significantly true of Fichte himself. His life was one of sharp external contrasts, but these followed and never determined the course of his thought and the direction of his will. The unchildlike concern of his boyish years for moral, not to say for theological, problems was expressed in self-denying actions as well as in the famous sermons to the geese whom he herded. His intellectual divergence, during his university days, from the orthodox doctrine of his time was followed by his abandonment of the preacher's profession, spite of his preparation for it. The conviction, gained at this same period, that nature determinism is the valid system of philosophy filled him with despair, but never affected his purpose to square his life with his philosophy; in the wreck of his ideals he never dreamed of abandoning metaphysics nor of forcing its conclusions to his desires. In the same spirit, ten years after, he lived out his later doctrine of ethical idealism, the doctrine that a man's environment is the object of his obligation, by resigning his professorship at Jena when its freedom of teaching had been challenged.

Fichte has himself sketched for us the progress of his thought, as it has just been outlined. From his early acceptance of the current form of theism, he had been driven — by the necessity, he believed, of logical reasoning — into a doctrine of physical determinism: the theory that our acts and feelings and volitions are determined by an endless chain of physical causes. Absolutely honest and seeing no escape from this doctrine, Fichte accepted it fully and despairingly. The philosophic cloud lifted only when he read Kant's "*Kritik of Practical Reason*." Then a great light dawned for him. He realized that a conscious self can never be subject to the laws of objects which are, in their real nature, mere phenomena — that is, creations of con-

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sciousness. From the exposition of Kant's doctrine, with which his productive work began, he went on to formulate his own system. /This consists fundamentally in a development of Kant's conception of the transcendental I./ The thing-in-itself vanishes and the transcendental self becomes for Fichte an absolute though impersonal self, inclusive of finite selves whose deepest reality consists in their moral striving to apprehend and to realize their own infinity.

I. FICHTE'S 'POPULAR PHILOSOPHY'

Fichte's first book of technical significance, published in 1794, is the "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," commonly known as "Wissenschaftslehre," or "Science of Knowledge," a complete and detailed account of his metaphysical system. It was followed, in 1796, by a work on ethics, the "Grundlage des Naturrechts." It is probable that Fichte contemplated a further, regular development of his system, in the form of expositions of the philosophy of nature, of religion, and of art. But his departure from Jena, with the circumstances which embittered it, and — still more — his patriotic absorption in the political problems of those years preceding the war for freedom, broke in upon the plan for a development of his system. From this time on, Fichte's books are either popular expositions and applications of his doctrine, or are restatements of it.¹ To the first class belongs his "Bestimmung des Menschen (Vocation of Man)," a brilliant, distinctly autobiographical account of the progress of a thinker from a position of physical determinism, through a phase of idealistic phenomenalism, into a triumphant sort of ethical idealism. The little work is written throughout in the first person as befits a philosophical autobiography; but it is not purely autobiographical. Rather, Fichte undertakes the story of the thought-progress of a typical and

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 538.

logical thinker who begins, as he had begun, at the standpoint of determinism. So he says in the preface that "this I is by no means the author; he hopes, on the contrary, that his reader may assume the rôle." The style of the book is clear and very direct; it is eloquent, often by its very simplicity and by the reaction of the thought on the emotion of the imaginary hero.

a. The first stage of philosophic thought: scientific determinism

In Book I., named "Doubt," I am confronted with the question, "What am I and what is my vocation?"¹ To answer the question, I look out upon nature, convinced that I too belong to the world of nature. And I at once discover that every nature object "is throughout determined; it is what it is and is absolutely nothing else."² Its qualities are, furthermore, determined by those of all other nature phenomena. For, "Nature is a connected whole; in every moment, every single part . . . must be what it is, because all the others are what they are, and you could move no grain of sand from its place without making some change throughout all the parts of the immeasurable whole. But every moment of this duration is determined by all the past moments, and will determine all future moments. You cannot, therefore, in the present moment, imagine any difference in the position of any grain of sand, without being obliged to think of all the past and all the future as changed."³ And since I myself "am not what I am because I think or will it;"⁴ since rather I find myself existing and thinking and am obliged to infer some cause of me which is other than myself,

¹ Werke, II., p. 169; translation, by William Smith, Open Court edition, p. 1 (all the references in the notes to the "Vocation of Man" are to this edition). The student should not fail to read this work.

² Werke, II., p. 172², translation, p. 5¹.

³ Werke, II., p. 178²; translation, p. 11³.

⁴ Werke, II., p. 181²; translation, p. 15².

evidently, therefore, I am 'one of the manifestations of the nature force.'¹ Yes, "I myself with all that I call mine am a link in the chain of this stern nature necessity," "I am a determined being whose beginning was at a definite time. I did not come into being through myself but through another power without me . . . through the universal power of nature."² It is true that I seem to myself to have freedom and independence, but this is readily explained as my consciousness of the force of nature welling up within me, unchecked by any other manifestations of it in other persons or objects. "Freedom is absolutely impossible. . . . All that I have been, all that I am, and all that I am to be, I have been, am, and shall be, of necessity."³

This conception richly satisfies my understanding. It orders and connects all the objects of my knowledge: the facts of my consciousness, of my bodily constitution, of the world without me.⁴ But, alas, it does violence to my 'deepest intuitions and wishes.' My heart is anguished and torn by the doctrine which soothes my understanding. I cannot apply the doctrine to my action, "for I do not act: nature acts in me. To make myself something other than that to which I am destined by nature is impossible, for I do not make myself. Nature makes me and makes all that I am to be. . . . I am under the pitiless power of stern nature necessity."⁵

b. The second stage of philosophic thought: phenomenistic idealism

Book I. ends with this despairing acknowledgment of the truth of physical determinism. In Book II., named "Knowledge (*Wissen*)," the fallacy which underlies this type of

¹ Werke, II., p. 183²; translation, p. 18¹ (cf. p. 14²).

² Werke, II., p. 179^{2, 3}; translation, p. 13¹.

³ Werke, II., pp. 184² and 183¹; translation, pp. 19¹ and 17¹.

⁴ Werke, II., pp. 184³ seq.; translation, pp. 19² seq.

⁵ Werke, II., p. 189³ (cf. p. 196³ seq.); translation, p. 25² (cf. p. 32 seq.)

determinism is set forth in the form of myself and a keen philosophic reasoner, 'The Spirit.' He assures me that I am toms of my own creation. "Take courage, me, answer my questions." Under guidance and questioning, I then convince myself, step by step, that the early deterministic philosophy was invalidate conception of nature and of nature objects. I begin with the assumption that I belong to the class of nature objects, whereas every nature object is simply the construction of my own consciousness.¹ The colors, sounds, and textures of which it is composed are my sensations;² its spatial form is my way of perceiving visual and tactual sensations;³ its relations — of causal connection, for example — are my thoughts about the sensations and the forms.⁴ "And with this insight, O mortal," exclaims the Spirit, whose questioning has led to this conclusion, "receive thy freedom and thy eternal deliverance from the fear that tormented thee. No longer wilt thou tremble before a necessity which exists only in thy thought; no longer wilt thou fear to be overborne by things which are made by thyself. . . . As long as thou couldst believe that such a system of things existed independent of thee . . . and that thou mightest thyself be a link in the chain of this system, thy fear was justified. Now that thou hast realized that all this exists only in thee and through thee, thou wilt not fear before that which thou hast known as thine own creation."⁵

But though I am delivered from the dread of nature necessity, I am assailed by a terror still more pitiless. "Wait," I cry, "deceitful Spirit! Dost thou boast of delivering me? . . . Thou destroyest necessity only by annihilating all

¹ Werke, II., pp. 235², 239² *et al.*; translation, pp. 77-78; 82-83.

² Werke, II., p. 202 *seq.*; translation, p. 38 *seq.*

³ Werke, II., pp. 232 *seq.*; translation, pp. 74 *seq.* Notice that Fichte adopts Kant's space theory. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, pp. 200 *seq.*

⁴ Werke, II., pp. 213 *et al.*; translation, pp. 52 *et al.*

⁵ Werke, II., p. 240³; translation, p. 83⁴.

olutely nothing exists except ideas, lity. . . . There is nothing permanent e, but mere endless change. I know no ny own. There is no being. I myself ist not. Images exist: they are all that n myself one of those images: no, I am t the confused image of an image!"¹ To this the Spirit replies: "Thou art right to seek he mere appearance. . . . But thou wouldest labor in vain to gain it through and by thy knowledge. If thou hast no other means of seizing on reality, thou wilt never find it. But thou hast the means. Only use it."

*c. The third and final stage of philosophic thought:
ethical idealism*

So ends Book II., on knowledge. As is evident, it is a summary, in highly dramatic form, and in Kantian phraseology, of Hume's idealistic phenomenalism: the doctrine that ideas only — and neither spirit nor matter — have existence. Book III., entitled "Faith," sets forth Fichte's own doctrine of ethical idealism. Faith it should be noted, in Fichte's, as in Kant's, use of the term, is not opposed to thought, but only to knowledge, in an unduly narrow use of the latter word. Knowledge means to Fichte the perception of scientific fact, outer and inner, the consciousness of physical phenomena, that is, of things, and of psychical phenomena, that is, of ideas. Faith, on the contrary, is the immediate and certain consciousness of myself,² in active, moral relations with other finite selves, and thus with the absolute self, or God.

This result is reached by an analysis of the moral consciousness and its presuppositions. In brief, the argument is the following: I am directly conscious of the fact of obligation.

¹ Werke, II., pp. 240, 245; translation, pp. 84³, 89⁴.

² Werke, II., p. 253⁴; translation, pp. 99-100.

There is, indeed, "but one point on which I have to reflect incessantly: what I ought to do;"¹ "I certainly have a duty to perform and truly have these definite duties."² But in the phenomenal world, it has been shown, there is no obligation, for phenomena, mere successive facts which are links in a chain of necessity, can be bound by no ought. Therefore, this immediate certainty of experience, the fact of my consciousness of duty, can only be explained, Fichte teaches, — as Kant had taught, — by admitting that the world of linked phenomena is not the sole, or even the truest, sphere of reality. Indeed, the immediate certainty of the consciousness of obligation, and the reality implied by the obligation, "absolutely demand,"³ Fichte holds, "the existence of another world, an oversensuous"⁴ . . . eternal⁵ world . . . of which" (by virtue of my moral consciousness), "I already am citizen. . . . This which men call heaven does not lie," Fichte declares, "beyond the grave: it already encompasses us and its light dawns in every pure heart."⁶

Of this unsensuous reality, presupposed by the fact of obligation, there are three important characteristics. It is, in the first place, a reality kindred to my own nature. It is "no strange being . . . into which I cannot penetrate. . . . It is framed by the laws of my own thought and must conform to them. . . . It expresses throughout nothing save relations of myself with myself."⁷ This follows because obligation to duty implies the possibility of its attainment; and only in a world which I can enter can I fulfil obligation.

The oversensuous world is, in the second place, a world of free spirits or selves, for only to other selves do I stand in direct relation of obligation. "The voice of my conscience,"

¹ Werke, II., p. 257²; translation, p. 104².

² Werke, II., p. 261³; translation, p. 100².

³ Werke, II., p. 265³; translation, p. 113².

⁴ Werke, II., p. 296¹ (cf. 281¹, *überirdisch*); translation, p. 150.

⁵ Werke, II., p. 282²; translation, p. 133².

⁶ Werke, II., p. 283²; translation, p. 134².

⁷ Werke, II., p. 258² (cf. p. 251²); translation, p. 104².

Fichte declares, "cries to me, 'Treat . . . these beings as free, independent creatures, . . . existing for themselves. . . . Honor their freedom: embrace their aims with enthusiasm as if they were your own.' . . . The voice of conscience — the command, 'here limit thy freedom, here assume and honor purposes foreign to thyself' — this it is which is first translated into the thought: 'here is surely and certainly a being like unto me.'"¹

The eternal reality, finally, is an absolute spirit, or will. This follows, according to Fichte, from two considerations. An absolute will is necessary to explain the unanimity of human experience.² It is admitted that each conscious self constructs its own world, hence separate spirits could not be aware of each other and could not see the same sense world, were not all human selves parts and manifestations of the absolute self, the eternal and infinite will.³ The existence of the absolute will is demanded also by the more-than-individual authority of the moral law. Though each individual has his own unique ideal, yet the moral law has an authority underivable from individual purpose. "Neither my will nor that of any other finite being, nor that of all finite beings taken together, gives this law, but rather my will and the will of all other finite beings are subordinate to it⁴. . . . This supreme law of the oversensuous world is, then, a will."⁵

With this discovery of the absolute will, enfolding me and all finite spirits, I "become a new creature. . . . My spirit is forever closed to perplexity and indecision, to uncertainty, doubt, and anxiety; my heart is closed to sorrow, to repentance, and to craving."⁶ Doubt and desire have become impossible to me for I realize my oneness with the eternal

¹ Werke, II., pp. 259⁴–260¹; translation, pp. 106³–107¹.

² Werke, II., p. 299²; translation, p. 153².

³ Werke, II., p. 302¹; translation, pp. 155–156.

⁴ Werke, II., p. 295²; translation, p. 149².

⁵ Werke, II., p. 297²; translation, p. 151².

⁶ Werke, II., p. 311; translation, pp. 167²,³ seq.

will. "Sublime, living will," I cry out to him, "whom no name names and no thought comprehends, well may I lift my heart to thee, for thou and I are not apart. . . . Thou workest in me the knowledge of my duty, of my vocation in the series of reasonable beings — though how thou workest I do not know. Thou knowest what I think and will — though how thou canst know I do not understand. . . . Thou willest . . . that my free obedience should have results in all eternity; the act of thy will I do not understand and know only that it is not like my will."¹

The words just quoted disclose a feature of Fichte's doctrine of the Absolute which can hardly fail to surprise the reader who has so far followed his argument. In spite of the teaching that this Absolute is Will, Fichte conceives it as impersonal. "In the concept of personality," he says, "is involved that of limits."² To attribute personality to the absolute will is, then, to attribute limitation. An impersonal, absolute self which yet works, knows, and wills is — it thus appears — Fichte's conception of ultimate reality. But such a view seems, on the face of it, to involve a self-contradiction. It conceives of the Absolute as impersonal, and yet claims for it all the characters — knowing, willing, working — of personality. To assure ourselves that this is really Fichte's meaning and that his metaphysical theory has not unconsciously been affected by the demands of his moral teaching, it is useful to study some one of the technical expositions of his philosophy. It is convenient to select the earliest and most widely read of these: "Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre," or "Science of Knowledge." It has been abundantly proved that the essentials of Fichte's system remained unaltered, in spite of his diverse formulations of it, his varying arguments and emphases, and his changing terminology.³

¹ Werke, II., pp. 303-305; translation, pp. 158², 160¹.

² Werke, II., p. 305; translation, p. 159².

³ Cf. A. B. Thompson, "The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge," p. 3 *et al.* and Appendix; C. C. Everett, "Fichte," pp. 13, 14.

Hence the outline of the "Wissenschaftslehre" may rightly serve as summary of Fichte's constant teaching.

II. FICHTE'S TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHY

a. The universe consists of mutually related self and not-self

To the student acquainted only with Fichte's "Vocation of Man," or even with his "Way to a Blessed Life" the "Science of Knowledge" seems, at first, to be the work of an utterly different writer. It consists in a technical, severely abstract, metaphysical argument, seldom lighted up by illustration, or by practical application. Its chief faults of style are repetition and overelaboration. The joy of discovering significant truth is fairly worn away by the carefulness with which such a truth is turned and twisted, viewed in this light and in that, from every possible standpoint, important and unimportant.¹ The book has three divisions, General, Theoretical, and Practical; and of these the first two are more closely connected than the second with the third. The book starts with the everyday admission that reality is made up of self and not-self. The consciousness of the I, the myself, is particularly vivid, it is pointed out, when I judge or identify, that is, when I say "*a* is *a*."² For such identification implies the existence of a relatively permanent self which is conscious of the first *a*, of the second *a*, and of their oneness. And since the consciousness of identity is an immediately certain 'fact of empirical consciousness,'³ the I on which its possibility depends must exist.

It is, however, equally certain that I — the single, finite

¹ This sentence is quoted from a paper by the writer, in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. III., p. 462.

² § I, 1), Werke, I., p. 92; translation, by A. E. Kroeger, p. 65 (all references to the "Science of Knowledge," in translation, are to this work).

³ § I, 5), Werke, I., p. 95; translation, p. 68¹.

I — am not all that exists. I perceive objects which I do not create; my desires are opposed and thwarted: clearly there exists some reality beyond myself — in other words there is a not-I, or not-self.¹

— The self and the not-self may, then, be looked upon as together making up the universe, all that exists. For the term 'not-self' is wide enough to include everything besides myself. The nature of the relation between self and not-self has, however, to be taken into account; and, from this point to the end of Part II., the "Science of Knowledge" consists chiefly in the repeated formulation of this relation between I and not-I. In place of an argument directly advancing from beginning to close of the book one finds, thus, an argument which returns upon itself, going over and over the same ground with unimportant modifications. This argument is, in brief, the following:—

As together constituting the all-of-reality, I and not-I seem, in the first place, to be reciprocally or mutually related to each other.² For, since all reality is made up of self and not-

¹ § 2, Werke, I., p. 101; translation, p. 75. In this section, Fichte attempts a deduction, or demonstration, of the existence of the not-self. Really, however, he merely asserts its existence, as a fact of experience. That this is his procedure, Fichte himself elsewhere virtually admits (Werke, I., p. 252).

² This conception of reciprocal relation is discussed in the following portions of the "Science of Knowledge":—

The self and not-self determine each other (§ 4, B, Werke, I., p. 127; translation, p. 108).

In reciprocal relation (regarded as causal) matter and form mutually determine each other (Werke, I., pp. 171⁴ seq.; translation, pp. 147⁴ seq.).

In reciprocal relation (regarded as that of substantiality) matter and form mutually determine each other (Werke, I., pp. 190⁴ seq.; translation, pp. 160⁴ seq.).

The 'independent activity' and the 'form' mutually determine each other (Werke, I., pp. 212 seq.; translation, pp. 176³ seq.).

The last three of the passages of which the headings have been quoted occur in the discussion of the independent activity.

It may be noted that Fichte describes the three sections, just summarized, of the "Science of Knowledge" — the successive assertions of the existence of I, of not-I, and of the related totality which includes both — as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and that he dwells upon the significance of this

self, it follows that the self is limited by the not-self; and that, conversely, the not-self is limited by the self. Were there nothing outside me to thrust itself on my observation or to obstruct my purpose, I should constitute all reality. And were I not here, the not-I would reign undisputedly. As a matter of fact, we are both here, I and not-I; reality is divided between us; we mutually determine each other.

b. The relatedness of self and not-self implies their existence as parts of an independent, or absolute, reality

But it is not enough, Fichte continues, to say simply: these opposed realities, self and not-self, limit each other. For relation, as Kant has already argued, implies a reality deeper than that of the terms related. The existence of related terms is, in fact, only possible if they are parts of an underlying, 'independent' reality which expresses itself in them. In Fichte's words, "To make the reciprocal relation possible, the activity must be taken as absolute,"¹ as all-enclosing.² This conception of the ultimate reality as One, rather than as coördinated manifold, is emphasized in all Fichte's works. In the "Anweisung zum seligen Leben," or "Way towards the Blessed Life," for example, he defines the ultimate reality as 'One, not manifold,' as 'self-comprehensive, self-sufficient, absolute, unchanging unity,' and, finally — in Spinoza's phrase — as 'by itself, for itself, through itself.' But though he constantly asserts, he does not argue at any length for the utter completeness or for the singleness of the reality fundamental to related self and not-self. The arguments which he neglects to make explicit are readily supplied. (1) The fundamental reality must be complete because it consists of I and not-I, and obviously not-I is all

sort of advance in thought. The procedure recalls Kant's arrangement of the categories in groups of three, and is the germ of that dialectical method which, in Hegel's hands, became so important.

¹ Werke, I., p. 160²; translation, p. 136.

² Werke, I., p. 192²; translation, p. 161, end.

which I am not, since together they must round out reality. (2) Complete reality is a singular, because I and not-I are related, limited, the one by the other. Now related terms must constitute either a composite made up of parts or a singular differentiating itself into parts. In the former case the relation which unites the terms would be a third reality *why?* in addition to them, that is, would be external to them. But if it were external to the terms it could not unite them, bind them together — in a word, they would not be related. Thus I and not-I can be related only as they are manifestations of a deeper reality, an all-embracing One or singular — an ‘independent activity,’ as Fichte calls it — which manifests itself in them and is their relation. In Fichte’s own words, “The relation of the reciprocally related terms as such presupposes an absolute activity.”¹

c. The nature of independent, or absolute, reality

1. Ultimate reality is absolute I

An important problem remains: the nature of this ‘independent,’ all-inclusive One. This, also, like the problem of relation, is considered by Fichte, not once for all, but at many points of the “Science of Knowledge;” it is not discussed and then dismissed, but is again and again recurred to. The constantly reëmerging argument is the following: —

One of two answers must be given to the question, what is the nature of the ultimate One — the ‘independent activity,’ to use Fichte’s term. Evidently, it must be either of the nature of the self, the-I, or of the nature of the not-I, since the two are utterly exclusive and exhaustive. The second of these possibilities is discussed under the rather misleading head-

¹ Werke, I., p. 208; translation, p. 174². The passage is quoted in full, *infra*, p. 323. (Cf. the expression, Werke, I., p. 205³, translation, p. 171³, the absolute holding together of the opposites’.)

It should be noted that Fichte, here as elsewhere, assumes, and does not argue, that the all-including One is activity.

ing, causality.¹ The hypothesis is that of the non-idealists: ultimate reality — independent activity, as Fichte in this book calls it — is conceived as non-ideal, that is, as not-self. The argument for the hypothesis is the common one: the existence of an 'external' world, known to us through perception. In perception, it is urged, I am conscious of reality independent of me, external to me. I cannot choose what I shall see or hear; on the contrary, I passively see and hear what I must. Evidently, then, if this reasoning be correct, the independent reality is, in part at least, of the nature of a not-self. But it has been proved already that ultimate reality is numerically a One — and this requires that it be either self or not-self, and not a composite of both self and not-self. Now the argument just outlined, from the passivity of perception, results in the conclusion that the not-self is ultimately real. It follows that ultimate reality is not-self, unconscious reality; and that the supposed I, or conscious self, is a mere mode of the not-self, having, as self, only superficial reality.

Fichte hardly does justice to this conception, so clearly does he apprehend the argument which invalidates it. He states the argument somewhat as follows: The existence of a not-self is merely an inference from the experience of perceiving, involving as that does a certain passivity suggesting the existence of reality independent of it; but perceiving, however passive, is a form of consciousness whose existence is immediately known; and to infer from consciousness, and as explanation of consciousness, a reality which denies the fundamental reality of it is logically impossible. "There is no reality in the not-I," Fichte says, "except so far as the I is passively conscious. No passivity in the I, no activity [reality] in the not-I." In other words, one really knows nothing of a not-self: one knows merely that one is passively

¹ This conception is discussed in the following portions of the "Science of Knowledge": (1) Werke, I., pp. 131 *seq.*; translation, pp. 108⁴ *seq.*; (2) Werke I., pp. 153 *seq.*; translation, pp. 129 *seq.*; (3) Werke, I., pp. 162 *seq.*; translation, pp. 138 *seq.*; (4) Werke, I., pp. 171 *seq.*; translation, pp. 147 *seq.*

as well as actively conscious. Thus one knows oneself as limited, but has as yet no conclusive reason to suppose oneself to be limited by a not-self.

Fichte turns, therefore, to the alternative hypothesis: the conception of independent activity (by which, as always, he means ultimate reality) as I, or self. As has been shown,¹ the independent activity is absolute; hence, on this theory, ultimate reality is an absolute I. The problem which presses for solution is, accordingly: can the existence of an absolute self be reconciled with one's awareness of a limited self, an I which finds itself thwarted and opposed? Fichte answers that the absolute self is not only possible in a universe of finite selves, but that it is required for their existence. The relation between absolute and finite selves he defines as that of substantiality.² It is the relation of the greater to the less, of the manifesting to the manifested, of the whole to the parts.³ Thus the alleged opposition of I to not-I turns out to be the opposition, within the absolute self, of some finite self to the rest of reality. In other words, not-self means simply not-this-self; and every finite self is not-self to every other. Only in this restricted sense is there any not-I, for since the ultimate reality, or independent activity, turns out to be that of absolute self, there can be no reality outside it. But external to finite self, are other finite manifestations of the absolute self; and this explains the fact that the finite I feels itself passive, opposed and thwarted, even in a world whose ultimate reality is self.⁴ The very existence of the opposition implies, however, the reality of the absolute I: "The coming

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 320 *seq.*

² This conception is discussed in the following portions of the "Science of Knowledge": (1) Werke, I., pp. 136⁴ *seq.*, esp. 139; translation, p. 113³; (2) Werke, I., p. 157; translation, p. 134; (3) Werke, I., p. 163; translation, p. 140; (4) Werke, I., p. 190⁴; translation, p. 160.

³ Werke, I., pp. 165¹ and 192²; translation, pp. 141¹ and 161. Cf. Fichte's words in the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseins" (1810-11), Werke, II., p. 640: The self-contraction of the One is the original *actus individuationis*."

⁴ Cf. Werke, I., p. 287; translation, p. 292.

together of the reciprocally related members (*Wechselglieder*) as such is subject to (*steht unter*) the condition of an absolute activity of the Self, through which the latter opposes subjective self to objective not-self, and unites both. Only in the Self, and by means of this absolute activity of the Self, are self and not-self related terms: in the self and through its activity they are related."¹

This distinction between the absolute and the finite I's, suggested by Kant, it is true, but first carried out by Fichte in the "Science of Knowledge," is, far and away, the greatest achievement of the book — and, indeed, of Fichte's entire philosophy. It carries with it a complete disproof of the existence of any thing-in-itself. For if there is no absolute not-I, if — on the contrary — the not-self is opposed simply to a finite self, never to the absolute self, then there is evidently no reality utterly independent of consciousness — in other words, there is no thing-in-itself. Fichte's denial of the possibility of a thing-in-itself is very energetic; and, after his usual fashion, he recurs to it again and again. The main argument, he says, for the existence of a thing-in-itself may be stated thus: Granted that there is an absolute self manifesting itself in finite selves, what is the reason for this self-differentiation? Why should an absolute I break itself up into lesser I's? ² Must not this *ground* of the absolute Self? opposition of a finite self to its not-self — this check (*Anstoss*) as it may be called, to the perfectly undetermined activity of the absolute I — lie outside of the activity of the Absolute? And in this case, is there not a reality-independent-of-consciousness which, if not a thing-in-itself, is at least a ground in-itself? ³ Fichte's negative answer to this question is given

¹ Werke, I., p. 208²; translation, p. 174². For justification of the use impossible in German, of capitals to distinguish reference to the absolute Self from reference to the finite selves, cf. *Philosophical Review*, 1894 Vol. III., p. 459, where a more elaborate symbolism is proposed.

² Werke, I., p. 210; translation, p. 175⁴.

³ Cf. Berkeley's discussion of this same hypothesis, *supra*, pp. 128 seq.

over and over again in Part III., called the Practical Part, of the "Science of Knowledge." He insists on the impossibility of reality-independent-of-consciousness, even in the attenuated form of check to the absolute self's activity. The activity of the finite self must indeed be checked by the reality outside it, but "this not-self must be a product of the absolute I, and the absolute I would thus be affected by itself alone."¹

2. *The independent reality is impersonal I: a system of finite selves*

But though the ultimate reality, or independent activity, is a "self which determines itself absolutely," this absolute I is, none the less, it appears, impersonal. For since it is independent of all other realities, — since it is ultimate or realest reality, — it is evidently, Fichte says, unlimited. But every personal self is conscious of itself, that is to say, it has an object of its own consciousness, and is thus limited by its object. Evidently, therefore (so Fichte teaches, here, as in the "Vocation of Man," and, indeed, in all his works), the absolute self, or I-in-itself, is impersonal, "never comes to consciousness,"² "is conscious of itself only in individual form."³ Any apparent assertions by Fichte of the personal nature of the absolute reality are mere metaphor; the 'love of God,' for example, so often referred to in the "Way towards the Blessed Life," is defined as the "act of Being in maintaining itself in existence."⁴

The further study of the independent reality becomes thus a study of those finite selves in which it comes to conscious-

¹ Werke, I., p. 251².

² Werke, I., p. 269³; translation, p. 275².

³ "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., p. 647. Cf. "Anweisung zum seligen Leben" ("Way towards the Blessed Life"), Werke, V., p. 455; translation, II., p. 353²: "God throws out from himself . . . such part of his existence as becomes self-consciousness."

⁴ Werke, V., p. 541; translation, II., p. 473. (References to translations of the "Way towards the Blessed Life" and "Characteristics of the Present Age" are to William Smith's translations in "Fichte's Popular Works," 1848.)

ness. The last part of the "Science of Knowledge" contains this detailed discussion of the nature of the personal and finite selves. Each finite I has two significant phases, appears, in other words, both as practical and as theoretical. The practical self is the finite self reflecting on the absolute self and on its own oneness with the absolute. The theoretical self, on the other hand, is the finite self reflecting on its finiteness, realizing itself as limited. The two, theoretical and practical I, are not separable individuals, but merely distinguishable phases of each finite self. They are not separate, because each implies the other. I, the finite self, could never be reflectively conscious of my finitude, were I not always conscious, however inattentively, of my essential infinity; for a limit, as Fichte says, is not known as a limit until, in consciousness, one has gone beyond it.¹ On the other hand, I, the finite self, could not be conscious of myself as infinite without realizing that it is precisely this finite self which manifests and forms a constituent part of the infinite self. This realization of infinity in the form of finitude is empirically, Fichte teaches, a striving (*Streben*) after the ideal. No finite end ever satisfies this ideal striving; one purpose after another is set up, attained, and left behind. For the very nature of the finite self's consciousness of itself as part of the Infinite implies a striving after that which cannot, in the sphere of finite being, ever be apprehended. The following passage condenses this teaching into a statement which the bracketed clauses seek to make clearer. "The I," Fichte says (here meaning the practical, finite self), "demands that it comprehend all reality within itself and that it fulfil infinity. The necessary presupposition of this demand is the idea of the absolutely posited, infinite I; and this is the Absolute I. (This I is unattainable by our consciousness [. . . that is, by our immediate consciousness].) The I must — by the very conception of it — reflect on itself, consider

¹ Cf. passage quoted below.

whether it really include all reality within itself. . . . In so far, it is practical; neither 'absolute,' because by the tendency to reflection it goes out beyond itself [*i.e.* realizes itself as limited by something outside itself]; nor yet 'theoretical,' because its reflection has for its ground only the idea proceeding from the I itself and abstracted from the possible check [or thing-in-itself]. If, however, the finite self reflect upon the 'check,' that is, if it regard its activity as limited . . . it is in so far 'theoretical' self, or intelligence. If there be no practical phase in the self, no theoretical consciousness is possible: for if the activity of the self reaches only so far as the check, and not beyond it, then, *for the I*,¹ there exists no check. On the other hand, if the self be not intelligent, then no consciousness of its practical phase — and, indeed, no self-consciousness of any sort — is possible,"² for only through the opposition of finite and infinite is the consciousness of either possible.

Thus, the outcome of the "Science of Knowledge" is that of the "Vocation of Man." In varying terms, but with virtually the same meaning, Fichte's other books outline the same conception of reality: an absolute self called Will, and Life, and Being, and God, and by other names as well,³ which is spiritual, yet impersonal, and which includes within itself finite realities. These realities are single selves, but their common experience constitutes the so-called physical world: in Fichte's words: "the world of purely material objects . . . is the expression of life in its unity. Not the individual as such, but the one life, the totality of individuals, perceives these objects."⁴ Each of these single selves, in the second place, is but "a single division (*Spaltung*) of the one . . . I," yet "each individual has in his own free

¹ Italics mine.

² Werke, I., pp. 277-278.

³ Cf. A. B. Thompson, *op. cit.*, Appendix, Nomenclature, p. 199.

⁴ "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., pp. 614 *seq.*, 621 *seq.* Cf. also "Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (Characteristics of the Present Age)," IX., Werke, VII., p. 130; translation, p. 133; "A world has no existence except in knowledge, and knowledge is the world."

choice . . . the possibility of enjoying from any of these . . . standpoints, that peculiar portion of the absolute being which belongs to him."¹ In its essence this consciousness of union with the infinite constitutes the moral consciousness of each one of us; and all our consciousness is indeed inherently moral. Thus, the physical world is from this truest point of view 'the object and sphere of my duties'; and my fellow human being is known to me in the acknowledged obligation to respect his freedom.² Even more obviously, the consciousness of obligation is acknowledgment of the claim of the infinite self; the growth of the moral ideal is the progressive striving after attainment to unity with the Infinite.

III. CRITICISM OF FICHTE'S CONCLUSION

The inevitable criticism upon this theory may be simply stated. Fichte's impersonal Absolute is not in any sense a self, or I; it is rather — though this contradicts Fichte's express statement about it — a not-self. For my knowledge of the self is surely rooted in my immediate knowledge of myself; and this myself, whom each of us immediately knows, is a personal self. There is no such thing as impersonal consciousness; there never exists feeling, thought, or will which some person does not feel, think, or will. If, then, Fichte is right both in the doctrine that ultimate reality is an absolute and singular, not a composite, reality (an independent activity, and not a set of reciprocally related terms),³ and if he is also justified in arguing that this absolute reality is self, then this absolute I must be personal. Fichte's teaching that reality is ultimately an absolute and singular I, which is yet impersonal, is, in truth, a contradiction in terms. For ultimate reality could be both spiritual and impersonal only

¹ "Way towards the Blessed Life," translation, II., p. 459; Werke, V., p. 530.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 316 *seq.*; and "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," Werke, II., p. 635.²

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 320 *seq.*

moral community = evidence of absolute ?

if it were a composite, a community, of finite selves bound together by their common perceiving experience and by their mutual moral ideals. This is, in fact, the teaching of Fichte's practical philosophy, but by resolving ultimate reality into a lot of related individuals, he virtually yields the conception of reality as absolute and singular.¹

It must be added that Fichte often tacitly implies the personality of the Absolute whose impersonal character he constantly asserts. He admits it when, in the "Vocation of Man," he names the ultimate reality Will; or when, as in the "Way towards the Blessed Life," he calls it God. For to attribute to the deepest reality knowledge, will, and love is, to all intents and purposes, to treat it as personal. That the absolute will is "not like my will," may be admitted, for the Infinite must differ from the finite at least as the whole from the part; but, as will, it must be personal; and, for all his doctrine to the contrary, Fichte seems sometimes to have thought of it thus. In the same way, he virtually acknowledges the personality of the Absolute in his accounts of the religious consciousness,² which gain their force only because they assume a relation of the finite self to a divine person, and which would lose all their meaning if they were interpreted as descriptions of the attitude of the finite self to the community of its fellow-beings. Thus, when Fichte exclaims, "the blessed Life is the apprehension of the One and Eternal with inward love and interest,"³ he gains assent because the 'One and Eternal' is instinctively taken to mean a divine personality. If, however, one remember that to Fichte the 'One and Eternal' means either a hidden impersonal reality or — as is likely — a community of human beings, then either it becomes impossible to love this hidden being, or else the love is no longer love of the One but of the many.

¹ For fuller discussion, cf. Chapter 10, pp. 378 *seq.*; Chapter 11, pp. 418 *seq.*

² Cf. "Way towards the Blessed Life," translation, pp. 306, 345, 440, 444, 450 (Werke, pp. 418, 448-449, 516-517, 519-220, 523).

³ "Way towards the Blessed Life," p. 447; translation, II., p. 343.

It remains to consider briefly Fichte's reason for holding to this doctrine of an impersonal, absolute self. The conception, there is reason to believe, is inherently contradictory, and Fichte does not himself consistently hold to it. Why, then, it may well be asked, does he so persistently assert it? Evidently, for the reason that personality involves limitations and that he cannot conceive of the ultimate reality as limited.¹ This is, indeed, the only obstacle to the doctrine of an absolute, an all-including person. If it can be overcome, there is no barrier to the logical conclusion of Fichte's reasonings: the doctrine that there is an absolute reality, and that this Absolute is a personal self. Now Fichte, though he never realized it, had himself surmounted this difficulty by the teaching that the absolute I determines itself. Over and over again, he calls it self-determining, insisting that it 'determines'² or 'contracts'³ itself; and he asserts that this determination or contraction of itself into the totality of finite selves is through its own activity, not through any external impetus. By this distinction, Fichte formulates the true conception of the Absolute, not as unlimited, but as 'self-limited' — that is, as limited by nothing external to itself. With this admission, the impossibility of a personal Absolute vanishes. Personality, it may be acknowledged, is limitation; finite personality involves a limitation of myself by the not-myself; but infinite personality is self-limitation, determination of oneself through the laws of one's nature — a necessity which is freedom.

B. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHELLING

The systems of Fichte and of Schelling are rightly studied in close connection, both because they are so nearly contemporaneous, and because they so strongly resemble each

¹ Cf. p. 325.

² "Science of Knowledge," *Werke*, I., pp. 299, 307, 310; translation, pp. 313 *et al.*

³ "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," *Werke*, II., p. 640.

other in their critical reaction on the doctrine of Kant, and in their less direct yet significant relation to Spinoza's teaching. Schelling, like Fichte, demonstrates the impossibility of Kant's thing-in-itself, and interprets Kant's transcendental self, as well as Spinoza's substance, as absolute self. But, in spite of these fundamental likenesses, Schelling's doctrine stands in sharp contrast to that of Fichte; somewhat as Schelling himself, with his prosperous youth, his early academic success, his romantic friendships, — in a word, with his life of inward caprice and of outward change, — stands opposed to the serious Fichte, with his life of poverty, struggle, misunderstanding, and hard-won success.

I. SCHELLING'S EARLY DOCTRINE: THE UNIVERSE AS CONSTITUTED BY AN UNCONDITIONED BUT IMPERSONAL I

The important periods of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's philosophic activity are compressed within the short period of fifteen years — roughly speaking, from 1795 to 1810.¹ Like Fichte, he entered on philosophy as expositor and critic of Kant. But, like every independent thinker, he developed a doctrine of his own in the very effort to understand, to expound, and to correct another system. His first work, "*Vom Ich (Concerning the I)*" was published in 1795, when its brilliant young author was only twenty years old. Its success led to Schelling's appointment to the chair of philosophy in Jena, which Fichte had left; and Schelling's distinctly technical works were written, all of them, from this academic background. The "*Vom Ich*" is a clear and

¹ The beginner in philosophy may well postpone the reading of Schelling, for his most significant doctrines are found in the more accessible works of other writers. Schelling is not translated, and the student who does not know German must be referred to Watson's excellent condensation of the "*Transcendental Idealism*" (containing briefer summaries of other works). The German reading student should study the "*Vom Ich*," selections from the mature philosophy, the "*Darstellung*" (1801), parts at least of the "*System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*," and one of the later works, e.g. the "*Philosophie und Religion*."

eloquent exposition of the doctrine, common to Schelling and to Fichte, that ultimate reality is an absolute, but impersonal self. Schelling argues thus: We are immediately conscious of limited, that is, conditioned, realities. Each of these conditioned facts, or things, seems to depend on some other; but every limited cause in turn demands a cause, and thus the attempted explanation of one thing by another falls to the ground.¹ But we are not forced to the conclusion that there is no accounting for the universe; on the other hand, the very existence of related things presupposes the existence of unconditioned reality.²

Schelling proceeds to consider the nature of this unconditioned reality. The Unconditioned evidently is no object, for every object, or thing, is object of some consciousness, in other words, is the construction of a conscious subject. "Whatever is a thing is . . . object of knowledge, is therefore a link in the chain of our knowledge, falls within the sphere of the knowable, and therefore cannot be the real ground of all knowing."³ Even the thing-in-itself, the supposed reality beyond consciousness, is object of our conception and fails, therefore, of being unconditioned.⁴ But though unconditioned reality is not an object, it is not, on the other hand, a subject. For just as an object presupposes, and is therefore conditioned by, a subject, so a subject presupposes and is, then, conditioned by its object. "Precisely because the subject is thinkable only in relation to an object, and the object only in relation to a subject, neither one of the two can contain the unconditioned."⁵ Now, primarily at least, as the context seems to indicate, Schelling means, by subject, finite self. This second step in the deduction of the nature of

¹ Cf. "Vom Ich," §§ 2¹ and 3⁷, Werke, I., 1, pp. 164¹ and 170¹.

² *Ibid.*, §§ 1-3, especially 3, Werke, I., 1, pp. 166-170. These passages contain no demonstration of the existence of unconditioned reality. Cf. *infra*, p. 419, for proof of Schelling's assertion.

³ *Ibid.*, § 2⁵, Werke, I., 1, p. 164⁵.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 239³.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 2⁸, Werke, I., 1, p. 165³. Cf. "System des Transcendentalen Idealismus" (1800), Werke, III., 1, §§ 1, 3, pp. 339 *seq.*, 346 *seq.*

the ultimate reality simply means, therefore, that every finite self is, by virtue of its finiteness, conditioned, not unconditioned, reality.

There remains but the one possibility. Unconditioned reality is neither external thing nor finite self: it must, then, be the absolute I, the self which is conditioned, or determined, by nothing outside itself, the self which is realized through itself, the unconditioned "I am because I am."¹ The essence of this I is "freedom, that is to say, it is unthinkable, except as it posits itself—through simple power (*Selbstmacht*) in itself—not as anything whatever but as mere I."²

The greater part of the "Vom Ich" consists in a detailed and reiterated consideration of the characters, or aspects, of the unconditioned I, from the standpoint of Kant's four groups of categories. The main results of this discussion may, however, be summarized in a few paragraphs. Quantitatively considered, Schelling teaches,³ the absolute I "is . . . unity." It is unity, not plurality, for a true plurality would contain members endowed with an independent reality, and this has been shown to be impossible.⁴ In contrast with the empirical I, this absolute I is, thus, all-inclusive: "it fills all . . . infinity." The 'quality,' in the second place, of the unconditioned I, is its reality. "The I," Schelling says,⁵ "includes all . . . reality," else it would be no longer unconditioned. The only not-self, therefore, is such as derives its reality from the absolute self. In Schelling's words, "The not-self has . . . no reality, so long as it is opposed to the self, so long, that is, as it is pure, absolute, not-self." This means that, though realities exist doubtless outside any finite self, which are not-selves to this limited I, even these are included within the unconditioned I. Going on to the

¹ "Vom Ich," § 3, Werke, I., 1, p. 167. Cf. p. 221.

² *Ibid.*, § 8, Werke, I., 1, p. 179. Cf. pp. 205, 235, 239, end.

³ *Ibid.*, § 9, Werke, I., 1, p. 182 seq. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 332. Cf., also, pp. 349 seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 10¹, Werke, I., 1, p. 186³.

relation categories, Schelling points out that by 'substance' is meant 'unconditioned reality.' Hence, he says, "the I is the only substance. . . . All that exists is in the I. . . . All that exists is mere accident of the I."¹ And because the unconditioned I is absolute power, it is also causality; in other words, it is the presupposition and the explanation of itself and of all subordinate realities. "Its essence is itself power."² There remain only the categories of modality, and of these Schelling recognizes only one: the absoluteness of the unconditioned I. In truth, the predicate 'absoluteness' merely includes, or reaffirms, the characters already attributed to the unconditioned I, namely, all-including unity, ultimate reality, substance, and power. And, herewith, as Schelling points out, all the categories have been conceived as aspects of the absolute I, instead of being externally derived, after Kant's fashion, from distinctions of formal logic.³

Certain comments at once suggest themselves on this category doctrine. It has the merit, which Schelling claims for it, of avoiding the artificiality and the consequent incompleteness of Kant's derivation of the categories. But Schelling fails to notice that his own point of view is avowedly different from that of Kant, to whom the categories are the relations of known objects or predications about them. And, in the second place, considered in and for themselves, Schelling's categories — characters of the unconditioned I — demand the following criticism: every one of them turns out to be a corollary, or else a restatement, of its unconditionedness. But besides these, the unconditioned I has certainly the qualitative character of selfhood, in its various expressions: it is not merely unconditioned, but *I*. Schelling should surely have found a place, among the categories of the I, for the characters which belong to it regarded as self.

The neglect to discuss the qualitative characters of the

¹ "Vom Ich," § 12, Werke, I., 1, pp. 192²-193¹.

² *Ibid.*, § 14, Werke, I., 1, p. 196.

³ *Ibid.*, Werke, I., 1, p. 154.

unconditioned I is due doubtless to Schelling's denial of its personality. This is based on the theory that the self-conscious personality of the I would demand that it be object to itself, thus turning the unconditioned into the conditioned self. "Reflect," Schelling says, "that the I, in so far as it occurs in consciousness, is no more pure, absolute, I; reflect that there can be for the absolute I no object, and that it can far less become object for itself."¹ This is the old argument of Fichte and of Kant: the self of which one is conscious is *ipso facto* a limited self. The refutation of this argument has been over and over again formulated:² self-consciousness is self-limitation, and self-limitation does not derogate from absoluteness. It is interesting to notice that in this early stage of his thinking, even Schelling seems to be only half-hearted in his denial of the absolute I's personality. "The absolute I," he says, "exists (*ist*) without all reference to objects. That is to say, it exists not in so far as it thinks in general, but in so far as it *thinks itself only*."³ Of God, he says, a little later, that he "perceives . . . no thing, but merely himself."⁴ Still more significant is Schelling's appeal to self-consciousness in the midst of the demonstration, already outlined, of an unconditioned I — an I which exists through itself. "I am because I am,"⁵ Schelling exclaims, "this thought seizes suddenly upon every man." In these words, Schelling really acknowledges a truth which has no place in his formal system, the truth that consciousness essentially is personality, and that an unconditioned I is, of necessity, a personal, though a self-limiting, self.

¹ "Vom Ich," § 8⁴, Werke, I., 1, p. 180¹. Cf. "System des Transcendentalen Idealismus," 2^{ter} Hauptabschnitt Vorerinnerung 3, f, A, Werke, III., 1, p. 383⁴, "Das Ich indem es sich anschaut wird endlich."

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 246 *seq.*; 330 *seq.*

³ "Vom Ich," § 15, Anmerkung 2, Werke, I., 1, p. 204, footnote. (*Italics mine.*)

⁴ *Ibid.*, Anmerkung 3, p. 210².

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 3, Werke, I., 1, p. 168. The entire passage should be read to gain the full force of the statement.

Up to this point, no important difference has declared itself between Schelling's doctrine and that of Fichte. Yet even in this early work, so closely following the line of Kant's teaching, a contrast appears between Schelling and Fichte in their theories of the moral consciousness. Both teach that the ultimate reality is an absolute I, manifested in finite consciousnesses; but Fichte lays more stress than Schelling does on the individuality implied by the moral consciousness, and on the essentially moral nature of all self-consciousness. Thus, Fichte, starting from the facts of the moral consciousness, teaches that a man to find out what he *is* must reflect on what he *ought* — must, in other words, study his consciousness of obligation and its presuppositions. Schelling, on the other hand, leads up to the consciousness of obligation instead of beginning with it, teaching that a man derives his sense of obligation from his consciousness of unity with the absolute self. What to a finite self is the deepest formulation of the moral law is accordingly embodied by Schelling in the words, "Be absolute, be identical with thyself."¹ Thus, for Schelling, ethics is a deduction from metaphysics, whereas to Fichte, ethics is a prerequisite to all philosophy. "Give to a man," Schelling says, "the knowledge of what he is; he will soon learn what he ought to be."² Fichte would have stated the relation between doctrine and conduct in a different way. "Let a man but act as he ought," Fichte might have said, "and he will soon learn what he is."

II. SCHELLING'S DOCTRINE OF THE ABSOLUTE AS NATURE

Schelling's idealism, like Fichte's, consists in the doctrine of an unconditioned but impersonal I differentiating itself into limited selves and not-selves, particular I's and their

¹ "Vom Ich," § 13, p. 199¹.

² *Ibid.*, Preface to the first edition, Werke, I., 1, p. 157.

objects. But Schelling, as has just been indicated, was, from the first, far less interested than Fichte, in the experiences of the individual selves. It is not, then, unnatural that his early years at Jena should have been largely occupied with the formulation of a philosophy of external nature. There is no need of a special explanation of this tendency, for the later eighteenth century was alive with a fresh interest in nature. The prevalent Spinozism of the poets took the form of a pantheistic attitude toward nature; and the scientists were making constant discoveries and elaborating new and fascinating theories. In 1777, Lavoisier isolated the element oxygen; in 1790, Galvani discovered animal electricity; Erasmus Darwin, in his "*Zoonomia*," published in 1794, anticipated the evolution theory of Lamarck. Even the critics, the philosophers, and the poets had their share in scientific theorizing and in discovery. Winckelmann and Herder and Lessing applied the development theory in the domains of art, of history, and of literature; Kant anticipated Laplace's formulation of the nebular hypothesis; and Goethe, the universal genius, proposed his theory that the parts of the flower are metamorphosed leaves. Schelling's special interest, evidenced by every one of his writings upon nature-philosophy, in the phenomena of magnetism and of electricity and in the principle of development, has thus its root in the scientific interests and achievements of his age.

Every nature phenomenon, Schelling teaches, is a combination — in other words, a reconciliation — of opposing tendencies. These he names variously: sometimes he calls them the 'unifying' and the 'individualizing' tendencies; again, he names them the 'first,' or 'positive,' and the 'second,' or 'negative,' tendencies.¹ The positive, or unifying, tendency is, he says, concretely illustrated by gravitation, the force which attracts bodies towards each other;² it is

¹ "*Weltseele*," *Werke*, II., 1, pp. 381 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 364 and 366³.

abstractly exemplified by time, for the character of succeeding moments, as of events, is to determine each other — they are necessarily connected.¹ In a similar way, space is a manifestation of the individualizing tendency,² since spaces separate things and each object occupies its own space.³ The complete union of the two tendencies is exemplified by the organism, the spatial body which is yet temporally connected with preceding organisms.⁴

It would be unwise to follow, in detail, Schelling's countless variations on this theme. He traces the oppositions and the reconciliations of unifying and individualizing tendencies within the group of organic,⁵ as well as within that of inorganic, phenomena.⁶ In the group of the organic, sensibility to external influence is the unifying tendency, irritability is individualizing, and the reproductive impulse binds both tendencies together. But this and much more like it is, after all, analogy and symbolism, not reasoning. And one will vainly search the pages of "Weltseele," of "Ideen zur Philosophie der Natur," or of "Erster Entwurf," for any cogent argument. The upshot of Schelling's play upon scientific analogies seems to be this: every nature phenomenon is a one-of-many, a union of opposites. Back of the multiplicity of phenomena, therefore, there doubtless is one power, itself a one-of-many, which manifests itself in these diverse phenomena. "Since it is unquestionable," Schelling writes, "that in the living being there is a series (*Stufenfolge*) of functions, since nature opposed to the animal process irritability, to irritability sensibility, and so brought about an

¹ "Weltseele," Werke, II., 1, p. 368¹.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364³.

³ Schelling suggests light as concrete manifestation of the individualizing tendency (*Ibid.*, p. 368² seq.). He evidently uses the term, not in a literal, but in a vague, symbolic sense. As thus used, it is no real correlate to gravitation, the concrete manifestation of the unifying tendency.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 371³. "Der Lebensquell der allgemeinen . . . Natur ist daher die Copula zwischen der Schwere und dem Lichtwesen . . . Wo auch diese höhere Copula sich selbst bejaht im Einzelnen, da ist . . . Organismus."

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 493 seq.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 397 seq.

antagonism of forces which mutually balance each other in such wise that when one rises the other falls and *vice versa*. therefore one is led to the thought that all these functions are merely branches of one and the same power, and that the one nature principle, which we must assume as cause of life comes forward [in these lower forms] as its single appearances."¹ This ultimate One, in his books on nature philosophy, Schelling vaguely names 'Nature.' "Nature," he declares, is ". . . not mere appearance or revelation of the Eternal: rather [it is] itself the Eternal."²

III. SCHELLING'S DOCTRINE OF THE ABSOLUTE AS IDENTITY

The outcome of the phase of Schelling's teaching known as the nature philosophy is, as has just appeared, the doctrine that nature is the absolute reality. But Schelling never conceives of nature, after the manner of Descartes or of Hobbes, as ultimately 'material.' Rather, he regards nature as the progressively developing expression of the Absolute; and in this third period of his thinking, he argues deductively from the Absolute—now called Identity—to the nature-force or phenomenon, instead of reasoning inductively to the existence and character of the Absolute from the existence and character of natural phenomena. There are two accounts of Schelling's identity-philosophy. He is sometimes supposed to coördinate physical reality and consciousness as manifestations of a deeper reality, which is thus the 'identity' or 'indifference' of nature and self. Undoubtedly many passages, especially in the writings of 1795-1800, indicate that Schelling conceives of an 'absolute identity in which there is no duplicity and which

¹ "Weltseele," "Ueber den Ursprung des allgemeinen Organismus," IV., Werke, II., I, p. 564.

² "Verhältniss des Realen und Idealen in der Natur," Werke, II., I, 255.

. . . can never come to consciousness,"¹ and of physical phenomena as parallel with consciousness. But it is probably truer to the final form of Schelling's thought to emphasize his idealistic conception of the Absolute and his subordination of the physical to the conscious, of the object to the subject. "Absolute Identity," he says, "exists only under the form of knowing its identity with itself,"² and every part or expression of this Absolute Identity must partake of its nature.³ Now self-knowing is subject-objectivity. Accordingly, each of the stages — dynamic, organic, and vital — of the developing Absolute is a 'relative totality' within which less developed stages are distinguished as subjective and objective aspects.

The essentially idealistic character of this teaching, which differentiates it from Schelling's earlier nature philosophy, is accentuated by the main doctrine of his "System des transcendentalen Idealismus." The problem of this book is the explanation of the correspondence between knowledge and object. Knowledge, it is admitted, seems to imply the existence of reality external to mind: *sensation* is the consciousness of my limitation, and *perception* is the consciousness of nature-objects; *reflection* reveals me as causally affected by objects. Even in my *willing*, I am incited by somewhat more-than-myself, else my will is mere capriciousness (*Willkühr*).⁴ There is, Schelling teaches, but one solution to this problem of the relation of intelligence to objects. The object must be the product of a blind, unconscious activity, and yet this 'blind force' must be identical in nature with the intelligence which perceives objects and is seem

¹ "System des transcendentalen Idealismus" (1800), IV., Werke, III 1., p. 600.

² "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801)," § 19, Werke, V. Schelling characterizes this work as the first statement of his system as whole. Cf. Kuno Fischer, *op. cit.*, VI., p. 770 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 39, 40.

⁴ "System des transcendentalen Idealismus," III., Hauptabschnitt Epoche I.-III., and Hauptabschnitt IV.

ingly limited by them. "How the objective world accommodates itself to ideas in us, and ideas in us to the objective world, is incomprehensible unless . . . the activity by which the objective world is created is originally identical with that which is manifested in willing; and *vice versa*." ¹

The criticisms upon this identity-doctrine, the most characteristic contribution of Schelling to philosophy, must be summarized very briefly. In the first place, Schelling does not really prove, but rather asserts, the existence of an Absolute. Second, he seldom offers a philosophical demonstration of development within (or of) the Absolute, usually accepting the ultimate reality of evolution on the basis of empirical observation and of merely scientific inference. Furthermore, his argument for development, when he frames it, is based upon his conception of the Absolute as self-knowing, or subject-objectivity, coupled with his (unargued) conviction that each part or stage of reality must be like the whole. But this assumption of the self-knowing, or self-conscious, nature of the Absolute is in flat opposition to Schelling's constant teaching that the Absolute is originally impersonal and comes only gradually to consciousness. For such a conception of the Absolute as impersonal reduces either to that of an unconscious Absolute — a hypothesis forbidden, as has appeared, by Schelling's argument for development — or to the no longer absolutist conception of a mere sum of finite consciousnesses.² The fundamental criticism of Schelling's system is, thus, that his conception of the Absolute as originally impersonal really invalidates his own argument, besides bringing back what Schelling as well as Fichte thought he had forever banished from philosophy, a thing-in-itself.

¹ "System des transcendentalen Idealismus," Einleitung, § 3, C. Werke, II.

² For criticism of this view (which, however, Schelling did not hold), cf. comment on Fichte, p. 329, *supra*.

With the first decade of the nineteenth century the most important periods of Schelling's philosophy end. From this time onward, his writings are so desultory, often so eclectic in their teaching, and in the end so mystical, that they have been reckoned among the works of German literature rather than as products of strictly metaphysical thought. German philosophy and German literature have indeed always stood to each other in a peculiarly direct and vital relation: many of the German poets, notably Lessing and Schiller, have been, in a way, philosophers also; and Schelling, in his later life, is most often looked upon as a philosopher turned poet—a representative rather of romanticism in literature than of idealism in philosophy. The writer of this book more and more inclines to the view that this charge is unjust. Certainly Schelling himself protested vehemently when he was accused by Hegel of *Schwärmerei*, and he stoutly defended against Jacobi the advantages of reasoned thought. To be sure, the reader of the "Denkmal gegen Jacobi" feels that Schelling is more concerned to defend reasoning in general than to offer any rigorously reasoned argument for his own conclusions. But these conclusions, different as they seem at first reading from the outcome of the identity philosophy, are at bottom grounded in the same principle. Schelling's later teaching is in brief the following: he conceives what he names the Absolute as personal God; but he teaches that God has developed, in time, from the pre-personal to the higher, personal phase. In such a doctrine, it is evident, personality is still a subordinate category; the Absolute, even if it be called God, or Reason, so long as it has not come to self-consciousness is an unknown reality manifested in the personal, but not itself essentially and completely personal.¹

¹ On the interpretation of Schelling, cf. throughout Volume VI., Kunc Fischer's "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie."

C. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER

Schopenhauer's philosophy, like Fichte's and Schelling's, is closely related to the teachings of Spinoza and of Kant, though it must be added that Schopenhauer does not himself recognize the affiliation to Spinoza. Like Hegel, he conceives the ultimate reality as an absolute self — though he never uses, and even repudiates, this term.¹ His great advance upon Fichte and Schelling consists in his implicit recognition of the personality of the absolute self. But because he inadequately conceives this personality, tending constantly, indeed, to identify it with impersonal force, and because he fails to demonstrate its absoluteness, he falls short of an idealistic monism; the conception of an absolute and personal self, whose conscious activity is self-limitation. Because Schopenhauer does not fully grasp this conception, his philosophy is properly studied before that of Hegel, though Schopenhauer, born in 1788, is eighteen years Hegel's junior, and though he died in 1860, nearly thirty years after Hegel's death. Yet this order of study does little violence to chronology, for Schopenhauer's philosophic genius, like Schelling's, blossomed early, whereas Hegel's books were published relatively late in his life. Schopenhauer's first work, his doctor thesis, the brilliant "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," was published in 1813, only a year after the first volume of Hegel's "Logic"; yet it contains all the essential features of Schopenhauer's system. The complete exposition of the system, the first volume of "The World as Will and Idea," followed in 1818, only a year later than the first edition of Hegel's "Encyclopedia," and two years after the second volume of Hegel's "Logic."

The pitiful story of Arthur Schopenhauer's life — of the

¹ "Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde" — ("On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," cited as "Fourfold Root"), § 20.

boyhood of travel, the brief period of mercantile pursuits, the petty squabbles with his mother, the envious scorn of academic philosophy, the vain struggle for professional recognition, the long, lonely middle age filled with trivial interests and deep-dyed with lonely cynicism — all this belongs, in its details, to literary biography rather than to metaphysical discussion. Yet the combined influences of disposition and environment are evident in the pessimism of his system; and his cosmopolitan training — in particular, his study of English — had a marked effect on the form of his metaphysical works. The lucidity and brilliancy of Schopenhauer's style make it utterly unlike that of any other German philosopher of the period. The reader is, indeed, almost inclined to sympathize with Schopenhauer's fretful remark that he failed of an 'academic hearing because the German public did not believe that sound metaphysics could be expressed in unambiguous terms. Oliver Herford's famous rhyme is, therefore, singularly unjust to Schopenhauer. It applies fairly well to other German philosophers, but the metaphysically minded goose-girl could hardly have failed to comprehend "What Schopenhauer's driving at." The succeeding summary of Schopenhauer's teaching mainly follows the order of "The World as Will and Idea," but takes into account also the doctrine of the "Fourfold Root."

I. THE TEACHING OF SCHOPENHAUER

a. The world of phenomena: 'the world as idea'

"The world," so Schopenhauer begins, "is my idea."¹ In other words, like Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Schopenhauer fully accepts the results of Berkeley's idealism, though,

¹ "Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung." — "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," § 1. (Cited, after this, by the title of the English translation, "The World as Will and Idea.") Cf. "Fourfold Root," § 21. References in both cases are ordinarily to sections and their paragraphs. The student may well

unlike them, he explicitly credits Berkeley with the doctrine. "One knows no sun," Schopenhauer continues, in the passage just cited, "and no earth, but always only an eye which sees a sun, a hand which feels the earth." In other words, "every object is object only in relation to the subject":¹ so-called external things are, after all, facts of consciousness. With great skill, Schopenhauer next proceeds to analyze these objects of knowledge. Such an object consists, he points out, of sensations, ordered by underived and *a priori* forms of thought. This, of course, is Kant's doctrine. But Schopenhauer maintains that these forms are not — as Kant had taught — of four distinct sorts.² Rather, there is but one form, or principle of unity. This is the "principle of sufficient reason"; it consists in the necessary relation of every imaginable object or event to every other: every object or event, in other words, determines and is also determined by every other.³ "By virtue of this relation," Schopenhauer says, "nothing can become object for us which exists for itself and is independent, nothing which is single and detached."

The relatedness of phenomena is thus, Schopenhauer rightly teaches, the fundamental category. There are, however, several sorts of relatedness: time and space, causality, and two other categories, which — as will immediately appear — Schopenhauer incorrectly includes with these. His discussion of these forms of unity is brilliant and suggestive, especially in its criticism of Kant, yet it is both inadequate and positively defective. It makes only incidental reference to the relations of comparison — identity, difference, and

read both works entire. He should not fail to read Bk. I., §§ 1-4; Bk. II., §§ 17-23, 27, 29; Bk. IV., §§ 53-54, 56-58, 61, 66-68, 71, of "The World as Will and Idea."

¹ "Fourfold Root," § 41.

² Cf. Appendix, pp. 527, 554.

³ "The World as Will and Idea," § 2².

⁴ "Fourfold Root," § 16¹.

the like; it denies the close likeness of time and causality; it counts motivation as a distinct category, instead of describing it as causal connection of psychic facts; it denies reciprocal relation, though definitely recognizing one form of it, the spatial; finally, it includes among these categories the *causa cognoscendi*, or ground of knowledge, a manifest confusion of epistemology with metaphysics.¹

But the object, constituted as it is by our sensations and by our forms of thought, has empirical, but not ultimate, reality. Rather, as Kant had taught, it is mere appearance, and absolute reality must be elsewhere sought. In the words of Schopenhauer: "The whole objective world is and remains idea . . . in fact, a series of ideas whose common bond is the law of sufficient reason."² And since ultimate reality is not to be found in objects, clearly it must be sought in the subject, or self. It is evident, as Kant had argued, that the forms of knowing, ways of unifying, presuppose and require the existence of a knowing subject, a permanent reality underlying the succession of phenomena. Herein, then, we are likely to find ultimate reality. But a difficulty at once presents itself. This subject, as knower, is not — so, in common with Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Schopenhauer teaches — itself known. He defines it as "that which knows all and is known of none," and says distinctly, "We never know it, but it is precisely that which knows."³ This inability to know the subject follows from the alleged impossibility that the one knower should be both subject and object. "There is no such thing," he says, "as a knowing of knowing; for to that end, it would be necessary that the subject should separate itself from knowing, and yet at the same time should know the knowing — which is impossible."⁴

¹ On all these points, cf. Chapter 7, pp. 204 *seq.*; Chapter 10, pp. 369 *seq.*; and Appendix, p. 554.

² "The World as Will and Idea," § 5¹; Translation, I., p. 18 (Werke, II., p. 17).

³ *Ibid.*, § 2¹.

⁴ "Fourfold Root," Chapter 7, § 41³.

It would seem as if Schopenhauer were irrevocably committed by these words to the doctrine that self-consciousness is impossible and that ultimate reality is, therefore, unapproachable. But Schopenhauer was a discriminating observer of his own experience, and he entertained — along with the reasoned conviction that the knower cannot, in strict logic, be known — the immediate certainty that every self knows itself. "We have," he says, "an inner knowledge of self. But every case of knowledge, by its very nature, presupposes a known and a knower. Hence that which is known in us is, as such, not the knowing but the willing self."¹ In truth, Schopenhauer urges, this willing self always is the object of our introspection. "The concept, will," he says, "comes from the innermost part, from the most immediate consciousness of every man. Herein a man knows and at the same time is himself, his own individuality . . . immediately, without any form even that of subject, for here the knower and the known merge into each other."² In this known self, as will, it is at last, then, possible that we may find ultimate reality.

*b. The will as ultimate reality: 'the world as will'*³

Schopenhauer has up to this point argued that there exist (1) external objects which are phenomena, that is, objects of consciousness, and (2) an individual self which knows these objects, and which also knows itself — but knows itself as will, not as knower. He now advances to the Spinozistic position, that the individual is but the manifestation, the partial expression, of an underlying One;⁴ and he interprets this one rea

¹ "Fourfold Root," § 42. This summary of Schopenhauer's system here follows the order, not of "The World as Will and Idea," but of the 'Fourfold Root.'

² "The World as Will and Idea," Translation, I., p. 145, § 22 (Werke, II., 133).

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. II., § 17 *seq.*

⁴ Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Schopenhauer is not well acquainted with Spinoza's doctrine; and is out of sympathy with it, as he understands it.

as will. "The thing-in-itself," he exclaims, "is the will."¹ And the will, he teaches, is without ground and is "free from plurality, though its manifestations in space and time are innumerable."² "As a magic lantern shows many and manifold pictures," Schopenhauer continues, "but there is only one and the same flame which makes them all visible; so, in all the manifold phenomena which, side by side, fill the world, or, one after another, as events, crowd each other off the stage, the one will is that which manifests itself. Phenomena and events are the visibleness and objectivity of the one will which remains unmoved in the change: it alone is thing-in-itself; every object is appearance."³

1. *Schopenhauer's argument for the doctrine that ultimate reality is of the nature of will*

The argument by which Schopenhauer reaches this significant result is curiously indirect. I come to the knowledge of my willing self, he teaches, through consciousness of my body. I am no 'winged cherub-face without a body';⁴ and, indeed, each of my volitions is accompanied by, and, in part, consists, Schopenhauer says, of a movement of my body. This invariable coincidence of volition and bodily movement must indicate, he teaches, that my body is a manifestation of will. But my body is not an isolated phenomenon. As already shown, it is closely interrelated with other objects, it is a part of a continuous organic process; it is, indeed, more or less closely related with every physical object. If, then, my body is an expression of will, so also must all these related bodies be expressions of will. "The whole body, . . . before also the process through and in which it consists is nothing other than phenomenon of the will, the becoming

Schopenhauer's doctrine of the one, ultimate reality is none the less allied to Spinoza's, and was doubtless indirectly affected by it.

¹ "The World as Will and Idea," § 21, Translation, I., p. 142 (Werke, II., p. 131). ² *Ibid.*, § 23¹.

³ *Ibid.*, § 28¹. ⁴ *Ibid.*, § 18, Translation, I., p. 129 (Werke, II., p. 118).

visible, the objectivity of the will.”¹ And yet these bodies external to mine are surely not expressions of my individual will: there must exist, then, the absolute will, manifesting itself in all nature phenomena and in all finite selves.

The doctrine for which Schopenhauer presents the argument outlined in the preceding paragraph forms the basis of his system, and the argument, therefore, demands careful criticism. He has to prove (1) that every object is a manifestation of will, and (2) that the will expressed in external phenomena is absolute. As has just been indicated, he leads to the first of these conclusions by the following steps: (*a*) the psychologically accurate recognition of the correspondence between volition and bodily movement, and (*b*) the inference that external objects, because closely related with my body, must, like my body, themselves be forms of will. But (*a*) the correspondence of volition and movement cannot prove that movement is identical with volition. And, similarly, (*b*) the interconnection of human body and external object cannot demonstrate the identity of their nature: the argument has, at best, but the force of an analogy. It is curious that Schopenhauer should lay such stress on an argument so weak throughout, for he has really no need of it. He has shown that every object is a fact-for-self, an object within experience. If then, as he asserts on the ground of introspection, the self is in its inmost nature will, it follows at once, without intermediate proof, that all objects, inorganic and organic, are manifestations of will.

2. Schopenhauer's assumption that ultimate reality is a single One

There remains the second teaching of Schopenhauer about ultimate reality. He has argued that it is of the nature of will: he has now to show that this will is one and unconditioned, in other words, that one absolute will, not count-

¹ “The World as Will and Idea,” § 20³, Translation, I., p. 140 (Werke, II., p. 129).

less coördinate wills, forms the reality behind phenomena. But it is fair to say that he never definitely proves the absoluteness of the will; he rather takes it for granted. That it is, however, possible to prove the necessity of a single all-including One, behind all the single individuals, Kant had suggested, Fichte and Schelling had explicitly taught, and Hegel was yet to demonstrate. But though he did not prove it, Schopenhauer certainly believed that a single, absolute will expresses itself in all phenomena. "The force," he exclaims, "which vegetates in the plant, even the force through which the crystal expands, the force with which the magnet turns to the pole . . . yes, even gravity which so powerfully strives in all matter, attracting the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun — these all . . . [are identical with that which] . . . is called will. . . . It is the innermost nature, the kernel of every individual and of the whole; it appears in every blindly working nature force, it appears, also, in the reflective activity of man, for the great diversity of these two is only in the degree of the manifestation, not in the essential nature of that which manifests itself."¹

All these illustrations of nature forces as expressions of the ultimate reality must not obscure the fact that Schopenhauer conceives these forces as forms of conscious will and that, contrariwise, he does not conceive the will after Schelling's fashion, as a function of unconscious nature force. "Before this," Schopenhauer says, "people have subsumed the concept of will under the concept of force. I do just the contrary, and would have every force in nature thought as will. This is not to be regarded as an indifferent strife of words: it is rather of the highest worth and significance. For the concept 'force' is . . . in the end based upon and exhausted by the perceptual knowledge of the objective world, that is, by the phenomenal. The concept 'force'

¹ "The World as Will and Idea," § 21.

is abstracted from the domain in which cause and effect rule, and means precisely the causality of the cause at the point where it is no longer ætiologically explicable. . . . The concept 'will' on the other hand, is the only one . . . whose source is not in the phenomenal, in the purely perceptual, but in . . . the most immediate consciousness of every man."¹ It is true that in discussing detailed topics of his nature philosophy, Schopenhauer appears, often, to lose sight of his own warning and to conceive of conscious will as a function of the 'blind, inexorable pressure (*blinder, unaufhaltsamer Drang*)' of unconscious nature.² We have a right, however, to hold him to his express assertion and to state his doctrine as the conception of an absolute, conscious will, manifested in individual human wills and in external nature.

3. *Schopenhauer's conception of the will as unsatisfied desire: the ethics of Schopenhauer*

Schopenhauer's statement that the self is essentially will has, so far, been accepted without close analysis of the conception involved. The time has come to inquire more precisely what he means by will. Fichte's doctrine of the will has especially concerned itself with the moral will; Schopenhauer, closely following Schelling, interprets the will as an inexplicable, inarticulate activity — a striving, a yearning. Fichte has looked upon the progressive change of ideals, the ceaseless adoption of a fresh end when a primary end has been attained, as a mark of the alliance of the finite with the infinite, an indication that the finite must ever burst the bonds of finitude. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, lays stress on the unattainableness of any completely satisfying aim, and conceives the will as a striving for the unattainable. "The striving," he says, "of all the manifestations of will

¹ "The World as Will and Idea," § 22, Translation, I., pp. 144-45; Werke, I., p. 133. Cf. Werke, II., p. 362 and Translation II., p. 405.

² *Ibid.*, § 54¹. This is the conventional interpretation of Schopenhauer.

. . . must ever be repressed, can never be filled or satisfied. Every goal attained is merely the starting-point of a new race; and so on to infinity.”¹ From the fact of this ceaselessly unsatisfied activity in all the individual manifestations of the infinite will, there follows the struggle which we see in nature all about us. “Everywhere in nature we see combat, struggle and varying fortune of war. . . . The universal struggle is most readily seen in the animal world which lives on the vegetable world, and in which every animal becomes the prey of another. . . . Thus the will to live forever devours itself.”²

This one-sided conception of the will — interpreted always in terms of the lowest, most primitive, activity of self-consciousness — forms the basis of the two main applications made by Schopenhauer of his metaphysical teaching: his pessimism, and his practical ethical doctrine. The pessimism is an obvious corollary of the metaphysics: granted that ultimate reality is will, and that will is nothing more nor less than unsatisfied desire, it follows, of necessity, that the world is “the worst possible,”³ and that “all life is misery. . . . The basis of all willing,” Schopenhauer says, “is need, lack, therefore pain. . . . Yet if one have no object of will, one is assailed by frightful emptiness. . . . Life, therefore, vibrates between pain and ennui.”⁴ Thus, philosophical reasoning substantiates the results of empirical observation: “Pleasure is always negative; only pain is immediately given;”⁵ and “the life of almost every man is simply a constant struggle for life, with a certainty of losing it in the end.”⁶

On this pessimistic theory of the universe Schopenhauer builds up his ethics — a system strangely opposed, on its negative side, to the theories of Fichte and of Kant. In sharp

¹ “The World as Will and Idea,” § 29³, Translation, I., p. 214 (Werke, II., p. 195²).

² *Ibid.*, § 27, Translation, I., pp. 191-192 (Werke, II., pp. 174-175).

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. IV., § 56, end.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 57².

⁵ *Ibid.*, § 58¹.

⁶ *Ibid.*, § 57³, Translation, I., p. 403 (Werke, II., p. 368).

contrast with their emphasis upon the fact of obligation, Schopenhauer insists that there is no such thing as 'unconditioned obligation.' To call the will free and none the less to prescribe laws for it is pure contradiction, he asserts. 'Ought to will — wooden iron!' he exclaims, contemptuously.¹ This part of the ethics of Schopenhauer need not, however, detain us, for it is at once evident that his treatment of freedom and of obligation is too slight to be effective. Thus, he does not attempt to account for the fact that though obligation be illusion, men none the less do sometimes feel that they 'ought,' nor does he analyze and discuss the important conceptions of freedom.² But the denial of freedom is merely the introduction to the more important positive teaching of Schopenhauer's ethics. This follows, as has been said, from his pessimism, and comprises first, a doctrine of virtue as self-renunciation and of sin as selfishness, and second, a conception of man's highest aim as denial of the will to live.

(1) The world — so Schopenhauer, as we know, teaches — is inevitably wretched. The source of the wretchedness is this: that every individual realizes himself as one with the Infinite, that each therefore asserts himself as 'centre of the world,' and that thus each "wills everything for himself."³ Such self-assertion must become denial of the rights of others, and so there results the struggle of humanity. The good man is he who, rightly tracing the world's misery to its source, no longer says, I partake of the Infinite and so all is mine, but rather, These others also are expressions of the Infinite and are thus of one nature with me. Thus, the good man "makes a less than ordinary difference between himself and others . . ., recognizes himself, his very self, his will, in every being . . ., therefore also in him who suffers."⁴

¹ "The World as Will and Idea," § 53, Translation, I., p. 351 (Werke, II., p. 321).

² In particular, Schopenhauer does not discuss the view that freedom is expression of an individual as opposed, not to the Infinite, but to other human selves.

³ *Ibid.*, § 61².

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 66, Translation, I., pp. 480, 482 (Werke, II., pp. 439, 441).

The good man realizes that the happiness or the life of a multitude of human beings overweighs his own individual interest. And he will therefore "sacrifice his own well-being and his life for the good of . . . others. So died Codrus," Schopenhauer exclaims, "so died Leonidas, Regulus, Decius Mus, Arnold von Winkelried — so dies every man who freely and consciously goes to certain death for his friends and for his fatherland."¹

In its highest form, self-abnegation becomes pure denial of the will to live, the renunciation of one's individuality as a thing of unreality. Schopenhauer's words are the best exposition of this culminating doctrine: "As we saw that hate and evil are conditioned by egoism, and that this rests on the capture of knowledge by the principle of individuation, so we discovered as the source and the essence of righteousness . . . that penetration of this principle of individuation which annihilates the difference between myself and the foreign self. . . . If now this penetration of the individuality, this immediate knowledge of the identity of will in all its manifestations, is present to a high degree of definiteness, it will . . . show a still wider influence on the will. If . . . a man no longer makes the egoistic distinction between his own person and that of another . . . then he knows the whole, comprehends its essential nature, and finds it to consist in constant passing away (*Vergehen*), in futile striving, in inner contradiction, and in persisting sorrow; he sees, wherever he looks, suffering humanity, the suffering animal creation, a vanishing world. But all this is as close to him as only his own person is close to the egoist. How should he, then, with such a knowledge of the world affirm such a life as this by repeated acts of will? . . . Rather, this knowledge of the whole, of the essence of reality, becomes the quietus of each and every act of will. The will turns from life. . . . The man attains a condition of freely willed renunciation, of

¹ "The World as Will and Idea," § 67¹.

resignation, of true indifference, of entire will-less-ness.”¹ Asceticism and poverty are the outward marks of this annihilation of the will; the absorption of Christian mystics and of Oriental religionists are its extreme forms; inner peace and true heaven’s rest are its accompaniments. In such a state, “there is manifested to us, in place of the constant change from wish to fear and from joy to sorrow, in place of never satisfied and never dying hope, . . . that peace which is higher than all reason — that perfect ocean stillness of the mind. . . . Knowledge alone is left,” Schopenhauer concludes, “will is vanished. . . . For all those who are still pervaded by will, what remains,” he admits in the final sentence of the book, “is Nothing. But . . . for those in whom the will has turned upon and negated itself, to them this very real world of ours, with all its suns and milky ways — is Nothing.”

II. ESTIMATE OF SCHOPENHAUER’S TEACHING

The preceding summary has briefly outlined Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system and its most important applications, omitting only his curiously parenthetical discussion of æsthetics. This discussion, in itself of the greatest merit, cannot make good its claim to an inherent connection with Schopenhauer’s strictly philosophical doctrine.² The most important difficulties of the system must next be enumerated. They fall into two main groups.

a. The inadequacy of Schopenhauer’s conception of the will

In the first place, as has been suggested, Schopenhauer misconceives the nature of the will. The dissatisfied yearning, unattained striving, to which he constantly gives the name ‘will,’ is mere wish or desire, not active, self-assertive will.

¹ “The World as Will and Idea,” § 68, paragraphs 2-3, Translation, I., pp. 488 *seq.*; Werke, I., 447 *seq.*

² Cf. Appendix, p. 554.

This follows from the testimony of self-consciousness, whose authority Schopenhauer must admit, since upon it he rests his doctrine that ultimate reality is identical with will. "To the reality-in-itself," he says, "[underlying] the world of idea, we can attain only by . . . taking into account self-consciousness (*mittelst Hinzuziehung des Selbstbewusstseins*), which testifies to the will as the in-itself of our idea (*Erscheinung*)."¹ But the will to which self-consciousness testifies certainly is not identical with blind yearning. At most, it only includes this unsatisfied desire as one of its elements; its essential character is rather the affirming, espousing, domineering assertion of itself. Schopenhauer tacitly admits this in the teaching that the highest act of consciousness is 'freely willed renunciation (*freiwillige Entsagung*).'² It is true, he calls this freely willed renunciation 'will-less-ness'; but in so doing he obviously implies what he verbally denies. For that which is freely renounced is desire, or yearning, not will; and the renunciation is the assertion of a self deeper than all objects of desire — is, in other words, what Schopenhauer virtually calls it, free will. There is, furthermore, another reason for rejecting Schopenhauer's conception of will, as an account of ultimate reality. Even granting (what has just been shown to be contrary to experience) that the individual will consists of unsatisfied yearning, it is certain that no absolute reality can thus be defined. For the Absolute is precisely the complete, the all-including; it cannot then be, in its essence, unfulfilled desire.

The rejection of Schopenhauer's conception of the will overthrows those parts of his system which are built upon it. The first of these is the pessimistic estimate, already summarized, of the universe. This is the part of his teaching by which he is best known; but the common estimate of him as mere prophet of pessimism is both unfortunate and

¹ "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy," Translation, II., p. 31 (*Werke*, II., p. 517).

² For the context, cf. *supra*, p. 354.

unjust. Brilliant and appealing as his pessimism is, it is after all only an offshoot from his metaphysical doctrine, and is not to be compared, in strength of argument or in keenness of analysis, with the idealistic philosophy on which it is based. Its immediate foundation is, as has been shown, the conviction that ultimate reality is ceaseless yearning. From this premise it would certainly follow that all life must be misery. But with the refutation of this doctrine — that absolute reality, or will, is unfulfilled desire — the necessity of universal wretchedness falls away. The actual, empirically observed existence of wretchedness and sorrow is, of course, still to be reckoned with; and the abiding value of Schopenhauer's pessimism is the relentlessness with which he insists upon the grim facts of misery and anguish. In these unquestioned facts, and not in any metaphysical necessity of unhappiness, the problem of pessimism is to be found. It is Schopenhauer's merit to have forced it upon the attention of idealistic philosophers.

With the doctrine of the necessity of misery vanishes, also, Schopenhauer's positive ethical theory. For that consists, as has been shown, in the teaching that pity is the only duty. With the certainty that the human being is more than a long drawn out desire, comes the need of a wider formulation of one's duty toward him. The groundwork of a doctrine of sin and of virtue has, however, been laid by Schopenhauer, in spite of the defects of his moral system. His diagnosis of sin as narrow and self-centred individualism, his description of virtue as the progressive realization of one's unity with the lives of other human beings, form the core of an idealistic doctrine of the content of the moral consciousness.

It should be added that the persisting part of Schopenhauer's doctrine is, to all appearance, its pessimism. In the hands of one of his disciples, von Hartmann, Schopenhauer's teaching of the unappeasable nature-will becomes, indeed, a non-idealistic doctrine,¹ and another adherent, Nietzsche,

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 557.

builds on a pessimism like Schopenhauer's an ethical system utterly opposed to his — a theory which condemns pity and enjoins egoism.¹

b. The inadequacy of Schopenhauer's conception of the ultimate reality as pure will

A second fundamental objection must now be made to Schopenhauer's metaphysical teaching: not only is his conception of will at fault, but his doctrine that one is conscious of oneself as willing only, not as knowing, is untrue to introspection. That self whom we intimately know is indeed will but is more than will. The support of this assertion is that appeal on which, as has appeared, Schopenhauer himself bases all his teaching, to the self-consciousness of the individual. Surely each one of us is conscious of himself, not only in his active attitudes of asserting his own individuality in opposition to other selves or things, or in actively identifying himself with the interests of others, or even in impotently yearning and desiring: one is conscious of oneself, also, a thinking and perceiving. The thought and the perception it is true, ally the one individual with others, but they are not the less integral parts of one's single, individual self.

The only objection urged by Schopenhauer to this simple deliverance of self-consciousness is the logical contradiction which is, supposedly, involved in the doctrine that a self knows itself.² This is identified with the doctrine that the subject and the object of knowledge are one — a statement which is then branded as a sheer contradiction. To this it may be replied that the very definition of knowledge as relation of a subject to an object, is an attempt to describe the immediately certain consciousness of self. No argument drawn from the nature of this description can possibly, therefore, impugn the reality of the experience which the description is to render into words. Moreover, the antithesis between

¹ Cf. Appendix, p. 555, note.

² Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, pp. 244² *seq.*; and this chapter, p. 346.

subject and object (the root of the difficulty in conceiving of the self as knower of the knower) is plainly due to the fact that this definition of knowledge has reference primarily to knowledge of external things, not to knowledge of the self. In being conscious of a phenomenal fact, the subject (or knowing self) certainly does know an object different from a self. This, however, does not argue against the existence of another sort of knowledge, in which there is no recognition either of subject or of object — in which, rather, subject and object coalesce in the experience of my consciousness of myself, as knowing and thinking, feeling and willing.¹

To sum up the important points in this estimate of Schopenhauer: he rightly teaches that ultimate reality is an absolute self, though he does not offer the demonstration ready to his hand, of the absoluteness of this self. He unduly limits this absolute self by affirming that its nature is will without knowledge; and he virtually annihilates the absoluteness of the ultimate will by the reiterated teaching that will is mere unattaining struggle. None the less, he distinctly conceives of ultimate reality as absolute person. His doctrine may therefore be classed as complete, though not as wholly adequate, monistic idealism. At all events, in its essential features, it is close to Hegel's philosophy, though so utterly unlike it in form. Schopenhauer, it must be admitted, would most indignantly have repelled this aspersion, for Hegel's system seemed to him, as to so many others, a mere broth of unintelligible and pretentious terms. Yet the distance from Schopenhauer to Hegel is short and easily bridged.

¹ The doctrine, that the self is fundamentally will, did not die with Fichte and Schopenhauer, but has been more than once revived. A brilliant modern form of the doctrine is held by Professor Münsterberg. In the opinion of the present writer, Münsterberg really inflates the conception of will beyond its natural extent, making it virtually synonymous with self, and thus inclusive of perception and thought. A similar comment may be made on modern doctrines of 'voluntarism' in psychology. All these doctrines are based upon the true insight that the will is principle of individuality, uniqueness.

CHAPTER X

MONISTIC SPIRITUALISM: THE SYSTEM OF HEGEL

" . . . The greatest master of abstract thought that the world has seen since . . . Aristotle died. . . . No one else has so much to tell the searcher after truth who will make the effort to grasp what he has to say." — R. B. HALDANE.

THE writings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are curiously parallel, in their unhurried reasoning to great conclusions, to his own slow progress from obscurity to brilliant success; and in their curious union of rationalism with mystical insight, to the union, in his own character, of prudence with good fellowship. His teaching closely connects itself with that of his contemporaries. With Fichte and Schelling he has much in common—with the former, in particular, his 'dialectic method,' and with the second his Spinozistic monism. The difference between Hegel's system and these others is, however, more significant than the likeness. Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer all deny the existence of any reality save that of self, yet each falls short of the completely monistic and adequate conception of absolute self. Fichte and Schelling assert that the self-conscious being is of necessity limited, and that the Absolute because unlimited may not be self or spirit; Schopenhauer admits the self-consciousness of the ultimate reality, but does not adequately conceive this consciousness. The characteristic which distinguishes Hegel from preceding idealists is the uncompromising doctrine that there exists an absolute self, and that every finite reality is an expression of this all-comprehending self. The first section of this chapter is occupied with the attempt to state very clearly the argument by which Hegel seeks to prove the existence of this inclusive

self. The clearest and fullest formulation of this argument is found in the most severely reasoned of Hegel's metaphysical works, the "Logik" (1812-1816), and in the first part of the greatly abbreviated restatement of his philosophy which Hegel called the "Encyclopädie." On the larger "Logic," therefore, and on the "Logic of the Encyclopædia," this chapter is based. The less adequate and less well-proportioned argument of the first part of Hegel's earliest book, the "Phänomenologie," has been mainly disregarded; and Hegel's other works are referred to chiefly as applications of the doctrine of the "Logic," and only occasionally for support of its arguments. Hegel's arbitrary use of current philosophical terms, his high-handed appropriation of common words, by a change of their ordinary meaning, to philosophical purposes; his inordinate love of paradoxical statements, and his over-regard for systematic arrangement and for repeated formulæ make his "Logics" harder reading (if that is possible) than Kant's "Kritik" itself. But, however obscured by schematic arrangements or encrusted in words, Hegel's essential argument, expressed and implied, for monistic spiritualism is profoundly significant and — in the opinion of the writer of this book — convincing.¹

¹ In substance, the remainder of this chapter closely resembles a paper by the writer, on "The Order of the Hegelian Categories in the Hegelian Argument," published in *Mind*, XII., N.S., 1903. Certain paragraphs and sentences, p. 384, are, in fact, exact quotations. I have, however, changed my account of the categories of Life and Cognition, largely because of the criticism of my colleague, Professor Mary S. Case; and the chapter is throughout less polemical and less technical than the paper in *Mind*. It should be added that in both expositions I diverge widely from Hegel's own order of thought. In so doing I doubtless often obscure or even reverse Hegel's characteristic method. I believe that these liberties with Hegel's text are desirable, in the interest of clearness, for a preliminary outline of his doctrine. But certainly this departure from Hegel's method makes it impossible for the student to regard this chapter as a substitute for the text; especially since the "Logic" undertakes to discuss many subjects which are not here considered. The beginner in philosophy is warned, however, that Hegel's "Logic" and "Phenomenology" demand, if ever works demanded, to be read with a teacher.

This argument has two main parts, one negative and the other positive. In the first place, Hegel refutes those theories, Kant's and Schelling's, which would make the search for ultimate reality futile. In the second place, he argues for his positive conception of the all-of-reality as absolute spirit or self. The outline of his argument will be more readily followed, if it is preceded by a brief summary of its important steps. This summary will serve, also, by its references to Hegel's text, to indicate his curious fashion of repeating an argument already set forth.

- I. (Introduction.) Metaphysics is possible, for
 - a. Ultimate Reality is not undetermined. (Bk. I., "Being and Naught.")
 - b. Ultimate Reality is not unknowable. (Bk. II., "Essence and Appearance," and parallel categories.)
- II. Ultimate Reality is Absolute One, for
 - a. Ultimate Reality is not a limited, single reality; for every such single reality is
 - (1) (a) Same and other. (Bk. I., "Determined Being;" Bk. II., "Identity and Difference.")
 - (b) Like and unlike. (Bk. II., "Likeness and Unlikeness;" Bk. III., "Notion and Judgment.")
 - (2) Dependent on others. (Bk. II., "Causality.")
 - b. Ultimate Reality is not a composite of ultimate parts. (Bk. II., "Finitude and Infinity" and "Being-for-self;" Bk. II., "Action and Reaction;" Bk. III., "Mechanism.")
- III. Ultimate Reality is Absolute Spirit, for
 - a. Ultimate Reality is not mere Life. (Bk. III., "Life.")
 - b. Ultimate Reality is not "Finite Consciousness." (Bk. III., "Cognition.")

This Hegelian argument must now be considered step by step.¹

I. ULTIMATE REALITY IS NEITHER UNDETERMINED NOR UNKNOWABLE

Two forms of the doctrine which makes metaphysics impossible were well known to Hegel. According to the first of these, reality in its 'realest,' its most ultimate, form must be undetermined; that is to say, no predicate may be applied to it. A partial reality has attributes: it may be round or square, blue or red, soft or hard, pleasant or unpleasant, familiar or unfamiliar, psychical or physical. But ultimate reality has no one of these predicates, nor indeed, according to this view, any other predicate. For ultimate reality, it is urged, is the all-of-reality, in other words, unlimited reality; and every predicate applied to reality must limit it. For example, if a thing is visible, it cannot be invisible; if it is square, it cannot be round: in other words every predicate, which anything has, prevents its having the opposite predicate. Evidently, then, since ultimate reality is—it is held—unlimited, it must be without predicates (determinations); it must be what Schelling called it, an 'indifference,' or, as Hegel names it, 'pure being,' not a being of any particular definable sort or kind. And, as such, it is obviously unknowable, since as known it would not be utterly unlimited, but would be limited at least by that one predicate or determination, 'known.'

Against the doctrine, just summarized, that ultimate reality is absolutely undetermined, Hegel offers the following argument: Such 'pure,' that is, entirely undetermined, being is not reality at all: it is nothing. "There is nothing perceivable in it . . .; there is nothing thinkable in it. Being, undetermined, unmediated Being, is in fact Nothing, and is

¹ The headings of this chapter are, in essentials, those of the summary, though not all of the latter are repeated.

neither more nor less than Nothing.”¹ This doctrine, that being is as good as nothing, is likely to strike the uncritical reader as inherently absurd. Hegel indeed realizes that this is the fate of this teaching. “Being and Non-being the same!” he imagines his reader to exclaim. “Then it is all the same whether I exist or do not exist, whether this house exists or does not exist, whether these hundred dollars are or are not in my possession.”² But such objections overlook the fact that it is only undetermined, or pure, being which Hegel asserts to be mere nothing. A house, a dollar, a human being — each of these is a determined being, and is distinguished from ‘nothing’ by the possession of innumerable positive characters; but pure being is, by hypothesis, without characters: it is in no place, for place would limit it; it is at no time, for a temporal position would be a determination; it is neither inorganic nor organic, conscious nor unconscious, matter nor spirit — it is nothing!³ But such a conception of ultimate reality it is impossible to hold. Whatever it is, it is somewhat, not nothing. For, at the very least, ultimate reality includes, or is identical with, my present moment’s thought about it; and a fact of consciousness — even the fact of saying to oneself “ultimate reality is pure being” — is a determined reality, since it has at least the attribute of consciousness. In other words, ultimate reality certainly has this attribute: it may be thought about or guessed at; and the possession of even a single attribute turns

¹ Werke, III., p. 73¹; Stirling, p. 320¹. (References to the larger “Logik” are made to the later edition of Hegel’s Works, cited as Werke, III., IV., and V. Quotations from Bk. I. (*Seyn*) are often also referred to James Hutchinson Stirling’s translation, contained in his “Secret of Hegel,” Vol. I., first edition, 1865.) The names of categories are capitalized in the quotations from Hegel and in the footnotes.

² Werke, III., p. 77³; Stirling, p. 325³. Cf. “Encyclopædia,” § 88(?). (References to the “Encyclopædia,” are uniformly to the sections of the “Encyclopædia,” third edition, contained in Werke, Vol. 6; and translated by William Wallace.)

³ Cf. Berkeley’s parallel argument against one conception of matter, *supra*, pp. 131 *seq.*

ultimate reality into determined being.¹ Thus, to recapitulate: Pure, or undetermined being, would be nothing. But the ultimate reality has, at least, the attribute of being thought about. Therefore ultimate reality is determined; and metaphysics is justified in its avowed aim, the discovery of the nature of ultimate reality.²

Hegel has thus disposed of one of the theories which would make impossible a true metaphysics — an honest effort to get at the nature of ultimate reality. If ultimate reality were without characters, it would be useless to seek to know it; but since it is somehow determined, one need not, at the outset, despair of apprehending it. At this point, however, another objection, or another form of the same objection, may be made. Granting that ultimate reality has positive characters, must it not be utterly independent of the objects of human knowledge, entirely cut off from the facts of our experience? Our objects of knowledge are fettered by the forms and the limitations of human consciousness: they exist, as Kant has shown, under the subjective forms of space and time, of causality and the other relations. Must we not suppose that ultimate reality has characters of its own, that it is free at least from the determinations of our consciousness? This is, in truth, the supposition of Kant and of all others who teach the existence of the thing-in-itself, the reality independent of consciousness and of objects of

¹ Werke, III., p. 97²; Stirling, p. 348². "Being . . . belongs to a subject, is expressed [therefore, thought about], has an empirical existence and therefore stands on the plane of the limited. . . . Whatever the expression or periphrases which Understanding employs in opposing the identity of Being and Nothing, it finds in this very experience nothing except determined being."

² This summary of Bk. I., Section (*Abschnitt*) I., Chapter 1 of the larger "Logic," and of §§ 86-89 of the "Logic of the Encyclopædia," neglects not merely Hegel's historical digressions, but a psychological digression as well, on which he lays stress. This is his obscure teaching that Pure Being and Nothing alike are found to be mere Becoming (*Werden*). By this doctrine, Hegel seems to mean no more than the following: Pure Being and Nothing are found each to be an unsatisfactory expression for ultimate reality, and therefore when reflected on they are replaced by (that is, they 'become') more adequate conceptions of reality. Cf. Appendix, 549.

consciousness. In particular, this doctrine is espoused by many philosophically inclined scientists and by philosophers who come to metaphysics through natural science. Known reality, they teach, is mere phenomenon or appearance. But back of the appearance there must be a real essence; behind the phenomenal manifestation, there must be an ultimate force; beneath the outer phenomenon must be the inner reality; and essence, force, inner reality, are not to be known by us, since what we know is always the spatially, temporally, causally limited phenomenon or appearance.

Against the existence of such independent reality Hegel urges two considerations. The first of these is found in many sections of Book II. of the "Logic,"¹ and in the third chapter, "Kraft und Verstand," of the "Phänomenologie."² It consists in the proof that Kant and all other philosophers, known to Hegel, who hold to the doctrine of an unknowable reality independent of objects of consciousness, really teach that this reality is in relation with facts of human experience. Kant, for example, regards things-in-themselves as source of sensations, and as plural (things-in-themselves), that is, as thought under the forms of causality and of multiplicity. Still more palpably, those who teach that an unknown force is the reality behind phenomena of magnetism or of growth assume the existence of the force, merely as explanation of the observed phenomena. "We see an electrical phenomenon," Hegel says, "and we ask for its ground . . . : we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon. What is this but the same content which we had immediately before us, only translated into the form of inwardness?"³ Hegel means that the only argument

¹ It should be stated expressly that the interpretation given by the writer to this part of Bk. II. requires a very wide departure from the actual order of the "Logic." It is for this reason suggested with less confidence than the remainder of this exposition. For justification cf. *Mind*, *loc. cit.*, N.S., XII., p. 317 *seq.*; and Appendix, p. 551.

² Werke, II., p. 97.

³ "Encyclopædia," § 121. Cf. Werke, IV., p. 92³.

for the existence of a 'force' is the fact that it is needed to explain such and such phenomena. And attempts, old and new, to define force bear out this contention. Nobody knows what electricity, or mechanical force, or chemical affinity *is*.¹ Each is regarded as the hypothesized, but unobserved, cause of a certain set of phenomena, objects of our consciousness. Such a force, it is evident, offers no definite explanation of any particular phenomenon; it is, indeed, as Hegel says, a mere tautology.² And to claim that force, thus conceived, is independent of phenomena and more real than they, is absurd. For the force can be shown to exist only if the phenomena are known to exist, since the argument for its existence is simply this: these actual phenomena must have some ground. Whether conceived as thing-in-itself or as force behind phenomena, the alleged independent reality in truth turns out not to be independent of the fact of experience but to be closely linked with it, related to it. There is, then, no reason to hold that ultimate reality is outside the pale of possible objects of our knowledge.


The argument just outlined is based, it will be observed, on Hegel's examination of actual doctrines of ultimate reality independent of consciousness. His procedure amounts to the proof that the advocates of this doctrine have always, as a matter of fact, treated their alleged unrelated reality as none the less in relation with the world of experience. But the failure of all historical attempts (since, as well as before, Hegel's time) to hold to a reality independent of experience is not in itself a disproof of the existence of such a reality. Such a disproof is, however, furnished by Hegel's positive doctrine and this must now be discussed.

A preliminary observation on Hegel's method is, however, important. His constant effort is to show that erroneous conceptions are self-contradictory. The complete analysis


¹ Cf. Benno Erdmann, "The Content and Validity of the Causal Law," *Philosophical Review*, 1905, Vol. XIV., p. 163.

² "Encyclopædia," § 136^b.

of a wrong doctrine serves, he believes, as a refutation which is really a reinterpretation of it. Such an analysis, he points out, begins by substituting for the conception with which one has started the opposite of it, but ends by showing that the truth lies, not in either conception, as opposed to the other, but in a third conception which unites, on a higher plane, the essential features of the initial conception and its opposite. The movement of thought, just described, is known by Hegel as the 'dialectic,' and its three terms are, taken together, named a 'triad.' Thus, we have seen that Pure Being is Nothing, but that both Pure Being and Nothing, because thought about, are found to be really Determined Being. In triad ¹ form we have, therefore:—



Similarly, either Essence or Appearance (in other terms, Force or Manifestation) is believed by Hegel to be an inadequate description of ultimate reality. For the force, as has been shown, requires its manifestation (because it was hypothesized merely to explain the manifestation), and yet the manifestation, because it is a limited event, demands the existence of a more inclusive reality. So we have the triad: ¹—



Hegel's use of the triad form is not always consistent with itself, and it is often arbitrary and unessential; but fundamental to the triad method is the truth that the complete criticism of a conception involves an analysis of it, so that one can effectively dispose of a doctrine only by making it refute itself. This principle is sound and helpful; and Hegel's constant use of it is the chief advantage of his method.

¹ Neither of these triads is given by Hegel in precisely this form.

Hegel starts from the conclusion, just argued, that ultimate reality is determined, in other words, that it has positive characteristics. In his opinion, these reduce fundamentally to two: ultimate reality is (1) an absolute One, and is (2) spirit. Hegel undertakes to prove both points by the dialectic method just described. Assuming the conclusion opposite to that which he holds, he tries to show that it is self-contradictory, and thus that it implies the truth of that which it seems to deny. The following summary of his argument tries to make this clear.

II. ULTIMATE REALITY IS ABSOLUTE ONE

This doctrine of the absolute and individual unity of reality, receives, for a reason which will later be indicated, far more emphasis than the equally significant teaching that ultimate reality is spirit. It occupies, in fact, all the first two books of the "Logic," except those parts of them already considered, and two divisions of the third book. It has two parts: first, the demonstration that the ultimately real is no single, isolated reality, one among others, even if preëminent among them; and, second, the proof that the determined, yet ultimate, reality is not a composite of unrelated single realities.

a. Ultimate reality is not a single, limited reality

(1) *Every limited reality is at least 'same' (and perhaps 'like'), and thus implies other realities*

The hypothesis which Hegel here opposes is the ordinary conception of the nature of philosophy. According to that view, an ultimate or irreducible reality may be very limited; hence, because philosophy is the study of ultimate reality, any irreducible reality, however limited, is object of philosophy. To this conception Hegel opposes the doctrine that

no strictly limited or isolated reality is irreducible. He does not, however, start out, after the fashion of this paragraph, by a preliminary denial of the doctrine. Here, as elsewhere, he begins by assuming the truth of the doctrine which he opposes, and by making it disclose its own contradictions and show the insufficiency of its claim to be a final reality. He supposes, therefore, that ultimate reality is some one reality, among others; and he asks, what necessary attributes has it? Evidently, he replies, whatever its positive nature, it is at the very least identical with itself. The assertion is incontrovertible. A more obvious and certain attribute of any and every reality cannot be imagined. Whether psychical or physical, permanent or momentary, great or small, every reality must be identical with itself: for example, round is round; good is good; matter is matter; I am I.¹

This self-identity directly and necessarily involves another characteristic. A given reality, in being the same with itself, is other-than-other-realities. In being round, round is not-square; in being good, good is not-bad; in being matter, matter is not-spirit; in being myself, I am not some one else. The otherness is, thus, on a par with the self-sameness. The two are correlated aspects of any limited reality, and both seem at first sight to demonstrate its isolation.

But Hegel goes on to show that both self-sufficiency and distinctness testify to a relation between the supposedly isolated reality and other realities — a relation so close that the one cannot be thought without the others. To be distinct from others means that there are others from which one is distinguished; and to be identical with oneself implies, as certainly though less directly, an opposition to others. More than this: the 'same' actually *is* the 'not-other'; that is to say, relation to others is not a mere external and unessential appendage, but is itself an intimate part, a necessary attribute, of every limited reality. Roundness actually *is* not-

¹ In Bk. I., Identity and Otherness are known under the names, *Reality* (and *Somewhat*) and *Negation*.

squareness; that is to say, the full conception of a circle includes the characteristic of differing from the rectangle. And similarly the full consciousness of myself includes, and not merely is accompanied by, the consciousness of my distinctness from other selves. Thus the most intimate and apparently isolating attribute of a limited reality — its self-identity — implies the existence of other realities. It follows that this supposedly ultimate limited reality cannot be essentially realer than others, since the very conception of it requires the conception of these other realities, in terms of which it must be defined. In Hegel's own words: "The otherness is . . . within it as its own element (*Moment*)."¹

Both elemental and complex realities are self-identical, so that the argument just outlined applies to either. But almost every theory of ultimate reality conceives of it as complex, that is, as consisting of more than one quality; and every limited yet complex reality has other characters, besides its self-identity and its otherness, which prevent its being ultimate. Among these attributes are its 'likeness' and its 'unlikeness.'² Every complex is like and unlike (as well as 'same' and 'other'), because it has qualities; and a quality can be described only as the way in which one thing resembles one set of things and differs from another set.³ Redness is the way in which tomatoes are like strawberries and unlike russet apples; smoothness is the way in which tomatoes are unlike strawberries and like russet apples. There is, in fact, no way of describing a complex thing, except by comparing it, in respect of each of its qualities, with other things. Evidently then its likeness and unlikeness are essential characters of it. But this likeness and unlikeness imply

¹ Werke, III., p. 136; Stirling, p. 381⁴. Cf. "Encyclopædia," § 91.

² Cf. "Logik," II., Abschn. 1, Kap. 2, A and B. In III., Abschn. 1, Kap. 1, Likeness and Unlikeness appear again under the names Universality and Particularity. Cf. the summary on p. 362 above, and *Mind*, N.S. XII., pp. 322 *seq.*

³ Cf. G. E. Müller, "Zeitschrift für Psychologie u. Physiologie," Vol. 17, pp. 107 *seq.*, 1898.

the existence of other realities than those with which we started, which we have found to be essentially 'like' and 'unlike.' Therefore, a single, complex, supposedly unrelated, reality, just because it turns out to be inevitably 'like' and 'unlike' others, cannot, in distinction from these others, be regarded as ultimate reality.

The argument just outlined constitutes one of the most characteristic and significant contributions made by Hegel to philosophy. In one or both of its forms it appears in every book of the "Logic"; it involves categories of the most varying names; it is discussed on different levels of philosophic thought; yet it is always, in the last analysis, the same strong and distinctive argument which it is Hegel's great merit to have expounded and illustrated, until it has become inwrought with the common fibre of philosophical doctrine. A limited reality, he teaches, may not be supposed to exist preëminent among others, yet unrelated to them, for it cannot be conceived except as related to these others. In its aloofness and isolation, therefore, such a single reality cannot be ultimate reality — the final goal of the truth-seeker. For it is at least identical with itself; and this identity implies an otherness which with the identity, the likeness, and the unlikeness, is an integral part of itself; and otherness, likeness, and unlikeness require the existence of realities outside itself. Because, then, its own existence is bound up with that of other realities, no particular limited reality can be ultimate.

In opposition to the doctrine of ultimate reality as limited, Hegel has now a second argument. It may be stated thus:—

(2) *Every limited reality is dependent on others*

In the sections already outlined, Hegel has shown that, because every limited reality is itself and not another, and because every complex is like and unlike others, therefore no such limited, isolated, unrelated quality or thing can be

looked on as ultimate reality. He now goes on to show that the alleged unrelated reality, besides implying others, is dependent on them, that is, of necessity connected with them. In other words, no supposedly independent reality can make good its claim to independence. Not only does every quality or thing imply the existence of others, but it is conditioned by these others, inextricably bound up with them, influencing them and influenced by them. To be event or thing or self means to be causally or reciprocally related, that is, necessarily linked with others. The discussion of Kant's categories has already made this clear. There are relations of influence, or connection, as well as of comparison, and both are necessary and universal. An event is not sometimes part of a causal series and at other times uncaused and uncausal: on the contrary, to be an event means to be linked with past and with future; a mathematical quantity is not now and again dependent on others, but its being includes its linkages; a human being is not incidentally dependent on others and in turn an influence upon them, but rather a father's being a father is conditioned on there being a son, and a son is always son of a father, as a husband is husband of a wife, and a friend is friend of a friend. In Hegel's words, "Cause and effect are conceived as separate existences only when we leave the causal relation out of sight."¹ No isolated, unrelated reality, therefore, can be ultimate, because its dependence upon others, like their dependence upon it, is a part of its own nature; it cannot, then, be self-sufficient.

For two reasons then the single, exclusive, but limited, reality cannot, however significant, be ultimate. It is self-identical, and thus other-than-others, and in this way implies them. It is furthermore necessarily linked to these others in relations of dependence. It is not merely accompanied by the others: rather, it contains the implication of them and the connection with them. A crucially important objection

¹ "Encyclopædia," § 153³. Cf. *Werke*, IV., p. 218².

to the argument which this paragraph summarizes must, however, be stated. It is the following: Hegel proves only that along with every limited reality other limited realities must be thought to exist; he does not prove that these others do actually exist. Hence no conclusion about actual existence may be drawn from this argument, any more than the conclusion may be reached that there is a God because we have an idea of him. In agreement with this objection it may at once be admitted that Hegel does fail to take the final step in his argument. Yet the step may be supplied. For, so Hegel might have put the argument: if anything exist besides itself, then any limited reality is necessarily related to this other reality by relations of comparison and of dependence. And now — he might have added, in entire accordance with his general teaching — my consciousness of my own limitation is a direct witness to the existence of more than one reality. Thus, in knowing the limited reality as related to whatever else may exist, I know it as related, not only to an ideal other (or others), but to an actual other.¹

This result makes a farther-reaching conclusion necessary. What has just been proved of any partial reality, however simple, must hold true of every partial reality however complex. It must hold true, therefore, of anything short of complete reality. It follows that ultimate reality, whatever else may be said of it, must be conceived as all-that-there-is. For any lesser ultimate reality would imply the existence of what was left of reality, and would be ultimate only in connection with that remainder. Thus the significant conclusion is reached that, as Spinoza had insisted, ultimate reality is all-of-reality, and not merely some one reality, realer than the others. In Hegel's own words, "Das Wahre ist das Ganze," the true is the whole. To attain the goal of metaphysics it is necessary, therefore, to get at the nature of this complete reality. From the discovery that each

¹ Cf., on the direct knowledge of existing plurality, Taylor's criticism of solipsism, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

particular reality implies others, it at first seems to follow that the ultimate reality is a complete composite of these particulars. This is the theory which Hegel next considers in its different forms. His attitude toward it is expressed in the following statement:—

b. Ultimate reality is not a composite of all particular realities — it is neither an aggregate nor a system

There are two conceptions of ultimate reality as mere composite. The two agree in the conclusion which is the outcome of the doctrine just outlined, that ultimate or final reality must be absolutely complete: if anything, however trivial or insignificant, exist independently of it, that is, if it fail to include every scrap and shred of reality, then there is something outside and beyond it, it is no longer ultimate. But if ultimate reality, now proved to be all-of-reality, is simply a composite, it must be complete; it must include, in other words, every single bit of reality which exists now in every cranny of every world; it must, indeed, include every reality which is, or which has been, or which is to come. It follows, in the first place, that ultimate reality is no composite of temporal events; that it cannot consist, for example, in the series of transformations of the physical universe. For, as Kant has shown,¹ a temporal series is in its essential nature incomplete, since every moment involves, by hypothesis, both a preceding and a following moment. There is, therefore, no absolute beginning and no definite end of time; in other words, a really complete composite cannot conceivably be a temporal series. It is true that, inasmuch as ultimate reality is admittedly complete, the temporal events are not outside it, but in some sense belong to it. Such events must then be regarded as partial and incomplete manifestations of an underlying reality; and such a reality, as com-

¹ "Kritik of Pure Reason," first and third Antinomies; Hegel, *Werke*, III., pp. 140 *seq.*, "Encyclopædia," §§ 94 *seq.* Cf. also *supra*, p. 249.

plete, must in its essence be more-than-temporal.¹ From this common conviction that ultimate reality is a complete composite, and that it therefore does not consist in a temporal series, the two conceptions of this ultimate reality now diverge.

(1) *Ultimate reality is not an aggregate*

The first holds that ultimate reality is a mere plurality of entirely distinct and unrelated parts. The reality is thus in these isolated particulars, and it is purely the completeness of their number which distinguishes ultimate from incomplete reality. This explicit plurality-conception of reality Hegel analyzes with his usual tiresome, though skilful, iteration. The first result of the analysis is the discovery that a complete plurality of particular unrelated realities must be unknowable and incalculable, since no one of these limited real beings can completely know the supposedly complete number of particulars (even though these are not conceived under purely temporal forms).² To prove a complete plurality unknowable is, however, no conclusive argument against this conception of ultimate reality, for Hegel has as yet established only the presumption that ultimate reality is completely knowable. Besides being unknowable, however, the complete aggregate shows itself, Hegel teaches, to be impossible. In truth this conclusion has already been implied in the discovery that every fact, however isolated, consists in its relations to other facts. The existence of an utterly disconnected plurality of particulars (however complete) thus becomes more obviously impossible than the occurrence of the single, unrelated reality. For every one of these so-called single and independent realities is not only self-identical and like others, but is also either cause or effect, or else in reciprocal relation. But if each of its mem-

¹ Cf. Spinoza, "Ethics," Pt. I., Prop. 21; *infra*, pp. 441 seq.

² Cf. *infra*, p. 416.

bers is connected with others, the plurality obviously consists of related individuals. In other words, the supposedly unconnected plurality turns out to be a system of related reals.

(2) *Ultimate reality is not a complete and organically related system of related partial realities*

Hegel is thus led to the discussion of the important pluralistic doctrine that ultimate reality consists in a whole, not in an aggregate — in a complete system or organism of inter-related realities, not in a mere composite of isolated phenomena. This conception has such significance, inherent and historical, that it merits the most careful scrutiny. The absolutely complete system, like the complete aggregate, includes everything which exists, however slight or unimportant or superficial; and it is, furthermore, made up of realities which are not, in their innermost nature, temporal. From the complete plurality, however, it differs most significantly in the fact that the particular realities of which it is made up are completely related with one another. The systematic whole-of-realities is no mere aggregate, but the closest conceivable union of like and unlike, causally and reciprocally related part-realities. Now the conception of such a systematic unity of related particulars certainly avoids one of the objections to the conception of ultimate reality as an unrelated aggregate, in that the related system may be regarded as knowable. For though the complete knowledge of such a system would require acquaintance with every part of it, which is not possible to any finite knower; yet one may be said to know at least the scheme of reality, in knowing it as the system of like and unlike and dependent parts. The conclusive argument against the aggregate-hypothesis is indeed inapplicable to the related-system hypothesis. That argument consisted, it will be remembered, in the analysis of any one of the members of the supposedly unrelated plurality, and in the consequent discovery that each one is made

up, at least in part, of its relations to other members. But this discovery, though it annihilates the doctrine that ultimate reality is a mere heap of unrelated singles, is the support of the theory that precisely the organic unity of related particulars constitutes ultimate reality. It is not surprising, then, to find that this conception of reality is widely and tenaciously held in very varying forms. Leibniz's doctrine of the monads is a typical form of such conceptions. Fichte's conception of an absolute I, which turns out to be the complete system of all interrelated selves, is the most common idealistic form of the doctrine and is repeated in many contemporary conceptions, for example, in McTaggart's teaching that ultimate reality is the complete community of spirits,¹ and in Howison's conception of the "whole world of Spirits including God," the "many minds in . . . mutual recognition of their moral reality."²

But Hegel does not hold this view.³ On the contrary, he teaches explicitly that ultimate reality is not a mere system, made up of its parts, but an all-including Individual, constituting its members. It is highly important to discover the exact meaning of this conception of ultimate reality as an Individual. The expression will be used in default of any other to refer to a One which is neither a system nor an organism. It is true that 'individual' means primarily 'unique,'⁴ and that in this sense a system or an organism may rightly be called individual. There is need, however, of a single term to describe a One which is not a system, and

¹ "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," *passim*.

² "The Limits of Evolution," pp. xv. and xiii.

³ This statement is opposed to the conclusion of certain interpreters of Hegel — notably to that of a peculiarly close and careful student, J. McT. E. McTaggart, who attributes to Hegel the doctrine, just quoted, of the community of selves. In the opinion of the writer it is, however, impossible to interpret Hegel's teaching in any other than the general fashion of this chapter. (Cf. a review of McTaggart, by the present writer, in the *Philosophical Review*, 1903, Vol. XII., pp. 187 *seq.*; and a discussion of "McTaggart's Interpretation of Hegel's Category of Cognition," by Louise W. Allen, *ibid.*, pp. 694 *seq.*)

⁴ Cf. *infra*, pp. 408 *seq.*

for this purpose the capitalized word Individual, as qualified by the indefinite article, answers as well as any other known to the writer. It will later appear that only a self can be, in this sense, an Individual; but this is not yet manifest. Now of a composite, even if it be a composite of related Individuals, the constituent, limited realities are the essential feature. It is correct to say that the composite is made up of them. Without these many realities — atoms or monads or spirits — there would not be any composite; for example, without soldiers there would be no regiment, without sheep there would be no flock.¹ An Individual, on the other hand, has an existence fundamental, logically prior, to that of the parts or of the members. It is not separate from them, but it is distinguishable from them. It is fundamental to the parts, whereas the parts, though they are real, are not absolutely essential to it: it expresses itself in the parts, instead of being made up of them. A well-known example of this relation of Individual to parts is the relation of a given geometrical figure, say a square, to the parts into which it is divided. Such a square is, perhaps, divided into four triangles but it is not, strictly speaking, composed of these triangles since, in the first place, it would remain though the boundaries of the triangles were erased, and since, in the second place, it can be conceived as divided not into triangles but into other figures — rectangles, for example.² The reality of the square is thus fundamental to that of the triangles; and the triangles are to be conceived as modifications of the square — in Hegel's phrase, as "factors of a higher reality."³ Now Hegel teaches in every part of the "Logic," that ultimate reality is such an Individual and not a mere composite. "The One," he says, "forms the presupposition of the Many; and in the thought of the One is implied that it explicitly

¹ Cf. McTaggart, *op. cit.*, II. "The unity which connects individuals . . . has no reality distinct from them."

² J. E. Erdmann uses this figure in his exposition of Spinoza.

³ Encyclopædia, § 156, note.

makes itself many.”¹ Such a One is not merely a related system, it is itself an Individual. In Hegel’s own words, it is both “a totality of its particular members and . . . *single, particular, or exclusive individuality*.”²

But though, in the opinion of the writer, Hegel over and over again asserts or implies this doctrine that ultimate reality is an Individual, and not merely a system of coördinate parts or an organism, it must be admitted that he nowhere explicitly outlines the argument for this highly significant conclusion. To the present writer, this neglect seems the greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel’s “Logic.” There is not lacking, however, an argument, perhaps implied by Hegel, and certainly in accordance with the spirit of Hegel, which, by analysis of the nature of a system, shows that every related system of necessity implies, that is, requires the existence of, an Individual who relates. The inclusive whole of coördinate, interrelated individuals is thus shown to be but the manifestation or expression of the absolute Individual. The argument which, logically followed, leads to this conclusion, is virtually Kant’s proof of the existence of a transcendental self carried to its inevitable conclusion:³—

It has been seen that single particular realities do form a related system. The question at issue is, then, whether ultimate reality consists simply in this interrelated system. To answer this question, it is necessary, after Hegel’s method, to analyze closely the conception of a related system or whole. What, it will be asked, is a whole? It is defined ordinarily in some such fashion: the sum of the relations of distinct

¹ “Encyclopædia,” § 97, note. Cf. *ibid.*, Werke, III., 182³ and 175¹. It should be observed that the Notes, or Zusätze, are not parts of the “Encyclopædia” as Hegel left it, but additions made by the later editors, Hegel’s pupils, from their notes of his lectures. Thus it is evident that they have not the full authority of Hegel’s text.

² *Ibid.*, § 191. (Italics mine.) For discussion of the sense (not, of course, a literal sense) in which Hegel can call the ultimate reality ‘exclusive,’ though he has just named it totality, cf. *infra*, p. 420.

³ Cf. “Kritik of Pure Reason,” Edition B, 129 *seq.*; and *supra*, Chapter 7, pp. 229 *seq.*

yet connected parts. What, then, is a relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would be still another reality and would itself need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on *ad infinitum*. A relation external to the terms related would, in a word, be useless to them: it could not be their relation. As Hegel says, in "a unity of different . . ., a composite, an aggregate . . ., the objects remain independent and . . . external to each other."¹ And yet, though a relation cannot be external to the terms which it relates, neither can it be a quality inherent in any or in every one of them. For the quality, or attribute, or function, which is in a particular reality, cannot be the bond between that particular and some other. In other words, if ultimate reality were a composite of completely related terms, and if the relations between the terms were qualities of the terms, each for each, then the relations would themselves need relating with each other, for each would belong to some particular reality. There is no escape from this difficulty except by the abandonment of the conception of ultimate reality as a composite, and the alternative conception of it as a whole which is also a singular, an absolute reality whose unique nature is manifested in the particular realities which form its parts. These parts, therefore, need no external relation; they are related in that they are alike expressions of the one reality.²

The two first books of Hegel's "Logic" and the greater part of the third and last book are occupied with the portion of his argument already outlined; and Hegel's chief aims in this large part of the "Logic" are, first, opposition to the doctrines which make metaphysics impossible, and, second,

¹ "Encyclopædia," § 195. Cf. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 32: "How the relation can stand to the qualities is . . . unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities, then they are not related at all. . . . But if it is to be something to them, then clearly we now shall require a new connecting relation."

² For criticism cf. B. Russell, "The Principles of Mathematics," §§ 54, 99 *et al.*

the positive teaching that ultimate reality is an absolute One. But this conception of ultimate reality as numerically one leaves unanswered the even more pressing question: what is the nature of this absolute Individual, this self-determining, self-differentiating One; what is it qualitatively, what is it in its own nature? Hegel's answer to this question forms the second great teaching of his system, and is contained in the last division of Book III. of his "Logic," on "The Idea."

III. ULTIMATE REALITY IS SPIRIT, OR PERSON

Already this question of the nature of ultimate reality has been partially, though only partially, answered. It will be remembered that we have recognized three logically possible conceptions of ultimate reality: it may be of the nature of consciousness, or of the nature of non-consciousness; and if the latter, it may either be of the character of the nature-world as we know it, or may be an unknown reality, underlying both psychical and physical phenomena. But the teaching that ultimate reality is knowable has annihilated the possibility last named; and the conclusion that ultimate reality is a complete reality and yet no composite, or collection of externally united terms, narrows the view that ultimate reality is coincident with the physical world. For the world, conceived in terms of inorganic science, is precisely an aggregate of more or less well-adjusted phenomena, a composition of forces, a sum of interacting parts. Such an ultimate reality, obviously, would not conform to the conclusion reached that ultimate reality is a One manifested in its parts, not made up of them, a One which is the relater of the terms because each of them is an essential expression of it.

It is thus evident that the nature-world, conceived as inorganic, and therefore as composite, would not meet the conditions of ultimate reality as absolutely one. But there still remains the possibility of conceiving ultimate reality no longer as inorganic, but as organic, no longer as dead, but

as living. This is the theory which Hegel next analyzes in a concluding section of the "Logic." It is summarized in the following statement:—

a. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as mere Life

In Hegel's time, Schelling had espoused this life-hypothesis of ultimate reality. In our own day, philosophically inclined biologists—Spencer, for example, and Haeckel—have again made the hypothesis fashionable. At first glance, it has much to commend it. It is superficially possible to regard inorganic phenomena as subordinate to organic,—to hold that inorganic phenomena exist only as nourishment and stimulus to living beings,—and, on the other hand, to regard consciousness as a mere function of nerve change, thus making of life the central and supreme reality. The organism, moreover, seems to conform to the conception of the individual (the form, as has been shown, of ultimate reality); for the parts of an organism exist through and for the organism, instead of being added together to make it. Hegel begins his discussion¹ by admitting this analogy between the organism and the absolute One manifested in essential parts. The living organism, body, he agrees, is not an aggregate of independent parts, but a One, manifesting itself in different members, or organs, related to each other and to the one organism. But there are, he points out, at least two objections to the conclusion that ultimate reality is rightly conceived as identical with organic nature. In the first place, such an answer is certainly insufficient; it does not fully meet the question: what, generically, is ultimate reality? By organic nature, or life, we are by hypothesis to mean something more than the inorganic, the not-living. But the distinction between living and not-living has never been made to the satisfaction of all biologists. Life, it is asserted by many of them, is completely definable in terms of those

¹ "Logik," Werke, V., pp. 243 *seq.*; "Encyclopædia," § 216.

processes which are reducible to physical and chemical changes — contraction, oxidation, loss of heat, and the like, and by enumeration of its chemical constituents—its peculiar proportion of protein, phosphorus, albumen, and so on. In other words, it has proved impossible — as much, it must be noted, since Hegel's time as before — unambiguously to distinguish life from the not-living. Indeed, modern biologists, Loeb, for example, believe themselves on the verge of the discovery that life may result from inorganic processes. It seems manifestly impossible, then, to conceive of the ultimate reality as life, when we cannot distinguish life itself from what is by hypothesis its opposite.

In the second place, Hegel recalls the result already reached, that ultimate reality is all-inclusive, utterly complete, and he points out that the conception of ultimate reality as organism does not meet this second condition. For according to such a view ultimate reality is either one organism among others, or else it is the totality — past, present, and future — of such organisms. The first of these hypotheses is obviously inconsistent with the conclusion, already justified, that ultimate reality is no single reality, limited by the existence of others. The second hypothesis implies the conception of ultimate reality as identical with the race, or type — or rather, with the totality of interrelated races. Admitting that the single organism can never be identical with ultimate reality, this theory thus holds that the life perpetuated through generations — the life, not of the individual, but of organic nature conceived as an organic whole — is the fundamental reality.¹ Hegel proceeds, with his cool and penetrating logic, to analyze this conception of organic nature as life of the race, which Schelling, in his ardour, had uncritically assumed to be ultimate. This race, or type, — he asks, — what is it? Simply, he answers, a plurality, an indefinitely prolonged procession of living beings.² And,

¹ Werke, V., pp. 252 *seq.*; "Encyclopædia," § 221.

² Werke, V., p. 254.

since it has been shown already that an organic unity of related individuals is not ultimate reality, the conception of ultimate reality as life of the race must be abandoned. In a word, the result which is usual with Hegel has followed: the analysis of the concept of life, or organic nature, has revealed its own inner inconsistency. In identifying ultimate reality with life we have supposed ourselves to conceive it as a One expressing itself in parts essential to it: instead, we have found that life, organic nature as conceived by biological science, is, after all, no absolute one, but a composite of distinct, and therefore of externally related, individuals.

b. Ultimate reality is not adequately conceived as totality of particular selves

The most promising form of the hypothesis that ultimate reality is of the character of the physical world has thus disclosed its weakness. And it, therefore, becomes evident that ultimate reality, since it is proved to be neither unknown reality nor physical nature, must be consciousness.¹ At this point Hegel might recall the numerical monism of his earlier conclusion and might argue thus: the ultimate reality, since it is, on the one hand, conscious and, on the other hand, an absolute Individual, is an absolute self. Instead, he advances on the conclusion that ultimate reality is consciousness by the ordinary observation that consciousness, whatever else it is, is the totality of limited selves.² And herein he has

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 57 and 382, to show that these alternative possibilities are exhaustive. Hegel does not, except by implication, enumerate these possibilities, but in the opinion of the writer some such argument has to be supplied in order completely to justify him for stopping where he does, without the effort to discover whether, in technical terms, any categories save those of Cognition and Idea might follow on that of Life.

² Hegel does not use this expression 'totality of selves,' and might sometimes seem to be discussing the hypothesis of ultimate reality, conceived as a single, particular self. The whole context, however, justifies the interpretation given above, and McTaggart adopts it.

It is observable that Hegel does not take into account the Humian concep-

obviously improved on the hypothesis of ultimate reality as totality of organisms. For the organisms, as mere living, non-conscious beings, are distinct from each other, whereas apparently distinct selves are yet connected (as Leibniz long since pointed out) in that they are conscious of each other. Possibly, then, in the fact that each conscious being may be conscious of the rest of the universe, we have the clue to our mystery; perhaps, in other words, in the totality of human conscious beings (each conscious of some of the others, and even of the scheme of the totality) we have a qualitatively conscious, numerically absolute One, which is yet a One of many. Hegel tests the hypothesis by an analysis of consciousness with intent to discover whether indeed the consciousness of limited beings can yield this absolute unity. Consciousness, it will be admitted, has two aspects, two fundamental phases, knowing and willing. But an analysis of knowing¹ at once discloses that neither a single knowing self nor the totality of knowing selves can constitute the absolute and all-inclusive reality. For every knowing self is confronted with the opposition of 'the immediate world found ready to hand,'² — a world of opinions and purposes contrary to its own and a world of things which it has not made. This is evident in our sense experience, as Descartes and Berkeley and indeed all philosophers teach: we are hot and cold and blinded by the dazzling light and deafened by loud sounds and stung by mosquitoes against our wish and without our initiative. And though in our conceptual dealings with the world, in our analyses and classifications of facts, we are in a way asserting our power over them, still the facts are there to be classified and explained — we do not create them. Our elemental experiences, in a word, come to us without our making them,

tion of consciousness as impersonal succession of ideas. This omission may be due to the fact that the hypothesis had been so abundantly refuted.

¹ "Logik," III., Abschn. 3, Kap. 2, A, Werke, V., pp. 266 seq., "Die Idee des Wahren." Cf. "Encyclopædia," Third Subdivision, C, (b), (a), § 226 seq., "Cognition proper."

² "Encyclopædia," § 224. Cf. Werke, V., p. 265³.

often in opposition to our desires. Purely knowing selves cannot, therefore, constitute a self-sufficient, or absolute, Individual.

It remains to consider¹ the possibility that the absolute reality is constituted by the totality of willing selves. At first blush, indeed, there seems a chance that this is true, for selves, when they will, subordinate all apparently external reality to their own ends, regard their own interests as supreme and absolute, and "take steps to make the world what it ought to be."² Yet even will, so far as it characterizes particular selves, demands the existence of reality to be opposed, materials to be shaped — in a word, "presupposes . . . the independence of the object," and is, therefore, limited by reality external to it. As long, therefore, as we define ultimate reality as consisting of particular selves, we regard it under the discredited form of a composite reality. A totality of limited selves would, in fact, be a composite, not a unique, singular Individual. In such a composite the oneness would consist in the sum of the consciousnesses which the single selves have of each other. But the consciousness of unity as possessed by any one individual (who is by hypothesis ultimately distinct from the others) is certainly distinct from that consciousness of unity which each of the other individuals feels, and thus the supposed absolute unity would remain rather a sum of relations (consciousnesses of unity) which would have need of still further relating.

The last sections, thus briefly outlined, of the argument of Hegel's "Logic" are marred by needless digression, by over elaboration of details, and by under emphasis, or even omission, of significant steps. None the less in its important features the argument, to the writer of this book, seems to stand out clearly. Absolute reality, Hegel teaches, though it must of course include all positive characters of inorganic

¹ "Logik," *ibid.*, Kap. 2, B, Werke, V., pp. 310 *seq.*, "Die Idee des Guten"; "Encyclopædia," *ibid.*, C. (b) (β), § 233-235, "Volition."

² "Encyclopædia," § 234, note. Cf. Werke, V., p. 314.

nature, is yet not identical with mere inorganic nature, for it is a more-than-mechanical unity. Nor is ultimate reality identical with mere life as totality of organisms, for even here the oneness is not absolute, and each natural organism has a life of its own. In the totality of selves, we have finally a unity of a more essential sort, that of consciousness unifying itself with its object, yet here also the unity is incomplete, for each unifying consciousness is, by hypothesis, distinct from each other. Absolute reality must indeed be consciousness, and unifying consciousness, but it can be no composite, no system, of limited and distinct selves. It must be, on the other hand, 'subjectivity, . . . self-moving and active,' absolute idea, that is, self — the 'absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself and is completely self-identical in its otherness.'²

We must guard ourselves from over literally interpreting the words of Hegel just quoted. He is popularly held to conceive of the absolute consciousness as abstract thought — thought quite untouched by emotion or by will; and this conception is rightly opposed, as doing violence to salient and vital factors of experience. Such an interpretation is due, however, to an absurd misreading of Hegel. By 'thought,' as predicated of the absolute self, he never means thought in the dry, exclusive sense of a strict psychology, or of an intellectualist philosophy, but rather 'consciousness' in all its rich fulness.³ The absolute self, differentiated, Hegel teaches,

¹ "Encyclopædia," § 232, note.

² "Encyclopædia," §§ 236, 238. Cf. Werke, V., 317¹.

³ It may well be regretted that Hegel uses the word 'thought' in so many distinct senses, yet it is not difficult to distinguish them. There are at least three: —

1. By 'thought' Hegel often means the mediate or reasoning process as contrasted with direct or immediate apprehension. In this sense he contrasts both scientific and philosophic thought with religion. (Cf. *infra*, p. 392.)

2. By 'thought' Hegel sometimes means the unifying or relating consciousness. In this sense both scientific thought (reflective understanding) and philosophic thought are contrasted with sense consciousness. (Cf. "Logic of the Encyclopædia," § 80.)

into the rich variety of the world of nature and of limited spirit is no lifeless or abstract thought, but concrete self. "The highest, extremest summit," as he says, "is pure Personality, which alone — through that absolute dialectic which is its nature — encloses and holds all within itself."¹

Up to this point this chapter has consisted in an analysis and criticism of the argument by which Hegel seeks to prove that ultimate reality is absolute spirit, or person. But it would be unfair both to Hegel and to the student of his philosophy to go no further. By far the greater number of the works which bear Hegel's name are characterized, not by metaphysical argument, but by genial application and illustration of the underlying principle of his philosophy: the spiritual and personal² nature of the absolutely real being. All save the first section of his earliest work, the "*Phänomenologie*," the entire "*Philosophy of Right*," and the collected lectures on the "*History of Religion*," the "*Philosophy of History*" and the "*Æsthetics*,"³ embody Hegel's applications and illustrations of this underlying doctrine: the existence of an absolute self which differentiates and manifests itself in human beings and in physical nature. The procession of events, Hegel teaches, is the progressive apprehension of this absolute self under more and more adequate forms; goodness is the adequate relation of human beings to each other as all related to this larger self; beauty is the absolute self's expression in sense forms; religion is the per-

3. By 'thought' in its deepest sense, Hegel means the consciousness which any self has of the infinite self as inclusive of all reality. In this sense, philosophic thought is opposed to purely scientific thought and is allied to the highest form of the religious consciousness.

It may be added that Hegel uses 'sense consciousness' in a narrower and in a wider sense. In the former, the most frequent, meaning it stands for mere sense perception. Occasionally, however, it is used in a general way to indicate the unphilosophic consciousness (perception and understanding).

¹ "Logik," Werke, V., p. 339.

² The justification for the use of this disputed epithet is given very fully, pp. 380 seq. and 382 seq.

³ Cf. Appendix, pp. 547.

sonal relation to the absolute self; and philosophy, finally, is the reasoned apprehension of the Absolute. Hegel's influence, through these conceptions, has been truly incalculable, and it is wholly beyond our power to trace it. Doubtless he has won adherents to monistic idealism, less by the cogency of his arguments, which few take the trouble to follow, than by the adequacy of the applications of his doctrine to specific spheres of observed reality. Hegel has, in other words, convinced men, not in so far as he has demonstrated the existence of absolute spirit, but in so far as he has shown how religions tend to recognize this absolute spirit, how goodness presupposes the relation to him, how human history and physical science manifest him.

It is beyond the purpose of this book to outline and discuss in detail these applications of Hegel's fundamental teaching that ultimate reality is an absolute self, a spirit, a person, absolutely one, yet including in its unity — as subordinate and yet essential to it — all the varied reality of the world as we know it. But whatever the limitations of this chapter, brief references to Hegel's conceptions as well of history as of religion are essential to the proper setting of his metaphysics. The essentials of Hegel's treatment of history are the following: His conception is, in the first place, intensely personal; he regards history rather as the progressively closer relating of selves, in ever widening groups, than as development of one mere event from another. From this point of view he is never tired of teaching that the individual and the tribal ideal of duty must be subordinated to that of the larger social organism. Socrates, strong in his conviction of individual duty, and Antigone, in her effort to fulfil the last rites for her brother, both yield inevitably to the state — the most inclusive unit of social personality.

Even more significant is Hegel's conception of successive stages in the world's history as in no sense isolated from each other, but as vitally related. In one form or an-

other this conception of history has dominated science since the days of Thucydides. Hegel's interpretation, however, differs from many others in that, in his view, the bond which connects events is no external one. In the place of this conception of mechanical connection Hegel substitutes that of development, always illustrating the relation of phenomena from the organic relation of seed to plant.¹ The present, he teaches, has been developed from the past, of which, potentially, it was already a part. This development he further conceives as through the progressive reconciliation of opposites: assertion of one aspect of reality grows into the expression of its opposite; and the two opposites are later reconciled in an inclusive unity.² Unquestionably, there is an apparent difficulty in this Hegelian doctrine of development. Given Hegel's view of the absolute and essentially timeless self, inclusive of all reality, how can there be development within it? how, in truth, does there come to be — as certainly there *is* — any temporal world? Hegel explicitly recognizes the problem,³ and never attempts to solve it by relinquishing either of its oppositions. He neither questions the more-than-temporal eternity of the Absolute, nor yet the reality of temporal development. But he regards the process

¹ "History of Philosophy," A, 2 a, transl., I., p. 22; Werke, 13, p. 343, cited, here and throughout, in latest edition (cf. Appendix, p. 546).

² These four stages in development Hegel indicates by the characteristic terms 'the in-itself (*an sich*),' that is, the undeveloped, primitive stage; 'the for-itself (*für sich*),' namely the stage of self-assertion; 'the for-other (*für Anderes*),' the phase of recognition of others; and finally, 'the in-and-for-itself (*an und für sich*),' the fully developed stage in which one's own nature is realized as constituted by its relations to others. (This term — *an und für sich* — inadequately expresses Hegel's meaning, which would be better served by the expression 'for-itself-and-for-other.') A man, for example, is potential, or 'in himself,' in his babyhood; he is 'for himself' in his domineering and passionate youth: he is 'for others' during the period of apprenticeship in trade or in profession; and he is 'in-and-for-himself,' completely realized personality, in his mature life when, on the one hand, he freely chooses a life of service, and, on the other hand, recognizes the rights of others in the very act of imposing commands upon them.

³ Cf. "History of Philosophy," A, transl., p. 7; Werke, 13, p. 19.

in time as subordinately real. The relative selves — and, indeed, the Absolute as manifested in them — are, so he seems to believe, temporal though also more-than-temporal; and every phenomenon is both an event in a temporal series, and an aspect, eternally true, of absolute reality.¹

From this indication of Hegel's doctrine of the relation of time process to the absolute self, and of the consequent connection between history and philosophy, we turn finally to his teaching of the relation between philosophy and religion. In varying contexts and in different words, he repeats that the object of philosophy is the object of religion "in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth."² The whole course of Hegel's metaphysics is, indeed, an argument for the existence of God — an argument, Hegel points out, which is in a sense 'ontological,' since it leads through a study of our conception of being, to the realization that the Absolute Idea (or Self) necessarily exists. In this sense, Hegel says, that "the Notion of God is identical with Being."³ Yet in spite of this fundamental identity of object, Hegel recognizes two frequent differences between philosophy and religion — the first, a contrast in nature and genesis, the second, a difference in object.

From the first of these points of view, religion is distinguished from philosophy in that its consciousness of God may be — though it need not be — immediately gained, without a struggle or argument. One may never have

¹ "Logic" of the "Encyclopædia," § 212, note, quoted by McTaggart, "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic," p. 171, *q.v.*

² "Logic" of the "Encyclopædia," § 1; "Philosophy of Religion," Introduction, paragraphs 2-3.

³ "Philosophy of Religion," translation, III., p. 355 *et al.*; Werke, 12, p. 542 *et al.* Cf. "Logik," Werke, III., Abschn. I, Kap. I, Anmerk 1, C; and "Encyclopædia," Chapter IV., § 51. Hegel often comments on the ontological argument and objects to Kant's criticism thereof — in particular to the 'hundred dollar illustration'; but his objection is mainly to Kant's terminology, and he is not blind to what he calls the 'certainly defective proof' ("Philosophy of Religion," translation, p. 357) of the ontological argument in its historical form.

reasoned about God and one may yet stand to him in the closest of personal relations; one may have what Hegel calls an 'immediate' assurance of oneself as related to him. The philosophic consciousness, on the other hand, is never immediate. Its endeavor always is to *prove* the nature of ultimate reality.¹ Its truth is gained, "not by intuition — not even by intellectual intuition, but only by the labor of thought."² From religion of the unreasoning and immediately gained variety, philosophy is accordingly sharply distinguished. On the other hand, as has been indicated, Hegel holds that the highest form of religious consciousness is reached by the way of thought; and religion, thus conceived, must include, even while it transcends, philosophic thought.³

The second of these constant, though not invariable, differences between philosophy and religion concerns the conception of God. Philosophy (as conceived by Hegel) must realize God as actually one with the human self. Religion, on the other hand, may — though it need not — conceive God as external to the human self. This is the view of God which dominates the lowest forms of religion — the religion of the child and the savage who picture God as human self and feel toward him the primitive human emotions of friendliness and of fear; and it is also the conception of the merely scientific thinker, who represents God perhaps as first cause and in any case as a being external to the human self, 'a reality beyond him (*ein Jenseits*)' either near or far, friendly or hostile.⁴

Thus, to sum up Hegel's teaching: religion as contrasted

¹ "Logic" of the "Encyclopædia," § 64². Cf. §§ 63-75 throughout.

² "History of Philosophy," A, 1 a, transl., p. 15²; Werke, 13, p. 27³.

³ To this interpretation it may be objected that "Absolutes Wissen," not "Religion," is the highest category of the philosophy of spirit. In the opinion of the writer, however, "Absolutes Wissen" (the thought which makes, as well as knows, reality, and which is therefore will) is the thought which the Absolute thinks, not the thinking of the limited selves, as such; and religion is, therefore, for human spirits, the highest of the categories.

⁴ "History of Philosophy," Introd. B, 2 b, transl., I., p. 62; Werke, 13, p. 77².

with philosophy is personal relation, not thought. Religion may be gained immediately or through reasoning; it may or may not include thought; its object may be falsely conceived as external to human selves, though it may also be known as the including self. Philosophy, on the other hand, always is mediate consciousness, and the God, or Absolute, who is its object is always known as Absolute Self. In a word, philosophy is thought about reality (*denkendes Bewusstseyn*), whereas religion, whether immediate insight or reasoned belief, whether worship of a far-off God or of a God who is one with the human self — religion in its lowest as in its highest form — is experience, never mere thought. Precisely, however, in its highest phase, religion, like philosophy, is ‘consciousness of the absolute being, *Bewusstseyn des absoluten Wesens.*’

CONCLUSION



CHAPTER XI

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS : THE PRESENT ISSUE BETWEEN PLURALISTIC AND MONISTIC PERSONALISM

ἐάν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε. — PLATO.

THERE is reason for concluding, with the outline of Hegel's philosophy, a study of metaphysical systems as exemplified in the works of modern philosophers. For it is fair to say that, in the years since Hegel, no radically new type of metaphysical doctrine has been conceived. Nineteenth-century philosophies have been variations of the forms of pluralism and monism, qualitative and numerical, already outlined; and nineteenth-century philosophers have performed the work of adaptation, elaboration, reconciliation, rather than that of origination. In the opinion, shared by the writer, of many students of philosophy, this dearth of new types is due, indeed, not to a modern lack of spontaneity, but to the fact that with Hegel's system all logically possible ground-forms of metaphysical doctrine have been put forward, so that a system, however spontaneous in inception, must fall within the grooves already worn. A summary of these nineteenth-century systems, and in particular of contemporary doctrines, forms the concluding chapter of this book.

A. CONTEMPORARY NON-IDEALISTIC SYSTEMS

I. MATERIALISM OR NATURALISM (QUALITATIVELY MONISTIC)

Materialism is, as has been indicated, a form of non-idealism — the conception of the universe, or all-of-reality, as independent of and as other than consciousness, in fact, as

non-consciousness. In this negative conception all materialistic systems agree.¹ In their positive account of material reality, they differ, however; part of them conceiving 'matter' in the terms of the physicists and mathematicians as extension or motion, force or energy; the rest regarding it, in the fashion of the biologists, as life, or organic reality. The latter, the biological form of materialism, appeared first. It was the natural accompaniment of the forward movement, during the early nineteenth century, in the sciences of organic life. In its first appearance, modern biological materialism followed closely the lines of the doctrine, outlined a hundred years before, by the French philosopher, La Mettrie, in his "*L'homme machine*" which appeared in 1748.² In the middle of the nineteenth century, when Müller and Schwann were minutely studying the structure of animals, when Ferrier and Munk were showing, in widening detail, the complexity, in developed animal types, of the nervous system, it was not unnatural that Vogt and Büchner and Moleschott should formulate anew the doctrine that consciousness reduces to a function of nervous matter, that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile," that ultimate reality is, in a word, nerve activity. The most modern statement of the doctrine is that of Ernst Haeckel, a biologist of the first rank, himself a contributor to evolutionary science. His philosophy does not differ fundamentally from that of Büchner, Moleschott, and Vogt. So-called spirit he identifies with 'energy': as energy is related to mass, so, he teaches, is spirit related to the non-spiritual. Every form of matter, he therefore holds, has spiritual functions: mass and ether alike are possessed of psychic activities, and the very atoms are characterized by feeling and impulse; *but these are uncon-*

¹ In our day, these systems discard the epithet 'materialistic,' often in favor of the term 'naturalistic.' The rejection of the older terminology obscures the historical affiliation of these systems.

² For book references throughout this chapter, cf. Appendix, pp. 556 *seq.*

conscious functions. Consciousness does not differ, in kind, from those unconscious characters; like other forms of energy it has a definite 'material substratum'; and this substratum of the energy called consciousness is body—psycho-plasma, Haeckel names it.

Haeckel's identification of spirit with energy is closely allied with the second, or physical, form of materialism, whose best known expositor is Wilhelm Ostwald. Ostwald, deservedly distinguished in the field of physical chemistry, approaches metaphysics from the side of physics, conceives ultimate reality as energy, and regards heat, as well as chemical, electrical, and nerve energy, as coördinate forms of the ultimate reality, and classifies consciousness as a sub-form of nerve energy.¹ Professor W. P. Montague, adopting this view, suggests the identification of consciousness with potential energy on the ground, mainly, that both are characterized by 'invisibility or privacy' and that "the conditions under which a stimulus is followed by a sensation happen also to be conditions under which energy passes from a kinetic into an intensive phase."²

When, however, we turn from exposition to argument we find that contemporary materialists have merely refurbished the weapons which were used by Hobbes and by Holbach. For the argument underlying all these materialistic systems is the appeal to the observation that consciousness is continuous with physical change, that the conscious organism is connected by imperceptibly progressive stages with apparently inorganic bodies, and that sensation follows on nerve-excitation and nerve-excitation on physical stimulus. But these considerations avail nothing if the idealist is right in his contention that nerve and protoplasm and energy themselves reduce to ideal qualities and relations. And

¹ "Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie," p. 381. Cf. "Natural Philosophy," pp. 174, 178.

² "Consciousness a Form of Energy," in "Essays in Honor of William James," pp. 126, 128.

modern materialists have for the most part offered no serious criticism of this idealistic position. Haeckel, to be sure, makes a successful, if rather hysterical, polemic against dualism of the spiritualistic type, but he nowhere criticises idealism as such. Ostwald and Montague openly play into the hands of idealism. "To gain an idea," Ostwald says, "of the content of the concept of energy, we will start from the fact that we are able . . . through our will, to call forth occurrences in the external world. This comes to pass in that, in consequence of voluntary activity (*Willensbethätigung*), definite muscles contract and thus excite movements of our limbs, which . . . cause movements in the outer world." This exertion, he continues, "is a magnitude for it is capable of being added." But "the like effects of motion which are caused by human activity may be caused by machines of all sorts to which one can attribute no exertion. It will, therefore, be more to our purpose to choose a more general name for the magnitude which here makes its appearance: the name 'work.' . . . And we shall in general define energy as work. . . ." ¹ In similar fashion, Montague asserts that "potential energy though not visible or externally perceptible is nevertheless definitely and directly perceivable internally or by *participation* in it through what is inaptly called the 'muscular sense.'" The idealist rightly claims that this elucidation of the concept of energy by appeal to our sense-consciousness so far from showing consciousness to be a form of energy really tends to reduce energy to consciousness.

II. MONISTIC REALISM (THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWN REALITY)

A second form of non-idealism is a doctrine numerically as well as qualitatively monistic, which maintains that

¹ "Vorlesungen," pp. 153, 154, 158.

Op. cit., p. 123. Montague, however, vigorously criticises idealism. Cf. p. 402, and bibliography.

neither consciousness nor matter (physical process) is the ultimate reality, but that both are forms, or expressions, of an underlying but an utterly unknown reality.¹ This is the doctrine, introduced among modern scientists by Herbert Spencer, which has claimed for itself the name of 'monism,' though it is obviously one form only of the concept of reality as fundamentally 'one'; and it is, therefore, better named monistic realism. In order fairly to estimate this doctrine, it must be held firmly in mind that, by its teaching, facts of consciousness and physical phenomena, inorganic and organic, are alike mere manifestations of a deeper reality; and that this underlying reality is in itself unknown: it is known only in its expressions, or manifestations — that is, in phenomena, psychical and physical. Evidently, such a theory differs utterly from the positive conception of the ultimate reality as itself identical with the physical — whether that be conceived as 'life' or as 'energy.' The historic fact that materialists have tended to this form of monism is an indication, therefore, of the logical weakness of materialism.²

Against this theory of the unknown reality which is manifested both in mind and in matter one may still urge the arguments which Hegel put forth in opposition to Schelling's conception of the Undetermined Reality.³ For, in the first place, this hypothesized being, so far from being unknown, is known as being one and as being source or ground, and it thus reveals itself as belonging to the domain of consciousness, since 'one-ness' and 'fundamental-ness' are both categories or facts of experience. In the second place, this hypothesized unknown reality, if described merely as source of these particular phenomena, mental and

¹ It will be remembered that Berkeley used the term 'materialism' to cover this doctrine as well as materialism in the narrower sense.

² Cf. Külpe, "Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland," 1904, p. 36, for discussion of the way in which Büchner and Haeckel vibrate between materialism and monistic realism.

³ Cf. pp. 339 *seq.*

bodily, really — as Hegel pointed out — has less, not more, reality than they. To hold that *a* and *b* have no positive nature of their own, but that they are really mere manifestations of *x*; and then to describe *x* as consisting merely herein that it manifests itself in *a* and *b*, is to attribute to *x* less reality than to *a* and *b*, and so to reduce its reality to theirs.¹

III. DUALISM (NEO-REALISM)

The first years of the twentieth century are marked by a lively reaction against idealism. Under their common banner, 'neo-realism,' the critics of idealism uphold divers doctrines of their own. The avowed materialism of one among them, Montague, has already been considered; but most of the neo-realists are dualists and their common contention is that, besides selves and their ideas, or experiences, there also exist 'objects,' in some sense external. The main arguments advanced in support of this view take the negative form of criticisms of idealism. Of these, the most important are the following: —

First (1), the neo-realist insists that the idealist is guilty of a gross assumption in teaching that because we are conscious only of the ideal, therefore only the ideal exists.² In reply to this objection, the idealist urges that he discovers, and does not assume, the ideal nature of all reality. Step by step, he has found that both sensible qualities and fundamental relations are describable only as ways-of-being-conscious.³ Many of the critics, indeed, yield this point but urge that there is no reason for denying the existence — along with that of the ideal, known objects — of

¹ Cf. Chapters 3, 5, 7, 10, pp. 66 *seq.*; 130 *seq.*; 240 *seq.*; 366 *seq.* For illuminating discussion and estimate of modern materialism and realism, cf. James Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism."

² Cf. especially, "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," *Journal of Philosophy*, VII, 1910, pp. 396, 399.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 118 *seq.*

realities utterly independent of consciousness. To this the idealist replies that, such realities devoid of sensible quality, of permanence, and of causal relation, would be empty nothings, never to be thought about or talked about, and in a word utterly negligible.¹

The neo-realist, however, next (2) claims that external objects must exist since otherwise no one would make the distinction — which yet, as a matter of fact, we all make — between perceived things and imagined things, between so-called subjective and objective realities.² The personalistic idealist answers that the distinction between subjective and objective reality, image and percept, is a contrast between my private experience and that which I share with other selves.³

In opposition to this teaching, the neo-realist brings forward (3) the subtlest and newest of his arguments against idealism. For up to this point, though it has for the most part escaped his notice, the neo-realist has merely repeated the old arguments with which Berkeley was familiar. This present-day argument runs somewhat as follows: "So far from defining the perceived, or 'objective,' as the experience shared with another self, the idealist has no right to assert the existence of any other self. For he can argue to the other self's existence only by presupposing the existence of external realities, that is, by observation of gesture or articulate sound which he attributes to the other self. But if, as the idealist holds, this movement or sound is simply an idea in the idealist's mind, then his only legitimate inference from it is — not that another self exists but that he himself exists. Idealism is, in other words, necessarily solipsistic. In reducing all reality to idea the idealist reduces reality to his own idea, and in denying the existence

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 131 *seq.*; 364 *seq.*

² Cf. especially, Fullerton, "A System of Metaphysics," chapters VI., XIII.; G. E. Moore, *Mind*, 1903, N.S. XII., "The Refutation of Idealism."

³ Cf. *infra*, p. 425.

of external objects he denies the existence of any other self.”¹ To this objection a pluralistic idealist of Berkeley’s type has, in the opinion of the writer of this book, no conclusive answer. On the other hand, the monistic or Hegelian idealist, believing that all finite selves are expressions and parts of the Absolute Self, denies the very premiss of the realist’s argument. Not by inference from his own ideas but in a sense directly — so he claims — he knows both himself and other self.² The main arguments against neo-realism as a positive theory — or rather, group of theories — is the fact that, one and all, neo-realists assume their starting-point. Thus, the dualists among them assume the existence of ‘entities,’ physical or logical or both, which they coördinate with mental realities; and monistic neo-realists assume the existence of those ‘neutral entities’ under which they subsume selves, or minds — thereby describing the immediately known in terms of an artificial construct.

B. CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS OF IDEALISM

I. PHENOMENALISM (NUMERICALLY PLURALISTIC)

Phenomenalistic idealism is the doctrine of Hume: the conception of the universe as a succession of complex psychic

¹ Cf. G. E. Moore, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1905–1906, VI. “The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception”; H. W. Carr, *ibid.* 1907–1908. ² Cf. pp. 410² f.; also pp. 138, 144 (4).

³ The doctrine, common to many neo-realists, of the ‘externality’ of relations — and, in particular, of the knowledge-relation — is not a necessarily realistic but rather a numerically pluralistic doctrine. It is virtually held by those pluralistic personalists who conceive of selves as entirely distinct from each other.

For more extended criticism of neo-realism cf. A. O. Lovejoy, “Error and the New Realism,” *Philos. Rev.*, 1913, XXII., pp. 410 ff., J. B. Pratt, “Perry’s Proofs of Idealism,” *Journ. of Philos.*, 1912, IX., pp. 573 ff., M. W. Calkins, “The Idealist to the Realist,” *ibid.*, 1911, VIII., pp. 449 ff. Criticisms, by Muscio and by Turner, of the paper last cited and replies by the writer appear in the *Journ. of Philos.*, IX., 321 ff. and 603 ff.; XI. 46 ff. and 297 f. For further references to neo-realistic writings, cf. the bibliographies, pp. 557 and 566 *infra*.

phenomena, impressions and ideas. To the phenomenalist, the idea — using the word, in Locke's broad sense, to include every fact of consciousness — is in truth the unit of reality; and the universe, consisting of the multitude of ideas, is qualitatively one, or homogeneous, though numerically a plurality. Hume's phenomenalism is to-day revived most brilliantly in the philosophical systems of a group of scientists: notably in those of Ernst Mach, physicist, and of Karl Pearson, mathematician.¹ According to these thinkers, ultimate reality reduces to the complex of sensational experiences — in Hume's terms, to a 'bundle of perceptions.' So Pearson affirms that "the field [of science] is essentially the contents of the mind."² A noteworthy feature of this doctrine is its unequivocal idealism. So-called matter, Mach and Pearson teach as emphatically as ever Berkeley taught, is a mere composite of sensational elements, a 'union of immediate sense impressions with associated stored impressions' from which, by association, "we form conceptions and draw inferences." Scientific law is no extra-mental force, but — in Pearson's terms — 'a brief description in mental shorthand . . . of the sequences of our sense impressions'; 'necessity in a law of nature' is no non-conscious entity, but 'our experience of a routine.'³ In a word, the universe is constituted by consciousness; it is the composite of experiences.

The system thus outlined has been criticised already as it first appeared in the Humian form of it.⁴ Its great merit lies in its determined and successful opposition to materialism, its convincing demonstration that supposedly non-conscious matter is really nothing more than a complex of elements of

¹ Among philosophical writers, C. A. Strong (who follows W. K. Clifford) might be called a phenomenalist but for his curious doctrine of the things-in-themselves. Cf. p. 237, footnote.

² "The Grammar of Science," second edition, Chapter 2, § 17, p. 75².

³ "The Grammar of Science," second edition, Chapter 2, p. 75²; chapter 3, p. 112²; chapter 4, § 3, p. 120¹. Cf. Mach, "Die Analyse der Empfindungen," 4th ed., p. 283² *et al.*

⁴ Chapter 6, especially pp. 171 *seq.*, 179 *seq.*

consciousness. Of course, this is precisely the position of Berkeley; but it has especial force as put forward, not by avowed metaphysicians, but by natural scientists. This espousal of idealism is in truth a guarantee that keen scientific observation, logical scientific reasoning, and bold scientific hypothesis are perfectly reconcilable with an idealistic outlook on the universe. The chief objections to this contemporary form of phenomenalism are precisely the objections already urged against Hume's doctrine. It over-emphasizes the sensational factors of consciousness;¹ and it is untrue to experience in assuming the independent existence of those abstractions called percepts, feelings and thoughts. It ignores the fact that percept or feeling is always the self perceiving, feeling. Contemporary phenomenologists advance no new arguments against this teaching of the personal idealists, and there is therefore no need for a fresh criticism of their position.

A curious result of phenomenalism is that its upholders often deny the metaphysical nature of their teaching. Thus, Mach and Pearson are alike in their opposition to metaphysics, a 'supposed branch of human knowledge,' Pearson calls it. Viewed in this way as an 'antimetaphysic,' phenomenalism is a form of positivism, the denial of the validity of metaphysics. D'Alembert, in the later eighteenth century, and Auguste Comte, in the first half of the nineteenth, were the leaders of the formal movement bearing this name; but certain thinkers of every period have asserted that one may not know the Ultimate.

II. PERSONAL IDEALISM (PERSONALISM)

Personal, or spiritual, idealism shares with phenomenalism the doctrine that all reality is of the nature of consciousness

¹ Exception must be made of Mach, who includes among 'sensations' relational experiences. But Pearson and others treat thought as mere associated image.

From the phenomenalist the personalist (or spiritualist) differs, however, in his account of what consciousness is. Consciousness, urges the phenomenalist, is a series or collection of momentary ideas; consciousness, the personal idealist insists, is a conscious self or person, that is, a unique 'real' which is conscious and which may be regarded as including ideas, but which is more permanent than ideas are, and independent of them in a sense in which — on the contrary — they depend on it. This issue between phenomenalist and personalist is, in the end, not debatable. For each relies and must rely upon direct introspection. With Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, Lotze and Renouvier, Bergson and Eucken, Howison, Ward, and Royce, and a great company of philosophers, the writer *finds* that consciousness is not mere idea or series of ideas, but that it is the unique subject of ideas. To one who claims to find momentary ideas only, and no self, in consciousness, it is impossible to prove the existence of the self :¹ for proof means bolstering up an assertion by a more fundamental one, whereas the self, supposing it to exist, is fundamental to ideas. Yet, as was shown in the chapter on Hume's philosophy, the spiritualist is not without argument. Though he must assert, without demonstrating, the existence of a conscious self, he may prove that every extant phenomenalist, so far from disproving, has actually implied the existence of the self to whom he so loudly denies a right to existence. The great problem of the personalistic philosophy is, therefore, the problem of the nature, the number, and the relation of conscious selves. With regard to the first of these problems personal idealists agree that the nature of the self or selves which constitute ultimate reality must be known primarily by introspective study. It is of course impossible in a strict sense to define this ultimate reality, conscious self, but it is possible to describe it, to distinguish different aspects

¹ Cf. the writers cited on p. 185, and G. Kafka, "Über das Ichproblem," *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 1910, XIX., pp. 1-241.

of it. The fundamental features of such a description have already been indicated in the exposition of various systems of philosophy. By self is meant a relatively persistent, yet changing, unique, complex, related being.¹ The *persistency* of the self has already been considered. *Change*, as Bergson teaches, is directly experienced by each of us in his growth from childhood. *Uniqueness* is the character by virtue of which the self is 'this' or 'that' and not any one of a group — a reality which cannot be replaced by another, however like it or qualitatively identical with it. That the self is a *complex* of many diverse experiences is admitted by everybody. Psychological analysis has distinguished certain fundamental 'personal attitudes' — assertiveness (which characterizes will and loyalty), receptivity (which distinguishes perception), sympathy, and attention (both egoistic and altruistic) — and has also enumerated the so-called 'elemental' kinds of consciousness, notably the sensations and the affections. The self, finally, must be regarded not only as *related* to any reality in any sense beyond it but also as the *relater*, or unifier, of the different parts or aspects of itself²!

¹ A comparison of this concept of the self with the traditional notion of 'spiritual substance' will disclose, on the one hand, a likeness between the two. Both teach the existence of a reality more permanent than ideas or 'mental operations,' and fundamental to them. As actually used, by Berkeley, for example, the concept of 'soul' or 'spirit' seems often to be almost identical with that of 'self.' On the other hand, the soul — or spiritual substance — is sometimes, as by Locke, emptied of all content, and sometimes conceived in the fashion of what might be called materialistic immaterialism. Against this bizarre conception of the soul, not against that of the conscious self, the arguments of Kant's Paralogisms prevail.

² This is not the place to argue for the exact nature and number of these attitudes and elements. Such a task belongs to the psychologist, and the reader is referred to the writer's "A First Book in Psychology," third edition, 1914, chap. I., pp. 3-5 and Appendix, Sect. III., § 34, pp. 330-331, 333-334, for justification of the outline here offered. A different yet closely allied account of the self may be found in A. Pfänder's "Einführung in die Psychologie," Leipzig, 1904, II. Teil, Kap. II and III. It should, however, be insisted that this analysis, though primarily the concern of the psychologist, is not on that account outside the domain of philosophy.

A word more is necessary with reference to the immediateness of our consciousness of self, thus described. Stress has been laid throughout this book on the fact that the immediateness of self-consciousness is the starting-point of all philosophy, the guarantee of all truth.¹ I cannot doubt, I know immediately, that I, a conscious self, or person, exist; and I must believe whatever is involved in this certainty of my own existence. To this the objection is bound to be made that such a consciousness of self, as has here been described, demands a high stage of development, and that it cannot therefore claim for itself the character of immediateness. Such an objection overlooks the meaning of 'immediate,' which is 'unreasoned, and consequently not demanding proof'; it overlooks also the fact that a consciousness of oneself as feeling or relating, active or passive, domineering or yielding, is far from implying the capacity to distinguish and state these characters. One may be chaotically, confusedly, dimly, conscious of oneself as unique, inclusive, and as sensationally, affectively, and relationally conscious, but — the personalist will insist — consciousness would not be consciousness if it were less than this.

Another common objection to this doctrine that the self is the immediate datum of consciousness is based upon the discovery of so-called alternating personalities and dissociated selves. How, it is urged, can one conceive Janet's patient, the peasant Léonie, as a single, unique self when the supposed Léonie has so plainly been shown to be a composite of different selves, not merely a dull *paysanne*, but also a vivacious Léonie, and a serious Léonie — these two revealed in different stages of the hypnotic trance and only imperfectly acquainted with each other.² And how, once more, can one

For not only is it true that philosophy must have to do with all facts of all sciences, but it is certain that a personalist philosophy must adopt as its unit that I or self which, to the psychologist, is the unit of what he rightly regards as his slice, merely, of a wider reality.

¹ Cf. Sturt, "Idola Theatri," p. 92.

² Pierre Janet, "L'automatisme psychologique," pp. 132 *et al.*

attribute the immediate consciousness of self to Dr. Prince's Miss Beauchamp with her four to six personalities,¹ or to Flournoy's Helène Smith suddenly stripped (it seems) of her own identity and apparently reinstating Cagliostro or Marie Antoinette?² This objection confuses the bare, ever-present centre of self-consciousness with the varying circumference and content. The alternations and dissociations are, in truth, the extreme instances of the variations of mood and interest, the temporary changes due to forgetfulness or to novel associations, which characterize every self, however normal. Through all these variations the consciousness of self persists. One does not lose it when one no longer remembers last summer's happenings or when one's customary serenity gives way to restlessness. In similar fashion, the second or 'split-off' personality retains a consciousness, however abnormally altered in specific content, of himself. Indeed the frequently recorded lament of the 'second personality,' "I have lost my old self," would be impossible were not the old self really there to mourn the change.³

Besides agreeing in a general way on some such account of the nature of a self, all personal idealists known to the writer hold that there are, in some sense, many selves bound or related to each other. The grounds for this belief that I, the narrow myself, am not all-of-reality must be stated here.⁴ In truth, they have repeatedly come to light. Psychological introspection reveals that, in being conscious of myself, I am directly conscious of myself as limited; and to be conscious of myself as limited is to be conscious of that which limits me as being, in a certain sense, beyond myself. But all philosophic thinking, the personal idealist believes, must culminate in the conclusion that only self is real. I rightly reason, therefore, that in being directly

¹ "The Dissociation of a Personality," 1905.

² "Des Indes à la planète Mar," Geneva, 3d ed., 1910.

³ Cf. K. Oesterreich, "Die Phänomenologie des Ich," Leipzig, 1910, pp. 343 ff.

⁴ Cf. B. Varisco, "The Great Problems," transl. R. C. Lodge, pp. 16 f., 292 f.

conscious of other-than-myself I am conscious of other self, or selves. Thus, my consciousness of friend, of master, or of God, is in its centre a direct consciousness. The rich details, indeed, which make up what I know as another conscious self, and the concrete lines of division between other selves — these are in great part the results of reflecting, comparing, reasoning, and interpreting; but of some reality other than my narrow self I am directly conscious; and I am justified in concluding that this other reality is self or selves.

So far, then, all personal idealists in the main agree. The question which divides them, the most hotly contested of the modern philosophical issues, concerns the ultimate distinctness of the selves. No one disputes, as has appeared, the reality, in some highly significant sense, of partial and limited selves (you and I and all the rest), related one with another. The question is: do these selves constitute the fundamental, the ultimate reality, the *ne plus ultra* of being? At this point the spiritualistic systems of pluralism and of monism sharply divide. The first teaches that the universe consists, in its ultimate nature, of a community of related selves. The second is the theory that ultimate reality is in its innermost nature a single individual or person, which differentiates itself into the manifold personalities and objects of the world as empirically observed. The contrast is that, already studied, between the doctrine of Leibniz, of Berkeley, and of Fichte, and the theory first unequivocally formulated by Hegel, later supported by Lotze (unaware of his essential agreement with Hegel), and finally upheld by the neo-Hegelians in England and in America — among others, by T. H. Green, Edward Caird, Bernard Bosanquet, and Josiah Royce.

a. Pluralistic Personal Idealism (Personalism)

There is no more vigorous tendency in modern philosophy than the upspringing in the most distinct quarters of the aca-

demic world of a pluralistic doctrine. As commanding figures among the pluralists stand William James, George Howison, John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Charles Renouvier, James Ward. More or less closely organized groups of pluralistic thinkers are found at Oxford and in the University of Chicago. To the former group belong F. C. S. Schiller, a disciple of James, Henry Sturt, Hastings Rashdall, and others; the Chicago pluralists, Addison Moore, S. F. MacLennan, and the rest, are former colleagues and pupils of Dewey. Distinct from all these is McTaggart, who founds his pluralism on his interpretation — a misinterpretation, it appears to the writer of this book — of Hegel.¹ Most, though not all, of these writers² combine with their pluralism a protest against rationalism in metaphysics, and this protest, under the name of pragmatism, looms large in the philosophical discussion of the day. This 'pragmatism' takes the forms mainly of (1) a constant appeal to direct experience; (2) a reinstatement of emotional and volitional, alongside intellectual, factors in consciousness; and (3) an insistence on the practical, that is, the more-than-intellectual significance of truth. These teachings are supposed by those who lay stress upon them to be incompatible with monistic personal idealism, and they are, therefore, brought forward as an argument for pluralistic personalism. The writer of this book believes, on the contrary, that these teachings of the 'pragmatists' are well founded and salutary truths, but that they are as compatible with monistic as with pluralistic doctrine. Accordingly, the pragmatist teachings of the pluralists, important as they are in themselves, will not be considered in the discussion, which follows, of the issue between pluralistic and monistic personal idealism.³

Pluralistic personalism is the doctrine that ultimate reality

¹ Cf. Chapter 10, pp. 378 *seq.*

² McTaggart and Howison and Ladd are important exceptions.

³ Cf. Appendix, p. 559, for an outline and criticism of pragmatist doctrine and its bearings.

consists in the community, or society, of all related selves or spirits. It is based on two considerations: the conviction that the experience of every I is unsharable, and the firmly held conception that any I's self-consciousness involves the recognition of distinct, other selves. "The very quality of personality," Howison says, "is that a person is a being who recognizes others as having a reality as unquestionable as his own."¹ From this conception it must follow, the pluralists argue, that the monistic doctrine of the partial, or limited, selves, as expressions of the absolute self and included in its ultimate reality, does violence to the very essence of selfhood, or personality. Neither the alleged absolute self nor the partial selves, could, they say, on this view, be selves at all; the personality of absolute and of partial selves alike would vanish, since personality consists in relations to other persons or selves.

Positively, the pluralists teach, this analysis of one's own individual self, this discovery that it includes, as essential part of itself, its relations to others, is the guarantee of the ultimately real existence of the other selves in relation with each other and with oneself. This argument is of great importance, for upon it rests the case of the pluralists. It demands, therefore, the most careful comment. The comment will, however, be postponed till the argument itself is restated in more detailed opposition to monistic doctrine. For the present, granting temporarily the basal conception, it is necessary to notice the two forms, theistic and antitheistic, of pluralistic personal idealism. Of these, the first affirms, and the second denies or questions or ignores, the existence of a supreme self, spirit, or person, in close relation with the finite selves.

The arguments for God's existence, put forward by contemporary theistic pluralists, reduce to three main types: first, a group of arguments from the nature of the physical universe; second, the argument from the imperfection of the

¹ "Limits of Evolution," edition of 1901, p. 7² (cf. pp. 49, 52).

human self; third, the argument from the nature of a system. The arguments of the first type need not here be considered, since they are really restatements of older arguments already discussed. They argue God's existence (1) from the inevitableness of our sense experience;¹ (2) from the fact that the physical universe existed ages before human consciousness appeared;² and finally (3) from the purposiveness of the nature-world.³ Of these arguments, however, as has already appeared,⁴ the first two are capable of proving no more than the existence of an other-than-human spirit; and the last shows at best a probability in favor of God's existence.⁵

The next argument of the theistic pluralists is certainly of far greater importance, for it reasons to the existence of God from an essential character of each partial self. Because of the imperfection of the human self it argues that God, the perfect self, must exist. Of contemporary thinkers none has elaborated this argument with greater subtlety than Professor Howison. The self-dependence of the individual, he argues, is his recognition of his own peculiarity, and this involves his recognition of other selves. "The spirit," he says, "is intrinsically *individual*, it is *itself* and not any other. But such a getting to exact identity can only be by means of *difference*; and difference again implies contrast and so *reference to others*. Thus, in thinking itself as eternally real, each spirit inherently thinks the reality of all other spirits." And this recognition of others, Howison asserts, implies the real existence of these others. "This universal self-defining," he continues, "implies and proclaims the universal reality, the living presence in all . . . the self-conscious *intelligence*, and this, *presented in all really possible forms*

¹ Cf. Howison, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

² Cf. Rashdall, in "Personal Idealism," VIII., § 9, p. 376².

³ Cf. Schiller, "Riddles of the Sphinx," pp. 371², 370¹ *et al.*

⁴ Cf. especially on Berkeley's causal argument for God's existence, Chapter 5, pp. 141 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. especially Chapter 5, pp. 134 *seq.*, 141 *seq.*; and (on Kant's discussion of the physico-theological argument) Chapter 7, pp. 250 *seq.*

or instances of its one abiding nature." The forms of self-conscious intelligence thus implied — that is, the kinds of other self which the individual spirit contrasts with itself — are two: God and finite selves, or minds. "The world of minds," Howison says, "must embrace *first* the Supreme Instance in which the self-definer defines himself from every other by the peculiarity of perfect self-fulfilment *in eternity*, so that all ideal possibilities, all rational perfections, are in him eternally actualized, and there is an absolutely perfect mind, or God, whose very perfection lies in his giving complete recognition to all other spirits as the complement in terms of which alone his own self-definition is to himself completely thinkable. But secondly, the world of minds must embrace this complemental world, and every member of this complement, though indeed defining himself against each one of his fellows, must define himself primarily against the Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God. Thus each of them in the act of defining his own reality defines and posits God as real — as the one Unchangeable Ideal who is the indispensable standard upon which the reality of each is measured. The price at which alone his reality as self-defining can be had is the self-defining reality of God. If *he* is real, then God is real; if God is not real, then neither can *he* be real."¹

But it is not possible to admit this conclusion. For though God, the perfect self, is, in truth, as he contends, conceived in any imperfect self's adequate definition of himself, yet the fact that each self thus defines "himself primarily against the Supreme Instance," cannot prove that this Supreme Instance has existence other than that of a necessary human ideal — in Kant's terms a 'transcendental Idea.' Howison's argument is, in other words, in its essentials, precisely the old ontological argument of Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz.² As Descartes, for example, confused the 'idea of existence'

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 352²–353, 355. Cf. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, §§ 9 and 15.

² Cf. Howison's admission (pp. 356² and 359¹) of the epithet 'ontological.'

with 'existence,' so Howison confuses the 'posited real' or the 'defined as real' with the 'real.' To this criticism of Howison the following rejoinder will perhaps be made: such an argument tells equally against the argument, insisted on by the writer of this book, that in being conscious of oneself one is always conscious of other selves. In reply it should be pointed out that what has been taught is the immediate consciousness, not of other-self, but of other-than-self.¹ Not immediately, but through reasoning on the nature of reality, does one reach the philosophical certainty that the other-than-self is other self or selves. Such an immediate certainty of the other-than-self is far from being the certainty of the existence of any particular self — least of all the certainty of a supreme and perfect self.

There remains a significant argument suggested by at least one of the pluralistic personal idealists. It is developed in criticism of the non-theistic pluralist doctrine. All pluralistic personalism, as has appeared, conceives the universe as complete and interrelated totality of selves. The non-theistic pluralism, however, regards these selves as co-ordinate, and fails to admit the existence among them of a supreme self, God. In opposition to this omission of God from the totality of selves, a theistic pluralist, Dr. Rashdall, calls attention to the fact that on the basis of idealism, an interrelated system can exist only as the object of a self's consciousness, and then urges that only a supra-human mind can conceive the totality of human selves. Dr. Rashdall explicitly adopts this position in his criticism of McTaggart's form of pluralism.² "Mr. McTaggart," he says, "feels that the world must be a Unity, that it consists, not merely of souls, but of related and interconnected souls which form a system. But a system for whom? The idea of a system which is not 'for' any mind at all is not open to an Idealist; and the idea of a world each part of which is

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 409.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 393, note.

known to some mind, but is not known as a whole to any one mind, is almost equally difficult. Where then, in his view, is the Mind that knows the whole, *i.e.* the whole system of souls with the content of each? The difficulty could only be met by making out that each soul is omniscient, and perhaps this is really Mr. McTaggart's meaning. If so, the difficulty of making each soul as an extra-temporal reality omniscient, while as occupying a position in the time-series it is all the time ignorant of much, is one which needs no pointing out. In short, I hold that the ordinary idealistical arguments for a Mind which knows and wills the whole are not invalidated by Mr. Mc Taggart's criticism."

The difficulty with this argument is in its denial of the partial self's knowing the totality of selves. For — it might be urged by the non-theistic pluralist — though the partial self does not know in detail *each* of all the selves, yet it does know the existence and the principle of the totality of all the selves, and accordingly there is no necessity of a mind other-than-partial to know the whole. We need not, however, discuss this argument in detail, for there is at least a grave doubt whether a pluralistic theist has a right to it at all. On the contrary, it might be insisted that the only self capable of being conscious of the totality of finite selves would be a self inclusive of them. This objection introduces the monistic form of personal idealism; and to the discussion of it, it is now the time to turn.

b. Monistic Personal Idealism

The remainder of this chapter is devoted, for the most part, to a study of the doctrine of monistic personal idealism. Such a study, as will appear, involves a careful estimate of the arguments in favor of the opposing theory of pluralistic personalism. For the two theories have developed in close and parallel contrast to each other. As has been repeatedly indicated, the two systems are fundamentally alike. Both are,

indeed, forms of qualitatively monistic, personal idealism; that is, both regard the universe as immaterial, conscious, and personal in its ultimate nature. But whereas the pluralistic systems find ultimate reality in the many individual selves, monistic personalism conceives it as consisting in one underlying, all-inclusive Self, manifested or expressed in all the many selves. In Royce's words, "there is but one absolutely final and integrated Self, that of the Absolute."¹ The discussion of this monistic hypothesis will include the consideration, first, of the arguments in its favor; second, of the objections urged against it by the pluralists; and, finally, of the answers given to the pluralistic difficulties by the specific applications of the doctrine.

The argument for this monistic, or absolutist, form of personal idealism has been often formulated in the preceding chapters,² yet it must once more be brought forward. It may be briefly stated in the following propositions, which closely repeat the conclusions of the Hegel chapter. The argument will start from the position, already—in the writer's opinion—established, shared by monistic with pluralistic personalism, the doctrine that the universe is ultimately consciousness, and that consciousness means selves or Self. Monistic personalism has only, then, to show reason for its divergence from pluralistic personalism in the teaching that ultimate reality is no system, community, or kingdom of selves, but a Self.

I. Ultimate reality is no absolute plurality; it does not consist in a plurality of utterly disconnected units. For we directly experience relations and connections; every one of the supposably discrete, distinct 'units' is both comparable with and dependent on other units: it implies others in being itself distinct, and it is connected with others by virtue of their all existing.

Stress should be laid, in the foregoing statement, on the assertion that the relations whose reality is asserted are directly

¹ "The World and the Individual," II., p. 289.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 323, 377 *seq.*

experienced, not inferred. Monistic doctrine, in its most justifiable form, starts out, in other words, precisely from the radical empiricism which, in the hands of the pluralists, is moulded to such different ends.

II. But ultimate reality is, furthermore, no mere manifold of units which are both distinct and yet related. For absolute distinctness and relatedness are mutually exclusive predicates. If the units remain entirely distinct, they are then distinct from the relations as well as from each other; in other words, the relations themselves become mere unrelated units. So long as the units are, by hypothesis, distinct, so long the supposed relations fail to relate. But relation is experienced, it is immediately known to exist. Hence the alternative, entire distinctness, must be abandoned. There results the conception of ultimate reality, not as mere including system, but as relater of its parts, not as mere one-of-many, but as unique Individual. And if it be objected that this conclusion, reached as it is by logical analysis and elimination, lacks the confirmation of concrete experience, it may at once be replied that each one of us has in his consciousness of self the example of a unique being which is a one-of-many. For every self is directly known both as particular, single individual (as this one self), and as one-of-many — as the includer of perceiving, thinking, and feeling experiences, and yet as diversified in its constantly varying experiences. In a word, every self is immediately known to be a unique, differentiated one.

III. The conclusion that ultimate reality is an Absolute, not a mere related plurality, combined with the conclusion, already argued, of all personal idealism, pluralistic as well as monistic, that the irreducible nature of the universe is self, gives—as the final outcome of philosophy—the conception of ultimate reality as absolute self. The monistic personalist contends that, underlying and including all the many selves, there is one absolute self which, by its oneness, constitutes their relatedness; and that these lesser

selves — accordingly — are only relatively, or partially, distinct.¹

It is to be noted that this doctrine is, from many points of view, pluralistic as well as monistic. For, first, like all forms of idealism, the doctrine of the absolute self is qualitatively monistic only in the technical sense of viewing all reality as of-the-nature-of-consciousness, whereas, in so far as consciousness is itself complex, the conception of the absolute self may be termed qualitatively pluralistic. And, second, when unity and plurality are themselves regarded as qualities, plurality as well as unity must be attributed to the absolute self as one-of-many. The important reason for describing the conception of the absolute self as monistic is the following: that it asserts the unique selfhood along with the all-inclusiveness, of the Absolute.

¹ The second part of the argument here outlined is based on Bradley's denial of the ultimacy of relations regarded as external to the terms related (cf. p. 381 *supra*). In opposition to absolutism the independence and externality of relations is maintained by contemporary pluralists. The argument of Russell (cited on p. 381) is typical. He recognizes three doctrines of relation: (1) the 'monadistic,' which regards relations as inherent in each of several terms; (2) the 'monistic,' or absolutist; and (3) the realistic conception of relations as ultimate realities. (1) He rejects the monadistic conception for the reason advanced by Bradley; a relation inherent in one of several terms would not connect one term with any other. (2) He opposes the absolutist doctrine on the ground that it regards relations merely as predicates of a subject. Now a subject, he says (§ 426) "cannot be qualified by nothing"; and yet if the relations are something, they are no longer mere predicates. There remains (3) the conception of relations as ultimates. But this doctrine, as Russell realizes, has to meet Bradley's objection that a relation needs relating to its terms, and that the new relations need relating *ad infinitum*. Russell admits the infinite regress (§ 99) but regards it as 'logically . . . harmless' on the curious ground that the relation (*R*) of one term (*a*) to another (*b*) does not "include in its meaning," though it *implies*, the relation of *R* to *a* and of *R* to *b*. This is, surely, a very quibbling defence of the position that relations are ultimately independent of the terms which supposedly they relate. And Russell's objection to absolutism is met by the appeal to experience. His dilemma (either the relation is independent of the subject, which it qualifies, or it is nothing) vanishes before the discovery that I am a self relating my different experiences (*e.g.*, two conflicting desires). For this 'relating' and the terms which it relates are alike within me — they are 'something' and they qualify me — and yet they are not 'logically prior' to me.

To recapitulate: the doctrine, here set forth, of the absolute self, like the so-called pluralistic doctrine of the universe as composed of many selves, is qualitatively monistic, because it views the universe as conscious in its nature. But, unlike pluralistic personal idealism, the doctrine of the absolute self is also a numerically monistic doctrine, not because it denies the existence of many selves (for it affirms their existence), but because it describes the universe, not only as includer of selves but as One Self.

The conception should be tested by its application to those particular relations which the pluralist theory, spite of its teaching of the fundamental distinctness of the many selves, none the less admits as existing between them. Fundamentally, these reduce to three main groups: cognitive, affective, active. It is held by all pluralists¹ that these selves are in their ultimate nature aware of each other, and by most pluralists that the selves are emotionally affected by each other and that they actively influence each other. But monistic² doctrine insists that the consciousness of another self, whatever its character, requires the ultimate unity of the self which knows, feels, or wills, with that self which is known, felt, or influenced. Absolute distinctness, the monist teaches, would carry with it the impossibility of such relation; the experienced fact of the relation indicates, beyond a peradventure, the ultimate unity of the related selves. The real uniqueness and the recognized distinctness of each self which the pluralist emphasizes are, the monist insists, relative to the unique oneness of the absolute self.

To all this, the pluralist reiterates the objection: this doctrine does rank violence to the experience on which it rests; it ignores the unambiguous consciousness of each one of us: I exist for myself,² though in contrast with other selves; and the independence of these other selves is required

¹ The terms 'pluralist' and 'monist,' as used in this chapter, refer of course to *numerically* pluralistic and monistic thinkers.

² Cf. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, pp. 383 *seq.*

both by my experienced relations to them, in particular, by my relation of obligation,¹ and by the experienced unsharableness of my own consciousness. In reply to these objections, the monistic personalist attempts to show that the ultimate reality of the absolute self leaves room for an independence of the finite selves such as is required by the facts of experience. In replying to the pluralist objection, the monist thus develops his own system. In the following pages the doctrines of the monists will be discussed, with special reference to pluralistic arguments, in the following order: first, the nature of the absolute self; second, the individuality of the human self.

1. *The nature of the absolute self*

Fundamental to the study of other problems of monistic personalism is the analysis of the conception of the absolute self. Here it is of capital importance to remember that the term 'self,' as applied to the Absolute, must mean, qualitatively, precisely what it means in its application to human selves. To call the absolute reality self is meaningless, unless there is then attributed to the absolute self a consciousness which is like that of finite selves.² From finite selves the absolute self must, it is true, differ; but it differs by virtue of its absoluteness, not by virtue of its selfhood.³ One may be guided, therefore, in the study of the nature of the absolute self by the following principle: to attribute to the absolute self all experiences and characters of the finite self which are essential to selfhood, but not to attribute to it any qualities which are inconsistent with absoluteness. If this prove impossible, — if it be shown, in other words, that a self is necessarily characterized by relativity, that is, by limi-

¹ Cf. Howison, *op. cit.*, p. 353². Cf. also Fichte, cited *supra*, pp. 315 *seq.*

² Cf., in confirmation, Rashdall's discussion of God's consciousness, *op. cit.*, § 15, pp. 386 *seq.*

³ Cf. criticism on Fichte, *infra*, Chapter 9, p. 358.

tation from without, or conversely, if it be shown that an absolute reality necessarily lacks some of the essential characters of a self, — then the concept of absolute self will perish, as it were, by its own hands in disclosing its inner contradictoriness. It is, however, the belief of the monistic personal idealist that the two characters, selfhood and absoluteness, are compatible. In what follows the effort will be made to exhibit this compatibility. Negatively it will be pointed out that the absoluteness of the Self prevents our conceiving it as primarily or exclusively temporal. This follows from the evident incompleteness and contradiction of time.¹ An absolute self is at least a complete self, and the very essence of time is its incompleteness. Thus, the Absolute must be conceived as supra-temporal, as immediately conscious of what appears to finite selves as present, past, or future. This character of the absolute self will be later considered in the discussion of the relation of absolute to partial self.

The immediate problem of this study of the absolute self is the discovery of those experiences and characters of the partial self which may be attributed to the absolute. For the purposes of a rough analysis, these may be grouped as, on the one hand, forms of consciousness: (1) perceiving and imagining, (2) thinking, (3) feeling (emotion), (4) affirming (willing and believing); and in the second place moral quality (goodness and badness).

(1) To begin with the form of consciousness first named: perception has four noticeable features. It includes a peculiar group of elemental, conscious experiences — sensations, as they are usually called; it involves the passive acceptance by the human self of these sensational experiences; it is a direct, an unmediated, consciousness; and finally, perception is an experience regarded as shared: the actual or possible consciousness of oneself as experiencing what one

¹ Cf. pp. 441 *seq.*

feels that any number of other selves do or may experience.¹ Now it is necessary to attribute to the absolute self the first and third of these factors of experience, sensuousness and immediateness. All the consciousness of the absolute self, in its absoluteness, is immediate, since mediation requires time, whereas the absolute must be supra-temporal.² It is equally evident that the absolute self must have sensational consciousness, since he must experience every sort and variety of consciousness which is experienced by human selves — otherwise, of course, the absolute self would miss what the finite self possesses. In Royce's words:³ "Unless the Absolute knows what we know when we endure and wait, when we love and struggle, when we long and suffer, the Absolute in so far is less and not more than we are." The old rationalistic view which denied sense experience to God, which thought it impious to conceive of God as smelling or tasting, really derogates from the infiniteness, the completeness, of God's consciousness.⁴ But though the sensuousness and the immediacy of perception are rightly attributed to the absolute self, he cannot, in the human way, experience its passivity. For passivity in any ultimate sense is evidently a consequence of the limitation of the human self. To the Absolute, whose being constitutes reality, there can be nothing utterly unavoidable. We see and hear what we must see and hear, but the absolute self must be free and uncompelled, in his seeing and hearing, as in all his experiences. There remains the question whether the absolute self may be said to perceive in the sense of sharing his sense consciousness

¹ For justification of these psychological distinctions of this section, cf. the author's "An Introduction to Psychology," Chap. 14, pp. 169 *seq.*; and "Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie" (Veit u. Cie., 1905), pp. 40 *seq.*

² Cf. pp. 442 *seq.* below.

³ "The World and the Individual," II., p. 364.

⁴ Doubtless this common, rationalistic doctrine is based on the conviction that God, if he had sense consciousness, must possess bodily organs. Yet no theist denies thought and will to God, though they, also, are correlated with bodily changes.

with other selves. An affirmative answer to this question is at least possible. For, as the next section will show in more detail, the existence of the absolute self cannot be taken as denying the existence of the finite and perceiving selves. The perception (if the term be allowed) of the absolute self may well, then, be defined as the sense consciousness which he shares with the finite selves, included within him.

At this point emerges the following question: does the absolute self not only perceive, but imagine? For imagination, as possessed by human beings, is distinguished from perception precisely herein that imagination is regarded as a primarily private unshared experience, whereas in perception one regards other selves as sharing one's sensational consciousness. Now imagination, in at least one allied meaning of the term, may be attributed to the absolute self.¹ Human selves imagine possibilities contrary to fact. I may, for instance, imagine that Columbus did not discover America; but my imagination must be object of the consciousness of the absolute self — else there were, *per impossibile*, conscious experience outside him; and the Absolute's consciousness of this idea of mine as relatively unshared may, not unfairly, be called imagination.²

It is necessary, then, to conclude that the absolute self must have, like the finite selves, all varieties of elemental sense experience; that he may share it with conscious finite

¹ On two grounds objection is often made to this conception of imagination. It is urged that our habit of describing imagined scenes proves our belief that imaginations may be shared; and that, on the other hand, perceptions as truly as imaginations are unshared. In answer to this last objection it should be noted that perception has been defined, not as actually shared experience (for from a psychological standpoint that question is not raised), but as experience regarded as shared; and it is certain that we do habitually believe ourselves to be seeing with others. With reference to the charge that description presupposes the consciousness of imagination as shared, it may be pointed out that the aim of description is to create similar, rather than identical, experience; in other words, I call on you not to share my imagination, but merely to form an image like mine.

² Cf. Lotze, "Metaphysics," Book I., chapter 6, 79, p. 183.

selves; but that the passivity which belongs to all human perception is incompatible with the experience of the Self who inhabits eternity and beyond whom is no reality.

(2) The second of the definite questions proposed in this section is the following: may the absolute self be said to think? Tradition, which has almost uniformly denied the perceptual nature of the supra-human consciousness, has here no objection to offer. Thought, like perception, is realized as a shared consciousness; it is contrasted with perception in the following ways: it is characterized by relational not by sensational elements; it is, in general, more complete, less fragmentary, than perception;¹ it is a more indirect or mediate consciousness; finally, a certain necessity is attributed to it. In the first of these aspects, thought must evidently be attributed to the absolute self. Absoluteness involves inclusiveness of experience and the absolute self must be conscious of every shade and variety of likeness, difference, union, and opposition, no less than of every hue, tint, odor, and form. It is equally evident that the absolute self-consciousness must be characterized by a necessity deeper than that of any partial self's consciousness, and by a completeness which human experience approximates only in the form of thought. Between our fragmentary, relatively unconnected, perceptions and the systems of thought in which percepts and images are linked in well-ordered dependence, one on the other, there is indeed a marked contrast. The absolute self, also, is conscious of well-ordered wholes; but his whole is the complete sphere of reality, and he has not to attain this completeness of insight in a slow and mediated way. Thus, the mediacy and the indirectness of thinking — evidenced especially in the slow process of syllogistic reasoning — must be foreign to the absolute consciousness. The Self, which knows and is all, does not gain truth by degrees, or see it bit by bit. To borrow a term from traditional metaphysics,

¹ Cf. Royce, "The Conception of God," pp. 27 *seq.*

the absolute self has *intellektuale Anschauung*, thought-intuition; he unites the directness of human perception with more than the completeness of human thought. Thus, to recapitulate and complete this section of the discussion: the absolute self must contain all the characteristic elements of the thought consciousness; his must be indeed the only really necessary and complete consciousness. The absolute self may, furthermore, share his thoughts, no less than his percepts, with finite selves. The mediacy and indirectness of human thought is, however, incompatible with his absoluteness.

(3) Emotions constitute the next great group of human experiences, and accordingly the next problem of the present discussion is the question whether emotional consciousness may be attributed to the absolute self. The answer to the question, of course, requires a preliminary analysis. In the opinion of the present writer, emotion is a doubly individualizing, passive, and affective experience.¹ That is to say, in emotion I am profoundly conscious of myself as affected, happily or unhappily, by selves or objects which I individualize, differentiate from the mass of selves or things, in being emotionally conscious of them. These characters are best considered in reverse order. To begin with, since the absolute self is utterly complete, it must have every sort of experience, and therefore the affective experience in both its phases, pleasure and pain.² Here, again, we do violence to traditional philosophy. For centuries past, expositors of the nature of the supra-human self, Greek mythologists and Christian theologians alike, have denied the possibility of his suffering — have represented him as secure from the human lot of misery and sorrow. Philosophical upholders

¹ "An Introduction to Psychology," second edition, pp. 264-266; "Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," p. 58.

² The word 'pain' is here used, for want of an exact opposite to 'pleasure,' in a psychologically inaccurate sense, not to designate the dermal sense consciousness due to laceration, but to mean 'consciousness of the unpleasant.'

of this doctrine have, it is true, admitted the necessity of reconciling it with that of the completeness of the divine consciousness; and they have attempted this reconciliation by distinguishing divine, or supra-human, knowledge from feeling, and by the teaching that the supra-human self knows pain without feeling it.¹ In the opinion of the present writer, this distinction is psychologically unjustifiable. One can no more know pain without feeling it, than one can know color without seeing it. And, more than this, the doctrine buttressed by this shaky psychology is, after all, incompatible with the conception of the absolute self's completeness and all-inclusiveness of experience. Pain, as felt, is as distinct and elemental a kind of consciousness as color or form or pleasure; it must, therefore, constitute an element of the absolute experience.

It is thus evident that the absolute self must be affectively conscious. But affection is one aspect only of emotion. A second aspect, passivity, so far as it belongs to the absolute self, is a subordinated factor.² On this character, not universally attributed to emotion, it is, however, unimportant to lay much stress. But the final factor of emotion, its doubly individualizing tendency, is of the greatest significance. In feeling, my own central personality is the object of my individualizing attention, always as related to some special other self, or special object. In perception and in thought also, I am, it is true, conscious of other selves as sharing my experience, but these are 'any' or 'all' selves, whereas in loving or in hating it is a particular self of whom I am conscious. Such an individualizing consciousness must, now, be attributed to the absolute self if any human individual is in any sense admitted to exist. For the absolute self, with his perfect knowledge, could know such limited individual self only as particular and unique. Now introspection testifies that I, at least, exist; and evidently, there-

¹ Cf. Berkeley, "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," III.

² Cf. *infra*, pp. 451-452.

fore, since the absolute self is affectively conscious, he must be able affectively to individualize me.

(4) In attributing to the absolute self the active experience of will, we are once more in accord with much of traditional philosophy. By will is meant the active, dominating relation of a self to other selves or to things;¹ and it is plain that the Self of which all other real beings, selves or not-selves, are the expressions, must be actively, assertively related to them. Activity must be, indeed, the fundamental character of the absolute self; and will, the supreme, assertive attitude, must be the basal relation of absolute to partial self. The human self is, thus, in the deepest sense, an expression of absolute will, in other words, a particular purpose of the absolute self; and in this sense the Absolute is the creator, or cause, of finite realities, which exist as his purposes. A later section of this chapter will discuss the possibility of the partial freedom of these finite selves. For the present, it will suffice to suggest that, by this conception of the Absolute as essentially a willing, active self, absolutist philosophy, in the form in which this book upholds it, meets a criticism often made by pragmatists and by other anti-rationalists. These critics object to the reduction of the world, so rich in will and in feeling, to the purely logical universe of an absolute thinker. It is obvious that the criticism does not apply to the conception of an Absolute who feels and wills. Yet there remains a real opposition between the pragmatist and the absolutist conception of will. In the view of the pragmatist, will has always a reference to the future and he opposes absolutism as denying (so he believes) the reality of struggle and of progress. The place of temporal reality, in the world of the Absolute, will be considered later. But it must here be emphasized that will is not always, or even primarily, an attitude toward the future. The human will may indeed be directed toward the future event, but will does not necessarily look toward the future; it is,

¹ Cf. "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 307 *seq.*

primarily, an active, subordinating attitude of one self to another, in which time may be left out of account.

This attempted analysis of the absolute self-consciousness would be culpably incomplete if it halted here. For, besides the predicates, 'knowing,' 'feeling,' and 'willing,' by which we characterize human selves, there are the so-called moral attributes, 'good' and 'bad.' And one of the peculiarities of these attributes is their opposition: a self is a knowing, feeling, and willing self; but it is not, either once for all or at one and the same time, both a good and a bad self. The present problem is, therefore, whether either goodness or badness, or both goodness and badness, or neither, should be predicated of the absolute self. It must be remembered that this question is asked of the absolute self, in its absoluteness. That the absolute self includes what we know as goodness and badness is as certain as the existence of good and evil finite selves, or even as the existence of a single self, alternately good and bad. But this inquiry concerns the individuality of the Absolute, *as absolute*, the individuality which is manifested in, and not made up by, that of the human selves. Is the one real Self, the self whose selfhood is unshared with any partial self, good or bad, both, or neither?

To one of these questions, a negative answer may at once be given. An absolute self is a complete, a consistent, not a self-contradictory consciousness. Therefore, since 'good' and 'bad' are antithetical, an absolute self-consciousness is not, as absolute, both good and bad. And it will furthermore appear, if one follow the clue of human analogy, that an absolute self-consciousness is not itself bad. For observation indicates that moral badness is a function of partialness. It is a commonplace of practical ethics that the more closely self-centred or selfish I — the single self — become, the more morally defective I grow. In other words: the greater my emphasis on myself, as distinguished from other selves, the greater my sin. And the converse is true: the self who sees others as belonging within the confines of his own true

self will do justice and love mercy and fulfil all the ideals of moral goodness. It will follow, if this analogy may properly be extended, that the Absolute who recognizes all finite selves as parts of himself, the Self whose selfhood is complete and all-extensive, will rightly be named 'good.'

A real difficulty is, however, involved in the reconciliation of the possible or probable goodness of the absolute self with the actually experienced evils of the universe. How, if the absolute self be inherently good, can the universe contain the evil which we directly know? Anti-theistic, pluralist idealism does not, of course, encounter this problem, for it finds no difficulty in attributing evil to any limited self. Even theistic personalism may avoid the difficulty if it frankly conceive God, after F. C. S. Schiller's fashion, as a finite, though greater-than-human, self. The prevailing religious consciousness, on the other hand, acutely feels this difficulty of monistic personalism. For the religious consciousness has inherited the conviction of God's power, and believes itself to experience his goodness: it consequently realizes the difficulty of proving this goodness in the face of the shattering and devastating evils of human experience. It is primarily of importance not to belittle the problem. A shallow optimism, which neglects the evil either from selfish preoccupation with personal good fortune, or from an arbitrarily limited observation of nature-adaptations, offers no foundation for the doctrine that the absolute self is not merely all-real, all-powerful, and all-knowing, but all-good. The goodness of the absolute self, if it be not compatible with the existence of actual suffering and real sin, is a baseless fiction, not a sober metaphysical doctrine.

The abstract requirements of a conception of the absolute self as good are readily outlined. If the absolute self, in its absoluteness, is to be good, not bad, and if yet the evil must be regarded as actual, then evil must be a subordinate factor, or element, of the good: it must be evil, in isolation, yet capable of forming part of a total good, somewhat as a chord

which, taken by itself, is a discord, may yet form a part of a larger harmony. Two considerations ably set forth, years ago, by Professor Royce,¹ establish, in the writer's opinion, the possibility — nay, the probability — of this view of evil as a transcended factor in the experience of the absolute self. The first of these is an undoubted fact of human consciousness: the experience that suffering nobly borne and temptation vanquished enrich the life and strengthen the character — in a word, that they are elements of a wider good. Every human self which knows, however intermittently, the strength developed by resistance of moral seductions and the rich fruits of sorrow patiently endured, knows that the "hours of mortal moral strife, alone aright reveal" the deepest goodness of the soul. From this point of view, the evils of our human existence are the elements of an experience which, regarded in its totality, is good, not evil. And the absolute self's consciousness of these evils, as in themselves bad, is such a consciousness as the good man's experience of temptation: he is aware of the luring thought, of the enticing evil, but he is not morally defiled by this awareness of evil, for he is conscious of the bad only to hate it; he recognizes evil only to vanquish it. So the Absolute, which is the complete self, must indeed be conscious of sorrow and of sin, but is conscious of them only in conquering them, and is not, therefore, evil by the fact of including evil.

To this conception of the goodness of the absolute self, the following objection may be made: It has indeed — it may be admitted — been shown how evil, granted its existence, may be a subordinate part of the absolute self. But why, it may be urged, does evil exist at all, if all that exists is willed, assented to, or chosen, by an absolute and yet a good self? It is easy to see how suffering greatly borne and temptation fiercely fought may be the self-assertions of an

¹ "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Lecture XIII., pp. 440 *seq.*

absolutely good self. But there is sin and sorrow which cannot, it is insisted, be regarded as the objects of the will of a good and yet an absolute self — in terms of theology, of a God who permits them. Grievances which narrow and belittle the mind, unresisted temptations which work the ruin of the soul, contaminating vice with its entail of hopeless misery and multiplying sin, — all these, it is urged, are evils of so positive a nature that they must taint the goodness of the self which, by virtue of its absoluteness, actually must have willed them, inasmuch as they exist.

Only one reply can be made to this objection. The absolute self, because complete, includes — it has been shown — all human experience as integral part of himself. It follows that the absolute self has all the experience that the human selves have. In a real sense, therefore, he shares our sorrow, is afflicted in our affliction, knows our grief. No anguish can wring the human heart but is felt by the absolute self; no self-contempt can flame up within the human spirit but is experienced by the all-including self. In other words, the absolute self is no God afar off, no supreme Being who decrees misery that he does not share, no divinity who feasts and delights in a distant Olympus, while below him his human subjects toil and sin and suffer. But it is not conceivable that a self whose will constitutes reality should will his own evil, if that evil be positive and unconquered. The fact that the absolute self shares in human suffering is, thus, a guarantee that the sorrow is neither final nor ultimate, that sin and misery, to human view irreconcilable with goodness, are none the less the elements — but the transcended elements — of the experience of an absolute and good self. It must be conceded that this reply to the objection of those who hold that the absolute self, because he wills and asserts the evil, cannot be good, offers no explanation of the existence of the deepest human suffering. No finite self, indeed, has ever probed this tragic mystery. What has been insisted on is simply this: that the existence of evil is reconcilable,

though not by us at this stage of our development, with the goodness of the absolute self. And the grounds of this conclusion are simply these: the absolute self has willed his own evil, as well as ours; and would not have affirmed it save as subordinated to a wider good.

This analysis of the consciousness to be attributed to an absolute self gives the following results: it has been found that the absolute self has all the elemental experiences — sensational, affective, relational — of human selves; that he is conscious of himself as actively related to the finite selves, included within himself; that his experience is utterly complete. Because of this completeness, however, the absolute experience, as absolute, lacks the essential temporality, the mediacy, and the passivity of the human consciousness. The more general conclusions from the discussion are, first, a conviction of the richness of this absolute self-consciousness and of the consequent impossibility of defining it in terms of any one of its aspects — whether Thought, or Will, or Love. Only when thought (for example) is taken, after Hegel's fashion, to mean self-consciousness can it be rightly used as synonym for the absolute, and consequently complete, experience. It is observable, in the second place, that the attempt to classify the absolute self-consciousness has broken certain lines of division necessary to a purely human psychology; and that it is indeed, therefore, impossible to conceive the absolute self as perceiving, thinking, or feeling, in the precise sense which psychology gives to these terms. Perception and thought merge the one into the other, when perception has lost its passivity and thought its mediateness. Similarly, emotion approaches will when it is conceived as an active form of consciousness. The main distinction in the absolute self's consciousness really — it appears — lies between his unparticularizing consciousness (roughly coördinate, but not identical, with human perception and thought), and his strongly individualizing consciousness (coördinate with emo-

tion and will), the aspects of his experience which demand the existence of sharply differentiated, unique, partial selves. The problems involved in the conception of these partial selves must now be discussed. These problems are the nature of the individuality attributed to these human selves; the reasons for attributing to human selves, which are expressions of an absolute self, any individuality; and the reconciliation of human with absolute individuality.

2. *Human individuality*¹

The issue between pluralistic personal idealism and the monistic personalism, which this chapter outlines and defends, is simply this: Pluralist and monist alike are immediately certain of human individuality, 'the essentially unique being'² of the human self. The monist, however, reasons that ultimate reality must consist in absolute self. To this doctrine the pluralist offers two significant objections. He urges, first, that the conception of a self as including selves involves an impossibility, second, that the existence of the human selves merely as manifestations of an including absolute self would make human individuality impossible. The monist has, thus, the alternative of meeting these objec-

¹ In this section, Professor Royce's teaching is substantially followed. In the opinion of the present writer no one has dealt so subtly and so satisfactorily with the problems involved in the reconciliation of the rights of individuality with the implications of an absolutist, a numerically monistic, idealism. The present section, then, is based throughout upon the teachings of Royce, as formulated in the "Conception of God" and in the "World and the Individual," especially Series II.

The divergences from Royce's teaching concern chiefly what may be called his psychology and his terminology. These divergences are more apparent in the section which has preceded than in this. They are, in particular, these: (1) The term 'experience' is used in the broad sense 'consciousness,' not as by Royce, for equivalent of 'presentation' or 'brute fact.' (2) Royce's contrast, to the writer inherently vague and unanalyzed, between 'brute fact' and 'idea' is not made. (3) Will is not, as by Royce, identified with attention. (4) Positively, the conception of *all* forms of consciousness as relations of selves is insisted on. (Cf. also note, *infra*, p. 438.)

² Royce, "Conception of God" (1902), p. 241¹.

tions or of abandoning either the immediate certainty that human selves exist or the inferred doctrine that the universe is absolute self. In defence of his first objection, the pluralist insists: The monist conceives what is directly contrary to human experience. Misled by a spatial metaphor, he talks of minds as if they were 'Chinese boxes which can be put inside of each other,'¹ whereas one self simply cannot include another self. Now it is open to the monist to retort: Pluralism involves the reality of an experience at least equally inconceivable, in that it conceives of essentially distinct selves as aware of each other. The reality of my experience of other selves involves, the monist well may insist, the only sort of 'inclusion' of selves within an absolute self which monism claims. But to meet charge with counter charge is an unsatisfying argument, even when, as here, one believes that one's opponent's inconsistency implies the truth that he criticises. The monist has, in fact, a reply far better than a *tu quoque* to the pluralist's charge. For he can show that the private experience of each one of us furnishes the example of a self inclusive of selves. How sharply, for example, I distinguish my childhood self, the self of one jubilant year of youth, the self of a period of philosophic vagaries, from what I know as my whole self, myself *par excellence*. Even without the distinction by temporal periods, I am conscious of well-differentiated partial selves within myself — of a radical and a conservative self, a frivolous and a strenuous self, for example. Such self-differentiation of the finite self makes it impossible to deny *a priori* the inclusion of partial selves within the absolute self.

At this point the pluralist may suggest the following difficulties. The conception of absolute monism supposes, he will urge, the existence of an Absolute which is not only includer but also self. And this unique personality must be regarded, the pluralist says, as indivisible. Hence, he

¹ Rashdall, *op. cit.*, VIII., § 15, p. 388¹.

proceeds, if the absolute self is *in* any partial self, it must be all in that self. But this is impossible, for it would make such a partial self absolute; and it follows that the absolute self cannot be in any partial self. Otherwise put, the pluralist continues, the aspect or character that constitutes the Absolute a person is just the aspect in which he is contrasted with any partial self — with you or me. On this side, he doesn't include us; hence it is not as unique self that he is absolute; hence his personality as such is limited personality — limited by what is not it. Hence *as person* he is not absolute. The appeal of this objection (which recalls a famous passage of the "Parmenides") is due partly to the spatial metaphor illicitly suggested by the word 'indivisible'; and partly to the assumption that personality is a mere aspect of the Absolute. In reply the monist insists that the Absolute, and not a mere character of the Absolute, is personality or self; and he energetically denies that the Absolute is indivisible in the sense which this argument requires: only a spatial unit, he holds, is in this sense either divisible or indivisible. Just as I, John Smith, know myself as constituting both my childhood and my adult self, and therefore as opposed or limited by neither of them, and just as I know myself, also, as more than any sum of partial selves or experiences so the absolute person includes us, the partial selves, and yet his personality is neither exhausted nor limited by that of any partial self.

But the pluralist, it will be remembered, has another objection to the doctrine of an absolute self. Even if finite selves were 'included,' in some sense, within the absolute self, they would lack, the pluralist insists, all that we call individuality; they would be unparticularized selves, each distinguished only by numerical position, from all the others, since each would be merely the expression of the one and same absolute self. In meeting this objection, it is necessary, first, to undertake a close scrutiny of the nature of individuality. The results of such a scrutiny have been suggested

in the preceding section of this chapter. The individual is the unique, and since all reality is conscious self, an individual is such through and for the individualizing consciousness. But, as has appeared, one individualizes when one feels or wills.¹ There is nothing individualizing in the merely perceiving or thinking consciousness. The objects of perception or of thought are members of a group and replaceable one by the other. I see things common to every man's vision, I think thoughts sharable with any minds. But with the objects of my feeling, as with those of my will, it is different. The object of my love or of my hate is unique, and not to be replaced by any one, however similar. I envy or pity this man, this child; I am thrilled with the beauty of this sunset; I feel myself as individual in relation to this other individual. In a word, no one — however similar — can take the place of the particular and unique object of my emotion or will. The essence of individuality is evidently, then, uniqueness, the character of being irreplaceable. And the problem of the compatibility of human personality with the absoluteness of the One Self reduces to this: does the existence of the absolute self permit or preclude the existence of unique partial selves?

The monist undertakes to show that the existence of the absolute self not merely permits, but requires, the existence of unique, included, human selves. The proof is the following: It has been shown already that the absolute self, if he exist, must be like human selves. Therefore, the absolute self must possess the individualizing consciousness, and his absoluteness must not thereby be lessened. Now the absoluteness of the self is not derogated from, the monist insists, by the existence of lesser selves within himself. In fact,

¹ Taylor, and Royce (in certain passages, not in others), seem to the writer unduly to limit the conception of individuality by identifying it exclusively with will and purpose. (Cf. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 98; Royce, "Conception of God," 1902, pp. 222, 268 *seq.*) The unique, however, is object of emotion as well as of will.

the absolute self-consciousness would be less rich and complete — which is impossible — than the human consciousness, if the absolute self were incapable of individualizing, of distinguishing through personal feeling and will, the mutually exclusive parts of himself. Thus viewed, the existence of distinct individuals, each representing a different emotion or purpose of the absolute self, is not merely reconcilable with his existence, but essential to the completeness and fulness of his experience. And not only is the multiplicity of individuals essential to the Absolute, but the existence of the Absolute is necessary to insure to each partial self its individuality. For individuality, on which the pluralist lays such stress, is a shifting, contradictory affair unless defined from the standpoint of the absolute self. A given human being is *this* to one of his friends and *this* to another and still a third *this* to himself. He would possess no one individuality were he not, fundamentally, the expression of the unique individualizing consciousness of the absolute self. Thus, this monistic personalism does not involve, as its opponents assert, the loss of human individuality. You and I, so far from being swallowed up in the absolute self, so far from being lost or engulfed in the ultimate I, find the guarantee of our individual reality precisely herein that we are essential and unique expressions of this absolute self. It is idle to raise the question, might the absolute self have existed without me — you — him? For as a matter of direct observation, I at least exist in relation to other-than-myself. Hence the absolute self is a self which includes this precise, finite self. But since his reality is absolute, it follows that whatever exists is expression of him. Thus, because the Absolute is as he is, I am what I am.

In the end, therefore, we reassert the monistic, and yet personalistic, doctrine. Ultimate reality is absolute self, not a totality of related conscious selves, but a Self, inclusive of the many selves, yet characterized by a single personality. The absolute self is conscious of himself, as I am conscious

of myself; but whereas I may distinguish myself from selves in some sense beyond me, he distinguishes himself only from selves in some sense within him. Thus he at once shares in the experience of each of these selves, for it is his experience, and yet transcends this experience, since his consciousness is more than a sum of different consciousnesses—since, in other words, he is conscious of himself as unique, as individual. The lesser selves, of whom I am one, are thus expressions, objects, of the emotion and the will of the absolute self; they exist because he has a nature such that it must express itself in these unique ways. My consciousness is, then, “identically a part” of the experience of the absolute self, “not similar . . . but identically the same as such portion,”¹ and this explains why I know the objects, though not all the objects, which the absolute self knows. My distinction from the absolute self is, in part, a purely quantitative difference, shown in the fact that I do not know so much as he. In part, however, it is the difference of the Absolute, as self, as utterly unique personality, from any one of the totality of included selves. From this difference, it follows that the lesser self does not, necessarily, feel and will with the Absolute; whereas the absolute self, besides possessing his own, the ultimate, personality, must feel and will with every partial self.

The most insistent of the problems of monistic personalism concern themselves with the relation of the selves—absolute and partial—to time, with the doctrine of human freedom, and with the question of immortality. A brief discussion of these great subjects will conclude this chapter.

(a) *The relation of absolute self and of partial selves to time*

By ‘temporal’ is meant that which exists at this moment or that. But a moment is precisely that which has both past and future. There is then neither beginning nor end of time; every moment is what it is by virtue of its relations to the irrevoc-

¹ Royce, “Conception of God,” p. 292².

cable and to the unattained. Thus, the temporal is the essentially incomplete; and because of this incompleteness, the Absolute cannot be conceived in purely temporal terms. On the other hand, the temporal has reality. Temporal distinctions are objects of actual experience. In the words of Bergson who, most vividly among contemporary writers, emphasizes the reality of time, "succession is an incontestable fact . . . *ce n'est plus du pensé c'est du vécu.*"¹ Now the absolutist has no more difficulty than any other thinker in reconciling the alleged contradictions involved in infinite time with the rationality of the universe. For all these contradictions arise, as Bergson so brilliantly shows, in the domain of abstract time — of time artificially measured and divided — and not at all with regard to concrete time, time as experienced.² But the personalistic absolutist seems to face a real obstacle in attempting to reconcile the completeness of the absolute self with the reality of time. Bergson, to whom ultimate reality consists in that which changes, does not feel this difficulty; but the absolutist cannot avoid the insistent question whether, or in what sense, the absolute consciousness is temporal. To this question he may, however, give the following answer: It follows from the analysis, already made, of the absolute self-consciousness, that the absolute self must experience the elemental sorts of consciousness, involved in the time consciousness, since human selves do have the consciousness of time, and since He experiences that which we experience. Human life, as our modern teachers insist, is movement, progress, unending struggle. In Eucken's words, the very "soul of life is self-conquest through struggle (*Selbsterröngen*)."³ But movement and struggle are temporal processes. The absolute self must therefore be conceived as temporally conscious, that is, as participating in the consciousness of the connection of the

¹ "L'évolution créatrice," edition of 1908, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 49. Cf. "Les données immédiates de la conscience," Chapter II. It is doubtful whether Bergson's term 'duration' adequately describes what he means by concrete, or real, time.

³ "Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung," pp. 128, 132, 169, 210.

irrevocable with the unattained. More closely analyzed this time-consciousness includes both a relational factor, the consciousness of connected terms, and the affective experience, yearning, hope, regret, or relief, inherent in the consciousness of the unattained or of the irrevocable. Possibly it contains also a *sui generis* elemental consciousness. These experiences, as actual, must belong to the absolute reality, the One Self.

But the absolute consciousness, though it must indeed include the temporal experience, cannot be merely temporal. The absolute self must, in other words, have both a deeper-than-temporal and a temporal consciousness, since by itself the temporal involves incompleteness. The possibility that one and the same self may possess both sorts of consciousness cannot be denied, for even the human self does not simply experience temporal succession: it has also more-than-temporal consciousness. There are at least three readily recognized examples of the more-than-temporal experience. Most fundamental of all is the consciousness, especially the emotional consciousness, of other selves. In loving and hating, in admiring and despising, we are conscious of ourselves and of other selves, not only, and not primarily, as continuous series of psychic events or even as beings developing in time, but without reference to time as unitary selves. Another example of the more-than-temporal experience of every human self is the consciousness of identity, the oneness which contradicts temporal discreteness. Thus, when I say, "This is the same song which I yesterday heard," I surely transcend the temporal difference between to-day's and yesterday's experience. And, finally, there is the more-than-temporal experience which Royce has so subtly and elaborately dissected: the consciousness of the sequence, of the melody, or of the sentence, for example, not as a series, but as a complete whole. "A succession," he observes, ". . . involves a certain . . . relation amongst the events that make up the succession. . . . Each one of them is over and past when the next one comes. . . . But side by side with this aspect

of the temporal order, . . . stands still another aspect. . . . When we more directly experience succession, — as for instance when we listen . . . to a rhythmic series of drumbeats, — we not only observe that any antecedent member of the series is over and past before the next number comes, but also, and without the least contradiction between these two aspects of our total experience, we observe that this whole succession, with both its former and later members, so far as with relative directness we apprehend the series of drumbeats or of other simple events, is present *at once* to our consciousness. . . . It is . . . true that for my consciousness *b* is experienced as following *a*, and also that *a* and *b* are *together* experienced as this relation of sequence. . . . This essentially double aspect of every experience of a present series of events . . . is a matter of . . . fundamental importance.”¹

But at this point an objection will be offered to this doctrine that the absolute, like the human, self is not only supratemporally, but also temporally, conscious. It will be urged that the Absolute, *as absolute*, is incapable of sharing human hope, yearning, and regret, since the very core and centre of these experiences is their partialness. Only in so far as a self is limited, relative, partial, can it be in hope or in fear; for how, it is asked, if it realized all, and itself constituted all reality, could it waver, yearn, or regret? The answer is once more by reference to the everyday experience of each one of us. Who that really loves a child — if only that which Plato calls the child within a man — does not know what it is to share, in a true sense, the bewilderment, the foreboding, the baseless hope due to childish ignorance, while yet one is, as adult self, unperplexed, confident, and courageous? My heart aches or yearns or beats high with his, and yet I am all the time possessed of a deeper, correcting, supplementing consciousness. Even so, we have the right to suppose, the absolute self may share the experiences, essentially incom-

¹ “The World and the Individual,” II., Lecture III., pp. 114² seq.

plete, of yearning for the unattained and of contemplating the irrevocable, holding them as real, though subordinated, elements in that ever complete consciousness of the self which is all reality. Such a view, it must carefully be noted, does not invalidate the teaching that the absolute self must feel pain. For the Absolute, as complete consciousness, must indeed share in my pain, since that is an elemental sort of experience. And yet the pain, which for me is an uncontradicted element of a doubting or despairing mood, is for him the factor of doubt or despair comprehended, and so transmuted into assurance or victory. The absolute self is thus conscious of the universe both after the temporal fashion and as a complete, that is, a non-temporal, whole. In Royce's words: "The larger consciousness does not lose the conscious incompleteness of the lesser, but gives that, just as it is, its place in the completed whole."¹ The antithesis between the temporal and the eternal, in the fullest sense of that term, is thus the contrast between the point of view which divides events into "what *now* is and what *no longer* is, — what *is to be* but is *not yet*," and the standpoint from which "these same events . . . in so far as they are viewed at once by the Absolute, are for such view all equally present." There is a curious approximation to this doctrine in the teaching, already referred to, of Mr. Schiller. He conceives of "a state of perfect adaptation" of the finite consciousness in which "there would be no consciousness of change. . . . In such a state of perfection," Schiller adds, "Time would be transcended." For eternity, in this positive sense, Schiller, in another book, appropriates a term used by Aristotle in a slightly different connection, *κίνησις ἀκινήσεως*, changeless activity; instancing as 'example' of it 'the state of perfected absorbed attention.' "Could we once attain," he exclaims, "an object of contemplation which was wholly satisfying, should we not seek to retain it in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 300.

consciousness forever?"¹ The likeness of this doctrine to that already outlined need hardly be pointed out; and the theory of the transcended time-consciousness wins a certain confirmation through the fact that it is espoused by thinkers so antagonistic. Like Royce, the monist, Schiller, the pluralist, teaches that time, spite of its partial reality, is not all-of-reality; and that eternity is a transcendence of time. Moreover, the pluralist description of time as perfect adaptation, and still more the conception of this adaptation as absorbed attention, is thoroughly compatible with the doctrine of the eternal as that which is conscious-at-once of the whole.² In addition, monistic doctrine distinguishes, though it also allies, the absolute and the human consciousness of temporal and eternal. "The presence in this sense," Royce says, "of all time at once to the Absolute constitutes the Eternal order of the world — eternal, since it is inclusive of all distinctions of temporal past and temporal future, — eternal, since, for this very reason, the totality of temporal events thus present at once to the Absolute, has no events that precede or that follow it, but contains all sequences within it, — eternal, finally, because this view of the world does not, like our partial glimpses of this or of that relative whole of sequence, pass away and give place to some other view, but includes an observation of every passing away, of every sequence . . . , and includes all the views that are taken by the various finite Selves."³ And yet, though the eternal order in its fullest sense can be known to the absolute self only, we human selves also share, though partially, in the more-than-temporal consciousness. "To conceive in what sense the temporal order of the world is also an eternal order, we

¹ "Humanism," Chapter XII., p. 217.

² After teaching the reality of time, and after insisting that eternity transcends time and forms its ideal, Schiller inconsistently makes eternity part of the temporal order, teaching that time began in eternity and is likely to end there. ("Riddles of the Sphinx," Chapter IX., § 11.)

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

have, therefore," Royce declares, "but to remember the sense in which the melody, or other sequence, is known at once to our own consciousness, despite the fact that its elements when viewed merely in their temporal succession are in so far *not* at once. . . . The brief span of our consciousness, the small range of succession, that we can grasp at once, constitutes a perfectly arbitrary limitation of our own special type of consciousness. But in principle a time-sequence, however brief, is already viewed in a way that is not *merely* temporal, when . . . it is grasped at once.¹ . . . A consciousness related to the whole of the world's events . . . precisely as our human consciousness is related to a single melody or rhythm," — a consciousness, it might be added, related to all human selves, as our human consciousness is related to any one self, which it regards both as developing life and as unitary being — such a consciousness ". . . is an Eternal Consciousness."²

(b) *The freedom of the finite self as related to the absoluteness of the absolute self*

Most difficult of all the problems which confront monistic personalism is the need of harmonizing with it the insistent claims of human freedom of choice. In calling a self free in this sense, one means that a self is, to some degree, self-directive, that it has real choice; in other words, that a self may, independently of outside influence, be conscious in this way *or* in another, — that it may be, at will, happy or unhappy, humble or imperious, good or bad.³

¹ At this point, Royce adds the words: "and is thus grasped not through mere memory but by virtue of actual experience." As I have said, in the footnote on p. 435, the antithesis between memory and actual experience seems to me unfortunate. It is rather true that experience includes memory. Moreover, the argument would be unaffected if it were held that the sequence is grasped by memory, and yet apprehended at once.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 141²-142¹.

³ It is perhaps unnecessary to remind the reader that this is by no manner of means the only sense in which a self may be called 'free.' It is free,

The pluralistic personalist is wont to assert with great vigor the reality of human freedom. To do this he has first to rescue the doctrine from the attacks of scientific determinism. This form of determinism denies human freedom on the ground that freedom is incompatible with the universality of the causal law. The causal law, as applied by natural science, is the teaching that succeeding events are connected by a uniform necessity; in other words, that they are connected in a relation such that on the repetition of event *a*, event *b* uniformly recurs. And it is urged by scientific determinists that to conceive of several sorts of conscious experience as, at one and the same time, genuinely possible is to annul the principle of uniformity, inherent in the law of causality. In meeting this objection, personal idealists (monists as well as pluralists) must, I think, admit that the doctrine of human freedom restricts the application of the causal law, by denying the absolute uniformity of causal connection. But the personalist thinker will rightly refuse to regard this as a decisive objection to the doctrine of freedom. For, as Hume and Kant have shown, the law of causality is a form of self-consciousness, its necessity is a necessity of thinking; its reality is, therefore, that of the self or selves whose consciousness it helps to constitute. It cannot then be used, like a boomerang, to weaken our confidence in the existence of any directly known or rightly inferred character of the self.¹ More than this: in the opinion of the writer, the absolute uniformity involved in the causal relation, so far from being demonstrable, is, at best, probable on the ground of repeated experience. There is, for example, no *a priori* reason why the contact of the charged wires should uniformly be followed by the spark. So conceived, the causal principle has only the force of a very wide generalization,¹ applicable particularly to external phenomena, that is, to shared percepts — also, in so far as it is self and not mere temporal phenomenon. Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, pp. 257 *seq.*

¹ Cf. Bergson, "L'évolution créatrice," pp. 31 *seq.*, 47 *seq.*; "Les données immédiates," Chapter III.; Huxley, "Collected Essays," I.

a domain of experience into which, it may well be observed, the human will seldom enters as a factor. And the fact that we habitually and reasonably look for uniformity, especially in this sphere of the external, does not prejudice the possibility of freedom of choice — does not, in other words, forbid the possibility that at a given moment this or that may happen. The principle of uniformity is regarded in this way, by consistent personalists, as an hypothesis either of universal, or else of very wide, application to the facts of the physical world — in a word, as scientific law and as a basis for our expectation of future happenings. But it is freely admitted that the principle of uniformity has the force only of a large and useful empirical generalization. Therefore the opposition between the causal law and the conception of freedom is not sufficient to disprove the reality of freedom.

The pluralist, as we have seen, asserts the existence of human freedom, thus defended, and insists that the existence of the absolute self is incompatible with the reality of human freedom. Granting the existence of the absolute self, he urges, no freedom, no alternative, would remain to the finite selves who are but expressions, manifestations, of the Absolutely Real, channels through which its reality flows. No longer, the pluralist insists, can the monist conceive of a human self as being, at this moment, glad *or* sorry, good *or* bad; the consciousness of this self-direction, possible choice, or freedom, is a pure illusion due to our imperfect recognition of our source. In truth, we must feel and will — no less than perceive — in accordance with the One Will. This, then, is the issue: either the assertion of human freedom *or* absolutist personalism, either the doctrine of human selves possessed of true alternative *or* the doctrine of selves as determined expressions of the One Self. If the alternative is indeed unavoidable, then either human freedom must be denied, or we must admit an unnoticed flaw in those arguments which have led to monistic personalism. These

arguments are so recently outlined that they need not here be reviewed. The considerations tending to establish human freedom should, on the other hand, be briefly restated.¹ They reduce to two: first, that we are often conscious of freedom, that we seem to ourselves free to will thus *or* thus; second, the alleged implication of freedom in the moral consciousness.

The first of these arguments starts from the normal human self's instinctive belief that he is free. Experience of one sort or another may bring me to the point of denying my freedom, but primitively I believe myself to control, to some degree, my own consciousness. It may be questioned, however, whether this is a sufficient ground for regarding freedom after Eucken's and Bergson's fashion as "an undeniable fact of experience."¹ That a majority of human beings have a feeling of freedom may well be admitted. But a finite being might be dependent without being conscious of dependence; it might, in its imperfectness, ascribe to its own narrow self a power greater than it possessed. Its consciousness of freedom, then, though actual, would not be ultimately real — would not conform to the whole constitution of reality. Such a self would err, like the supposed cannon-ball which, coming to consciousness in mid-air, attributed to itself the power which actually originated in the cannon.

More important is the argument for freedom from the existence of the moral consciousness. I have, so the argument should run, the consciousness of obligation, the conviction that "I ought." This is a feeling quite distinct from every mere *expeditur* — every belief that "I would better act thus or thus." Its uniqueness constitutes the very inner core of such characteristic experiences as those of remorse and of self-respect. Now, second, if the feeling of obligation be not also an illusion of consciousness, it implies moral freedom.

¹ Cf. Eucken, "Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung," p. 147.

It is, then, true that I can if I ought; it is certain that I may espouse either good or evil, if it is true that I am rightly praised for the one choice and blamed for the other — in a word, if it is true that I ought to choose the good. Once more, then, the decision turns on the question whether an experience be illusory or true. Evidently the answer to this question cannot be given on the basis of direct observation. Nobody, indeed, can feel obligation without feeling it as real; the mere conviction that my feeling adequately represents the real nature of the universe is, as has just been admitted, no demonstration that it is real. But certain considerations about the nature of the absolute self tend to confirm the individual persuasion of freedom. To a complete self-consciousness, it was shown,¹ belong emotional and volitional phases. A complete self loves, pities, wills. But both emotional and voluntary consciousness individualize their objects; there seems, then, an inherent reason why the absolute self should individualize its own self-expressions. And, in the second place, if the absolute self be conceived as good, it may be urged that it is inconsistent with such goodness that the finite selves be deceived on precisely this point of their moral obligation. This is, of course, in principle Descartes's argument against God's deceitfulness. Obviously, it offers tempting openings to unwarranted anthropomorphism, and to unduly individual interpretation of the Absolute, yet (though, for these reasons no great stress may be laid on it) as a supplementary consideration it may carry weight.

So far as has to this point appeared, the doctrine of human freedom of choice has not established itself. In other words no consideration has compelled the recognition of human freedom in this sense. In the issue between the truth of human freedom and the existence of the absolute self, he who has found reason to accept the reality of the Absolute cannot

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 427 seq.

yield this conviction in favor of the claims of the freedom of the human self. From this point of view there is, in truth, but one possibility of human freedom. If the freedom of the lesser self is willed by the Absolute, then — and only then — is the lesser self free. To such a conception there is, however, a ready and serious objection: For how, the objector asks, can the Absolute be supposed to will my freedom to choose what He does not will? The following paragraphs are submitted as a contribution to the discussion of this great problem.

(1) The purpose of the human self in opposition to the absolute will should, of course, be conceived as opposed to His specific and not to His inclusive purpose. In other words, the human self is partially and not completely free; his opposition to absolute will is futile; his temporarily rebellious will is a factor, not in itself but as balanced by other factors, in the full expression of the complex purpose of the absolute self. More concretely stated: I, as unique self, am object of the will of the Absolute. But if He purposes precisely my freedom, then it follows that specific acts and momentary choices may be in opposition to what would have been His purpose if He had willed a world without me in it. We may best understand this by recourse to a human analogy. The wise teacher chooses that his pupil shall become an independent thinker. To this end he wills that the student shall make experiments and sift evidence for himself. But this means that the teacher wills his pupil's very errors, not in themselves but as temporary factors of the capacity for independence.

2) To this attempted reconciliation between absolutism and the doctrine of freedom it will however be objected that the analogy is misleading. For, from the absolutist standpoint, a human purpose, like everything else, is real only by being object of the absolute experience and therefore, it may be urged, every human purpose is *ipso facto* purpose of the Absolute, and there can be no will which

is, in any sense, opposed to His. This is a very important objection and indeed many writers deny that it can really be met. Let the following consideration suggest the possibility, if it does not demonstrate the necessity, of reconciling limited human freedom with absolute will. The absolute self, though He unquestionably experiences all that I experience, none the less opposes some of the objects of my will. All realities, my free choices included, are objects of the Absolute's consciousness — are real, indeed, only as experienced by Him. But in so far as He has willed me to be free there must, or may, be partial phases of reality which He opposes. If, for example, I choose, in opposition to the absolute will, to commit a theft, this very volition of mine is a part of the absolute experience, else it has no reality, yet the absolute self though conscious of it opposes it.

To this conception it will be objected (*a*) that by experiencing what He opposes the absolute self would become passive. In reply it may, with some confidence, be suggested that though the Absolute must be fundamentally active, He yet may be conceived as willing his own partial passivity. Such a relation of self-activity to passivity though it seems paradoxical, is psychologically possible. Thus, suffering is a passivity, but I may cling to the very agony of my yearning for one who has gone from me.

But the objector will return (*b*) with reiterated emphasis to his first position. The absolute self, he will insist, can not in this fashion be conceived as opposing and still willing the finite self's rebellious purpose. For, by hypothesis the finite self's very rebellious purpose exists only as part of the absolute self's consciousness, or — to put this in another way — the finite self exists only by virtue of forming an identical part of the Absolute. How then can the finite self be supposed to will anything in opposition to the absolute will? To this question the following reply may be suggested: The finite self, it will be reasserted, does form an identical part of the Absolute Self. Th

absolute self, therefore, experiences all that the lesser self experiences in its rebellious will — all its sensational and affective consciousness, all its imperious and combative ‘attitudes.’ More than this: the absolute self, in willing the finite self as he actually is, wills precisely this rebellious volition. But the Absolute wills the rebellious volition not, as the lesser self wills it, in isolation and out of relation to the whole, but as part of a universe which includes, also, such other purposes and fulfilments as balance or (in Royce’s fine phrase) ‘atone for’ this rebellious volition and its outcome.¹ Thus, the rebellious purpose of the finite self, though indeed experienced and willed by the Absolute, differs from the Absolute’s purpose by the essential difference between part and whole; and Absolute Will differs from partial will merely, but significantly, by transcending it. The distinction may once more be compared to that between the circle and the sector. The circle unquestionably possesses all the qualities of a sector — excepting that of not-being-a-complete-circle. Such a difference, inherent in the very natures of ‘part’ and ‘whole,’ certainly cannot invalidate their genuine qualitative identity. Absolute Will differs from human will not in what it lacks but in what it adds.

(c) *Immortal moral selves and nature-selves*

The eager effort to attain a philosophical demonstration of human immortality is neither unnatural nor unjustified. For philosophy, as cannot too often be said, is an aspect or part of life, and it follows that nothing may be hoped which may not also be thought. The problem is, at this stage of our thought, the following: does or does not monistic personal idealism require the endless existence of the partial selves — does this monistic personalism at least guarantee

¹ “The Problem of Christianity,” I., Lecture V.

the existence of the human self after the event which we call death?

It is at once evident that our philosophy, in the words — often quoted — of McTaggart, “gives us hope.” This it does, in so far as it is a form of immaterialism, by delivering us from the fear of death regarded as the victory of matter over spirit. The proof that matter is phenomenal, that the body to which change comes is but a complex of ideal qualities, that the dissolution of the body need therefore mean no more than the loss of a familiar percept common to a group of selves — all these deductions from idealistic doctrine meet the most common objection to the conviction of immortality. The personalistic form of idealism adds a positive consideration in favor of the doctrine. The conclusion that ultimate reality is not merely ideal, but personal, cannot fail, by its emphasis on the truth of personality, at the least to quicken the hope of immortality.

We are, however, immediately concerned with the bearing on the immortality problem of the doctrine of the monistic form of personal idealism — the conception of the human self as expression of the Absolute.¹ Most pluralistic personalists believe it impossible to combine a philosophic conviction of immortality with a doctrine of the absolute self. The conception of the partial selves as included in the Absolute, as mere expressions of the One Self — this conception, they urge, deprives the partial selves of individuality; it is therefore likely that these mere illusions of personality will succumb to the vicissitude of death. Now it should at once be recognized that it is abstractly possible to conceive an absolute self which is expressed in temporally limited forms — in selves which are not endowed with immortality. For the Absolute has been admitted to be temporal as well as supratemporal, therefore he might conceivably be manifested in

¹ Cf., throughout, Royce, “The Conception of Immortality,” and “The World and the Individual,” II., pp. 444 *seq.*

discontinuing temporal forms. On the other hand, it must be insisted that the Absolute might at least as probably express himself not exclusively in temporally limited but also in temporally endless forms. Unless, then, some positive argument inclines us in one way or in another, immortality will remain, from the point of view of this philosophy, an open question. But such a positive consideration is not lacking; it is discovered through a study of the moral consciousness. For though a man may not directly realize himself as immortal, yet every man who knows himself as unique person may discover also that as such he is possessed of a specific duty — a duty which distinguishes him from other selves, a duty which is his own particular way of expressing the Absolute. Now it is of the nature of duty to be endless. There is no such thing as fulfilled obligation, for every achievement of duty forges a fresh claim, every moral conquest is itself the call to a new battle. Not, therefore, on the ground that the absolute self could express himself only in immortal partial selves, and still less because human beings yearn for immortality, but because there are human beings who know themselves as embodiments of unique duties, and because a duty is inherently endless, therefore the monistic personalist may hold to the immortality of the moral self.

This admission that freedom and immortality are not inherent characters of a self, coupled with our previous decision that all reality is personal, leads to the assertion of the probable existence of lesser selves expressing the temporary and progressive not the eternal purposes of the Absolute. Such a conception "does away with the distinc-

¹ The conception of 'physical nature' here suggested (pampsychism) is held by Royce ("The World and the Individual," esp. Lecture V.), and by Ward ("The Realm of Ends," esp. Lecture XII.). The two differ in that Royce affirms and Ward denies that the finite selves are, one and all, manifestations of an Absolute. Another idealistic view of Nature, that of Berkeley, refuses to attribute personality to inorganic nature, regarding it rather as uncentred, as experienced not experiencer, a psychic object common to several subjects. Bosanquet seems to formulate an absolutistic idealism of this type ("The Principle of Individuality and Value," Lecture X.).

tion between persons and things altogether." For there well may be many different orders of these selves — selves of merely momentary sensational and affective experience, selves with limited memory, even perhaps selves with restricted foresight and narrow purposes. But so long as such partial selves are devoid, each one, of a life-ideal, a genuinely moral purpose, they have no claim on immortality, are not — in the fullest sense — human selves. What we call physical nature may well be constituted, as Leibniz and Fechner have taught, by these partial selves, in their divers kinds below the level of humanity. They differ from us so widely that we can not definitely designate them. We can not, for example, speak with assurance of tree-self, stream-self, or rock-self. For our complex experience — the tree, stream, or rock-experience — may conceivably not be shared with a particular subject-self, but may rather indicate a mere fragment of self or else a multitude of lesser selves. In more concrete terms: Whereas by analogy with our own bodies we can with reasonable assurance identify a human body, that is, the complex sense experience which signalizes for us the existence of another human self, we lack exact acquaintance with the bodies of other-than-human selves. And we are not only ignorant of the precise nature and extent of these lesser selves, but are unable to share their experience in any verifiable way. In Royce's telling phrase, physical nature, though not unconscious, is uncommunicative.

A discussion of the problems suggested by this view of Nature would lead us much too far afield. We have ended one stage of our philosophic journey, for we have gained a vision of the truth as the monistic personalist sees it: the vision of a One which includes, without annihilating, the many, of an absolute self who guarantees the individuality of the particular selves, of an eternity which transcends yet does not negate time, and of an immortality required by the deathless ideals of every moral self.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHIES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF MODERN WRITERS ON PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH SUMMARIES AND DISCUSSIONS OF CERTAIN TEXTS

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS Appendix contains (1) biographies and bibliographies of those writers whose systems are discussed at length in this book, and (2) briefer notes upon most of the writers to whom the book incidentally refers. It further supplements the book by (3) certain critical notes, excluded for simplicity's sake from the body of the book; and by (4) commentaries on those portions of Kant's "Kritik of Pure Reason" and Spinoza's "Ethics" which are not considered in Chapters 8 and 9. The order followed in the Appendix differs from that of the chapters mainly by grouping the philosophers with greater reference to their nationality and by restoring Spinoza to his proper chronological position.

In selecting critical works for reference, the standard histories of philosophy have not been repeatedly mentioned by name; and the lists of commentators have been lengthened or shortened, according to the obscurity or clearness of the different systems. An effort has been made, in most cases, to head the lists by titles of works which seem to the writer of greatest importance to the student. For fuller bibliographies the student is referred to the "Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology, and Cognate Subjects," compiled by Benjamin Rand as Volume III., Part I., of Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology."

A. FORERUNNERS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

GIORDANO BRUNO (1548-1600)

Giordano Bruno, born at Nola near Naples, entered as a youth the Dominican order, but soon abandoned the monastic vocation. After an adventurous life of travel and teaching, in Paris, London,

and Germany, he was arrested in Venice by order of the Inquisition; was imprisoned for two years; and was burned at the stake in the Campo dei Fiori at Rome, where his statue now stands as memorial to his daring life of thought and to his martyr death. Bruno accepted unreservedly the Copernican system as metaphysical and not merely as astronomical principle. To him the universe is both infinite and alive, and God is its soul. Evidently, therefore, Bruno's writings contain in germ most of the important doctrines of modern philosophy.

CHIEF WRITINGS

1584. "De la causa, principio, et uno," Venice.
 1584. "Del infinito universo e dei mondi," Venice.
 1591. "De monade, numero et figura," Frankfort.
 1591. "De immenso et innumerabilibus s. de universo et mundis," Frankfort.
 "Opera latine conscripta," Naples, 1879-91.
 "Opere (Italian writings)," new edition, Göttingen, 1888-89.

J. Lewis McIntyre, Giordano Bruno, 1903. (The most detailed account in English of Bruno's life and works.)

Cf. Frith, Lutoslawski, Pater, and Tocco — all cited by Rand.

FRANCIS BACON (1561-1626)

The brilliant career of Francis Bacon, in the reigns of Elizabeth and the first James, and his tragic fall from the office of Lord High Chancellor are familiar to students of English history. Bacon's contribution to metaphysics is mainly negative; he opened the way for modern philosophy by his vigorous onslaught on scholasticism and on every sort of formalism. For the rest, the value of his work consists in the impetus which he gave to inductive, to scientific, and — in particular — to experimental, method.

CHIEF WRITINGS

1597. "Essays."
 1605. "The two Bookes of Francis Bacon: Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Humane." (In Latin, 1623, "De Dignitate et augmentis Scientiarum." Latest edition, with the Essays, Lond., 1874.)
 1620. "Novum organum scientiarum." (First published, 1612, as "Cognitata et visa." Latest edition, Camb., 1878.)

Cf. the histories of philosophy for accounts of the lives and writings of other writers of the Renaissance, especially for discussion of Boehme, and of Campanella.

B. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH LEIBNIZ

RENÉ DESCARTES: THE PLURALISTIC DUALIST

I. LIFE (1596-1650)

René Descartes, born of a noble family in Touraine, was educated in the well-known Jesuit school at La Flèche, and early showed unusual power of acquisition and initiative. It was characteristic of him, that, despite his love of study, he left school when he was only sixteen years old. His earliest published work, the "Discourse on Method," recalls the period of his early studies, and sets forth the reasons for his temporary abandonment of the life of study. "I knew," he says, "that the languages learned in the schools are necessary for understanding the books of the ancients, . . . but I thought I had given enough time to the languages and even to the books, histories, and fables of the ancients, for . . . if one spend too much time in travelling, one becomes a stranger in one's own land. I especially enjoyed mathematics, . . . but I did not yet realize its true use, thinking that it served only for the mechanic arts. . . . I revered theology, but having learned that the way to heaven is no less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that revealed truths . . . are beyond our intelligence, I would not have dared to submit them to the feebleness of my reasoning. As for philosophy, . . . seeing that it had been cultivated by the best minds for several centuries and that none the less there was nothing undisputed in it, I had not the presumption to hope to succeed better than the others. . . .

"Therefore, as soon as my age permitted, I utterly abandoned study and resolving to seek no other knowledge than that which could be found within myself or in the great book of the world, I employed the rest of my youth in travelling, in seeing courts and armies, in mingling with people of different dispositions and conditions, in gaining all sorts of experience . . . everywhere making

such reflection as would profit me, on the subjects which presented themselves. For I believed that I should meet much more truth in the reasonings of every man on the matters which concerned him, than in the reasonings of a man of letters in his study, on useless speculations. . . . And I was always deeply anxious to learn to distinguish the true from the false, that I might see clearly in my actions and might walk assuredly in this life."¹

The first two of Descartes's four years of military service were spent in the Netherlands, in the service of Prince Maurice, son of William of Orange. The position seems a curious one for a pupil of the Jesuits; but France under Louis XIII., with Marie de Medici as virtual sovereign, offered no military career; and the hostility of France toward Spain and Austria had sent many Frenchmen to the army of Maurice. Two years later, when this first service ended, Descartes enrolled himself in the army which Maximilian led to fight for the Emperor Ferdinand II., in his pretensions to the throne of Bohemia, against the Bohemians led by the Protestant king of their choice, the unfortunate Frederick V.

But neither camps nor courts could divert Descartes from the life of thought to which he was called. He never saw active military service; and, especially during the years of armed truce in which he served Maurice, he had abundant leisure for the mathematical investigation which constitutes his earliest claim to the world's regard. His friendship with the Dutch mathematician, Isaac Beeckman, dates from this period. A little later he took up the tangled thread of philosophical speculation, with the avowed aim of introducing into metaphysics mathematical clearness and precision.² For a time he lived in Paris; but, though admirably fitted by position, intellect, and training, for a life of social intercourse, he found the cosmopolitan and crowded life of the city ill suited for a student's environment. Consequently, he withdrew to the Netherlands, and — the better to avoid distractions — changed his residence from time to time, communicating with the world outside through the medium of trusted friends who kept his secret.

In this solitude, Descartes composed his works on philosophy

¹ "Discourse on Method," Pt. I., paragraphs 7-14.

² Cf. *supra*, Chapter 2, pp. 26, 38, 45.

and natural science. He was not a student of preceding systems of philosophy, for he reacted strongly from the mediævalism of his day, and reached metaphysics by the way of mathematics and science.¹ The story goes that he led a visitor, who had asked to see his library, into his dissecting-room and, pointing to the partly dissected body of a calf, said "This is my library." Besides inventing the fruitful method of analytic geometry, Descartes made contributions of more or less importance to physics — notably to optics — to astronomy, to physiology, and to psychology. The list of his writings, which follows, suggests the scope of his intellectual activity.

Both the scientific and the philosophical speculations of Descartes tended to bring him into conflict with the Romanist church, of which he remained throughout his life a loyal member. That the opposition of the church was never more pronounced is due to Descartes's attitude of at least outward submission. He suppressed his earliest work, "*Le Monde*," when the tidings reached him of the condemnation of Galileo's doctrine; and he says in the last paragraph of his "*Principles*," "Nevertheless . . . I affirm nothing, but submit all this to the authority of the Catholic church and the judgment of the more prudent. . . ." His position seems to savor of unworthy subservience; yet there is little doubt that he was sincere in the belief that his independent scientific and metaphysical conclusions were in harmony with the teachings of the church.

The influence of Descartes on philosophy was quickly felt and widely extended. Modern thinkers, scornful of the dogmas of scholasticism, welcomed a metaphysical system which started out from the position of the doubter, and which made clear thinking its criterion. Among the friends whom he made, by his teaching, are two women of remarkable, though diverse, gift. The first is the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of that Bohemian elector, against whom Descartes had served. Elizabeth, to whom Descartes wrote, "I know but one mind and that is your own, to which both geometry and the first philosophy are alike congenial," lived for several years at her mother's court in The Hague; and in order to be near her Descartes lived in the neighboring palace of Endegeest. For her he wrote that brilliant psychological essay, "*The*

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chapter 2, pp. 19 *seq.*; also Chapter 1, pp. 6 *seq.*

Passions of the Soul"; and to her he dedicated the summary of his system called "Principles of Philosophy." The correspondence between the two (published in full in the new, complete edition of Descartes) reveals, in both master and disciple, the qualities of loyal friendship and of vigorous thought.

The more famous of Descartes's disciples is Queen Christina of Sweden. In 1649 he accepted her invitation to Stockholm, prompted to leave the Netherlands because his doctrine, as taught at the universities, had fallen under the ban of the church. But he was not fitted to endure either the rigorous climate of Sweden or the strenuous life of his royal hostess, who demanded philosophical discourse in the early hours of the cold, northern winter days. He died, deeply and truly mourned, in 1650.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Chief Writings of Descartes

(Arranged according to dates of publication)

- 1637. "Essais philosophiques," including
 "Discours de la méthode." (For English translation, see below.)
 "Dioptrique."
- 1641. "Meditationes de prima philosophia."
 Written in 1629. Originally published, with the Objections of various scholars, to whom the work had been submitted in manuscript, and with Descartes's Replies to these Objections. Followed, in 1647, by a translation into French, by the Duc de Luynes, corrected by Descartes. (For translation, see below.)
- 1644. "Principia philosophiæ."
 A summary, in formal propositions, of Descartes's philosophy, physics, physiology, and psychology. (For translation, see below.)
- 1650. "Traité des passions de l'âme."
 A brilliant little treatise on the psychology of the emotions.
- 1664. "Le monde ou traité de la lumière."
 "Traité de l'homme et de la formation du fœtus."
 Portions only of the earliest of Descartes's works, finished in 1633, but never published in his lifetime.

b. Editions and Translations

- "Opera omnia." 8 vols, Amst., 1670-83.
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THE OCCASIONALISTS¹

ARNOLD GEULINX (1625-1669)

Geulinx was born at Antwerp, taught in the universities of Loewen and of Leyden, and died in Leyden. From his metaphysical doctrine of the entire independence of mind from body, Geulinx deduced an ascetic sort of ethics. *Ubi nil valet, ibi nil velis*, are the words in which he exhorts the soul to escape the world and its lusts.

1662. "Logica."

1665. "De virtute . . . Tractatus ethicus primus."

1688. "Physica vera: opus posthumum."

1691. "Metaphysica vera."

"Opera philosophica," ed. J. P. N. Land, The Hague, 1891-93.

¹The term applies to Geulinx and his followers rather than to Malebranche.

NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715)

The life of Malebranche was given over to philosophic and religious meditation and retirement. He was a member of the Oratory of Jesus.

1674-75. "De la recherche de la vérité."

1680. "Traité de la nature et de la grâce."

1684. "Traité de morale."

1698. "Traité de l'amour de Dieu."

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BARUCH DE SPINOZA: THE MONISTIC PLURALIST

I. LIFE (1632-1677)

Baruch Spinoza was born in November, 1632. His parents belonged to the community of the Portuguese Jews who had taken refuge in Amsterdam from the persecution of the Inquisition. His early environment was therefore that of the Hebrew community in Amsterdam — a society which, despite its political freedom, was yet isolated by its distinct customs and traditions. All that we know of his childhood and youth are certain details of his training at the Jewish schools in Hebrew literature; and later under his well-known tutor, Francis van den Ende, in Latin, in physiology, and perhaps in philosophy. The story of his unsuccessful courtship of Van den Ende's daughter rests on too slight evidence to be credited.

The most significant event of Spinoza's outward life was his expulsion, in 1656, from the Jewish synagogue. We do not know exactly what course of thought or what line of reading disposed Spinoza to question the teachings of the rabbis. Certainly the teaching of Descartes profoundly affected his thinking, and it is very likely that he was influenced by the nature-philosophy of Bruno and of the mediæval neo-Platonists.¹ His expulsion from the synagogue followed an unsuccessful attempt of the rabbis to purchase by an annuity of one thousand florins his outward conformity with Jewish ceremonial and teaching. The sentence

¹ Cf. Pollock (pp. 82 *seq.*), and Avenarius, both cited below.

which excommunicated him pronounced him "cursed . . . by day . . . and by night, . . . in sleeping and . . . in waking, . . . in going out and in coming in;" and warned the members of the synagogue "that none may speak with him . . . nor show any favor to him . . . nor come within four cubits of him."¹

The twenty years which remained of Spinoza's life were spent in the spiritual solitude, enforced by this excommunication, from the association with the friends of his race and of his youth. His doctrines of government, of scripture interpretation, and of theology earned for him the distrust and the enmity both of Protestant and of Romanist church, and of the prevalent Cartesian philosophy.² In the years following immediately upon his expulsion, he lived near Amsterdam with a friend who belonged to the small dissenting Christian community of the Remonstrants; later, he spent a few years in the village of Rijnsburg, near Leyden, the headquarters of this same sect; the last ten or twelve years of his life he spent in or near The Hague.

In 1670 appeared the only work which Spinoza published during his lifetime, the "*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*," which in the first place advocated the interpretation of the Scriptures as literary and historical documents and as vehicles of moral truth; in the second place, appealed from church to state authority; and finally, counselled absolute freedom of thought and speech, on the ground that a man may live rightly whatever his theory, or speculative system. A storm of disapproval greeted each one of these teachings. The book was prohibited by the Dutch government and was placed on the Index.² None the less it gained the attention of thoughtful men, and perhaps procured for Spinoza, in 1672, an invitation, which he declined, to the chair of philosophy in Heidelberg University. "I reflect," he said, "that I must give up philosophic research if I am to find time for teaching a class. I reflect, moreover, that I cannot tell within what bounds to confine . . . philosophic freedom."

During all these years Spinoza supported himself by the handicraft which he had learned as a boy, in accordance with the Jewish custom: the art, in which he acquired both skill and reputation, of making and polishing glasses. His outward life was one of

¹ Freudenthal, pp. 115-116, note, cited below.

² Cf. the resolutions of synods, States of Holland, etc., quoted by Freudenthal.

almost austere simplicity, of thrift, and of scrupulous honor. Its quiet was, to be sure, well-nigh disturbed when, in 1672, he was barely restrained from exposing himself to personal danger by the public expression of his indignation at the assassination of Jan and Cornelius de Witte. Of the vigorous and daring range of his thought, speculative and practical, during these mainly uneventful years, his works give evidence. For proof of his capacity to give and to gain loyal friendship we must turn to the small collection of his letters and to the indications given by contemporary biographers. Most significant of these is John Colerus, a minister of the Lutheran church at The Hague. For the 'pernicious opinions' of Spinoza, the philosopher, Colerus entertained only 'aversion and horror,' but he honored the simple, honest, and courageous life of the man, and deprecated the 'many and false reports' about him. In truth, the judgment of Spinoza's contemporaries has long since been reversed. Not only is his philosophy the source of one strong current in modern thought, but many who reject or care not for his metaphysics seek in his ethics and in the example of his life to learn the lesson of renunciation touched with enthusiasm.

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III. NOTE UPON SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITE MODES

'Infinite modes' of two sorts ('immediate' and 'mediate' infinite modes, as one may designate them, for want of names definitely given by Spinoza) are described in Propositions 21 and 22 of Part I. of the "Ethics," but so ambiguously that the student will at once turn to Letter 66 (Van Vloten 64) for the illustrations which Spinoza gives of these infinite modes. "The examples you ask for of the first kind," he says, "are, in thought, absolutely infinite understanding; in extension, motion and rest; an example of the second kind is the appearance of the whole universe (*facies totius universi*)."

By *facies totius universi*, Spinoza may be supposed to mean the indefinitely great (and thus, in a certain sense, the infinite) sum of all the finite modes — of all the minds, ideas, bodies, and physical processes. For the other examples of infinite modes, it is harder to find a place in Spinoza's system. In my own hesi-

tating opinion, Spinoza meant to designate by 'infinite intellect' the fundamental aspect of the attribute, thought, and by 'motion and rest' the significant aspects of extension.¹ Thus conceived, the infinite modes of this group are, as it were, sub-attributes. Such an interpretation, it must be admitted, gives a new meaning to the term 'mode'; but other interpretations (that of Erdmann and Fischer, for example) are not reconcilable with Proposition 2I of Part I. The truth is that Spinoza treats the whole subject so briefly and recurs to it so seldom that we may well question whether we are able to discover his meaning.

IV. EXPOSITION AND ESTIMATE OF PARTS II.-V. OF SPINOZA'S "ETHICS"

The discussion of Spinoza's psychology, epistemology, and ethics, though it does not fall within the narrow purpose of this book, is here undertaken both because these doctrines are so frequently referred to in the strictly metaphysical portions of the "Ethics," and because they form the consummation of Spinoza's teaching. It seems unjust to Spinoza and unfair to his great work, the "Ethics," to present its metaphysical without its practical doctrine. A further justification of such a summary is the fact that the very wealth of detail in Parts IV. and V. of the "Ethics" often obscures the underlying principles of Spinoza's psychological and ethical teachings. The sections following attempt only to indicate the underlying outlines of his doctrine. For stimulus to psychological analysis, as for the tranquillizing yet invigorating influence of Spinoza's theory of the moral life, the reader must turn to the 'Ethics' itself.

a. The Psychology and Epistemology of Spinoza

1. The nature of mind

Spinoza has two ways of describing the mind. The first and most natural of these is found in the third definition of Part II. of the "Ethics," where Spinoza says of the mind that it is "a conscious thing" which forms ideas.² This is a conception of the

¹ Cf. "Tractatus de Deo et homine," Pt. I., 8 and 9.

² 'Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum quem mens format, propterea quod es est cogitans.'

mind as subject of consciousness. It is restated by Spinoza in many connections; as when he says: "the mind will contemplate,"¹ "the mind imagines,"² "the mind perceives . . . through ideas."³

Spinoza's second way of describing the mind is as the complex idea of the body.⁴ According to this view, the mind is no longer a subject of ideas, or a self conscious of ideas, but is the mere sum of ideas. This is the conception whose inadequacy has been revealed by the study of Hume's theory of the self.⁵ Spinoza seems not to realize its inconsistency with his more usual view of the mind as possessor, not sum, of ideas. He, however, employs this complex-idea-theory of the mind only when he is emphasizing the practically useful conception of the mind as parallel to, coördinate with, the body. This is the meaning of the statement that the mind is constituted by an idea of the body — a teaching about the relation of mind to body which follows necessarily from Spinoza's general doctrine of parallelism. And even if, as suggested in the latter part of the eighth chapter of this book, there is reason to question the metaphysical validity of the concept of parallelism, every one will admit this conception of the mind as a convenient way of ordering psychical and physical phenomena. That is, to put it differently, most psychologists will admit that minds and bodies, as observed, are, to say the least, parallel phenomena even if they are also interrelated, and even if one of the two turns out to be more real than the other.⁶

Thus Spinoza's definition of the mind as 'idea of the body,' in the first place, substitutes for the conception of the mind as conscious thing (*res cogitans*) the less adequate view of it as a sum of ideas. In the second place, however, it supplements either of the two conceptions of the mind by the accepted teaching that the mind is parallel to the body. Unhappily, however, Spinoza appears to be sometimes himself misled by this ambiguity of the

¹ "Ethics," II., 17, Corol. ² *Ibid.*, Scholium. ³ II., 26. Cf. 43, Schol.

⁴ II., 13: "Objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus." Cf. 11 and 15.

⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 179.

⁶ Spinoza himself indicates this double meaning of the term 'idea,' in the Scholium to II. 17, where he sets forth the difference between (1) the 'idea' (that is, the psychic phenomenon, parallel to Peter's body), which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and (2) the 'idea' (consciousness) of Peter's body which Paul has. The physical parallel to this second idea, *Paul's idea*, of Peter's body is, as Spinoza does not fail to point out, a modification of Paul's, not of Peter's, body.

term 'idea,' and seems accordingly to regard the mind, defined as idea of the body, as if it were not a parallel, but a consciousness, of the body. This, at least, is the obvious meaning of such a statement as the following, "Nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind."¹ Such an assertion flatly contradicts our experience. We certainly are not conscious of all the bodily changes which, there is reason to suppose, go on in our bodies. The doctrine is inconsistent with Spinoza's initial conception of the mind; and it may well be that his expression, not his thought, is at fault and that he never meant to teach that the mind is conscious of all bodily modifications. His words, however, sometimes lend themselves to this interpretation, and in any case he uses the word 'idea' with misleading ambiguity.²

2. *The different sorts of consciousness and their value*

Spinoza's account of the different types of consciousness, that is, his psychological classification, is preceded and, in part, based on a discussion of the properties of body.³ Spinoza justifies this procedure on the ground of his parallelism: if psychic changes go on, side by side, with physical ones, then for every distinct physical change, a psychical change is to be expected. To this method it may be objected that, considering the assumed independence of psychical and physical, each should be studied for itself and classified by internal likenesses and differences.

Waiving this objection to the adequacy of Spinoza's method, we may now summarize and classify, as follows, Spinoza's psychological and epistemological doctrine — his classification of consciousness according to (1) its value, (2) its object, (3) the accompanying physical phenomena: —

Stage I. *Opinion or Imagination.*⁴

A. Its Nature: —

I. Consciousness of the Body.

a. *Cognition* (Consciousness primarily of external bodies which affect one's own body): —

1. Primary Cognition (The possession of ideas exactly corresponding to external bodies): —

¹ "Ethics," II., 12.

² Cf. Pollock, "Spinoza," p. 125

³ "Ethics," II., 13, with its Axioms, Lemmas, and Postulates.

⁴ "Ethics," II., 40, Schol. 2. Cf. Spinoza's "On the Improvement of the Understanding," Elwes's translation, p. 8. The technical names used by Spinoza himself are italicized.

- (a) *Perception*,¹ when these external bodies are present.
 (b) *Imagination*,² when these external bodies are absent.

Note. *Memory*:³ repeated imagination.

Association:⁴ the relation of images.

2. Secondary Cognition (The consciousness, varying with the individual, of common qualities of bodies):⁵ —

(a) Abstract⁵ (e.g. 'Being,' 'Thing').

(b) Concrete⁵ (e.g. 'Man,' 'Horse').

- b. *Affect*:⁶ (Consciousness primarily of one's own body as affected.)

II. The Mind's Consciousness of Itself (*Idea ideae*).⁷

Note. The Mind's illusional consciousness of freedom.⁸

B. The Value of *Opinion*:⁹ —

- I. Opinion is inadequate, because its parallel (a modification of the human body) is more limited than its object (external thing, human body, or itself).¹⁰

II. Opinion is

a. Untrue so far as its object is external body, human body, or mind;¹¹ yet

b. True so far as its object is a limited idea.¹¹

Notes. a. Falsity is not a positive quality.¹²

b. Ideas, even if inadequate and untrue, are necessary.¹³

Stage II. *Reason*.

A. Its Nature: Consciousness of ideas common to all men.¹⁴

I. Ideas of modifications, which are

a. 1. Common to all bodies and parts of bodies.¹⁵

2. Common to all ideas.

b. Common to human body and to all affecting bodies.¹⁶

II. Ideas of the eternal and necessary as such (extension, thought, and infinite modes).¹⁷

B. Its Value.

- I. These common ideas are relatively adequate, or complete, because limited in intention.¹⁸

¹ "Ethics," II., 17. ² II., 17, Corol. ³ II., 18, Schol. ⁴ II., 18.

⁵ II., 40, Schol. 1. ⁶ III., Def. 3. (Cf. *infra*, p. 473 *seq.*) ⁷ II., 21 and 43.

⁸ I., Appendix, and II., 35, Schol.

⁹ Spinoza has two criteria of the value of the different forms of consciousness: their adequacy, which he defines as their completeness (cf. II., Def. IV.); and their truth, which he defines as the agreements of the idea with its object (*ideatum*). Cf. II., Def. 4; Epistle 64 (Van Vloten, 60); "Improvement of the Understanding," Elwes's trans., pp. 12 *seq.* He teaches, also, that the adequate is the true (II., 34). ¹⁰ II., 25-28. ¹¹ II., 41, 35, and Schol.

¹² II., 33; Epistle 34 (Van Vloten, 21); "Improvement of the Understanding," Elwes's translation, p. 40, VIII. ¹³ II., 36.

¹⁴ II., 40, Schol. 2; 38, Corol.; "Improvement of the Understanding," Elwes's translation, p. 8. ¹⁵ II., 38. ¹⁶ II., 39. ¹⁷ II., 44, and Corol. 2 with Proof.

¹⁸ II., 38-40.

II. These common ideas are true

a. because adequate;¹

b. because the object, with which they agree, is limited.²

Stage III. *Intuitive Knowledge.*

A. Its Nature: knowledge of real essence of

I. Attributes of God.³

II. Things.³

B. Its Value. Adequate and necessary.⁴

Detailed comment on this doctrine would lead us too far afield.⁵ Its obscurest features concern, not the purely psychological classification, but the epistemological valuation. Not only is there a tendency to confuse adequacy with truth; but the definition of truth as agreement of idea with its object (*ideatum*), inherited as it is from dualistic philosophy, involves great difficulty in the case of self-consciousness (*idea ideæ*), where the two are, by hypothesis, the same.⁶ The criterion which Spinoza really employs in his estimate of the grades of consciousness is not the agreement of idea with ideate, but completeness — not alone, as his definitions suggest, in the object of consciousness, but in its subject as well. Thus the second stage of consciousness, reason, is a consciousness (shared with all men) of common qualities, of extension or of thought, either as manifested in bodies⁷ or in ideas, or as abstractly considered. And the highest consciousness is the explicit, immediate consciousness of the one substance in itself and in its manifestations; a consciousness which (if it be right to attribute self-consciousness to Spinoza's God) the finite mind shares not only with all other finite minds, but with God.

3. *The nature and classification of the affective, or non-cognitive, consciousness*

Spinoza treats in great detail the psychology of the affects or non-cognitive mental functions. His interest seems to be due

¹ "Ethics," II. 34.

² *Ibid.*

³ II., 40, Schol. 2: "Intuition . . . proceeds from the adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." Cf. II., 45; V., 36, Schol.; "Improvement," etc., *loc. cit.*

⁴ II., 46-47. ⁵ Cf., throughout, Joachim, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 *seq.*

⁶ With Spinoza's double use of the term 'idea,' there is also the difficulty that an idea has two objects, or ideates: its bodily accompaniment and its 'object.' On all this cf. Joachim, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 *seq.*

⁷ In II., 39, only the ideas of common bodily properties are explicitly recognized. Spinoza's general doctrine, however, requires the application to ideas also.

partly to his dissatisfaction with contemporary writers who, he says, treat the affects rather as 'phenomena outside nature than as facts which follow the common laws of nature' and who "would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them." But besides the general scientific interest in analyzing the emotions and in reducing them to natural law, Spinoza has also an especial concern with them in their influence upon the life of morality.

From the standpoint both of psychology and of physiology, Part III. of the "Ethics," which contains these discussions, is of the very greatest value — full of close observation and keen analysis. Spinoza's first definition of the affect makes the term broad enough to cover both the mental process and the accompanying bodily changes. Indeed, he makes the latter primary in his definition. "By affect," he says,¹ "I mean the modifications (affections) of the body by which the power to act of the same body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of these bodily modifications." Here, on the basis of his fundamental parallelism, Spinoza follows out the method, already criticised, of distinguishing mental states according to the distinctions of the parallel, though independent, bodily states. Now it is a common observation that good health attends happiness and that sorrow is accompanied by bodily depression, and it is this fact, widely recognized by modern and evolutionary theories of emotion, on which Spinoza here lays stress. The bodily phenomena, however, though a constant accompaniment, should not be treated as a cardinal part of the affect — especially on Spinoza's principle of the perfect independence of psychical and physical; and, as a matter of fact, Spinoza usually means by 'affect,' not the idea-plus-the-bodily-change, but the idea alone.

A true, though a negative, distinction of the affect is the one already recognized;² the cognition has, or may have, as its object, the external thing, while the affect is not, at any rate primarily, a consciousness of external object. But obviously this distinction is sufficient only to mark off the affect from the cognition, and reveals nothing of its actual nature. It is supplemented by Spinoza's distinction between two sorts of affect, on the one hand, what he calls desire (*cupiditas*) or will (*voluntas*), on the other hand emotion proper, affect in the narrowest sense. Spinoza does not,

¹ "Ethics," Pt. III., Def. III.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 472.

it must be admitted, say in so many words, "there are two kinds of affect, will and emotion." On the contrary, he often treats desire as coördinate with the basal emotions, joy and sadness. But his definitions justify the distinction, and, as will appear, it is needed to bring consistency into his psychology. He defines will as 'the endeavor (*conatus*) of the mind . . . to persist in its own being.'¹ (It will be observed that endeavor, or *conatus*, is a broader term than will, in that it may be referred to the body. The term 'appetite' Spinoza reserves for the endeavor of mind and body in conjunction.) The definition in this Scholium of desire, or *cupiditas*, as 'appetite with consciousness thereof,' is not very clear; but practically Spinoza uses the term in the sense of will, to mean conscious self-affirmation;² and he defines desire, as 'nothing else but the endeavor to act,'³ 'the actual essence of a man . . . as determined to a particular activity. . . .' Now most of the affects which Spinoza treats—for example, fear, indignation, and pity—obviously are not endeavors toward self-persistence, and clearly need to be distinguished from the activities, the strivings of the mind. It is truer to Spinoza's own teaching to make such a contrast.

(a) From this discussion of Spinoza's definition of emotions, we turn to his classification of them. Of the affects proper, he recognizes joy and sorrow—*lætitia* and *tristitia*—as basal. That they are psychologically elemental and indefinable he tacitly assumes, for in his definition of them he goes back to the principle of parallelism, taking for granted that the power of the mind increases and decreases as the bodily activity is helped or hindered;⁴ and accordingly defining *lætitia* and *tristitia* as passive states (passions) "wherein the mind passes (*transit*) to a greater"—or lesser—"perfection." In its development, this doctrine of the emotions reveals the subtle analyst and the keen student of the human mind. The emotions are grouped by Spinoza, according to their object, in two main classes, forms of love or hate, that is, of joy or of sorrow

¹ "Ethics," III., 9, Schol. Cf. 7, 8.

² III., Definitions of the Emotions, I., and Explanation.

³ IV., 59, first Proof, end.

⁴ III., 11: "Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the power of thought in our mind." It should be understood that this section is throughout an attempt to interpret, rather than merely to expound, Spinoza's doctrine of the emotions.

"with the accompanying idea of an external cause."¹ The nature of this cause, or object, of the emotions is virtually the controlling consideration in the grouping of them; it may be personal or impersonal, person or thing; but the personal emotions, as Spinoza does not fail to notice, are stronger and more vivid. He assigns as reason the illusion of human freedom. "Love or hatred," he says, "towards a thing which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. . . . Hence it follows," he concludes, "that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else."²

(1) Among the personal emotions the most important contrast is implied between the egoistic and the sympathetic. In the former group are included simple love and hate, and also those emotions following from the comparison of oneself with others, pride and vainglory, humility and shame. "These emotions, humility and self-abasement (*abjectio*)," Spinoza shrewdly says, "are of the rarest. For human nature, in itself considered, struggles against them as much as it can; and thus those who are thought to be most self-abased and humble, are generally most ambitious and envious."³ Repentance, on Spinoza's theory, simply is humility with the illusion of free will. "Repentance (*Pœnitentia*)," he says, "is sadness, with the accompanying idea of some deed, which we believe we have done by the free decision of the mind."⁴ The basal emotions of sympathy are joy in the joy of another or sorrow in his sorrow. "Whosoever," Spinoza says, "imagines that which he loves to be affected with joy or with sorrow will be affected with joy or with sorrow; and each emotion will be the greater or the less in the lover, according as it is greater or less in the thing loved."⁵ Evidently, the sympathetic emotions, thus conceived, are intensely personal, involving the explicit realization of other selves and the sharing of their experience. This is true, also, of the mixed emotions; joy in that "an object of hatred is affected

¹ "Ethics," III., 13, Schol.

² III., 49, and Corol.

³ III., "Definitions of the Emotions," XXIX.

⁴ Def. XXVII. Cf. Prop. 30, Schol; Prop. 51, Schol.

⁵ III., 21. Spinoza has an ostensibly supplementary, but really contradictory, account of the sympathetic emotions which is less true to the most trustworthy introspection. According to this view, set forth in Prop. 27, after the manner of Hobbes, sympathy is conceived as an involuntary imitation, bodily and mental, of the modifications of the human beings who resemble us.

with sorrow" and sorrow in that "the same object is affected with joy."¹ Spinoza indiscriminately calls both these emotions by the same name, envy (*invidia*).

(2) Besides the personal emotions, described by Spinoza with peculiar vigor and insight, he discusses also those which are impersonal, — those, in other words, whose cause is not necessarily a person, but a thing or an event. Among the significant emotions of this sort are hope and fear, defined as "inconstant joy or sorrow arising from the idea of something past or future about whose issue we are somewhat doubtful;"² despair, conceived as "sorrow whose source is the idea of a thing, future or past, wherefrom the cause of doubt has been taken away;"³ a group of emotions — consternation, veneration, horror, and devotion⁴ — whose common feature is that they are compounded with wonder (*admiratio*), that is, fixed attention — itself incorrectly named by Spinoza among the emotions;⁵ and, finally, a group of emotions defined by the precise nature of their object, as avarice, and the love of luxury.⁶

(b) Parallel with these emotions of joy or sorrow, like or dislike, are the compounds of desire (*cupiditas*) with emotion proper. Parallel, for example, with love is benevolence, the active impulse to benefit the loved one;⁷ parallel with hate is cruelty;⁸ coördinate with pride is ambition.⁹

Toward the very end of the discussion¹⁰ Spinoza makes one further cardinal distinction — basing it, to be sure, on the early definitions and on Propositions 1 and 3 of Part III — between those affects "which are passions" and others, either desires or emotions of joy, not of sorrow, "which are referred to us in so far as we act (*agimus*)."¹¹ By activity of the mind, however, Spinoza here means not, as before, will, endeavor, or striving, but the contemplation of adequate ideas.¹¹ The confusion of the

¹ "Ethics," III., Prop. 23. Cf. "Definitions of the Emotions," XXIII., and Prop. 35.

² III., Definitions of the Emotions, XII. and XIII. Cf. Prop. 18.

³ III., Definitions, etc., XV.

⁴ III., Prop. 52, Schol.; Definitions, etc., XLII.

⁵ III., Definitions of the Emotions, IV. and Explanation.

⁶ III., Prop. 56, Schol.; Definitions, etc., XLV.-XLVIII.

⁷ III., Definitions, etc., XXXIV., XXXV. Cf. Prop. 41.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XXXVIII. ⁹ *Ibid.*, XLIV. Cf. Prop. 39, Schol.

¹⁰ III., Props. 58, 59; cf. 53.

¹¹ Cf. III., 1: "Our mind . . . in so far as it has adequate ideas . . . is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive."

two conceptions of activity constitutes one of the difficulties of this part of Spinoza's psychology.

The student of Spinoza will find it a stimulating exercise in psychology if he tries, on the basis of these suggestions, to classify the emotions which Spinoza names. No summary, however, and no condensation can reproduce the lifelike accuracy and poignancy of Spinoza's descriptions of the emotions — a portion of his "Ethics" which effectively gives the lie to the conventional conception of Spinoza as a logomachist concerned only with verbal distinctions and with abstract definitions.

b. The Practical Philosophy of Spinoza

There can be no reasonable doubt that Spinoza's entire system has been formulated as a foundation for the ethical teaching which the fourth and fifth Parts of his "Ethics" set forth. Already the limits of this ethical system have been suggested by the reiterated teaching that human freedom, in the undeterminist sense, is a delusion. For from this it follows that there is no such thing as a moral obligation founded on the freedom of the individual to choose one of two courses of action. On the contrary, the acts of the human being follow with necessity from the nature of God, or substance, whereof he is simply a modification or expression. In spite of this doctrine of the rigid necessity of human thoughts and actions Spinoza yet insists on the essential freedom of the human being. Under the concept of freedom, indeed, Spinoza, like Kant, summarizes all the characters of the ideal moral life. He thus contrasts what, subjectively regarded, he calls the life of bondage, the irrational, the *unvirtuous* life, with the life of freedom, the rational, the *virtuous* life. On the objective side — with reference, in other words, not to the character of the actor, but to the quality of the act or the situation — he contrasts the bad or irrational with the good or rational.¹ His ethical doctrine may be summed up in the following statement: The virtuous man is he who lives the life of freedom under the guidance of reason; in other words, the virtuous man possesses an adequate knowledge of himself in his completeness, as related to the rest of

¹ "Ethics," Pt. IV., purports to treat of the life of bondage and Pt. V. of the life of freedom; but in reality the two are continuous.

humanity and to God, he lives a life of happy activity for himself and for others, and he has a joyful knowledge of God. The bad man, on the other hand, lives the irrational life of bondage; he has an inadequate knowledge involving an over-estimation of himself, and because he lacks reason he is in bondage to the unhappy passive emotions; his life is unsocial and therefore self-destructive, and he does not attain to the knowledge of God.

The ethical doctrine of Spinoza, thus briefly formulated, is significant as a vital fusion of certain elements usually treated in isolation and even in opposition. (1) In the first place, Spinoza asserts — though he does not, it must be admitted, cogently prove¹ — the reconciliation of intellectual with emotional and volitional factors. The moral life, as Spinoza views it, is a life of thought, of adequate comprehension of oneself in all one's relations; but it is no less a life of action and a life of joy: the good man is constantly described as one who "*lives* under the guidance of reason"; and "he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects" is said to "feel joy (*lætitia*)."² (2) Spinoza's "Ethics," in the second place, recognizes the essential motives both of asceticism and of hedonism. A large portion of his definite ethical teaching³ consists in directions for holding in check the passive emotions. These directions — based, as they are, on keen psychological insight — are of abiding practical value. "An affect," Spinoza teaches, "can neither be controlled nor destroyed except by an opposite affect;"⁴ and he goes on to point out that, other things being equal, affects whose objects are certain and present and near at hand must be stronger than those whose objects are doubtful, absent, and remote.⁵ A later counsel to control emotion suggests that "we form a clear and distinct idea of the given affect."⁶ The two directions — first, to control affect by affect; second, to control affect by knowledge — seem at first sight inconsistent and it is possible that Spinoza never reconciled them. On the other hand, we may suppose him to imply that a preceding affect, namely desire, is necessary in order to change emotion into idea.

This teaching that the affects must be held in check represents the rigoristic side of Spinoza's "Ethics." It never leads him,

¹ Cf. *inſra*, p. 480¹, for Spinoza's argument that the life of freedom is not a life of sorrow. This, however, would not prove it a life of positive happiness.

² "Ethics," V., 15, Proof.

³ IV., 1-19, and V., 1-13.

⁴ IV., 7.

⁵ IV., 10-12.

⁶ V., 3.

however, either to decry all emotion as non-moral or, in a mood of pessimistic asceticism, to glorify emotions of sadness. On the contrary, he estimates the moral value of each emotion for itself; and the most important principle of his estimate is the doctrine that sorrow is in itself evil, since "he who rightly has discovered (*novit*) that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and come to pass according to the eternal laws of nature, clearly will find nothing which is worthy of hate, ridicule, or contempt, nor will he pity anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue will strive to do well (*bene agere*) . . . and to rejoice."¹ This lesson not, as Arnold points out, of "mere resigned acquiescence . . . but of joyful activity within the limits of man's true sphere,"² is that by which Spinoza most impressed himself on the moral philosophy of the later eighteenth century.

The doctrine that all events are expressions of divine necessity, and that consequently all emotions which involve sadness are evil, supplies Spinoza with a fruitful principle of distinction. Thus, hope and fear are evil emotions, sharing, Spinoza says, 'a defect of knowledge and a weakness of mind.'³ Even humility, he teaches, "is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason. Humility," he explains, "is sadness which rises from this, that a man contemplates his powerlessness. But in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is supposed to understand his essence, that is, his power."⁴ Perhaps the most vigorous of Spinoza's specific applications of this general doctrine is found in his teaching of the relation between hatred and love. "All emotions of hatred," he says, "are bad; therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will try so far as he can not to be assailed by such emotions and . . . to prevent his fellow from suffering them. But hatred . . . can be quenched by love and so passes over into love, therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will try to repay hatred with love." Such a man, Spinoza teaches, "fights his battle with confidence."⁵

Not merely all affects of sadness, but certain pleasant affects are, in Spinoza's opinion, evil. This teaching, it will be observed, more definitely than the exhortation to control desire, distinguishes the system from every form of hedonism. Spinoza, it is true,

¹ "Ethics," IV., 50, Schol.

² "Essays in Criticism."

³ "Ethics," IV., 47, Schol. ⁴ IV., 53, and Proof. ⁵ IV., 46, Proof and Schol.

seems at times to identify the good with the pleasant and the evil with the unpleasant. Thus he says in a Scholium of Proposition 39, Part III., "By good, I here understand every sort of joy . . . and by evil every sort of sorrow;" and he later asserts, in Part IV., "The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of joy and sorrow."¹ It is, however, impossible to regard Spinoza as a hedonist. He utterly forbids such a theory by this teaching that the pleasurable emotions may be evil. The expressions which suggest hedonism are most simply interpreted as over-emphasis of the optimistic doctrine that joy accompanies goodness. Of the pleasant yet evil emotions the most important are, in the first place, excessive and self-contradictory love and desire;² and, in the second place, the emotions, pride and disparagement, which involve an over-estimation of oneself.³

(3) The last of these teachings suggests the third of the eclectic or harmonizing aspects of Spinoza's "Ethics." It has already appeared that his system, spite of its intellectualism, does justice to the emotional and volitional aspects of human life. It has been evident, also, that his doctrine of sadness as essentially evil is tempered both by the recognition of certain pleasures as evil and by practically effective directions for the control of emotion. It remains to show that Spinoza recognizes and unites the principles of individualistic, socialistic, and theistic ethics. Many of the propositions of Part IV., taken by themselves, express a narrow and emphatic individualism. "Since," Spinoza says, "reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands that each love himself, and seek . . . that which is really useful to him."⁴ "No virtue," he asserts, a little later, "can be conceived prior to this: the endeavor to preserve oneself."⁵ Yet he insists with equal emphasis that "the good which every man who follows after virtue seeks (*appetit*) for himself, he will desire also for the rest of mankind";⁶ and, so far from basing this doctrine on empirical observation, he says that "it arises not by accident, but from

¹ "Ethics," IV., Prop. 8; cf. Prop. 19 for repeated assertion. Cf. also 20, 21, 41. The definitions of Part IV. are sometimes, but not necessarily, interpreted in a hedonistic sense.

² IV., 44 and 60. (Spinoza refers explicitly only to inconsistent desire.)

³ IV., 57, Schol. 48. ⁴ IV., 18, Schol. ⁵ IV., 22. Cf. 24 and 25.

⁶ IV., 37, Proof; cf. IV., 18, Schol. "There is nothing . . . more excellent than that the minds and bodies of all should form as it were one mind and one body."

the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to all." ¹ For the life of freedom is the life of reason, and reason is, as will be remembered, conceived by Spinoza as a consciousness shared with others. "It follows that men, in so far as they live by the guidance of reason, necessarily do only those things which are necessarily good for human nature and therefore for every man." ²

Thus Spinoza harmonizes egoism with altruism by the teaching that the one involves the other. The endeavor to preserve one's own being demands action for the good of other human beings, since one is oneself a part of humanity, or — to put it in the opposite way — since the other human beings constitute one's own larger self. This consideration leads at once to the crowning doctrine of Spinoza's "Ethics." The close union of human beings is only possible, he teaches, in that they are one and all expressions of God. Thus, he says, in a passage already quoted in part: "It arises from the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as he is defined by reason. . . . For it pertains to the essence of the human mind to have adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." These words are profoundly consistent with Spinoza's system of epistemology and of metaphysics. He has taught that completely adequate knowledge of any object involves a knowledge of God.³ Evidently, therefore, the complete knowledge of oneself and one's own good demands not merely the recognition of oneself as a member of humanity, but a knowledge of oneself and of all men as expressing God's nature, a knowledge, in other words, "of the eternal and infinite essence of God." Thus Spinoza's consummate conception of the good is acquaintance with God. "The mind's highest good," he says, "is the knowledge of God and the mind's highest virtue is to know God."⁴ And since adequate knowledge is companioned by joy, "he who clearly and distinctly understands himself . . . loves God," and "this love towards God must have the chief place in the mind."⁵ Such love toward God, it will be remembered, rises from the perfect knowledge of him; and this knowledge involves the consciousness that he is manifested

¹ "Ethics," IV., 36. ² IV., 35, Proof. ³ I., 16 *seq.*; V., 24-32. ⁴ IV., 28.

⁵ V., 15 and 16; cf. 32 and 33.

in humanity, consequently "this love toward God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise it is the more inflamed (*jovetur*) in proportion as we imagine the more men joined to God by the same bond of love.¹ . . . I have thus completed," Spinoza says, "what I wished to set forth touching . . . the mind's freedom."²

GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ: THE PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALIST

I. LIFE (1646-1716)

There is no philosopher of modern times whose life so strongly as that of Leibniz confutes the theory that the philosopher is of necessity a dreamy speculator, a man apart from the concerns of active life. To Leibniz, philosophy was the resource of hours snatched from the most strenuous concerns of diplomatic and professional service. He was born in 1646, in Leipzig, the son of a university professor who died in Gottfried's early childhood. From his earliest years he was an omnivorous reader and a precocious student; he immersed himself successively in the classics, in mathematics, and in philosophy. He entered, at fifteen, the university of Leipzig, concerned himself mainly with philosophical study, and two years later published his earliest work, "*De principio individui*." Turning then from philosophy, he spent one semester in mathematical study at Jena, and thereafter pursued juristic studies, taking his degree in 1666 from the university of Altdorf.

The youth of twenty then received, but at once refused, the offer of a professorship; and was introduced by a Frankfort friend, Boineburg, to the Elector of Mainz, Johann Philip. In his service Leibniz remained for six years, that is, until 1672. By the elector's authority he drew up — two hundred years ahead of

¹ "Ethics," V. 20.

² V., 42, Schol. It will be observed that this account of Spinoza's ethical theory disregards a large portion of Pt. V. Some of this has been discussed (cf. *supra*, Chapter 8, pp. 290 *seq.* on Props. 17, 35, 36), in considering Spinoza's doctrine of the personality of God. The propositions on which no comment is made are those which present an argument, inconsistent with Spinoza's general theory, for the immortality of the soul. There is the more reason for neglecting these since Spinoza himself says (V., 41, 42): "Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still hold as of primary importance piety and religion. . . . Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself."

his age — a scheme for attaining the union and security of the German states. One specific means for this end was, in Leibniz's mind, the effort to incite the powerful French king to undertake the conquest of Egypt from the Turks — an enterprise which could not fail to divert his attention from his neighbors, Holland and Germany. The scheme was submitted to Louis XIV., and in its interest Leibniz went, in 1672, to Paris. But, by this time, Louis had decided on the war with Holland and an understanding with the Turks; and Leibniz's far-seeing plans had no immediate result. They were carried out independently of each other, long years after his death, by the first Napoleon and by Bismarck.

Leibniz's patrons, Boineburg and the Elector of Maintz, died in 1672 and in early 1673. He himself spent the three following years in Paris, making a visit to London in the first months of 1673. For the most part, these years were given over to a study of mechanics, and especially of physics, which culminated in the discovery, published many years later, of the differential calculus. In 1676, he accepted the invitation of Duke Johann Friedrich to become librarian and counsellor at the court of Hanover. He directed his journey from Paris through The Hague, and visited Spinoza, ostensibly to discuss optics, really — we have reason to think — to confer on philosophical subjects.¹

The history of the remaining forty years of the life of Leibniz is one of undeviating fidelity and of efficient service to the House of Hanover. Leibniz was court librarian, historian, and diplomatic adviser, under three successive princes. He directed productive mining industries, travelled widely to collect materials for his great history of the House of Hanover, interested himself in plans for the union of the Protestant and the Catholic churches, attempted the foundation of academies of science in Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, and was appointed privy counsellor, by the Electors of Hanover and of Brandenburg and — late in his lifetime — by Peter the Great. Incidentally, he wrote letters, notices, and monographs on philosophical themes. For the last seven years of the life of his warm friend, the Hanoverian princess, Sophie Charlotte first queen of Prussia, Leibniz spent much time at her court in Berlin and in Lützenburg (now Charlottenburg). Through her, he succeeded in his efforts to found the Berlin

¹ Cf. L. Stein, "Leibniz und Spinoza," cited *supra*.

Academy; to meet her difficulties, he undertook his "Theodicy"; to her keen mind he furnished impetus and philosophic guidance.

The last years of the life of Leibniz were shadowed by neglect and ingratitude. His patroness, the elder Sophie Charlotte of Hanover, died; and the Elector of Hanover was crowned George I. of England, but forbade the attendance of Leibniz at the English court. Unnoticed and almost unmourned, he died in 1716.

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C. BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS THROUGH HUME

I. MATERIALISTS AND THEIR OPPONENTS

THOMAS HOBBS: THE PLURALISTIC MATERIALIST

I. LIFE (1588-1679)

Thomas Hobbes was the son of an unlearned middle-class clergyman who lost his living because he struck down a man at his own church door. He was educated, by his uncle, at Oxford; but the Oxford of his day was bound down to a classical and mediæval tradition. It offered, for example, no instruction in mathematics, which it regarded as a black art. Hobbes found nothing to interest or to stimulate him in the university, which later he criticised with great bitterness. He left Oxford, when he was twenty years old, in 1608, and became the travelling tutor and companion of the son of the Earl of Cavendish, soon, through the death of his father, to become head of the family. For twenty years Hobbes occupied this position, enjoying travel and giving himself also to classical study. In 1628 he published the first result of his study — a vigorous and accurate translation of Thucydides.

This year of 1628, in which Hobbes was forty years old, was the time of his philosophical quickening. The Earl of Cavendish died; Hobbes made his third journey to the Continent; and for the first time in his life, he opened a treatise on geometry — Euclid's "Elements"; and at once he set himself with fairly passionate interest upon the study of geometry and mechanics — the investigation of the laws of spatial relation and physical motion, which determined the whole course of his metaphysics. The ten years succeeding this awakening were years of intellectual activity

unmarked by any publication. Hobbes concerned himself not only for metaphysics and physics, but for psychological and social theory as well. In 1640 he had formulated and promulgated in manuscript his psychological and political doctrines. In that same year — moved very likely by his natural timidity to withdraw from the possibility of damaging political associations, during the years of civil war — he left England for Paris, where he lived until 1651. During part of these years he was tutor to the banished Prince of Wales, later Charles II.; and during all the time he enjoyed the society of scientists and mathematicians — Gas-sendi, Mersenne, and others.

The publication, in 1651, of the "Leviathan," the first of his political works to be published in English, won for Hobbes the disfavor both of the ecclesiastical party and of the royalists, then in exile in Paris. The churchmen resented his theory that the church should be subject to the government, and the royalists objected strenuously to his doctrine that it is lawful to submit to the conquerors of a vanquished monarch. Because of the distrust of both parties, Hobbes returned to England, where he published, in 1655, the summary of his metaphysical doctrine, called "De Corpore."

The last twenty-five years of the life of Hobbes were embittered by constant conflicts and disputes. These ranged around three subjects. One quarrel, notably with Ward and with Wallis, professors of mathematics at Oxford, concerned Hobbes's strictures on the universities¹ — criticisms which applied more fairly to the university of Hobbes's youth than to the greatly reformed Oxford of the middle seventeenth century. The honors of this controversy remained with the philosopher's opponents. They were, of course, more influential than Hobbes, and one of them, John Fell, the dean of Christ Church, expunged a reference to Hobbes from the Latin translation of Wood's "History of Antiquities of Oxford," and himself described Hobbes in these uncomplimentary terms: *irritabile illud et vanissimum Malmesburiense animal*. A second contest, in which, also, Hobbes was doubtless in the wrong, centred about his mathematical theories, notably his attempt at the quadrature of the circle. Hobbes had entered on mathematical study too late in life to pit himself against well-

¹ Cf. "Leviathan," Pt. I., Chapter 1, end; Pt. IV., Chapter 46.

trained scholars; but he maintained his positions with a vigor of invective worthy of a better cause.¹

But the bitterest of all quarrels was that in which Hobbes sought to defend himself against the accusations of atheistic and immoral teaching which haunted him throughout his life and persisted for decades after his death. Writers, theological and philosophical, many of them incapable of understanding Hobbes, united in these clamorous charges against him. The clergyman who wrote the "Dialogue between Philautes and Timothy" (London, 1673) fairly illustrates the critics of Hobbes's own age, who believed that Hobbes had "said more for a bad life and against any other life after this than ever was pleaded by philosopher or divine to the contrary." The allusions of Locke and Berkeley to 'that atheist Hobbes' reflect the opinions of the generations following. To his contemporary critics, Hobbes replied by publishing vehement Letters and Answers, of which the best known is, perhaps, "An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall . . . called Catching of 'Leviathan'" (1682). No one can really read Hobbes's books without agreeing in the main with his protestations. Hobbes certainly teaches that there is a God, and that faith in Jesus Christ is the supreme religious duty. True, he also teaches that God is corporeal, but only in the sense in which, as he believes, men, also, are purely corporeal. However theoretically unjustified the doctrine, it is certainly compatible — as Hobbes holds it — with religious teaching. The ethics of Hobbes, also, inculcates all the practical duties of a Christian morality, though it founds them on a psychologically inadequate basis: the assumption that all men are radically selfish. In a word, Hobbes was unfairly treated; his reputation suffered unjustly; and — more unfortunate than all — the suspicion of his atheism kept people from the study of his vigorous metaphysics and his acute psychology.

Truth to tell, the suspicion of immorality attached to Hobbes not so much for any teaching of his, as because Charles II., who was kindly disposed to his old tutor, and also highly diverted by the doctrine of Hobbes, had allowed the philosopher a pension. Hence the license of that notorious court of the second Charles was illogically laid at the door of Hobbes's materialism, and

¹ Cf. Introduction, p. xix., of the Open Court edition of Hobbes's "Concerning Body."

'Hobbiſt' became a mere ſynonym for 'free liver.' Hobbes himſelf, for all his doughty replies to his adverſaries, was apparently terrified by their onſlaughts, eſpecially when, in 1666, a parliamentary bill ordered a committee to receive information "concerning a book, 'Leviathan.'" The bill was dropped, but the translation, in 1668, of the "Leviathan" into Latin, toned down the eccleſiaſtical portions in a marked degree; and Hobbes refrained from the publication of any other political works. He lived to be ninety-one years old, vigorous to the end in intellect and in capacity.

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- Robertson, G. C.: "Hobbes," Edin. and Lond., 1886 (Philosophical Classics).
- Tönnies, F.: "Hobbes' Leben und Lehre," Stuttgart, 1896, pp. 226.
- Stephen, L.: "Hobbes," Lond., 1904. (Largely biographical.)
- Sigwart, H. C. W. von: "Vergleichung der Rechts- und Staats- Theorien des B. Spinoza u. des T. Hobbes," Tüb., 1842.
- Montuori, R.: "Il Principe del Macchiavelli e la Politica di Hobbes," in *Rivista Filosofica*, Jan., Feb., 1905.

Cf. bibliography of contemporary criticism in "Op. Lat.," I., p. lxi. *seq.*; bibliography in Sneath's edition, cited above; and Eachard, Wallis, Ward, Brandt, and Lange, cited by Rand.

OPPONENTS OF MATERIALISM: THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

HENRY MORE (1614-87).

"Opera Omnia," Lond., 1675-79. (Cf. G. N. Dolson, *Philos. Rev.*, 1897.)

RALPH CUDWORTH (1617-88).

1678. "The True Intellectual System of the Universe," Lond. (An erudite survey and refutation of the "atomic" and "hylozoic" materialism; coupled with an argument for the existence of God.)

"Works," 4 vols., Lond., 1829. (Cf. W. R. Scott, "An Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise," Lond., 1891.)

JOHN NORRIS (1657-1711).

1701-04. "Essay toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," 2 Pts., Lond. (A Platonized restatement of Malebranche's doctrine of "seeing all things in God.")

1724. "Reason and Religion," Lond., 7th ed.
 1697. "An Account of Reason and Faith . . . in Relation to the Mysteries of Christianity," Lond., 14th ed., 1790. (A reply to John Toland.)
 RICHARD BURTHOGGE (1638?-1694?).
 1677. "Organum vetus et novum."
 1694. "An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits."

LATER BRITISH MATERIALISTS (DEISTS)¹

- JOHN TOLAND (1670-1721).
 1696. "Christianity not Mysterious," Lond.
 1704. "Letters to Serena," Lond.
 1720. "Pantheisticon," Lond.
 DAVID HARTLEY (1705-57).
 1749. "Observations on Man," 2 vols., Lond.
 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY (1733-1804).
 1777. "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit." "Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity."
 1778. "A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity," Lond.
 "Works," 25 vols., Lond., 1817-31.

II. DUALISTS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment is a term applied generally and rather vaguely to most of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, British and Continental. The prominent characters of the period are (1) an opposition to tradition and to system, in particular, to that of the church; and (2) a marked individualism. (Cf. Leslie Stephen, "History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century," Lond., 1876.)

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704)

I. LIFE

The freedom of the individual is the dominant note in all the works of Locke as it is the keynote of his life. His life falls within the century which fought out for England the battle for the rights of the individual against both monarch and church. In such a time a man must have convictions, and Locke carried into philosophy and into religion the principles which he defended in politics. Whether he talked of education, of government, or of theology, always he claimed in the last resort the right and the duty of the individual to free action in accordance with reason. Locke was the son of a genial puritan lawyer of Somerset, a man who fought on the side of Parliament. From Westminster School, the younger Locke went at twenty to Oxford, where, because he would not

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 494, 503.

take notes "deferentially," he was regarded as "a man of turbulent spirit, clamorous and discontented."¹ The philosophy of the schools concerned him little, but Descartes stirred him, and the growing study, in large part unacademic, of natural science claimed his ardent interest. As student, tutor, fellow, he spent fifteen years in Oxford; leaving the university town in 1667 at the bidding of the first Lord Shaftesbury. In the next sixteen years he served Shaftesbury now as tutor to his son, now as secretary, always as friend. He gained the friendship also of Shaftesbury's intimates and spent four full years in France with Herbert, later Earl of Pembroke. It was inevitable that Locke's fortunes should vacillate with those of his stout-hearted patron, and in 1683 he followed Shaftesbury in voluntary exile to Holland. He returned to England in 1689, in the ship which carried the Princess of Orange. In the years which followed, he filled positions of trust and published the books, philosophical and political, which he had written in the time of his seclusion. The last years of his life he spent in the home of Sir Francis Masham, illustrating by his letters and his conversation that gift for friendship which was perhaps his greatest endowment.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Chief Works and Editions

1690. "An Essay concerning Human Understanding," Lond. (32d ed., 1860. Authoritative edition with notes, that of A. C. Fraser, Oxf., 1894. Edition of Books II. and IV. (with omissions) preceded by the English version of Le Clerc's "Eloge historique de feu Mr. Locke," ed. M. W. Calkins, Open Court Co., 2d ed., 1906.)

Locke's "Essay," the first widely influential English book on metaphysics and psychology, discusses "the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge." Locke opposes (in Book I.) the doctrine of innate ideas, by which he means ready-made pieces of information; offers (in Book II.) a psychological analysis of the human consciousness; and restates (in Books II. and IV.), after his own independent and inimitably vigorous fashion, Descartes's dualistic philosophy. Book III. is a largely parenthetical discussion of general terms. The main divergences of Locke from Descartes (and additions to Descartes) are (1) Locke's teaching that solidity as well as extension is a quality of matter (II., Chapter 8); (2) his conception of substance as support of qualities (II., Chapter 23); (3) his curious distinction of "spiritual substance," or "soul," from "person" (II., Chapter 27); (4) his emphasized argument for the existence of "corporeal bodies," from the occurrence of ideas which "force themselves upon me" (IV., Chapter 11).

¹ Fraser, "Locke's Essay," I, pp. xix. seq.

1689. "Epistola de Tolerantia." Engl.: transl. W. Popple, Lond., 1689.
 1690, 1692. "Second and Third Letter for Toleration."
 1690. "Two Treatises on Government." New edition, with Introduction by H. Morley, 1884. (The doctrine that governments are formed by the consent of the governed for the primary purpose of protecting property. A defence, against Hobbes and others, of constitutional government, and of the right of revolution.)
 1693. "Some Thoughts concerning Education." New edition by J. S. Blaikie, Lond., 1886.
 1695. "The Reasonableness of Christianity." Edition by J. A. St. John, 1836, 1853. (This book maintains the coördinate rights and the essential harmony of reason and revelation. As such, it is really the forerunner of the writings of the English deists, Toland, Collins, and others, and of the French deists, Voltaire, Helvetius, and the rest. The teaching of Locke that revelation is reasonable¹ gave way soon to the belief, which he would eagerly have repudiated, that revelation is superfluous, and still later to a doctrine positively hostile to revealed religion.)
 "Works." Latest (thirteenth) edition, 9 vols., 1853.
 "The Philosophical Works," ed. J. A. St. John, Bohn Library, 1854, 2 vols. ("Conduct of the Understanding," "Essay concerning Human Understanding," "Elements of Natural Philosophy.")

For comment, cf. Fraser, A. C., "Locke" (Philosophical Classics), Edin., Lond., 1890; and "Prolegomena" to the edition of the Essay, cited above.

Cf. also the following authors cited by Rand and by Calkins:—

For biographical and historical material: Fox-Bourne, Shaftesbury, Stephen.

For criticism of Locke by his contemporaries: H. Lee, J. Norris, and J. Proast.

For recent criticism: Drobisch, B. Erdmann, and A. W. Moore ("The . . . Theory of Knowledge in Locke's Essay," Univ. of Chicago Decennial Publications, Series I., 1892).

THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL OF "COMMON-SENSE" PHILOSOPHERS

These writers founded their system on an acute anti-sensationalistic psychology. But they uncritically assumed the existence of all objects of clear consciousness and the extra-mental existence of objects of perception.

ANDREW BAXTER (1686-1750).

1733. "Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul."

THOMAS REID (1710-96). (Professor at Glasgow.)

1764. "Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense."

1785. "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man."

1788. "Essays on the Active Powers of Man."

"Works," ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Edin., 1846.

"Selections" (with bibliography), ed. E. H. Sneath, N.Y., 1892. Cf. A. Seth, cited by Rand.

¹ Cf. pp. 503-505.

DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) (Professor at Edinburgh).
 1792-1827. "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," 3 pts
 "Works," ed. Sir W. Hamilton, 10 vols., Edin., 1854 ff.

Others of this school are James Oswald and James Beattie.

III. SPIRITUALISTIC IDEALISTS

GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753)

I. LIFE

George Berkeley, second of the great trio of British philosophers of the Enlightenment, was born in Kilkenny, Ireland, five years before the publication of Locke's "Essay"; that is, in 1685. At fifteen he entered Trinity College, obtained his bachelor's degree in 1704, and was admitted fellow in 1707. Trinity College was alive with the discussion of Locke's "Essay," and the effect on Berkeley was to stimulate a reaction against the system — or, better, an expansion of the secondary-quality doctrine into a purely idealistic teaching. For Berkeley's philosophic study bore early fruit. He belongs indeed to the group of writers whose thought ripens quickly: in 1709, when he was only twenty-four, he published his "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," and a year later he brought out his "Principles of Human Knowledge," a little work which yet contains all the essential features of his doctrine. Three years later appeared a popular presentation of his system, "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous."

While Berkeley was superintending, in London, the publication of this work, he enjoyed the society and friendship of Sir Richard Steele, Dean Swift, Alexander Pope, and the men to whom these influential friends introduced him. As chaplain to the Earl of Petersham he visited Italy in 1713-1714, and a year later he became the travelling tutor of Mr. Ashe, the son of an Irish bishop. The two spent more than four years on the continent, mainly in Italy, and we are told that in passing through Paris "Mr. Berkeley took care to pay his respects to . . . the illustrious Père Malebranche." Soon after his return, in 1721, he became chaplain to the Duke of Grafton. A year later he was greatly surprised to receive a legacy from Mrs. Vanhomrigh (Swift's Vanessa). In 1724 he was named Dean of Derry, at a stipend of £1100 a year, and threw himself with zeal into his new work. Already, however,

there had dawned on the mind of this vigorously cosmopolitan Christian the ideal of an American colony in which church and college should unite their efforts for the upbuilding of an ideal community. His enthusiasm gained adherents to the scheme, Utopian as it now seems, and in 1728 he sailed, with the promise, from the government of King George I., of lands in Bermuda and of a grant of £20,000. His newly married wife went with him, and a little group of men whom he had inspired with ardor. They were doomed to disappointment: Walpole lost little time in diverting the money to the purposes of a princess's marriage portion; and the colonists never saw the Bermudas, for they had sailed directly to Rhode Island, in the expectation of purchasing lands for the support of the college. The memory of the two years spent by Berkeley in Rhode Island is still preserved by the records of Trinity Church of Newport, where he preached many Sundays; and by the books which he left to the Yale and to the Harvard libraries. His "Alciphron" was written in America, and "Berkeley's Cave" is still pointed out as the reputed scene of the philosopher's study.

Two years after Berkeley's return to England, in 1734, he was appointed to the bishopric of Cloyne, and he spent the last years of his life in devoted service to this diocese of poor country folk, and in eager thought upon the pressing problems of Irish life. The main purpose of "The Querist," published in 1733, is to stimulate an interest in domestic manufactures. "To feed the hungry and clothe the naked," he says, "will, perhaps, be deemed no improper employment for a clergyman who still thinks himself a member of the commonwealth." We are told that Berkeley himself "chose to wear ill clothes, and worse wigs, rather than to suffer the poor of the town to be unemployed." His latest philosophical work, called "Siris," was published in 1744. He died in 1753, at Oxford; and many of us remember the marble tablet, in Christ Church, Oxford, which commemorates his life — a life so full of active service and practical achievement, that it goes far to vindicate philosophers from the charge that speculative thinking involves ineffective and useless living.

The inscription ends: —

"Si christianus fueris
Si amans patriæ,
Utroque nomine gloriari potes,
Berkeleyum vixisse."

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. 1. Philosophical and Psychological Writings

1709. "Theory of Vision," Dublin, 1810. (A development of the thesis that distance is not a direct object of vision.)
1710. "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge," Dublin, Open Court Co., Chicago, 1903.
1713. "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," Open Court Co., Chicago, 1901.
1732. "Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher," Dublin. (Seven Dialogues, directed against scepticism, and developing Berkeley's theological doctrines.)
1733. "Theory of Visual Language further Vindicated and Explained."
1744. "Siris. A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtue of Tar-water." Lond. (A fantastic compound of amateur medicine and natural science with an idealistic philosophy more rationalistic than that of the "Principles.")

2. Chief Writings on Political Subjects

1712. "Passive Obedience or the Christian Doctrine of not Resisting the Supreme Power."
The essay inculcates along with its political doctrine a sort of theological utilitarianism — the teaching that God secures the greatest good of the greatest number.
1721. "An Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain."
1725. "A Proposal . . . for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity."
- 1735-37. "The Querist," 3 pts.

3. Important Writings on Mathematical Subjects

1707. "Arithmetica absque Algebra aut Euclide demonstrata."
1721. "De Motu."
1734. "The Analyst." (A criticism of higher mathematics as leading to free thinking. The essay involved Berkeley in controversy.)
- "Works," ed. A. C. Fraser, Oxf., 1866, 4 vols., 1871, 1891, 1905.
- "Selections," ed. A. C. Fraser, Oxf., 1866; 5th amended edition, 1899. (Extracts from all the works on philosophy and psychology.)

b. Criticism and Biography

- Fraser, A. C., "Life and Letters of Berkeley and Dissertation on his Philosophy." (This is volume IV. of the "Works," and contains a "Common-place Book" written by Berkeley during his years at Trinity College.)
- Fraser, A. C., "Berkeley" (Philosophical Classics), Edin., Lond., 1881.
- Abbott, T. K., "Sight and Touch," Lond., 1864. (An antagonistic criticism of Berkeley's psychological doctrine.)

Friederichs, F., "Über Berkeley's Idealismus," Berlin, 1870.

Mill, J. S., "Dissertations," Vols. II. and IV.

Cf. Chandler, Loewy, Peirce, Tower, Überweg, cited by Rand. Berkeley is, however, his own best critic.

ARTHUR COLLIER (1680-1732)

"Clavis Universalis or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence or Impossibility of an External World," Lond., 1713.

A vigorously written argument against the possibility of reality independent of mind, curiously resembling Berkeley's "Essay" and "Principles" though it was planned and probably published before Collier had read Berkeley.

IV. THE PHENOMENALIST

DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

I. LIFE

The life of David Hume, in strong contrast to that of Berkeley, was a life preëminently of devotion to purely intellectual ideals. He was no recluse, but his social intercourse and even his years of diplomatic service were mere incidents and interludes in the business of study and speculation. Hume was born of a good Scottish family in 1711 — just one year after the publication of Berkeley's "Principles." His youth was a restless one. He was probably little more than fifteen when he finished his university courses at Edinburgh; he made an unsuccessful attempt, when he was seventeen, to study law; and he was equally unhappy, at twenty-two, in a half-hearted attempt to enter mercantile life. Thereupon, as he tells us in his story of "My own Life," he "resolved to make a very rigid frugality supply . . . deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired . . . independency, and to regard every object as contemptible, except the improvement of [his] talents in literature."

For three years he worked in "country retreat" in France, chiefly in *La Flèche*, and there composed his "Treatise of Human Nature." By his own account, this work "fell dead-born from the press"; but though it unquestionably did not, until years later, excite very wide discussion, there is yet reason to believe that its author's naïve self-esteem was needlessly sensitive. Burton tells us, for example, that Hume designated as "somewhat abusive"

a review of the "Treatise" which compared it to the juvenile work of a young Milton.¹

Three years later, in 1742, Hume published the first volume of his "Essays Moral and Political," really a system of political philosophy, though lacking systematic arrangement. Probably because of the reputation gained by this work, Hume was invited in 1745 to become tutor to the young marquis of Annandale, "a harmless literary lunatic," Adamson calls him. This position proved unfortunate; and a year later Hume became secretary to General St. Clair, at first "in an incursion on the coast of France," and a few months later "in his military embassy to the courts of Turin and Vienna."

During Hume's absence in Turin his "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding," a condensation of his metaphysical doctrine, was published as one of the "Philosophical Essays." According to Hume this, too, was at first "entirely overlooked and neglected." Not many years later, he was gratified, however, by "answers by Reverends and Right Reverends two or three in a year" and found by this sort of criticism that "the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company." For several years he lived quietly, at first at his brother's country house, later in Edinburgh, constantly occupied with his literary work. In 1752 he became Librarian of the Faculty of Advocates, receiving the appointment in spite of objections urged on the score of his impiety. He then, as he says, "formed the plan of writing the 'History of England'"; and its successive volumes appeared at irregular intervals from 1754 to 1761. From 1763 to 1766 he was secretary of the Earl of Hertford, ambassador to Paris. These were the years of Hume's most brilliant social success; "le gros David," as the Parisians called him, was showered with attention from men and women of all circles, social, academic, and diplomatic. "Do you ask me," he writes from Paris, "about my course of life? I can only say that I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but nectar, breathe nothing but incense." From 1767 he successfully filled, for two years, the position of under secretary of state in London. With warm content he returned to his Edinburgh home, his friends and his books. "A wife?" he had written, years before, "That is none

¹ Burton, "Life and Correspondence of Hume," I., p. 109, quoted by Huxley in his "Hume," p. 10.

of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? That is one of them: and I have more than I can use." He died, after seven years of happiness and popularity, in 1776.

To gain an adequate conception of Hume's character and his personal convictions is a task of acknowledged difficulty. It is admitted that he was kindly in nature and moderate in temper; it is not easy to deny in him a naïve self-esteem and an over love of popularity. He has, not unnaturally, been esteemed to be personally irreligious; but there is much to indicate that he himself held to an unambiguous, if attenuated and unreasoned religious faith. "Though [my] speculations entertain the learned . . . world," he is reported to have said, after the death of his mother, "yet . . . I do not think so differently from the rest of the world."¹

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. *Works of Hume*

- 1739-40. "A Treatise of Human Nature," Lond. Book I. "Of the Understanding"; Book II. "Of the Passions"; and Book III. (published in 1740) "Of Morals"; ed. Green and Grose, 2 vols., last ed., 1889-90; and by L. H. Selby-Bigge, last ed., Oxf., 1896. Book I. is divided into four parts, of which the *first* is mainly psychological; the *second* treats of space and time, with the purpose of derogating from their alleged absolute reality; the *third* includes Hume's doctrine of causality; and the *fourth* includes his reduction of matter and spirit alike to impressions.
- 1741-42. "Essays, Moral and Political," ed. Green and Grose, 1889-90. This book is composed mainly of Hume's graceful and vigorous essays on literary subjects. It was later combined with the two "Enquiries," the "Four Dissertations" (including "Natural History of Religion") and published, 1758, under the title, "Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects."
1748. "Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding" (later called "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding"); ed. by Green and Grose, 1889-90; by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1894; by Open Court Co., 1906. This book purports merely to recast in more popular form the teaching of Book I. of the Treatise; but as a matter of fact, it omits the culmination of that work, the doctrine of matter and spirit, as well as the discussion of space and time. It also makes certain additions, notably the section on miracles and most of the teachings about liberty and necessity.

¹ Reported by Hume's friend, Dr. Carlyle, on the authority of Mr. Bayle. Cf. Burton, "Life and Correspondence of David Hume," I, p. 294; and Huxley, "Hume," p. 28.

1751. "An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," Lond. (Open Court Co., 1902.)
Hume's fresh formulation in abbreviated form, of Book III. of the "Treatise"; "in my own opinion," he says, "of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best."
1752. "Political Discourses," Edin.; ed. Green and Grose, 1890.
"The only work of mine," Hume says, "that was successful on its first publication." A brilliant, though unsystematic, work on political economy — at many points an anticipation of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations."
- 1754-61. "History of England," in five volumes.
A brilliant, though untrustworthy history "in which all the lights are Tory and all the shades Whig."
1757. "Four Dissertations": "The Natural History of Religion," "Of the Passions," "Of Tragedy," "Of the Standard of Taste," Lond.
The dissertation first named is the earliest attempt to discuss religion from the psychological and the historical standpoints. It teaches that polytheism is the oldest and most natural form of religion. The "Dissertation on the Passions" is a good restatement of Book II. of the "Treatise."

Posthumous

1777. "My own Life," Lond.
1777. "Two Essays," Lond. ("On Suicide," and "On the Immortality of the Soul.")
1779. "Dialogues on Natural Religion."
An essay embodying a sort of deistic doctrine. Hume wrote it with great care and left directions that it should be published.

b. Modern Editions

- "A Treatise of Human Nature and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," 2 vols., and
"Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary," 2 vols.; all edited with important Introductions and Notes by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, last edition, 1889-90.

c. Commentaries and Criticism

- Introductions to the volumes of Green and Grose's edition; especially Green's Introduction to "A Treatise of Human Nature."
- Elkin, W. B. "Hume's Treatise and Enquiry," N.Y., 1904.
- Gizycki, G. v. "Die Ethik David Hume's in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung," Bresl., 1878, pp. 337.
- Huxley, T. H. "Hume," Lond., N.Y., 1879. (A relatively uncritical exposition.)
- Jacobi, F. H. "David Hume über den Glauben, Idealismus und Realismus," Bresl., 1787.

Jodl, F., "Leben und Philosophie David Hume's," Halle, 1872.

Meinong, A., "Hume-Studien," I., "Zur Geschichte u. Kritik des modernen Nominalismus," II., "Zur Relationstheorie," Vienna, 1877 and 1882.

(*On the relation between Hume and Kant*)

E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," Vol. I., Chapter 5.

B. Erdmann, "Kant's Kritikismus," Chapter I. (cf. "Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.," I., 1887-88, pp. 62 *seq.*, 216 *seq.*).

J. H. Stirling, "Kant has not answered Hume," in *Mind*, O. S. Vol. IX., pp. 531 *seq.*; and Vol. X. pp. 45 *seq.*

NOTE: BRITISH WRITERS ON ETHICS AND ON THEOLOGY

I. PREDOMINANTLY ETHICAL WRITERS

a. Egoistic

BERNARD DE MANDEVILLE (1670-1733).

CHIEF WORKS:—

1705. "The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits," Lond.
(A brilliant exposition of Hobbes's doctrine that morality is an expression of self-interest.)

1720. "Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and Natural Happiness," Lond. Later editions, 1729, 1731.

"A Letter to Dion (Berkeley) occasioned by his Book called Alciphron."

b. Altruistic

(Upholding, against Hobbes but with Locke and Berkeley, the doctrine that morality is based preëminently on social not on egoistic feeling.)

RICHARD CUMBERLAND.

1672. "De legibus naturæ," Lond. (Theistic).

(1) *Intuitionists*

ANTHONY, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY (1671-1713).

CHIEF WORK:—

1711. "Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times," Lond.
Shaftesbury conceives of the moral consciousness as feeling or instinct, and denies the existence of any conflict between egoism and altruism.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON (1694-1747). (A disciple of Shaftesbury.)

CHIEF WORKS:—

1725. "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," Lond.

1755. "A System of Moral Philosophy," Lond. and Glasgow.

ADAM SMITH (1723-90). (Author of the "Wealth of Nations").

1759. "Theory of Moral Sentiments," Lond.

(2) *Theistic Moralists*

(The moral consciousness is conceived as submission to the law of God.)

JOSEPH BUTLER (1692-1752).

1726. "Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature," Lond.

WILLIAM PALEY (1743-1805).

1785. "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," Lond.

(3) *Utilitarian Moralists*

(Cf. E. Albee, "A History of English Utilitarianism," 1902.)

J. BENTHAM (1747-1832).

1789. "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," Lond.

Bentham with his basal principle, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," is the founder of the most significant school of nineteenth-century British ethics, that of the Utilitarians, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Sidgwick, and others.

II. PREDOMINANTLY THEOLOGICAL WRITERS

a. *Deists*

(Deism is a reaction against church theology. It rejects or sets little value on revelation, conceiving God mainly as First Cause.)

JOHN TOLAND (cf. *supra*, p. 492).

1696. "Christianity not Mysterious," Lond.

ANTHONY COLLINS (1676-1729).

1713. "A Discourse of Free Thinking," Lond.

MATTHEW TINDAL (-1733).

1730. "Christianity as Old as the Creation," Lond.

b. *Theists*

(The theists hold to the possibility of proving *à posteriori* the intelligence and the goodness of God. Of the four named below, Clarke and Wollaston also teach that obligation exists independently of the divine law, and that morality is conduct in accordance with true relations.)

SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1729).

1705. "A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," Lond.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON (1660-1724).

1725. "The Religion of Nature Delineated," Lond.

JOSEPH BUTLER (1692-1752).

1736. "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature," Lond.

WILLIAM PALEY (1743-1805).

1802. "Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature," Lond.

D. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

(Cf. E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," Vol. I, Intro., Chapter 1.)

I. RATIONALISTIC DUALISTS

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679-1754).

Professor in Halle, banished in 1723 by Frederick William I. of Prussia through the influence of pietistic opponents, recalled in 1740 by Frederick the Great. (Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, p. 195.)

IMPORTANT WORKS:—

1712. "Logica, oder Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des Menschlichen Verstandes," Halle.

1719. "Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt," Frankf. und Leipz.

1728. "Philosophia rationalis," Frankf. und Leipz.

1731. "Cosmologia generalis," Leipz.

1732. "Psychologia empirica," Leipz.

1734. "Psychologia rationalis," Leipz.

MARTIN KNUTZEN (d.) 1751. (The teacher of Kant.)

1746. "Systema Causarum Efficientium."

A. G. BAUMGARTEN (1714-62).

1739. "Metaphysica," Halle, 7th ed., 1779. (Often used as text-book by Kant.)

1750-58. "Æsthetica," Frankf.

1751. "Ethica philosophica," Halle; 2d ed., 1763.

F. C. B. BAUMEISTER (1709-1785).

1733. "Philosophia definitiva," Wittenb., 3d ed., 1771.

1736. "Institutiones metaphysicæ," *ibid.*, 2d ed., 1774. (Occasionally used by Kant as text-book in his early university lectures.)

II. FRENCH MATERIALISTS AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE

VOLTAIRE (F. M. AROUET) (1694-1778).

Voltaire was no metaphysician, but he influenced philosophers by his firm opposition, from a deistic standpoint, to a 'prejudiced and privileged orthodoxy.'

CHIEF WORKS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS:—

1733. "Lettres sur les Anglais." ("An attack on everything established in the church and state of France.") Engl., Lond.

1738. "Éléments de la philosophie de Newton. . . ." Amst.

1740. "La métaphysique de Newton, ou parallèle des sentiments de Newton, et de Leibniz," Amst.

1759. "Candide, ou l'optimisme," Paris.

1764. "Dictionnaire philosophique," Paris; Engl., Lond., 1765 and 1843, Boston, 1852. (Mainly a compilation of Voltaire's contributions to the "Encyclopédie.")

JEAN LE ROND D'ALEMBERT (1717-83).

Mathematician and scientist. For many years co-editor with Diderot, of the *Encyclopédie*, and writer of the

"Discours préliminaire," in the "*Encyclopédie*."

(Sensationalist)

ÉTIENNE BONNOT DE CONDILLAC (1715-80).

IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1754. "Traité des sensations," Paris and Lond.

1755. "Traité des animaux," Amst.

"Œuvres complètes," 23 vols., Paris, 1798.

(Materialists)

J. O. DE LA METTRIE (1709-51).

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1745. "Histoire naturelle de l'âme," The Hague.

1748. "L'homme machine," Leyden.

"Œuvres philosophiques," 2 vols., Lond., 1751.

C. A. HELVETIUS (1715-71).

1758. "De l'esprit," Paris; Engl., Lond., 1807.

1772. "De l'homme, de ses facultés, et de son éducation," 2 vols., Lond.

BARON P. H. D. VON HOLBACH (1723-1789).

IMPORTANT WORKS:—

1770. "Système de la nature . . . par M. Mirabaud" [really von Holbach], Lond., Engl., Lond., 1884.

1756. "Le christianisme dévoilé." Par feu M. Boulanger [really von Holbach], Lond. [really, Nancy], Engl., N.Y., 1819.

DENIS DIDEROT (1713-84).

Diderot is not 'a coherent and systematic materialist,' yet his philosophy becomes in the end distinctly materialistic. He is best known as creator and chief editor of the "*Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers*," 1751-72, 28 vols.; suppl., 7 vols. The "*Encyclopédie*" is rightly regarded as 'the literary embodiment of the Enlightenment movement in France.' It is 'one unbroken piece of exaltation of scientific knowledge and pacific industry,' never atheistic, but throughout laying stress on 'the justice of religious tolerance and religious freedom.'

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1746. "Pensées philosophiques," The Hague.

1754. "Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature," The Hague.

"Rêve d'Alembert" (Posthumous).

"Œuvres," ed. Assézat et Tourneux, 20 vols., Paris, 1875-77.

(Cf. J. Morley, "Diderot, and the Encyclopedists," Lond., 1878, 1886.)

III. HUMANISTS

The writers named in this section illustrate a tendency without forming a school. They are representative of a far greater number; and though they are not in a strict sense philosophers, their influence on philosophy is not inconsiderable. The common feature of their writings is a reaction from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and a realization of the significance of personality.

a. In France

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1712-1778.

1750. "Discours sur les sciences et les arts."

1754. "Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité . . ."

1761. "La nouvelle Heloise."

1762. "Émile, ou sur l'éducation." 1762. "Du contrat social."

b. In Germany

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING, 1729-1781.

Lessing, the creator of German literature, is poet, critic, and apostle of freedom. Like Herder, he conceives of religion as personal relation between God and man. His most important works, from the standpoint of philosophy, are:—

1767-69. "Hamburgische Dramaturgie." (A criticism of the principles of dramatic art, essentially Aristotelian in teaching.)

1777, 1780. "Erziehung des menschlichen Geschlechts." (The conception of the history of religions as record of the education of humanity by God.)

(For discussion of Lessing as Spinozist, cf. Dilthey and Zirngiebl cited by Rand.)

JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, 1744-1803.

Like Rousseau, Herder lays stress on the significance of the primitive consciousness. But he corrects the narrow subjectivity of Rousseau by a doctrine of the development of the human consciousness, of literature, and of art; and he supplements his collections of early ballads and his literary and philological studies by works of philosophical significance, notably:—

1778. "Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele."

1784-92. "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," Engl., Lond., 1800.

1787. "Gott: einige Gespräche" (2d ed., 1800, entitled, "Gespräche über Spinoza's System").

1799. "Verstand und Erfahrung, Vernunft und Sprache. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft."

E. KANT AND THE KANTIANIS

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

I. LIFE

"The life history of Kant," Heine says, "is hard to write. For he had neither life nor history. He lived a mechanically ordered, very abstract bachelor's life in a quiet little street in Königsberg. I do not believe that the great clock of the Königsberg cathedral performed its daily task more tranquilly and regularly than its great fellow-citizen, Immanuel Kant. Getting up, drinking coffee writing, lecturing, dining, going to walk — everything had its appointed time. At half-past four he walked eight times up and down, in every season — and if the weather were bad, one saw his servant, old Lampe, walking behind him, with a great umbrella, like a picture of Providence. A curious contrast between the outer life of the man and his . . . world-destroying thoughts. If the people of Königsberg had dreamed of the full significance of his thought, they would have felt a dread of him . . . but the good people saw in him . . . a professor of philosophy, and when he passed them at the appointed hour, they greeted him cordially and set their watches by him." ¹

Kant was born at Königsberg, in 1724, the son of a strap-maker. From his parents, pietists of simple and noble character, he early learned lessons of virtue and of reverence. From his school, the well-known Collegium Fredericianum, he received a good classical training. In the university, which he entered at eighteen, he studied philosophy and natural science; and in 1755, after nine years of the life of private tutor, he habilitated also at Königsberg as privat-docent. The rest of his life he spent in this same quiet little academic city near the Russian border. He never married, and the records of his life contain no reference to any passionate friendships. Yet the attachment between him and his servant, old Lampe, attests the kindness of his disposition, and his letters to his students, in particular to Marcus Herz, bear witness to the relations of frank friendship which bound them to him. A tribute, written in Kant's later life, by Herder suggests the nature of these early relations with his students. Herder says: "I once had the happiness of

¹Heine, *Sämmtliche Werke*, V., "Religion und Philosophie," p. 186.

knowing a philosopher; he was my teacher. He had the joyous cheerfulness of youth at that happy time; his open forehead, created expressly for thought, was the seat of imperturbable serenity; his speech redundant with ideas flowed from his lips. . . . He would constantly bring us back to the simple, unaffected study of nature. He gave us self-confidence and obliged me to think for myself, for tyranny was foreign to his soul."

As will appear from the list of Kant's writings, his early interests were for mathematics and science, and he retained throughout his life his keen concern for mathematics, physics, geography, and anthropology. His achievements as a scientific theorist are considerable. As early as 1755 — that is, forty-one years before the appearance of La Place's "*Exposition du Système du Monde*" — Kant published a "*Universal Nature History and Theory of the Heavens*," which clearly suggests what La Place later named the nebular hypothesis; and his very latest work, the "*Opus Posthumum*," a dissertation on Physics, contains ingenious theories of the constitution of matter. It is perhaps not unnatural that his scientific interest was balanced by a disregard and even a comparative ignorance of technical works of philosophy. His criticisms, for example, of Leibniz and of Berkeley show that he had not thoroughly read either one of them, and even his conception of Hume's teaching is inadequate. His own thinking, as has appeared, was a baffling combination of conservatism and radicalism. He united a tenacious fondness for traditional beliefs with the ruthlessness of the reformer.

Kant was deeply interested also in contemporary affairs and sincerely in sympathy with the tendency of the later eighteenth century toward political emancipation. He was an enthusiastic reader of Rousseau and followed with friendly concern the successive events of the American War for Independence and the French Revolution. His critique of Herder's "*Ideas toward the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*" and his essay on "*Perpetual Peace*" are the most significant of his own writings on political subjects.

The breadth of these interests contrasts oddly with the narrowness of Kant's personal life. He was never tempted away from Königsberg. All his journeys were voyages of thought. His intercourse with the great men of his time was mainly by letter. With

evident satisfaction and with utter acquiescence in the justice of the verdict, but without any corresponding enlargement in his outward circumstances, he gradually found himself the foremost philosophical thinker of his age — the autocrat, or at least the centre, of the world of contemporary thought. He died quietly in 1804, after a few years of literary inactivity.

The almost exclusive concern with the affairs of thought which characterized all Kant's life is well mirrored in a portrait of the little philosopher, recently discovered in a Dresden antiquary's shop. It represents a man with head somewhat bowed under the weight of the commanding brow, and with tranquil eyes, unmindful — so it seems — of the passion and toil and pettiness of the world of men, but fixed upon the goal of reasoned truth.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Cf. "German Kantian Bibliography," E. Adickes, Boston, 1896, pp. 623.)

a. Most Important Works of Kant

(The references are to the volumes of the second Hartenstein edition of Kant's "Werke.")

1. Early Writings

(For useful summaries of the works of Kant's early periods, cf. E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Kant," Vol. I., Intro., c. 4.)

1755. "Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae: nova dilucidatio," H. I., Königsb. (Delivered when Kant habilitated as privat-docent. Rationalistic, that is, Wolffian, in character.)
1755. "Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels," H. I., Königsb. u. Leipz. Transl. by W. Hastie, Lond., 1900. (Anticipation of the nebular hypothesis.)

2. Writings Rationalistic, yet Critical of Rationalism

1762. "Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren," H. II., Königsb. (A criticism of over-pedantic logic.)
1763. "Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen," H. II., *ibid.*
1763. "Der einzigmögliche Beweisgrund . . . des Daseins Gottes," H. II., *ibid.* Transl. in "Essays and Treatises," Lond., 1798.
1764. "Über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral" (known as "Evidenz"), H. II. In Mendelssohn's Preisschrift, Berl.
1764. "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen," H. II., Königsb. Transl. in "Essays and Treatises."

3. *Transition to Critical Philosophy*

1766. "Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik," H. II., *ibid.* Transl. by E. F. Goerwitz, Lond., 1900. (An unacademic essay, teaching that knowledge is limited and that conscience is the basis of true faith.)
1768. "Von dem ersten Grund des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume," H. II., in "Königsberg Frage- und-Anzeig-Nachricht." (The first published indication of Kant's space doctrine. From the phenomena of symmetry, Kant argues the ideality of space.)
1770. "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis dissertatio" (known as "Dissertatio"), H. II., Königsb. Transl. by W. J. Eckoff, N.Y., 1894. (Delivered at Kant's inauguration as professor. A complete statement of his space and time doctrine.)

4. *The Period of the Three Kritiks*

(Cf. Kant's correspondence during this period, especially that with Marcus Herz.)

1781. "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," first edition (A), H. III., Riga (for transl. cf. *infra*, p. 511).
1783. "Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik," H. IV., *ibid.* Ed., with critical notes, by B. Erdmann, Leipz., 1878. Transl. by E. B. Bax, Lond., 1883; by J. H. Bernard, Lond., 1889; by P. Carus, Chicago, 1902. (Written in reply to a review of the "Kritik" by Garve published in the *Göttinger Gelehrten Anzeigen*. This review accuses Kant of Berkelianism. In his indignant refutation of this charge it is likely that Kant underestimates and misstates his own idealism.)
1785. "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," H. IV., *ibid.* Transl. by T. K. Abbott as "Metaphysics of Ethics" (cited *infra*, p. 511).
1787. "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," second edition (B), *ibid.*
1788. "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft," H. V., *ibid.* Ed. by von Kirchmann, and Kehrbach. Transl. by T. K. Abbott, as "Critique of Practical Reason."
1790. "Kritik der Urteilskraft," H. V., Berl. u. Libau, ed. by B. Erdmann. Transl. by J. H. Bernard, Lond., 1892, as "Critique of Judgment." Kant's discussion of 'æsthetic' and 'teleological' judgments. In these, according to his view, we are conscious through *feeling* of a harmony between subject and object which transcends *knowledge*. Cf. E. B. Talbot, "The Fundamental Principle of Fichte's Philosophy," pp. 11-15; E. Caird, *op. cit. infra*, Vol. II., Bk. III.

5. *Later Writings*

1793. "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft," H. VI., Königsb. Transl. in "Essays and Treatises of Kant," II. 1798; (in part) by T. K. Abbott (cited p. 511, *infra*).

1795. "Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf," H. VI., *ibid.* Transl. in "Essays," etc., I.; and in "Principles of Politics," by W. Hastie, 1891.
1797. "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechts und Tugendlehre" (known as "Metaphysik der Sitten,") H. VII., *ibid.* Transl. by J. W. Semple, 1836; 3d ed., 1871.
1798. "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht," H. VII., *ibid.* Transl. by A. E. Kroeger in *Journ. of Spec. Philos.*, 1875-1882. (Edited by other hands from Kant's lecture notes and papers.)
1800. "Logik," H. VIII., ed. G. B. Jäsche, *ibid.* Transl. by T. K. Abbott, 1885.
1821. "Vorlesungen über Metaphysik," ed. K. H. L. Pölit, Erf.

b. Editions

1. Of Complete Works, by

K. Rosenkranz u. F. W. Schubert, 12 vols., Leipz., 1838 ff.
 G. Hartenstein, Leipz., 1st ed., 10 vols., 1838; 2d ed., 8 vols., 1867 ff.
 Königl. Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften, Berl. 1900 ff., Vols. 1-4, and 10-12 (Letters) already published. (The authoritative and completest edition.)

2. Of the Kritik of Pure Reason

- (a) Edited on the basis of the second edition of the "Kritik," (1) by Benno Erdmann (1877, 3d ed., 1900) and (2) by E. Adickes (1889) (both with useful critical notes);
- (b) Edited on the basis of the first edition of the "Kritik" (1) by J. von Kirchmann (1869, 1891) and (2) by K. Kehrbach (Reclam series), 1878; in fine print but containing a very convenient compendium of all texts;
- (c) Translated, entire, by Max Müller (from the first edition, with the diverging passages of the second edition as supplement); in part by J. H. Stirling and J. Watson cited *infra*.

3. Compilations

- "The Philosophy of Kant, in Extracts from His Own Writings," transl. by John Watson, N.Y., 1888; last ed., 1901. (Judicious selections from the three "Kritiks," and the "Metaphysics of Morality," 1785.)
- "The Ethical Writings of Kant," transl. by T. K. Abbott, Glasg., 1879. (Includes "The Critique of Practical Reason," "The Metaphysics of Ethics," and part of the "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Understanding.")

c. Manuscript Notes of Kant

Benno Erdmann, "Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der kritischen Philosophie," Leipz., 1882-1884.
 (A collection of notes made by Kant, through many years, in the margins of his copy of Baumgarten's "Metaphysica" the basis of most of his lectures on metaphysics.)

- B. Erdmann, "Nachträge zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft," Kiel, 1881, pp. 59. (A similar collection of Kant's notes on the margins of his own copy of the "Kritik of Pure Reason," edition A.)
 R. Reicke, "Lose Blätter aus Kant's Nachlass," 2 vols., Königsb., 1889, 1895. (A collection of manuscript notes.)

d. Criticism and Commentary

(On the Development of Kant's Thought)

- E. Caird, "The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," 2 vols., Glasg., 1889.
 F. Paulsen, "Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie," Leipz., 1875. (Lays stress on the rationalistic aspect of Kant.)
 B. Erdmann, "Kant's Kriticismus," *ibid.*, 1878. (Lays stress on the sceptical factor in Kant's development.)
 W. Windelband, "Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen Lehre vom Ding-an-sich," Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philos., 1877.

(On the Kritik of Pure Reason)

- G. S. Morris, "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," Chicago, 1882.
 J. H. Stirling, "Text-book to Kant," Edin. and Lond., 1881. (Includes translation in part of *Æsthetic*, *Categories*, and *Schemata*.)
 H. Vaihinger, "Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft," I. and II., Berl. u. Leipz., 1881, 1892.
 This monumental work presents a careful compendium of all criticisms, including those of Kant's contemporaries, which had been made upon the Preface and upon the *Æsthetic* of the "Kritik of Pure Reason." This compilation is supplemented by original and discriminating comment.

(General)

- R. Adamson, "The Philosophy of Kant," Edin., 1879.
 E. Adickes, "Kantstudien," Leipz., 1895.
 C. Cantoni, "E. Kant," 3 vols., Milan, 1879-1883.
 T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant." (In "Works," II., Lond., 1893.)
 F. Paulsen, "Was uns Kant sein kann," Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philos., 1881, "Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und Lehre." Transl. by J. E. Creighton, N.Y., 1902.
 A. Schopenhauer, "Kritik der kantischen Philosophie" (cited *infra*, p. 554).

For critics contemporary with Kant, cf. also the writers cited *infra*, p. 534. For the present-day issue of Kantian criticism, cf. Vaihinger's journal, "Kantstudien." Among the histories of philosophy, cf. especially that of Fischer. Cf. also the following commentators: Cohen, Drobisch, Lasswitz, Simmel, Watson, cited by Rand.

III. OUTLINE OF THE "KRITIK OF PURE REASON"

The chapter on Kant's philosophy which this book contains is based mainly on his chief work, the "Kritik of Pure Reason," though departing widely from its order of topics. This divergence is, indeed, necessary, if a reasonably clear and rightly shaded view of Kant's philosophy is to be given, for the "Kritik," as it stands, is an almost inextricably confused tangle of different threads of argument. It is marred by useless reiterations, by subtle self-contradictions, and by misleading symmetries of arrangement. There is a double explanation of the greater number of these glaring faults of style. They bear witness, in the first place, to the opposition, so often noted, between Kant's native conservatism and his revolutionary criticism. They are due, also, to the fact that Kant worked ten years, and over, on the "Kritik." In its present form the book contains, side by side, the formulations of Kant's thought at different times during all these years; since in the end he very loosely and uncritically put together the various sections which compose the "Kritik."¹

The "Kritik of Pure Reason" has three main parts: the *Æsthetic*, the *Analytic*, and the *Dialectic*.² *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* are alike in that each aims to study an aspect, or aspects, of the world of experience. The *Dialectic*, on the other hand, discusses the nature of realities beyond experience. Regarded as doctrine of knowledge, the *Æsthetic* is the study of the perception of objects, the *Analytic* investigates our thought about objects, and the *Dialectic* is the study of reason — which Kant defines as search for the unknown. As has already appeared, the division lines are not closely drawn; discussions of unknown reality appear in every part of the "Kritik," and, on the other hand, the *Dialectic*, in spite of its negative purpose, contains an essential part of Kant's

¹For detailed proof of this, cf. E. Adickes, Introduction and Footnotes to his edition of the Kritik, and "Kant's Systematik als systembildender Faktor," 1887.

For evidence of Kant's long preoccupation with the "Kritik," cf. his correspondence with Herz. The following abbreviated extracts suggest its scope: "June, 1771: Busy with a work, 'The Limits of Sense and Reason . . .'" "February, 1772: I am now ready to publish a 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' . . . [a discussion] of the nature of theoretical and of practical knowledge — of which the first part will appear within three months. . . ." "Nov., 1776: The book is held back by a main objection, as if by a dam. . . ." "Aug., 1777: I hope to finish the 'Kritik' this winter. . . ." "Aug., 1778: I am still working unweariedly. . . ."

²The exact division of the Kritik is shown in the reproduced table of contents on pp. 514 seq.

positive doctrine. In view of these defects, the outline of Kant's teaching has been given, in this book, under headings which differ from those of the "Kritik."¹ The two schemes of classification correspond, roughly speaking, in the following way: Part of the teaching about the known object (the space and time doctrine) is contained in the *Æsthetic*, the rest in the *Analytic* (the category doctrine and the teaching about the "thing outside me"). The general teaching about the transcendental self is contained in the *Analytic*, but the doctrine of the transcendental self as moral and free forms part of the *Dialectic*. The doctrine of unknown realities and of the limits of knowledge appears in all parts of the "Kritik."

All this is made clearer by the annotations of the greatly abbreviated Table of Contents which follows. The references are to those pages of this book which discuss the different divisions of the "Kritik."

KRITIK OF PURE REASON

Preface.

Introduction.

I. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

Part I. Transcendental *Æsthetic*.

(The space and time elements of the object as known. 200 seq.,
A priori perception.) 516 seq.

Part II. Transcendental Logic.

Division I. Transcendental Analytic.

Book I. The Analytic of Concepts.

Section I. The Guiding Thread for the Discovery of
 the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.
 (Enumeration and first discussion of the
 categories, or relational elements of ob- 204 seq.,
 jects as known.) 526 seq.

Section II. The Deduction of Pure Concepts of the Understanding.

(This section considers:—

- (1) the argument for the existence of the
 transcendental self (§§15-17). 226 seq.
- (2) the doctrine of the transcendental self
 in relation with its object (§§18-19). 229 seq.
- (3) the doctrine of the limits of knowledge
 (§§22-23), especially the teaching
 about the unknown self (§§24-25). 241 seq.

¹ Cf. the sub-heads of Chapter 7, pp. 198 seq.

Book II. Analytic of Principles.

Section I. Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.

(This section accentuates the distinction between sense and understanding, and suggests that the time consciousness is a link between them. The difficulty is imaginary and the solution unsatisfactory. Cf. Caird, *op. cit.*, I., p. 457²; Adickes, edition of the "Kritik," marginal notes, Paulsen, *op. cit.*, Pt. I., Bk. I., §1, I., 5, 2.)

Section II. System of All Principles of Pure Understanding. (Doctrine of the categories, continued from Book I., §1.)

- (1) Axioms of Perception, 207 seq., 527 seq.
- (2) Anticipations of Observation, 208 seq., 528
- (3) Analogies of Experience.
 - The permanence of *substance*. 529 seq.
 - The law of *causality*. 210 seq.
 - The law of *reciprocal determination*. 217 seq., 531 seq.
- (4) Postulates of Empirical Thought.
 - Possibility*. 532
 - Actuality*. 532
 - (Inserted here is the Refutation of Idealism.)
 - Necessity*. 533

Section III. The Ground of the Distinction of Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena, 236 seq.

(The doctrine of the unknown things-in-themselves. A section properly belonging in the *Dialectic*.) 254

Appendix: Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection. (Chiefly a commentary on Leibniz.)

Division II. Transcendental Dialectic.

Introduction.

Book I. The Concepts of Pure Reason. (Introductory and unimportant.)

Book II. The Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Reason. (Doctrine of the Unknown.)

Section I. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 244 seq.

(Doctrine that the soul, as traditionally conceived, and the transcendental self are unknown.)

Section II.	The Antinomy of Pure Reason. (Doctrine of the necessary paradoxes.)	
	Antinomy 1. (The endlessness and the completeness of space and time.)	521 <i>seq.</i>
	Antinomy 2. (The indivisibility and the divisibility of matter.)	524
	Antinomy 3. (Phenomenal and free causality.)	256 <i>seq.</i>
	Antinomy 4. (A necessary cause and an infinite regress of causes.)	248 <i>seq.</i>
	(An anticipation of Section III. below.)	
Section III.	The Ideal of Pure Reason. (Discussion of the nature of God, and of the arguments for God's existence.)	
	The Ontological Argument.	247 <i>seq.</i>
	The Cosmological Argument.	248 <i>seq.</i>
	The Physico-theological Argument.	250 <i>seq.</i>

II. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

(By far the shorter part of the *Kritik*, and relatively unimportant in content.)

IV. DETAILED STUDY OF CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE "KRITIK OF PURE REASON"

To assist the serious student of the text of the "*Kritik*" and to complete, in outline, the discussion of the book, the following brief comments on Kant's teachings about space and time and about the categories are added here. They were excluded from the body of the book where they properly belong, on the ground that the consideration of details would have obscured the general argument. By this method it is believed that all essential parts of the "*Kritik*" are considered, in fairly close relation to the text, either in Chapter 7 or in this Appendix.

a. THE SPACE AND TIME DOCTRINE

I. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE *ÆSTHETIC*

This portion of the "*Kritik*" furnishes a good practice ground for the beginner in Kant. It is short and unusually clear; yet representative of some of the more important tendencies of Kant's thought. From the larger standpoint of modern philosophy, this division of Kant's thought has on the other hand merely a

temporary and individual significance, since his category teaching contains all that is permanent in the space and time doctrine. The following discussion follows the order of the "Kritik," in which Kant argues, first, the *a priori*, already defined as independence of sense involving universality and necessity, second, the perceptual character, and third, the subjectivity of space and time. For the *a priori* of space and time, Kant has three arguments:¹—

(1) Space and time — he teaches — unlike color, odor, and the like, are not secondary and derived conceptions, framed by the mind after it has come to know external things (and events); for the consciousness of an external thing is already a spatial consciousness, and the consciousness of an event is a temporal consciousness. The essential part of this argument, as already paraphrased in the chapter on Kant, is the correct teaching that both the spatial object and the temporal event include relation. There are, however, two difficulties with the argument as stated. As applied to space, it is at fault because of its implication that every external phenomenon is spatial. For it is at least possible — by many psychologists it is confidently thought — that certain external phenomena, sounds for example, are not spatial. Evidently, therefore, it is improper to identify 'spatial' and 'external' without further argument. In the second place, Kant seems to confuse *a priori* with chronological priority.² In so far as he means by *a priori* 'earlier in experience' he is unjustified in his assertion that the relations — spatial, temporal, and the rest — are *a priori*. For, as Kant himself often acknowledges, it contradicts all recorded experience to assert that our consciousness of a relation is earlier than our consciousness of its terms.³ Neither criticism, however, affects the main contentions of Kant: (1) that space and time include relations; and (2) that relations are necessary.

(2) Space and time, Kant argues in the second place, are *a priori* because one can never conceive of there being no space and no time, whereas one can well imagine a space with no objects in it and a time empty of events. This statement must, however, be chal-

¹ A, pp. 23 seq. and 30 seq. B, pp. 38 seq. and 46 seq. W., pp. 24 seq. and 29 seq. (Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, pp. 200 seq.)

² Cf. the first space-argument and the attempted proof of subjectivity from *a priori*, pp. 202 and 521.

³ Cf. for the same criticism, Caird, *op. cit.*, I., pp. 286 seq.; and F. C. S. Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," §§ 17 and 21, in "Personal Idealism."

lenged. Doubtless one is able, as Kant teaches, to 'think away' any given objects and events: one can imagine a room without furniture in it, or a garden without a house in it; and one can imagine that the Greeks did not conquer at Marathon, or that the Alexandrian library was never burned. But these possibilities do not bear out Kant's contention that utterly empty space and time absolutely without events are imaginable. For however rigorous an effort one makes to imagine empty space, one finds oneself always foiled in the attempt. Often, for example, one is conscious of a dim image of one's own body looking at, or groping about in, supposedly empty space; and even when one succeeds in banishing all images of concrete objects from the image of Space-as-a-whole, that space, if visualized, has of necessity some color however vague, it is, for example, black or dull gray or deep blue. In other words: one never imagines space without at the same time imagining some object or objects, or *at any rate some sense quality*, which is spatial. And similarly one is never conscious of a time which is not the time of some series of events however slight or unimportant. Kant's second argument for a *priority* may, thus, be set aside on the ground that it misstates the facts of experience.

(3) Kant's third argument for the *a priority* (that is, the independence of sense) of the space consciousness is in truth a corollary from the first. This argument, which he sometimes calls a 'transcendental deduction,'¹ runs thus: *Geometrical truths are both necessary and universally admitted*. It is certain that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles and that the square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares on altitude and base. But geometrical truths have to do with space-relations; and it follows that the space-consciousness is *a priori* — necessary and universal. The argument is based on the evident contrast between the propositions of geometry and statements — for example — about the odor or color of a flower, or the polish of a chair. The necessity of geometry is reasonably attributed, Kant teaches, to the character of its subject-matter, space-relations (Kant names them space-forms).² And similarly the necessity which we attribute to the succession of nature phenomena argues for the

¹ In edition A, this is the third of the space arguments (p. 25); in edition B, it has a section to itself (§ 3, p. 40). Cf. W., 25, 27. The time argument is similarly ordered except that in edition B the argument appears in both positions.

² For comment, cf. *supra*, pp. 220³ seq.

necessity, and thus for the unsensational character, of our consciousness of temporal succession.

In commenting upon these arguments, it is necessary to distinguish between the teachings about space and about time. So far as time is concerned, Kant is justified in asserting its peculiar necessity, for time is precisely the relation of necessary connection between irreversible phenomena.¹ But as regards Kant's treatment of space, that comment holds good which has been made on his general conception of relation:² he rightly teaches the necessity of spatial, as of temporal, relation, but he wrongly regards this necessity as a distinguishing feature of relations. On the other hand, as has been pointed out, logically necessary assertions may be made about mere sensations. If this criticism is correct, the permanently valuable part of Kant's space-doctrine is the reiterated teaching that space is, in part at least,³ relational.

Besides arguing thus for the unsensational and *a priori* nature of the space and time consciousness, Kant has two arguments to prove them perceptual. (It will be remembered that when Kant wrote the *Æsthetic*, the first division of the "Kritik," he was still in part a Wolffian. At this period, therefore, he wished to prove space and time perceptual, for if they were forms of thought he would be obliged on his persisting Wolffian principles to suppose the existence of an extra-mental space and time exactly corresponding with them,⁴ whereas he had already advanced beyond Wolff to the conception of space and time as subjective.) Kant's arguments for the perceptual nature of space and time are in brief as follows: "We can be conscious,"⁵ he says, "only of one single Space [or Time]; and if we speak of many spaces [or times], we mean by these, parts of one and the same all-inclusive space [or time]. These parts, moreover, cannot precede the one all-inclusive space [or time] as the parts of which it is composed, but can only be thought as in it." Now there is no doubt that Kant here suggests a correct criterion of the perception as contrasted with the concrete general notion: the perception is primarily apprehended as one, and only later analyzed, whereas the concrete concept, or class-

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 213².

² Cf. *infra*, p. 525².

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 220 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 199.

⁵ On space: ed. A, Arg. 4-5, p. 25; ed. B, Arg. 3-4, pp. 39-40; W., 25. On time: ed. A, Arg. 4-5, p. 32; ed. B, Arg. 4-5, pp. 47-48; W., 30.

notion, is built up gradually out of its parts. It is also true that Total Space is *imagined by the mathematician*, as one whole, fundamental to its parts. There is none the less a decisive objection to Kant's conclusion — the fact, namely, that the consciousness of space as one is not a primitive experience, but a consciousness which has been gradually built up, in the largely forgotten past of each individual, by the mental addition of the largest spaces which have been objects of direct experience.¹ As a matter of fact, therefore, the space-consciousness does not meet the criterion of perception: it is a result of synthesizing, though not of generalizing, consciousness, that is to say, it has been made up of parts, before it is analyzed into them. And if this be true of space, it cannot be doubted in the case of time, which consists primarily of its parts; whose oneness is the relation of these parts; and which is called a One, only when it is metaphorically represented by a spatial image.²

Kant's second argument infers the perceptual nature of space and time from their alleged infinitude. He calls space infinite because beyond every spatial boundary — a horizon, for example — one can always imagine the existence of still more space; and because every moment of time, however indefinitely distant in the past or in the future, must be thought of as having its own past and its own future. The chief difficulty with this argument is Kant's failure to show that infinity is a character of the percept exclusively. Here, as in the preceding argument, his opposition between percept and concept really applies to one class only of concepts — namely, to the concrete general notions, the class notions. He is right in the teaching that this sort of concept, built up as it is from experience, lacks an infinity of predicates; but he does not and cannot show that this is the only type of concept. 'Pure concepts' of the infinite may, on the other hand, occur, for all Kant shows to the contrary.³

It must be borne in mind that the insufficiency of these arguments for the perceptual character of the space and time consciousness does not affect Kant's main purpose — to prove against Hume the unsensational and *a priori* character of space and time, and then

¹ The discussion of this subject belongs rather to psychology than to philosophy. Cf. Kant's virtual admission, in his discussion of the category of totality, that the consciousness of space is gradually built up (*supra*, p. 207).

² Cf. Kant's admission of this, B, § 6, 65.

³ It may be pointed out also that the teaching about the infinitude of perception virtually contradicts the thesis of Kant's second antinomy.

to prove against Wolff that space and time are subjective — ideal in character. To the consideration of the arguments for subjectivity it is now necessary to turn. As contained in the *Æsthetic*, Kant's only argument for subjectivity is from the *a priority* of space and time. "Space," he says, "represents no attribute of things in themselves . . . which would remain if all subjective conditions of perception were abstracted from. For neither absolute nor relative conditions of things can be perceived *a priori* — in other words, before the existence of the things to which they belong."¹ This argument, as stated, is really based, it will be observed, not on the *a priority* — the necessity and universality — but on the *priority*, in actual experience, of the space and time consciousness.² And if we grant its premise, that is, if we grant that we are conscious of space and time before we become conscious of the existence of extra-mental objects, by receiving sensations through their influence, then it is, indeed, evident that space and time are not themselves impressions corresponding with these same objects. But it will be remembered that Kant did not prove that the consciousness of space and time is prior to impressions from extra-mental objects; on the other hand, he successfully proved merely that the consciousness of space and time is not later than the consciousness of objects of our experience. Kant's first and most definite argument for the subjectivity of space and time is therefore based on an invalid premise. This is the more strange, since he might successfully have argued the subjectivity of space and time from the *a priority* strictly conceived, and not from the falsely assumed priority of the space and time consciousness. He might, in other words, have said, as indeed he plainly says in other connections,³ that necessary propositions never could be made about realities independent of us, whereas we have the right to make them of our own ideas. From the necessity of propositions about space and time, there would then have followed their subjectivity.

2. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND ANTINOMIES

Kant argues the subjectivity of space and time not only from their *a priority* but from their contradictoriness. This argument

¹ A, 26, 32; B, 42, 49; W., 27, 31.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 517.

³ Cf. A, 196; B, 241; W., 115.

is contained in a part of the "Kritik" widely removed from the space and time arguments of the *Æsthetic* — namely in the *Dialectic*, the last division of Part I. of the "Kritik."¹ Yet the antinomies, though they appear in so late a part of the "Kritik," are the result of a relatively early phase of Kant's thinking. The gist of the argument contained in them has been stated untechnically in the text of Chapter 7. For this reason and because the first two antinomies make no important addition to the essential teaching of the "Kritik," the outline which follows is purposely abbreviated. Kant's statement of the first antinomy is as follows:

1. (Thesis.) The world must have a beginning in time, else at every particular moment of time an infinity of time has elapsed. Thus, there would be a completed infinity, which is impossible.

The world must be bounded in space, else it would consist of an infinite number of parts. But an infinite time would be requisite in which to apprehend the infinite space, and this has been proved to be impossible.

2. (Antithesis.) The world cannot have a beginning in time, else an empty time would precede it, and in an empty time there would be no reason for any beginning.

The world cannot be limited in space, for it would have to be limited by empty space, and empty space — which is nothing — can stand in no relation whatever.

Kant's conclusion (which applies the antinomy not merely to space and time but to phenomena in general) is best stated in a closing paragraph of what he calls the "Critical Discussion." The antinomy, he says, has brought to light the following dilemma: if the world be a whole-existing-in-itself, it must be either finite or infinite. But the first as well as the second of these alternatives has been proved untrue (by the thesis and antithesis respectively of the first antinomy). Therefore the world cannot be a reality

¹ There are four antinomies of which the theses affirm and the antitheses deny (according to Kant, with equal necessity) the following propositions:—

1. The beginning of the world in time and its spatial limitedness.
2. The occurrence of simple, or indivisible, material realities.
3. Free causes.
4. A necessary being.

Kant groups these antinomies together on the ground that each is a necessary illusion of the reason. A study of them shows, however, that the first two connect themselves with the space and time doctrine; the third with the doctrine of the free self; the fourth with Kant's teaching about God. Cf. *supra*, pp. 257 and 248.

existing in itself; whereas, since observation bears abundant witness to the paradoxes of consciousness, this same contradictory temporal and spatial world well may be a composite of mere phenomena of consciousness or ideas (*Vorstellungen*).

Before commenting, even briefly, on this antinomy doctrine, it is essential to observe that it presupposes throughout the older negative conception, not the modern positive view, of the infinite.¹ That is to say, it conceives of the infinite as in some sense the endless. But even judged on this basis, the first antinomy does not justify the assertion of Kant that thesis and antithesis are alike valid. The antithesis is indeed an incontrovertible statement of these truths; (1) that time — the related succession of moments — is without beginning, since every alleged first moment always by definition presupposes a still earlier one; and (2) that space must be thought as infinitely extensible since space is, by definition, that whose supposed boundaries must lie between parts of itself. The thesis is, on the other hand, invalid since it makes the false assumption that a series completed at a given moment might be infinite.² If this criticism be admitted, Kant's solution of the antinomies is discredited, for that assumes that thesis as well as antithesis is proved true. Yet curiously enough the main purpose of Kant's antinomy teaching is not hereby affected. For from the truth of the antithesis, as clearly as from the alleged contradiction between thesis and antithesis, one may infer the probability that time and space, whose boundaries ever elude the seeker, are not characteristics of an immutable reality-independent-of-consciousness.

¹ According to this positive conception the infinite is the self-representative; it is, in other words, that "which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a part of itself." Its endlessness is a corollary from this positive character. (For statements of this doctrine, cf. E. V. Huntington, *The "Continuum as a Type of Order,"* Reprint by Harvard Publication office from *Annals of Mathematics*, 1905, secs. 7 and 27; Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen," Engl. transl. in "Essays on Number," 1901, §§ 64 *seq.*; Royce, "The World and the Individual," I., "Supplementary Essay," esp. pp. 497 and 507 *seq.*, with the works there cited, especially those of Bolzano and Cantor. Cf. also, Couturat, "De l'Infini Mathématique." For Bertrand Russell's discussion of the Infinite and his criticism of Kant's first two antinomies, cf. "The Principles of Mathematics," Chapters XIII., XLIII., LII. Cf. Kant's "Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels," III., Hartenstein, I., p. 332, cited by Couturat, for an apparent approach to the positive conception of the infinite.

² The argument of the thesis as applied to space need not be separately considered, for it is based directly upon the time-argument. Infinite space is argued impossible on the ground that an infinite time would be needed in which to apprehend it.

The second antinomy has to do with space, not with time.¹ It alleges on the one hand the existence of indivisible units, and on the other hand the necessity of the infinite divisibility of space. It is equally necessary, Kant holds, to assert the existence of indivisible spatial units and to assert the infinite divisibility of space. And he draws, as before, the general conclusion that space, of which such contradictory assertions may be made, must be subjective. The decisive objection to this reasoning is that Kant is here using the term space in two different senses, so that the antinomy is due to verbal contradiction rather than to the essentially contradictory conception of space. For, on the one hand, the thesis is true of *space as perceived*, since there certainly are units of space than which no smaller can be perceived, and space is in this sense divisible into simple parts. And, on the other hand, the antithesis is true of *space as thought*, that is, of space as the object of the mathematical consciousness; for no contradiction is involved in the mathematically fruitful conception of the endless divisibility of the spatial. Thus regarded, the antinomy vanishes.

In conclusion, the main difficulties of Kant's space and time doctrine will be summarily restated. In the chapter on Kant the effort was made to state as forcibly as possible what in the writer's view is the permanently valuable part of the teaching. Even in the more critical discussion of the preceding paragraphs stress has been laid wherever possible on correct conclusions, even when, as has been indicated, these are reached through faulty arguments. A review undertaken in a more critical spirit is not, therefore, an unfair addition to this section. The main criticisms on Kant's space and time doctrine may be reduced to the following: —

1. In the first place, it is in the writer's view unquestionable that all which is correct in the Kantian doctrine of space and time should be included under his discussion of the categories. Kant has utterly failed in his arguments to prove that space and time are purely perceptual; and his teaching that space and time are *a*

¹ As has appeared from the statement of the antinomy, Kant claims to be discussing 'substances,' by which he here means material things. But the antinomy or contradiction turns on the spatial nature, the extension, of the material substances.

priori depends for him on the fact that they are manifestly relational in character. The segregation of space-relations and of time from the categories is accordingly misleading. It is apparently due to the unwarranted distinction between sense and thought, and between sense-objects and thought-objects, inherited by Kant from Wolff.¹

2. In the second place, Kant fails to consider what is certainly a possibility — what, indeed, in the minds of many psychologists is a fact — that the space consciousness includes, along with its relations, a strictly sensational factor.² One of the results (*a*) of this inadequacy is the unjustified teaching, just criticised, that space truths (geometrical propositions) have a peculiar necessity due to their specifically spatial nature. The persistence (*b*) of Kant's futile attempt to draw an exact parallel between space and time is another outcome of this neglect to acknowledge that there is in space a sensational factor lacking in the largely relational time consciousness. And finally (*c*) the false opposition of thesis to antithesis in the second antinomy would hardly be made, if Kant distinguished between space-as-object-of-sense (and hence, indeed, incapable of endless subdivision) and space-as-thought.

b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES

By 'category' Kant means either a way of thinking, an unsensational as opposed to a sensational sort of consciousness — in his own words, a concept of the understanding;³ or else he means the specific object or content of such thought consciousness, that is, an unsensational element or factor of the total object of consciousness. The term 'category' means literally 'predicate.' Its most general signification — common to Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel

¹ Most modern mathematicians have rejected Kant's intuitional, or perceptual, conception of geometry. They regard geometry, like the other branches of mathematics, as a 'science of pure concepts.' Cf. M. Bôcher, "Conceptions and Methods of Mathematics," Vol. I., of the Report of the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science; L. Couturat, "Les Principes des Mathématique," App., especially p. 307; J. Royce, "Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics," Journal of Philosophy, II., pp. 197 *seq.*; B. Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 457 ff.

² The irrelevant statement, midway in the first argument for the perceptual nature of space, 'space is a given magnitude,' suggests by its use of the term 'given' that Kant vaguely recognizes the sense-character of space. For 'given' is a predicate which he habitually applies to the sense-datum.

³ Cf. B, § 20: "Categories are nothing else except functions for judging."

alike — is ‘fundamentally important class.’ The main difference between Kant and Aristotle in their enumeration of categories is to be found in the fact that Kant starts from the subjective side, considering the categories first as forms of conscious judging, whereas Aristotle — herein followed by Hegel — regards the categories as relations of the objects of knowledge. Kant’s opposition to Hume, as has appeared, consists in great part in pointing out that the objects of our consciousness actually do contain unsensational as well as sensational factors. These unsensational elements, as treated by Kant, really fall into two groups, though Kant does not formally make the distinction. Kant implies, in other words, that our judgments are of two fundamentally important kinds: they are either judgments about the relation of known objects (or parts of known objects) to each other; or they are judgments about the reality attributed to objects. In the same way, the characters of objects as known by thought, not by sense, are of two sorts: first, relations of known objects to each other (‘scientific categories,’ I shall call them, though Kant does not use the expression); and second, reality, unreality, etc. (‘epistemological categories,’ as they may be called). Only categories in the former sense have been discussed in the body of this book. The purpose of the present section is to outline Kant’s doctrine of categories as a whole, commenting, however, mainly on the categories not heretofore discussed. In this exposition I shall follow Kant’s list and order, but shall try to show that the division into what I have called ‘scientific’ and ‘epistemological’ categories underlies his grouping and that his own principle of division obscures this and other important distinctions.

The category teaching is contained in two arbitrarily separated parts of the “*Kritik*”: first, in the sections numbered in the second edition 9–15, near the beginning of Book I. of the *Analytic*; second, in the division called “System of all Principles of Pure Understanding,”¹ in Book II. of the *Analytic*. The earlier sections are mainly given over to the enumeration and grouping of the categories. The exact number and the principle of division Kant gains by an artificial method. Understanding by category the object of thought, he argues that thought is judgment, and

¹ A, 148 seq.; B, 187 seq.; W., 92 seq. The word ‘principle’ is here used roughly to mean the ‘application of a category.’

that because a proposition is the statement of a judgment, therefore there must be as many sorts of category as there are sorts of proposition. His Table of the Categories, accordingly, is based upon the traditional Table of Propositions.¹ This principle of classification, as has been objected by most of Kant's critics, is at fault in the following way: it too uncritically assumes the adequacy of traditional logic to express all metaphysically important classes of judgment. We may test the criticism by a brief consideration of the different categories, as Kant has grouped them.²

(1) *Categories of Quantity*.³ — According to their quantity, Kant says, propositions are classed as universal, particular, or singular; and corresponding with these are the categories of unity, plurality, and totality. Obviously these are categories in the sense that they are all known through thinking, not through sensation. Kant discusses in detail only one of these categories, totality. Evidently, totality is a known relation of objects or of parts of objects to each other, and comes thus under the head of what have been called the scientific categories. The essential features of Kant's teaching, that every object is known as totality of its qualities, has been given in Chapter 7.⁴ Here it need only be added that in the course of this discussion of spatial totality Kant effectively corrects the space doctrine of the *Æsthetic*. For he describes the 'category' of totality virtually in those terms which he earlier applied to the so-called 'form' of space. This shows

¹ This table (according to Kant) is as follows (A, 70; B, 95; W., 48): —
Propositions are —

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. In <i>Quantity</i>
Universal,
Particular,
Singular. | 3. In <i>Relation</i>
Categorical,
Hypothetical,
Disjunctive. |
| 2. In <i>Quality</i>
Affirmative,
Negative,
Infinite. | 4. In <i>Modality</i>
Problematic,
Assertoric,
Apodictic. |

For a discussion of the points at which this table diverges from the conventional one, cf. Caird, *op. cit.*, I., pp. 339 *seq.*

² For enumeration, cf. "Analytic," Bk. I., Chapter 1, §§ 9, 10, A, 70 *seq.*, B, 95 *seq.*, W., 48 *seq.* For discussion, cf. the passages cited in the next following footnotes.

³ Discussed in the "Axioms of Perception," A, 161 *seq.*; B, 202; W., 92. For another formulation of the same doctrine, cf. the "Synthesis of Apprehension," in the so-called Transcendental Deduction of ed. A (A, 98).

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 200 *seq.*

that he might advantageously have abandoned his teaching that space is perceptual and might thus have regarded the ordering factor of our space-consciousness as a category.¹

(2) *Categories of Quality*.² — Propositions, Kant teaches, have three distinctions of quality: they are affirmative, negative, or 'infinite.'³ Corresponding with these distinctions he recognizes three categories of quality: reality, negation, and limitation. The last-named category need not be discussed, since Kant says nothing of it beyond the bare definition.⁴ The teaching about reality and negation may be paraphrased somewhat as follows: In making an affirmation, as 'The starfish has a nervous system,' I am conceiving something as real; and conversely in a negation, as 'The paramecium does not avoid obstacles,' I am denying reality. Evidently reality and its companion categories are unsensational ways of thinking and aspects of experience. Evidently, also, they are 'epistemological' categories. The main feature of Kant's teaching about them is his reiterated assertion that only the sensational is real, and that the unsensational is unreal. The 'principle' of the categories of quality is, he says, the following:⁵ — "In all phenomena the real which is an object of sensation has degree."⁶

(3) *Categories of Relation*.⁷ — Besides having quality and quantity, propositions have three relations — as Kant rather artificially calls them; they are categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Corresponding, as he says, with these distinctions, Kant recognizes three categories of relation — substance, causality, and reciprocity — which he discusses, one by one, under three separate

¹ Not merely this category of totality but the category of reciprocal determination (cf. p. 531) has to do with space.

For reference to a less important way in which the "Æsthetic" teaching differs from that of the "Axiom of Perception," cf. p. 520, n.

² Discussed in the *Anticipations of Sense-perception*, A, 166; B, 208; W., 96.

³ Only the first two are distinctions ordinarily admitted. The infinite proposition differs from the negative in that its negation is fused with its predicate. Kant's examples are: of a negative proposition, 'the soul is not mortal'; of an infinite proposition, 'the soul is not-mortal.'

⁴ For a different view, cf. Caird, *op. cit.*, I., pp. 341 seq.

⁵ Kant mixes with this teaching of the reality of the sensational a radically different doctrine of a 'real' phenomenon which corresponds with sensation. Cf. A, 175-176; B, 217; W., 100. For the exposition of the 'real' in this sense, cf. pp. 231 seq.

⁶ B, 207; W., 96. Degree is here conceived as midway between the real and negation, that is complete absence of sensation. It has been pointed out in Chapter 7 that by this incidental mention of degree Kant really suggests a group of categories which he does not explicitly discuss — scientific categories of comparison.

⁷ For discussion, cf. A, 176 seq.; B, 218 seq.; W., 101 seq.

'principles': the first, second, and third of the "Analogies of Experience." To Kant's discussion of the first of these categories, we shall at once turn, disregarding the disputed but comparatively unessential question of the actual correspondence of the categories with the classes of propositions from which he purports to derive them.

In discussing (a) *the category of substance*,¹ Kant gives to 'substance' two allied meanings — 'permanence' (*Beharrlichkeit*), and 'the permanent' (*das Beharrliche*). Regarded in the former way, substance, or permanence, is evidently a category, that is, an unsensational aspect of objects-as-thought. But Kant more often means by substance not 'permanence' but 'the permanent.' He seems to have in mind what corresponds to the subject of a categorical proposition — substance which stands to its attributes in the relation of subject to predicates. In this sense, as Kant says, "the category stands under the head of relation more as condition of relation than as itself a relation." For by substance, regarded as the permanent, is meant that which is presupposed by all change. And the argument for the existence of this 'permanent' is simply the following: so surely as there is change there must be something which changes — a 'permanent,' which undergoes transformations.

Granting this to be Kant's conception of substance the question at once arises, what concretely does he mean by substance thus conceived as the permanent-required-by-change? To this question Kant gives no satisfying answer.² Most of the first Analogy is occupied by a seeming effort to identify substance with time, of which Kant says, "time in which all change of phenomena must be thought to be [is itself] permanent and does not change." With this misleading conception of time as essentially permanent Kant was, however, rightly dissatisfied,³ for he also speaks of 'the permanent' as 'in time'; and he even suggests the identification of 'the permanent' with space, by a note written in the margin of his own copy of the first edition of the "*Kritik*."⁴ This

¹ For discussion, cf. A, 182 seq.; B, 224 seq.; W., 106 seq.

² A, 187 seq.; B, 230-231; W., 108 seq.

³ B, 225. It is very possible that Kant was first misled by the spatial image roused by Newton's definition of absolute time: *Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, æqualiter fluit*. This may very likely have suggested to Kant the hypothesis that substance, the permanent, is time — as distinct from events in time.

⁴ Erdmann, "Nachträge," LXXX.

note is as follows: "Here the proof must be so carried through as to refer only to substances as phenomena of our external senses, consequently [the proof must be] from space, for space and its determinations exist in all time." Kant suggested this hypothesis in a later section of the "*Kritik*," but he never rewrote the first Analogy in accordance with it.¹ The theory, though far more plausible than the identification of substance with time, is merely suggested, not formally worked out by Kant; and it overlooks the sensational nature of space, which should effectually prevent its being regarded as mere category or as 'the permanent.'

We are forced to the conclusion that Kant, though he teaches the existence of a 'permanent' implied by the facts of change, never unequivocally defines its nature; and we are left accordingly with full scope for hypothesis about it. From Kant's doctrine of the transcendental self the logical inference is surely that this 'permanent' is none other than the self. Kant, however, certainly does not adopt this view. Indeed, he expressly opposes it in the "*Refutation of Idealism*" which he added to the second edition of the "*Kritik*." Temporal determination, he there teaches, presupposes somewhat which is permanent, but this permanent may not be conceived as self, or I, for the permanent, or transcendental, self — so Kant always has taught — is unknown.² Therefore, he concludes, the permanent presupposed in temporal determination must be a 'thing outside me.' Thus conceived, the permanent, or substance, is perhaps neither more nor less than physical nature, the sum total of external phenomena. For though, strictly speaking, it is true that no sum of phenomena has permanence, still nature, if regarded as a whole (though of constantly shifting content), and — in particular — Nature as the object of the transcendental, more-than-individual self, may be conceived as possessing a certain sort of permanence as compared with any particular phenomenon.

However interpreted, substance as 'the permanent' evidently is not a category coördinate with the others. Paraphrasing Kant, we may say that it is the condition of the categories, that to which the categories are applied. For, while a category is, in Kant's view, a simple way of thinking or a given aspect of an object as thought, substance, if conceived as Nature, would include a complete sum


¹ B, 292; W., 127.

² Cf. Erdmann, "*Nachträge*," LXXV.

or system of categories. If, on the other hand, substance were conceived as I, it would of course be the subject of the categories.

As second among the categories of relation, Kant discusses, (b) *the category of causality*. This has been considered in such detail¹ that no comment need be made upon it beyond pointing out that it is clearly (like totality) a 'scientific' category of relation.

(c) *The category of reciprocal determination*² is really conceived by Kant in a twofold fashion. Sometimes he seems to mean by the term merely 'mutual causality,' that is, the double causal connection between two coexisting bodies. Again, however, he seems to refer to the necessary but reversible relation between spatial positions — one of the relations nowadays widely discussed under the name of forms of *order*. The important addition to the category-doctrine made — or better, implied — in the second of these teachings has been summarized and amplified in Chapter 7.³ On the other hand, Kant's introduction of considerations relative to mutual causality obscures the fact that the causality involved is of no new sort.⁴ For evidently mutual causality between two objects is the corresponding relation of their succeeding states. Change No. 2 in the moon's history is both the effect of change No. 1 and the cause of change No. 3 in the earth's history; and conversely change No. 2 in the earth's history is both the effect of change No. 1 and the cause of change No. 3 in the moon's history. The relation is simply represented thus: —



(4) *The Categories of Modality*.⁵—Propositions, and therefore judgments, have three modalities: they are problematic, assertoric,

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chapter 7, p. 210.

² For discussion, cf. A, 211; B, 256; W., 118.

³ Cf. p. 217.

⁴ Kant emphasizes also the here irrelevant teaching that observed or assumed mutual causality between objects may be regarded as an argument for their co-existence. (A, 211; B, 158; W., 118.)

⁵ Discussed under the heading, "Postulates of Empirical Thought," A, 218 seq.; B, 265 seq.; W., 122 seq.

or apodictic.¹ Corresponding with these distinctions, Kant enumerates as categories of modality: (1) possibility, or conformity with the formal conditions of experience; (2) actuality, or conformity with the material conditions of experience; and (3) necessity, or connection with the real. These are evidently what I have called epistemological, or metaphysical, categories — that is, predications about reality. No one will deny that the consciousness of possibility, actuality, or necessity is as such unsensational — in other words, that these are in the general sense categories; and the interest of Kant's discussion centres, therefore, in his consideration of the proper application of these categories. In concrete terms, Kant here discusses the question: *what* is possible, actual, or necessary?

To begin with the most significant of these categories as discussed by Kant, it is plain that by 'actual' he means the actual-for-us, not the 'ultimately real'; and that he unequivocally teaches that actuality is rightly attributed to sensational phenomena only. According to this view, actuality is, however, a mere synonym for a category already discussed by Kant — that of 'reality.'² And the doctrine that only the sensational is real is simply another affirmation of Kant's theory of the limits of knowledge: the doctrine that transcendental self, God, ultimate realities of every sort, because unsensational, are, therefore, unknown. As has been noticed, this involves a tacit denial of the force of his own teaching that relations, no less than sensations, belong to known reality.

Kant's treatment of 'possibility' and 'necessity' cannot lay claim to completeness. His treatment of 'the possible' is summarized in the statement that conceptions are merely possible, and this is obviously a mere restatement of the doctrine that only the sensational can be actual.³ Similarly his definition of the neces-

¹ Observe that these distinctions apply to judgments conceived as affirmations and not with any force to judgments conceived as unifications. For discussion of the distinction, cf. the writer's "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 239-240, with citations.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 528.

³ This teaching is difficult of interpretation by reason of the ambiguity of the term 'concept.' If by 'concept' Kant means category, or pure concept, then the doctrine is in flat opposition to his reiterated teaching that the categories are essential factors of objects of knowledge. If, on the other hand, the term be used in the sense of 'empirical concept' or 'image' — then this doctrine reduces to the obvious but, for Kant's purposes, unimportant observation that the 'possible' is the 'imagined' as distinct from the 'perceived.'

sary, as that which is inferred from the actual, harks back to the sensational view of knowledge. It is perfectly evident that Kant does not here pretend to discuss all the senses of the term necessary.

Midway in the discussion of actuality, the second edition interposes certain difficult paragraphs making up the "Refutation of Idealism."¹ The teaching of this section has already been considered: first, in the discussion of the transcendental self's object;² and second, in the comment on the category of substance.³ This teaching is, in brief, the following: "The . . . empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." For (1) I am empirically conscious of my existence as determined in time; and (2) temporal determination presupposes something permanent. This permanent must be, Kant insists, a thing-outside-me. The obvious objection to this argument has already been noticed: on Kant's own showing the permanent being, implied by the succeeding ideas which make up my empirical self, is the permanent or transcendental *self*, and not primarily any object at all. Kant sets aside the objection on the ground of his unfortunate persuasion that we have no knowledge of such a self.⁴ Evidently he fails to meet the difficulty, and leaves the things-outside-me with their existence unproved. None the less, as is elsewhere indicated, the existence of these objects is a corollary of his doctrine of the self.⁵

This discussion of Kant's account of the categories may be summarized as follows: As against Hume, Kant has shown conclusively that we are unsensationally conscious. He has enumerated and grouped these unsensational forms of consciousness on an artificial principle, by supposing that there are as many of them as there are kinds of proposition. He has thus considered the categories of quantity: singleness, plurality, and totality; the categories of quality: reality, negation, and limitation; the categories of relation: substantiality, causality, and reciprocity; and the categories of modality: possibility, actuality, and necessity. A critical study of these categories has revealed, in the first place,

¹ B, 274 seq.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 231 seq.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 530.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 241 seq.

⁵ For an illuminating discussion of the "Refutation of Idealism," and the kindred teaching of the "Fourth Paralogism" of ed. A, cf. Vaihinger in "Strassburger Abhandlungen," pp. 85 seq. Vaihinger very clearly exposes the inconsistencies of Kant's different attitudes to idealism, and his misapprehensions of preceding idealists.

several instances in which the category does not conform to the correlative proposition. Among the categories themselves, it has distinguished between (1) those which are objects of scientific thinking, relations between known objects or parts of these objects — notably the categories of totality, degree, and causality; and (2) categories which are objects of metaphysical judgment, or affirmation, the categories of modality and the parallel categories of quality. The so-called category of substance has turned out to be more ultimate than any category — a ground of relation, not itself a relation.

When these deductions and amendments have been made, the table of the categories assumes something the following shape:¹

CATEGORIES		
(Unsentational Experiences; <i>i.e.</i> Important Ways of Thinking and Factors of Objects as Thought)		
Epistemological Categories: —	Scientific Categories: —	
Reality or Actuality	(a) Of comparison:	(b) Of connection:
Negation	Degree	Totality
Possibility		Causality
		Reciprocity or Order

THE KANTIANS

I. WRITERS WHO EXPOUND AND DEVELOP KANT'S TEACHING

KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD, 1758–1825. (Professor in Jena and in Kiel.) Reinhold summarizes Kant's teaching, and also seeks to improve on it by deriving *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge from a common 'principle of consciousness.'

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS: —

1786. "Briefe über die kantische Philosophie," first printed in Wieland's *Deutscher Merkur*: published Leipzig, 1790–92.

1789. "Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens," Prag and Jena.

1791. "Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens,," Jena.

J. C. FRIEDRICH VON SCHILLER (1759–1805).

Schiller develops Kant's æsthetic teaching by the definition of beauty as 'freedom in phenomenal appearance'; and supplements Kant's ethical doctrine by the teaching that the æsthetic state, as disinterested, makes the moral life possible. He con-

¹ This sort of reduction of Kant's categories is no novelty. Schopenhauer, as is well known, attempted to reduce them to the single Law of Sufficient Reason, or Category of Connection (cf. *supra*, pp. 215 and 345); and a modern critic, Paulsen, retains only the categories of substance and causality.

ceives the 'beautiful soul (schöne Seele)' as that which has transcended the conflict between impulse and duty.

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1793. "Über Anmuth und Würde" (published in 'Thalia').

1795. "Briefe über ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen." (published in *Horen*).

1795-96. "Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung," *ibid*.

"Philosophische Schriften" (Auswahl), Leipzig, 1896.

"Essays æsthetical and philosophical" (transl.), Lond., 1875, '90. (Cf. the philosophical poems: "Die Künstler," "Ideal und Leben," etc.)

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841). (Professor in Königsberg and Göttingen.)

Herbart's system is from one point of view a development of Kant's thing-in-itself doctrine. It is formulated in specific opposition to Hegel's monistic idealism. Herbart teaches that there exists a plurality of real beings (*Reale*) tending to preserve themselves and manifested in phenomenal things. Herbart's philosophy thus becomes a sort of mechanics of substances in their interrelations. He includes 'souls' among his real substances and conceives ideas as the 'self-pervations' of souls.

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS:—

1806. "Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik," Göttingen.

1813. "Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie," Königsberg.

1816. "Lehrbuch zur Psychologie," Königsberg u. Leipzig.

1824-25. "Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik," Königsberg.

1828-29. "Allgemeine Metaphysik, nebst den Anfängen der philosophischen Naturlehre," *ibid*.

FRIEDRICH D. E. SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834). (Preacher, and professor at Berlin.)

Schleiermacher bases an emotional mysticism, allied also to Spinoza's monistic teaching, on the thing-in-itself doctrine of Kant.

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1799. "Über die Religion," Berlin.

1800. "Monologen."

1803. "Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre."

1841. (Posthumous) "Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik."

"Sämmtliche Werke," Abth. III., "Philosophie," 9 vols., Berl., 1834-64.

II. OPPONENTS OF KANT

FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI (1743-1819).

Jacobi holds that knowledge and faith are in necessary opposition. He therefore opposes Kant's doctrine that theoretical reason leaves scope for practical reason; and himself insists upon the primacy of faith.

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1785. "Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an . . . Moses Mendelssohn."

1787. "David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus u. Realismus."

1811. "Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung." (An antagonistic criticism of Schelling.)

"Werke," 6 vols., Leipzig, 1812-20.

GOTTLIEB ERNST SCHULZE (1761-1833).

Schulze opposes Kantianism, especially in the form which Reinhold gives to it, on the ground that it involves the essential contradiction of limiting knowledge to experience, and yet at the same time postulating realities beyond experience.

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS:—

1792. "Ænesidemus," Helmst.

1801. "Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie," 11 vols., Hamburg.

Other critics of Kant are J. G. Hamann, Herder, cited *supra*, p. 506; and J. G. von Fries who develops a system really midway between that of Kant and that of the 'common-sense' school.

F. THE POST-KANTIAN MONISTIC IDEALISTS

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814)

I. LIFE

The story of the life of Fichte may be briefly told, for it has already been suggested, in the chapter on his philosophy. He was born, in Saxon Lusatia, in 1762, the son of a poor weaver. A nobleman of the neighborhood, attracted by the boy's precocity, undertook his education, but died before Fichte finished his university course. For years, Fichte followed the difficult career of a family tutor, — a life for which his militant sense of duty seems to have made him singularly unfitted. When we hear, for example, of his habit of reading weekly to his employers a list of the faults which they had committed in the government of their children, we are not surprised to know that he seldom held a situation for a long time. To his employment as a tutor he none the less owed the greatest happiness of his life, for it brought him in 1788 to Zurich, and there he met and loved Johanna Rahn, a niece of the poet Klopstock. Johanna was herself a strenuous-souled young person, and from first to last the union between the two was singularly strong and beautiful. The inexorable need of money drove Fichte to Leipzig, and there, in order to read with a pupil Kant's "Kritik

of Practical Reason," he undertook in 1790 that study which revolutionized his whole life. A visit in 1791 to Königsberg chilled Fichte's hopes of personal friendship and personal help from Kant. Yet, indirectly, Kant made Fichte's fortune, for Fichte's first little book, the "*Kritik aller Offenbarung*," was published anonymously and attributed to Kant. Kant's denial of the authorship was accompanied by words of commendation which favorably introduced the younger writer.

Fichte was married in 1793; and in 1794 was called to the University of Jena where he gained an immediate success. He threw himself with ardor into all the phases of university life, and at once became very popular. His philosophical work of this period — the first "*Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre*" is so difficult and technical a book that one is at a loss to understand why Fichte's lecture room was thronged. Yet his enthusiasm must have inflamed even the phases of the "*Unabhängige Thätigkeit*" with interest; and besides these technical lectures he gave others on the history of philosophy and on ethical problems. Whatever his method, Fichte gained so strong a hold on the confidence of the students at Jena that he had almost persuaded them to abandon their secret societies. The failure of this effort seems to have been due to Fichte's over-conscientiousness. He questioned his own right to conduct personally the negotiations with the students, and gained their undeserved distrust by proposing to submit the matter to the university authorities. An incident of another sort brought to an end, in 1799, Fichte's Jena career. He published in the philosophical journal, of which he was an editor, a paper which was criticised for its lack of conformity to the orthodox theology of the day. The university council would have condoned the heresy but could not overlook Fichte's open and straightforward defence of his position. Accordingly, under Goethe's leadership, they dismissed Fichte from his chair.

Fichte's removal from Jena to Berlin quite upset the regular development of his system. For several years he had no academic affiliations but grew better and better known by his popular lectures to Berlin audiences. Some of these were expositions of his system, in which he laid stress on its ethical and religious implications. Even stronger in their influence were his lectures on subjects of political and social interest: his arraignment of the

frivolity and the indifference of the time in "Characteristics of the Present Age," and his summons to a patriotic revival in the "Addresses to the German People." When, in 1810, the University of Berlin was founded he was called to the chair of philosophy. But his second academic career was of short duration. In 1812 the call to arms stirred all Prussia. Fichte, with difficulty dissuaded from undertaking service in the army, remained in Berlin exhorting and inspiring the young men in camp. His wife, who had shared all the interests of his life, became a nurse in the soldier hospitals. In January, 1814, she fell ill with fever, contracted during her service. She recovered — but Fichte himself, who had nursed her devotedly, died of the same disease on the twenty-seventh of January, 1814.

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1795. "Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre," W., I. Transl. by Kroeger.
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(The application of Fichte's doctrine to principles of government. Part I. deals with the conception of rights; Part II. with state organization and with municipal law.)
1798. "Das System der Sittenlehre," W., IV.
(Fichte's theory of ethics and doctrine of duty.)
1800. "Die Bestimmung des Menschen," W., II. Transl. by Smith as "The Vocation of Man."
(The best of the popular expositions of Fichte's doctrine. For summary, see pp. 310 *seq.* of this book.)
1801. "Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre," W., II.
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FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING (1775-1854)

I. LIFE

The early life of Schelling reads like a romantic episode in this chronicle of philosophers' careers. He was born in a little town of Württemberg, in 1775, the son of a chaplain and professor in a cloister-school, near Tübingen. Like Berkeley, Schelling made his most significant contributions to philosophy while he was still very young. Throughout his youth he distinguished himself as a student of lively intellect and astounding precocity. When he was fifteen he entered the University of Tübingen and during the next five years was fellow student of Hegel and Hölderlin. His main interests were in historical and speculative problems. He read both Kant and Fichte, and by the time he was twenty had published philosophical essays of distinct merit — notably the "Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie."

During the two years following the university period, Schelling occupied the position of tutor to two brothers of noble family. Most of this time he spent at Leipzig where he heard lectures on medicine and on physical science, and where he published the chief works of his nature philosophy. The result of this rich productiveness was a call from Jena to a professorship in philosophy.

Here Schelling spent the years from 1798 to 1803, at first as colleague of Fichte, later in the companionship of Hegel. The years in Jena were distinguished by successful lectures, by notable publications, and by personal relationships of vivid significance. With Goethe, the Schlegels, and the foremost of the German romanticists he lived on terms of close comradeship. The brilliant centre of this brilliant circle was Caroline, August Schlegel's wife — a woman instinct with poetic gift, with swift thought, with unquenchable vivacity, and with immeasurable charm. Between herself and Schelling there sprang up an instantaneous friendship grounded in perfect congeniality of taste and temperament. At first there was thought of a marriage between Schelling and Caroline's daughter, Auguste Böhmer; but Auguste died and in 1803 Caroline was divorced from Schlegel and married to Schelling. The arrangement was consummated, it appears, without a break in the friendship between Schlegel, Schelling, and Caroline. At the same time Schelling left Jena as a result of certain quarrels due to his habit of free and rather self-confident criticism.

The three years following he spent as professor in Würzburg. During this time his philosophy took its turn toward mysticism and he himself was estranged both from Fichte and from Hegel through their criticism of his system. Hegel's charge of sentimentality (*Schwärmerei*) was particularly galling to him, doubtless because of the measure of its truth. In 1806 he entered on his thirty-five years' sojourn in Munich. This was a period of comparative inactivity. Caroline died in 1809, and three years later Schelling was married to a younger friend of hers. He had a happy family life and was highly honored in Munich where he held an official position in the academy of sciences. But he published little; and though his occasional lectures — mainly those delivered at Erlangen in 1820–27 — were full of criticism of Hegelian doctrine, this criticism was not published until after Hegel's death in 1834. The years following were marked in Berlin by a sweeping reaction against Hegel's system, due largely to the misconception of Hegelianism by Strauss, Feuerbach, and Baur, in their criticism of the New Testament. The anti-Hegelian movement was headed by influential statesmen and it resulted in the call of Schelling to Berlin to the position of privy councillor and member of the Academy, authorized to deliver university lectures. Thus, in 1841, a man

of nearly seventy, Schelling once more entered on a career of academic activity. The remainder of his life till his death in 1854 was spent in criticism of Hegelian doctrine and in elaboration of his own system. But to the end he lacked the energy or the industry to bring this work to a logically effective conclusion. In truth he was cursed as well as blessed by his romantic temperament: he possessed the insight and the warmth of the romanticist, but also his egoism and his restless caprice.

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THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL

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KARL WILHELM FRIEDRICH VON SCHLEGEL (1772-1829).

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831)

I. LIFE

Beside the biographies of contemporary philosophers that of Hegel is very prosaic. His life lacked the moral fire of Fichte's, the romantic capriciousness of Schelling's, and the deplorable yet diverting selfishness of Schopenhauer's. In fact, though Kant lived practically all his life in the little town of Königsberg, whereas Hegel knew the university life of Tübingen, Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, and lived all his later years in close association with the society of the Prussian capital, yet it is true of Hegel as of Kant, that the greatest events of his life are professional rather than personal, that the publication of his books rather than his more personal achievements claim attention, that the doctrine rather than the man wins one's interest.

Hegel was born in 1770, at Stuttgart. Of his boyhood little is known, save from the pages of a priggish sort of journal which he kept, partly in German and partly in Latin, from 1785 to 1787. The biographers add that he took snuff and played at chess and cards from his early youth.¹ In 1788 he entered the university of Tübingen as student of theology. He occupied himself, how-

¹ Cf. Rosenkranz, "Hegel's Leben," p. 23.

ever, with philosophy and with the classics, finding indeed less satisfaction with his university work than in certain friendships — notably with Hölderlin, the eager classicist, and with Schelling.

There followed three years in Switzerland, in the conventional position of tutor. In these years Hegel was mainly occupied with theological and historical studies, but in a letter to Schelling, dated 1795, he states that he has taken up again the study of Kant, and significantly prophesies a philosophical era in which the idea of God will be recognized as the idea of the Absolute. From 1797 till 1800, still as house tutor, Hegel lived in Frankfort on the Main. These are the years in which for the first time he formally set forth his system. The early draft of it still exists in manuscript, and includes all the essential features of the doctrine as later developed.¹

In 1801, when he was just past thirty, Hegel went to Jena as privat-docent in philosophy. With Schelling, who for several years had been professor of philosophy in Jena, he believed himself to be in entire metaphysical accord. In 1802-03, indeed, the two edited together the "*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*," a work in which Hegel had the greater interest. (In later years their disciples quarrelled bitterly over the question of the exact share of each in the work.) The divergence between the two systems soon became evident, and from 1803, when Schelling left Jena, the break widened rapidly. There is a real likeness between Hegel and Schelling in their intuitive outlook, and there is even a similarity in their results; but Schelling's mysticism is a method as well as an intuition and an attainment, whereas Hegel's method is that of patient demonstration and logical reasoning. It is this temperamental difference, coupled with the reaction from an intimacy founded mainly on propinquity and on general philosophical interests, which occasioned the complete rupture between Hegel and Schelling.²

Hegel's biographer, Rosenkranz, tells us that he "enchained" the students at Jena by the "intensity of his speculation."³ In

¹ Rosenkranz, *op. cit.*, 104 seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201. In 1805, in his first lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel criticised Schelling but still spoke warmly of him and acknowledged his contributions to philosophy. The open rupture between the two followed on the ironical allusions to Schelling's method contained in the Introduction to Hegel's "*Phänomenologie*" (1806).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 215.

1805 his ability was recognized by his appointment as professor extraordinarius. One year later his life in Jena was rudely ended by the incursion of the French under Napoleon, 'that world-soul,' as Hegel describes him. The university was closed for the time being, and Hegel went first to Bamberg where he spent two years as editor of a newspaper, and next to Nürnberg where for eight years he was rector of a gymnasium. In 1811 he was married to Marie von Tucher, the daughter of an old Nürnberg family, to whom he wrote poetry and love-letters much after the fashion of an unphilosophical lover. In 1812-13 he published his *Logic*; in 1816 he was called to the professorship of philosophy in Heidelberg; after two more years he succeeded to Fichte in the university of Berlin.

The story of Hegel's life in Berlin, which was only ended by his death in 1831, is a tale of professional, political, and social achievement. Through all these years he enjoyed the confidence and the support of the government, for his social philosophy, rightly or wrongly, was interpreted as a philosophical glorification of Prussian institutions. In the university he dominated the thought and commanded the allegiance of his students; with his family he enjoyed a peaceful and happy life; and in the best society of the Prussian capital he occupied a commanding position. It is hard for us to imagine Hegel as achieving distinctively social success; but this inscription on a drinking glass which Goethe gave him goes far to attest it: —

"Dem absoluten
empfielt sich
schönstens
zu freundlicher Aufnahme
das Urphänomen."

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Chief Philosophical Works in the Order of Publication

(The references are to the volumes of the *Sämmtliche Werke* (W.).)

1807. "Die Phänomenologie des Geistes." Bamberg u. Würzburg, W., II. A curious compound of metaphysics and type-psychology with the philosophy of history and of religion. The book is characteristically Hegelian: his voyage of discovery, as Hegel himself called it.
- 1812-13. "Wissenschaft der Logik." Nürnberg; 2d ed. in which Vol. I. is thoroughly revised, 1841; W., III-V. Vol. I. section on *Quantity*, transl. by Stirling. (For summary, cf. *supra*, Chapter 10.)

1817. "Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse." Heidelb. 2d enlarged edition, 1827; 3d ed. 1830; W., VI, VII, transl. by Wallace.
This work in three parts, *Logic*, *Philosophy of Spirit* and *Philosophy of Nature*, perhaps resembles the synopses of philosophical doctrine dictated by Hegel to his older pupils in the Nürnberg Gymnasium. In 1827 Hegel enlarged it, prefixing several introductory chapters. As it appears in the complete edition of his works, it has been further supplemented by notes, taken by the editors from Hegel's lectures.
1820. "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," Berl.; 3d ed., 1854. W., VIII. Transl. by Dyde.
A study of the objects, or goals, of the individual will. In the first section, will is analyzed and found to consist in the imperious aspect of self-consciousness. The following sections discuss three conceptions of right: 1. Abstract right, which in its primary form is property right; 2. Morality, the consciousness of individual obligation; and 3. Social morality, *Sittlichkeit*, the acknowledgment of oneself as morally related to family, state, humanity. The "Philosophy of Right" has, indeed, the appearance of a textbook of social philosophy.

Posthumous

The titles following are of books which are really reports of Hegel's lectures published after his death, not from manuscripts of his own but from the collated lecture-notes of his students. Evidently they cannot offer an entirely authoritative account of Hegel's philosophy.

1832. "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, nebst eine Schrift über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes," ed. by P. Marheineke; 2d altered ed. 1840; W., 11 and 12. Transl. by Speirs and Sanderson.
Part I. on the nature of the religious consciousness is followed (Parts II. and III.) by a discussion of the three main forms of religion: "Natural Religion;" "The Religion of Spiritual Individuality" (which includes the Hebrew religion of sublimity, the Hellenic religion of beauty, and the Roman religion of utility); and the "Absolute Religion." Absolute Religion, Hegel teaches, is man's consciousness of union with God, the infinite, personal spirit. Thus, the object of the absolute religion is that of the absolute philosophy.
It should be noted that the second edition of the "Werke" alters and enlarges these lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion."
- 1833-36. "Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie," ed. by K. L. Michelet, 2d ed., 1842; W., 13-14. Transl. by E. S. Haldane.
An account of the growth of philosophical systems from each other, which insists that every system is preserved as subordinated, yet significant, element in that which supersedes it. Hegel's treatment of ancient philosophy, his appreciation of Spinoza, and his criticism of Kant are of especial value.

- 1835-38. "Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik," ed. by H. G. Hotho; 2d ed. 1840-43; W., 10, Pts. 1, 2, and 3. Translations of portions of the *Ästhetics* by Bosanquet, Bryant, and Hastie. *Ästhetics* is conceived by Hegel as the philosophy of Art. Part I. treats the æsthetic consciousness as a deepening of self-consciousness by immersion in the object of beauty; and defines the beautiful object, conversely, as a spiritualized (*vergeistigt*) sensuous object. Part II. considers the types of art, symbolic, classic, and romantic; and Part III. discusses the different arts, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry — in the order of the more to the less material art.
1837. "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte," ed. by E. Gans, 2d edition, 1840; W., 9. Transl. by Sibree.
The history of humanity imaged as the development of a world spirit; a conception of historical events as vitally related by a growing reconciliation of opposing phases; and a conception of history as the progressively closer relating of human beings.

Hegel's occasional essays and speeches, in particular his early contributions to the Jena "Kritisches Journal," and his later papers in the "Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik," are found in Volumes 1, 16, 17 of the "Werke."

b. Editions and Translations

- "Werke," published 1832-40, by a group of his students. Berlin.
- "The Phenomenology of Spirit," Chapters 1, 2, and 3, transl. by Brockmeyer and W. T. Harris in *Jour. of Specul. Philos.*, Vol. II.
- "The Logic," Book I, "Quality," transl. by J. H. Stirling in "The Secret of Hegel," 1865, 1898 (cf. *infra*).
- The Encyclopædia: —
- "The Logic," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 2d ed., 1892.
- "The Philosophy of Mind," transl. by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1892.
- "The Philosophy of Right," transl. by S. W. Dyde, Lond. and N.Y., 1895.
- "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," transl. by E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson, 3 vols., Lond., 1895.
- "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," transl. by E. S. Haldane, 3 vols., Lond., 1892 *seq.*
- "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," transl. by J. Sibree. Bohn Libr., 1860.
- "Lectures on *Ästhetics*: Introduction to the Philosophy of Art," transl. by B. Bosanquet, Lond., 1886.
- "Philosophy of Art," abridged, transl. by W. Hastie, Edinburgh.

For translations of selected parts of the "Logic," "Science of Rights," "History of Philosophy," "Philosophy of Religion," and "*Ästhetics*," cf. *Journ. of Specul. Philos.*, Vols. II.-XX.

c. Biography

Rosenkranz, K., "Hegel's Leben," Berlin, 1844. (Published as supplementary volume to Hegel's Werke.)

"Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph.," Leipzig, 1870.

Haym, R., "Hegel und seine Zeit," Berlin, 1857.

Klaiber, J., "Hölderlin, Hegel u. Schelling in ihren schwäbischen Jugendjahren," Stuttgart, 1877.

d. Commentary and Criticism

1. On Hegel's Logic

(Of the books and articles named below, Stirling's book and McTaggart's articles contain detailed text criticism invaluable to the close student.)

Stirling, J. H., "The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter," 1st ed. in 2 vols., Lond., 1865; 3d ed., 1 vol., Edin. and N.Y., 1898.

J. McT. E. McTaggart:—

(1) A series of articles on "Hegel's Categories," in *Mind*, N.S., VI. and seq., 1897, seq.

(2) "Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic," Camb., and N.Y., 1896.

Harris, W. T., "Hegel's Logic," Chicago, 1890.

Calkins, M. W., "The Order of the Hegelian Categories," *Mind*, N.S., XII., 1903.

Noël, G., "La logique de Hegel," Paris, 1897. (Careful exposition with comments.)

Hibben, J. G., "Hegel's Logic," N.Y., 1902. (A brief paraphrase, with occasional comment, of the "Logic of the Encyclopædia.")

Baillie, J. B., "The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic," Lond., 1901. (A suggestive study of the "Logic," in comparison with the "Phänomenologie.")

2. On Other Works of Hegel

McTaggart, J. McT. E. "Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology," Camb., 1901. (Discussion of Hegel's doctrines of Immortality, of the Nature of God, of Sin, of Punishment, of Society.)

Morris, G. S. "Hegel's Philosophy of the State and History," Chicago, 1887.

Kedney, J. S., "Hegel's Æsthetics," Chicago, 1885.

3. General Commentaries

Wallace, W., "Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and especially of his Logic," 2d ed., Oxford, 1894.

Caird, E., "Hegel," Edin., 1883.

Seth, A., "Hegelianism and Personality," Edin. and Lond., 2d ed., 1893.

According to this book, personality is virtually denied by Hegelianism.

Rosenkranz, K., "Kritische Erläuterungen des hegelschen Systems,"
Königsberg, 1840.

Köstlin, K., "Hegel," Tübingen, 1870.

III. CRITICAL NOTE UPON THE ORDER OF THE HEGELIAN CATEGORIES

The interpretation, in this book, of Hegel's argument has really proposed a new reading of his *Logic*. As the summary on page 362 indicates, it has aimed to neglect artificial distinctions, to exhibit the parallelism of many different sets of categories in different sections, or books, of the "*Logic*," and to disentangle distinct lines of argument. At the same time, it has proposed only occasional emendations of Hegel's argument, and it has made only two important omissions: the category of 'Becoming' and the sections included under 'Quantity.' These omissions and reorderings must briefly be justified.

The category of Becoming has not been discussed, on the ground that it is not, as it claims to be, a synthesis of the first two categories, — Being and Naught, — but is rather the universal category of the *Logic*, the common method by which every category is shown to involve its opposite and thus to imply a reality deeper than that of itself or of its other. Becoming, which is merely, thus, a name for the dialectic process, might as well be called the synthesis of Somewhat and Other, of Finite and Infinite, or of Essence and Appearance as of Being and Naught. The true synthesis of Being and Naught, on the other hand, is Determined Being; for since Pure Being and Pure Nothing are shown to be mere fictions, the reality implied by each is that of Determined Being. Hegel admits this by the statement "Being Determinate is the Union of Being and Nothing."¹ He virtually admits, also, that Becoming is a universal category, by giving the name to the transition from Somewhat to Other.² Indeed, every page of the *Logic* shows the futility of trying to confine Becoming to any one stage — least of all to an early stage — of the thought development.

The entire neglect, in this reading of Hegel, of the sections on Quantity and Measure is a more serious matter. The attempt to explain it in detail would involve a complicated discussion, but the reasons for the omission are in general the following: the cate-


¹ "Encycl.," § 89.

² Werke, III., 115².

gories of Quantity are substantially parallel with those of the later sections of Book I. — the categories of Finitude and Infinity, of One and Being-for-Self. For example: (1) The attributes of Quantity, Continuity, and Discretion are explicitly identified with the Attraction and Repulsion (meaning likeness and difference) within the One.¹ (2) The discussion of Infinite Quantitative Progression differs in no essential respect from the treatment of the subject in the consideration of the Quality-categories, Finitude and Infinity. Finally, (3) the discussion of Quantitative Ratio² is a close anticipation of the teaching, in Book III., about the interrelation of syllogisms; and the sections in Book III., as we have seen, are really a continuation of the concluding sections under Quality.

This virtual parallel of the categories of Quantity with those of Quality does away with the alleged necessity of 'reconciling' Quality with Quantity in Measure. The section on Measure, therefore, — in all its confusion of empirical illustration with metaphysical analysis, — simply falls away, to the great advantage of Hegel's argument.

The initial difficulty in the interpretation of Book II. is the arrangement of its categories on the model of the order in Book I., in triad form, as if they grew out of each other by antithesis and synthesis, whereas most of these categories of Book II. are, in the main, restatements of the fundamental opposition, that between Essence and Appearance, the really real and the apparently real. The true movement in the two books may thus be symbolized: —



¹ Werke, III., 204; "Encycl.," § 100.

² Werke, III., 367²; "Encycl.," § 105¹.

Ground and Consequence, Matter and Form, Force and Expression, Inward and Outward, and even Substance and Accidents, are virtually variants of the expression Essence and Appearance, though each set of terms is meant to show more clearly than the last the actual relatedness of the Inner and the Outer, and the consequent impossibility of defining ultimate reality in the terms of the Inner only.¹

This discussion, in Book II. of the "Logic," of Reality as Unknowable Essence has been transposed in the present arrangement to follow on the consideration in Book I. of Undetermined Being. It may be freely admitted that this change of order is not positively required. For the hypothesis, here discussed, that Reality is unknowable might be made at any point of Hegel's argument, and not merely at its beginning. But though the transposition is not strictly necessary, it is, on the other hand, both natural and logical. The destructive analysis of the doctrine of ultimate reality as unknowable Essence is more closely connected with the proof that ultimate reality is no Undetermined Being, than with any other section of the "Logic,"² in that both theories would make a positive metaphysics impossible. For this reason, the Essence hypothesis, like the Pure Being theory, appropriately precedes the positive discussions of the "Logic."

The transposition of the sections on Identity and Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness, would still, however, be imperatively needed, even if the discussion of Essence were left in its present place. As they stand, these categories — Identity and the others — come midway between the categories of Essence and Appearance and the entirely parallel categories of Ground and Consequence. But, as our summary of these sections has shown,³ Identity, Difference, Likeness, and Unlikeness are not relations of unknowable essence to the world of appearance, but rather categories of the connection of determined realities within the world of appearance. Since, then, it is necessary to dislodge these categories — Identity and the others — from their present position,

¹ Cf. "Encycl.," § 136; "Phänomenologie," A, III., "Kraft und Verstand." Compare also Hutchinson Stirling's criticism: "The manifestation, he says, depends on the essence and yet, no less, the essence depends on the manifestation. This is a simple idea, but with this, and this only, Hegel contrives to wash over page after page." ("Secret of Hegel," Chapter 2, C. 3, p. 41.)

² Cf. Werke, IV., 127.

³ P. 369 *seq.*

there can be no doubt that they follow most naturally on the parallel categories, in Book I., of Reality and Negation, Somewhat and Other, and the rest.

The remaining changes of order suggested in this summary of Hegel's teaching will be readily allowed, when once the need of some change in the present order has been clearly apprehended. Some transposition of the categories is, in truth, demanded by the fact that Hegel's argument, in its present form, has the wholly fictitious and misleading appearance of progress and steady advance from the earliest categories of Being to the final category of Absolute Idea. The truth is, however, that both Book II. and Book III. are largely composed of repetitions, in varied form and terminology, of the categories already discussed. Just because it doubles on itself, without proper warning, the Hegelian argument needs to be disentangled. The changes required consist merely in the juxtaposition of groups of equivalent categories; and the justification for each change is found — as has been shown — in Hegel's own admission. He himself asserts the equivalence of Identity and Difference not only with the categories of Determined Being, in Book I., but with the categories of the Judgment in Book III. He clearly implies the parallelism of the categories of Syllogism with the categories, in Book I., of Being-for-Self, or One, and he distinctly affirms the substantial identity of Mechanism, in Book III., with Reciprocity in Book II.

This attempted reconstruction of Hegel's order will, however, fail of its object if it in any wise detracts from the value of Hegel's argument. It should, rather, reveal the strength of a system which has triumphed over such difficulties of interpretation. The idealistic critic may, therefore, reshape but he may not reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an absolute self.¹

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860)

I. LIFE

Arthur Schopenhauer, youngest of the great post-Kantian German philosophers, was born thirteen years after Schelling, in 1788, the only son of a well-to-do merchant of cosmopolitan tendencies.

¹ The greater part of this Note is reproduced from the paper by the writer already referred to, in *Mind*, N.S., XII., 1903.

At fifteen, accordingly, the boy Arthur travelled with his parents in Holland, in France, and in England. The philosopher's works bear witness to the good which he gained by his sojourn in Paris and in London. No contemporary German philosopher ever attained Schopenhauer's clearness of style, and he has hardly written a chapter which has not gained from his wide acquaintance with modern literature. The mercantile career which succeeded upon these *Wanderjahre* proved a toil and a vexation of spirit to Arthur Schopenhauer. It was terminated, with his mother's consent, soon after the death of his father in 1805. The mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, a brilliant and attractive but self-centred woman, took up her abode in Weimar after her husband's death, and shone in the society of Goethe, Schlegel, and the other men of the brilliant Weimar court. Schopenhauer, however, was not admitted to his mother's circle. The two were indeed utterly antipathetic, so that Johanna Schopenhauer could write to him: "It is needful to my happiness to know your happiness but not to be a witness of it. . . . I will make any sacrifice rather than consent to live with you. . . . Your eternal quibbles, your laments over the stupid world and over human misery, give me bad nights and unpleasant dreams."

From these unsympathetic words one gains a vivid impression of Schopenhauer's temperamental pessimism. His conviction of the misery of human existence resulted not in active warfare on its evils but in self-centred brooding and in nervous fears; his only activity was that of thought. He matriculated at Göttingen; later studied at Berlin; and in 1813, after four years mainly devoted to the classics and to philosophy, gained his doctorate at Jena by the brilliant essay on "The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason."

During the next five years he lived for the most part in Dresden, occupied in writing the first volume of his great work, "The World as Will and Idea." Through the success which he anticipated for this book he hoped to secure a professional following and a university position. But to his natural disappointment and to his inexpressible scorn the book attracted relatively little attention and the lectures which he offered in 1820, as privat-docent, in Berlin barely gained him a hearing. The announcement of the lectures was repeated until 1831, but Schopenhauer never delivered them again. It was the day of Hegel's vogue, and the philosophical

public, accustomed as it was to metaphysics in a barbarous jargon, had no ears for Schopenhauer's keen and clear philosophical analysis. No one can blame him for resenting the injustice, but no one can justify his bitter recrimination and his personal abuse of the men he called his rivals.

From this time until his death in 1860 he lived a bitter, selfish, and morose life full of petty personal interests and great only in its intellectual achievements. His most human characteristic was a warm kindness to animals, and the dwellers in Frankfort on the Main, where he lived in retirement from 1831, were familiar with the precisely dressed figure of the pessimistic philosopher as he took his daily walks in company with his white poodle.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Works of Schopenhauer in the Order of Publication

1813. "Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde," Rudolst. Transl. as "The Fourfold Root . . ." by Hillebrand. (Cf. *supra*, Chapter 9, p. 345.)
1816. "Über das Sehen und die Farben," Leipz. (An essay due to the influence of Goethe, who interested Schopenhauer in investigations on colors.)
1819. "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," Leipz., Vol. I. Transl. by Haldane and Kemp as "The World as Will and Idea." Parts I, III., and IV. of this, the most important work of Schopenhauer, are summarized in Chapter 9. Part III. consists of a brilliant though really irrelevant discussion of æsthetics. The æsthetic consciousness is conceived as the immersion of a will-less self in the æsthetic object, or Platonic Idea, that is, the object freed from the 'forms of appearance,' in particular from time and causality.
To this work Schopenhauer added as supplement an important "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy." He criticises (1) Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself; and with even greater effectiveness (2) Kant's category doctrine. Schopenhauer maintains (a) that Kant should have included space and time among the categories; (b) that Kant should have omitted all save causality from the list; and (c) that Kant's distinction of 'objective' from 'subjective' succession is invalid.
1836. "Über den Willen in der Natur," Frankf. Transl. by Hillebrand as "On the Will in Nature." (Eight essays, under one title, prefaced by an introduction abusing the philosophy of the professors, and in particular that of Hegel.)
1841. "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. I. Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, II. Über das Fundament der Moral," Frankf.

1844. "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," 2d ed., Vols. I. u. II. Transl. by Haldane and Kemp. (In this edition, Schopenhauer's chief work was enlarged by a second volume of illustration and commentary.)
1851. "Parerga und Paralipomena," Berl. Transl. in part by Saunders and by Josefe. (Two volumes of essays on subjects philosophical and critical.)

b. Editions and Translations

- "Werke," edited in 6 vols. by Frauenstädt. Leipz., 1873-74 (often reprinted).
- "The World as Will and Idea." Transl. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 1884-86, Lond., 3 vols.
- "The Fourfold Root" and "On the Will in Nature." Transl. by K. Hillebrand, Bohn Library, revised ed., 1903.
- "Selected Essays," Transl. by Bax, Bohn Library.
- Selected portions of "Parerga and Paralipomena." Transl. by T. B. Saunders, Lond. and N.Y., 3d ed., 1892, 5 vols.; Chapters 1 and 2, transl. by C. Josefe in *Jour. Specul. Philos.*, Vol. 5.

c. Comments, Criticisms, and Biography

(For fuller bibliography, cf. Wallace and Caldwell quoted below. Schopenhauer's text needs no elucidation and he is his own best commentator.)

- Wallace, W., "Schopenhauer," Lond., 1890; and article in "Encycl. Brit."
- Caldwell, W., "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," N.Y., 1896.
- Gwinner, W., "Arthur Schopenhauer," Leipz., 2d ed., 1878.
- Frauenstädt u. Lindner, "Arthur Schopenhauer: von ihm; über ihn," Berl., 1863.
- Adamson, R., "The Philosophy of Schopenhauer," *Mind*, 1876.
- Volkelt, J., "A. Schopenhauer," Stuttg., 1900.

Cf. Foucher de Careil, Jellinck, Ribot, Seydel, Sully, Zimmern, cited by Rand.

NOTE. — An ethical system widely different from Schopenhauer's, that of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), is based on Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will, interpreted in the light of modern evolution-theory. Accepting Schopenhauer's estimate of the facts of human misery, Nietzsche sees no ground for hope save in the development and the survival of the 'super-man.' His chief works are: "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches," 3 vols., 1876-80, Chemnitz; "Also sprach Zarathustra," 1883-84, *ibid.*, Engl., A. Tille, Lond., 1896; "Jenseits von Gut und Böse," *ibid.*, 1886; "Zur Genealogie der Moral," *ibid.*, 1887. The "Werke" appeared in 15 vols., Leipz., 1895-1901; Engl. transl. A. Tille, Lond., 1896.

G. NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS AFTER HEGEL

I. POSITIVISTS. (OPPONENTS OF METAPHYSICS)

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857).

1830-42. "Cours de philosophie positive," Paris; Engl. (condensed), by H. Martineau, Lond., 1853; Lond. and N.Y., 1896. (This work offers, as substitute for metaphysics, a classification of the sciences with mathematics as base and sociology as summit.)

M. P. LITTRÉ (1801-81).

1845. "Analyse raisonnée du cours de philosophie positive de M. A. Comte," Paris. 1863. "Comte et la philosophie positive," Paris.

JOHN STUART MILL (1806-73).

IMPORTANT WORKS: —

1843 ff. "System of Logic," Lond. 1848. "Principles of Political Economy," *ib.*

1863. "Utilitarianism," *ib.* 1865. "Auguste Comte and Positivism," *ib.*

1865. "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," *ib.*

Other positivists are George Henry Lewes and Frederic Harrison.

II. OPPONENTS OF IDEALISM

MATERIALISTS

(The materialistic movement in Germany was 'reinforced' by the left-wing Hegelians. Cf. especially Feuerbach. Three of those named in the following list, Büchner, Haeckel, and Ostwald, are often classed among the so-called "monists.")

KARL VOGT (1817-1895).

1854. "Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft," Giessen.

1863. "Vorlesungen über den Menschen," *ibid.*

JACOB MOLESCHOTT (1822-1893).

1852. "Kreislauf des Lebens," Mainz.

FRIEDRICH C. C. LUDWIG BÜCHNER (1824-1899).

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORK: —

1855. "Kraft und Stoff," Dantzig; 19th ed., 1898; Engl., "Force and Matter," Lond., 1864; Leipz., 1884. 1857. "Natur und Geist," *ibid.*

1869-70. "Die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur," Leipz.; Engl., Lond., 1872. 1882. "Licht und Leben," Leipz., 2d ed., 1895.

ERNST HAECKEL.

1899. "Die Welträtsel, Gemeinverständliche Studien über Monistische Philosophie," Bonn; Engl., as "The World-riddle," 1905.

WILHELM OSTWALD.

1902. "Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie." Leipz.

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W. P. MONTAGUE.

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MONISTIC REALISTS

(For criticism, cf. James Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism," 1903.)

HERBERT SPENCER (1819-1903).

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1855. "Principles of Psychology," Lond., 1855, 5th ed., 1890.

1860-62. "First Principles of Synthetic Philosophy," 6th ed., 1889, Lond.

1879. "Data of Ethics."

1892-93. "Principles of Ethics" (including the "Data of Ethics"), 2 vols.

CARL EDUARD VON HARTMANN (1842-1906).

Von Hartmann's system is Schopenhauer's with the idealism omitted. Von Hartmann substitutes for Schopenhauer's "Will," as ultimate reality, the "Unconscious."

CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORK:—

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NEO-REALISTS (CHIEFLY DUALISTS)

(Cf. Holt and others in "The New Realism," 1912; also pp. 402 ff., 566.)

ALEXANDER S.

1907-11. Papers in Vols. VIII.-XI., *Proc. Arist. Society*, N. S.

1914(?). "The Basis of Realism," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XI. (Alexander is a dualistic neo-realist who verges toward personalism. He teaches that percepts and images are 'physical,' and that consciousness consists in 'conation,' or 'enjoyment.')

1910-11. JOSEPH, H. W. B. Papers in *Mind*, N. S., XIX-XX.

1915. PRICHARD, H. A. *Mind*, N. S., XXIV. (Joseph and Prichard are 'common-sense' dualists.)

RUSSELL, B.

1912. "The Problems of Philosophy," 1914-15. Papers in *The Monist*, XXIV., XXV.

1914. "Our Knowledge of the External World," esp. III., IV. (Russell opposes 'neutral monism' and the common-sense realism of the physicist and upholds a theory of 'private,' extra-neutral sense-data, 'perspective' space, and 'things' as series of connected appearances.)

WOODBIDGE, F. J. E.

1906. "Problem of Consciousness" in "Studies in Honor of Garman."

1914. HOLT, E. "The Concept of Consciousness," esp. I., V-IX. (Holt, a monistic neo-realist, conceives a universe of 'neutral' entities.)

III. IDEALISTS

1. PHENOMENALISTS

ERNST MACH.

CHIEF WORKS WITH PHILOSOPHICAL BEARING:—

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1901. "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung," Leipz., Engl.

KARL PEARSON.

1892, 1911. "The Grammar of Science," Lond.

1911. Cf. C. A. Strong, "Why the Mind has a Body," 1903, cited pp. 237, 405.

2. PLURALISTIC PERSONALISTS

(Of these all save Howison and McTaggart are, in greater or less degree, anti-rationalistic.)

WILLIAM JAMES (1842-1910).

1897. "The Will to Believe" (cf. esp. the Preface).

1907. "Pragmatism."

1908. "A Pluralistic Universe."

1909. "The Meaning of Truth" (a collection of previously published papers).

1911. "Some Problems of Philosophy." (Unfinished.)

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

1891, 1911. "Riddles of the Sphinx," Lond.

1903. "Humanism."

1902. "Axioms as Postulates" (a paper in "Personal Idealism," Oxford).

1905. "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," *Mind*, N.S., XIV.

1906. "Pragmatism and Pseudo-pragmatism," *ibid.*, XV.

HENRY STURT.

1902. "Art and Personality" (in "Personal Idealism").

1906. "Idola Theatri," Oxf.

HASTINGS RASHDALL.

1902. "Personality, Human and Divine" (a paper in "Personal Idealism").

GEORGE H. HOWISON.

1895. "The Conception of God." (Cited *infra*, p. 561.)

1901. "The Limits of Evolution," N.Y., 2d ed., 1905.

JOHN MCT. ELLIS McTAGGART.

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CHARLES RENOUVIER (1819-1903).

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1876-1896. "Essais de critique générale," 12 vols.

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HENRI BERGSON.

1889. "Essais sur les données immédiates de la conscience," transl. as "Time and Free Will," by F. L. Pogson, 1910.

1896, 1903. "Matière et Memoire," transl. by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, 1911.

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(Cf. James, Schiller, and Bergson cited above.)

JOHN DEWEY.

1903. "Thought and its Subject Matter" (in "Studies in Logical Theory," Decennial Publications of Univ. of Chicago, Second Series, XI.).

1906. "Beliefs and Realities," *Philos. Review*, XV.

"The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, N.S. XV.

ADDISON W. MOORE.

1902. "Existence, Meaning and Reality" (a paper in the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Series I.).

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1910. "Pragmatism and Its Critics."

SIMON FRASER McLENNAN.

1903. "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment" (a paper in "Studies in Logical Theory").

HENRY W. STUART.

1903. "Valuation as a Logical Process" (a paper in "Studies in Logical Theory").

1904. "The Logic of Self-Realization" (a paper in University of California "Studies in Philosophy," I.).

NOTE : PRAGMATISM

Pragmatism is formulated sometimes as a psychological, sometimes as a logical, sometimes as a metaphysical doctrine. In the first sense, it has been defined by Mr. Schiller as 'the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities.'¹ In this sense we all are, or ought to be, pragmatists; and we unquestionably owe a debt to contemporary pragmatists for laying stress on the non-cognitive aspects of experience.

As a logical doctrine, pragmatism has two forms. It teaches either (1) that the conception of the use, value, or consequences, of a reality form part of the conception of it; or (2) that the conception of a reality consists solely in the conception of its use or value. This extreme form of logical pragmatism is formulated in the 'maxim' of C. S. Peirce: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."² In adherence to the first of these two senses of logical pragmatism we are again practically unanimous, for to the adequate conception of object, situation, or truth there certainly belongs, as inherent part of it, a conception of its consequences. The opposition to pragmatism is, however, primarily directed against the second of the logical conceptions of it.

¹ "Humanism," p. 8.

² Cf. the article by C. S. Peirce in the *Popular Science Monthly*, XII., 1878, which he quotes in his contribution to Baldwin's "Dictionary of Psychology," II., p. 321. In the later article Mr. Peirce seems, however, to disavow the radical pragmatism of this maxim when 'pushed . . . to extremes.'

The conception of an object, situation, or truth, the objectors insist, — in the writer's view, with justice, — *is more than* a conception of its future, its results, its use, however truly the conception includes this awareness of practical consequences. It must be added that most pragmatists confuse these two views of logical pragmatism, and waste their time by reiterating the accepted statements that truth "makes a difference"¹ or that "personal attitudes and responses are real,"² when they should be trying to establish the entirely different conclusion that "the conception of effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

Metaphysical pragmatism is a consequence of logical pragmatism of the extreme form, and will stand or fall with it. It is the doctrine that reality is to be defined only in terms of progressively unfolding experience and that there is, therefore, no 'absolute' or 'complete' reality. It is pragmatism of this sort only which necessarily involves pluralism.

Critics of Pragmatism

(Most of the papers cited below refer specifically to the articles by James, Dewey, Moore, and Schiller already cited.)

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 J. CREIGHTON, "Purpose as a Logical Category," *Philos. Review*, XIII.
 J. ROYCE, "The Eternal and the Practical," *Philos. Review*, XIII.
 CHARLES M. BAKEWELL, "Latter-Day Flowing Philosophy" (a paper in University of California "Studies in Philosophy").
 CHARLES H. RIEBER, "Pragmatism and the *A Priori*" (a paper in the University of California Studies).
 1905. A. E. TAYLOR.
 "Truth and Practice," *Philos. Review*, XIV.
 1906. "Truth and Consequences," *Mind*, N.S., XV.
 1905. H. W. B. JOSEPH, "Professor James on 'Humanism and Truth,'" *Mind*, N.S., XIV.
 1906. A. K. ROGERS, "Professor James's Theory of Knowledge," *Philos. Review*, XV.

MONISTIC PERSONALISTS

RUDOLF HERMANN LOTZE (1817-81).

IMPORTANT WORKS ON METAPHYSICS: —

1841. "Metaphysik," Leipz.

¹ Schiller, *op. cit.*, 197⁸.

² Dewey, "Beliefs and Realities," *Philos. Review*, 1906, XV., p. 124.

- 1856-64. "Mikrokosmos. Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit," 3 vols., Leipz., 4th ed., 1884-88; Engl., Edin. and N.Y., 1885-86.
1879. "System der Philosophie," 3 Pts., 2d ed., 1884; Engl. ed., Bosanquet, Parts I. and II., "Logic," and "Metaphysic," 1884, 1887.
1882. "Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie," Leipz., 3d ed., 1894; Engl., G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1885.
1883. "Grundzüge der Metaphysik," Leipz., Engl., G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1884.

THOMAS HILL GREEN (1836-82).

(Green is the first of the English neo-Hegelians. He teaches that "the unification of the manifold in the world implies the presence of the manifold to a mind for which, and through the action of which, it is a related whole.")

1874. "Introductions" to Hume's "A Treatise of Human Nature," Lond.
1883. "Prolegomena to Ethics," ed. A. C. Bradley, Oxf.
- "Works," ed. R. L. Nettleship, 3 vols., Lond., 1885-88.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

MOST IMPORTANT WORKS ON METAPHYSICAL SUBJECTS:—

1885. "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" (especially Chapter 11).
1892. "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (especially Lectures X.-XIII.).
1895. "The Conception of God," a discussion, by Professors Royce, Le Conte, Howison, Mezes, 2d ed., with Supplementary Essay by Royce, N.Y., 1897.

The World and the Individual:—

1900. First Series, "The Four Historical Conceptions of Being."
1901. Second Series, "Nature, Man, and the Moral Order."
- R. B. HALDANE.
- 1903-04. "The Pathway to Reality," I. and II. Gifford Lectures.

Other neo-Hegelian monistic personalists are Edward Caird, William Wallace, and J. H. Stirling (already cited); Bernard Bosanquet, Henry Jones, and D. G. Ritchie.

(Upholders of the Absolute-Experience Doctrine)

F. H. BRADLEY.

1876. "Ethical Studies," Lond. and Edin.
1883. "The Principles of Logic," Lond.
1893. "Appearance and Reality," Lond.; 2d ed., 1897.

A. E. TAYLOR.

1901. "The Problem of Conduct," Lond. and N.Y.
1903. "Elements of Metaphysics," Lond. and N.Y.

NOTE: THE ABSOLUTE AS EXPERIENCE

The position of Bradley and of Taylor is, so far as I understand it, the following: (1) They are numerical monists, teaching that

ultimate reality is an Absolute — not a collection or a mere society.¹ (2) They are idealists, and indeed spiritualistic idealists, denying the existence of extra-mental reality, and defining ultimate reality as Absolute Experience.² On the other hand, they refuse to describe the Absolute as 'self' or as 'personal.'³ Closely scrutinized, this divergence from the teachings of 'monistic personalism' seems to me to be purely verbal. The ground of the denial of the Absolute's selfhood is the adoption of too rigid and too complicated a definition of 'self.' In the sense of 'unique, inclusive, and conscious being,' the term 'self' seems indeed to mean what Bradley and Taylor mean by 'Experience.' When Taylor speaks of "a super-human experience to which the whole universe is directly present"; and when he says that "an all-containing, coherent experience . . . must apprehend its contents . . . must be aware of them as exhibiting a structural unity,"⁴ he attributes to Absolute Experience precisely the characters which are essential to an Absolute Self. And when Bradley says, "the Absolute holds all possible content in an individual experience,"⁵ then we are justified in concluding with Royce that "Bradley's Absolute . . . escapes from selfhood . . . only by remaining to the end a Self."⁶

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Külpe, O., "Introduction to Philosophy," pp. 245; transl. Pillsbury and Titchener, Lond. and N.Y., 1897, from the German, "Einleitung in die Philosophie," 2d ed., 1898.

'A short account of the development and present status of philosophy,' useful for brief descriptions of current schools and conceptions of philosophy.

¹ Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," Bk. II., Chapters 13, 14, 20, pp. 135 *seq.*; Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," Bk. II., Chapter 2, §§ 4-5. "The Absolute," Bradley says (*op. cit.*, p. 144), "is not many; there are no independent reals." "We are committed," Taylor says, "to some form of theory of the type generally known as Monism." The name monism Taylor eschews because of its misleading associations.

² Bradley, *op. cit.*, Bk. II., Chapter 14, pp. 144 *seq.*; Taylor, *op. cit.*, Bk. II., Chapter 2, §§ 6-7, pp. 97 *seq.*; Bk. IV., Chapter 5, § 7, pp. 394 *seq.*

³ Bradley, *op. cit.* Taylor, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV., Chapter 3, pp. 334 *seq.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Bk. II., Chapter 1, pp. 60-61.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 147³.

⁶ "The World and the Individual," I., pp. 550-552.

- Ladd, G. T., "Introduction to Philosophy," N.Y., 1891.
- Marvin, W. T., "An Introduction to Philosophy," 1903.
- Paulsen, F., "Introduction to Philosophy," pp. 429, transl. F. Thilly, N.Y., 1895, from the German, "Einleitung in die Philosophie," 10th ed., 1903. A brilliantly and popularly written summary and discussion of (1) the problem of metaphysics, whether ontological or cosmological or theological, and (2) the problem of epistemology.
- Perry, Ralph B., "The Approach to Philosophy," pp. 448, N.Y., 1905. A book which aims "to introduce the general standpoint and problem of philosophy, through its implication in practical life, poetry, religion, and science."
- Rogers, A. K., "A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy," pp. 360, N.Y., 1899.
- Watson, John, "An Outline of Philosophy with Notes Historical and Critical," pp. 483, Glasgow and N.Y., 1898. "A work which tries to fix the main outlines of a complete system of philosophy," under the following heads: "Philosophy of Nature," "Philosophy of Mind," "Moral Philosophy," "Philosophy of the Absolute."

Other 'Introductions' are those of Dilthey and Eucken (cited by Rand); of G. S. Fullerton (The Macmillan Co., 1906); and of A. E. Taylor ("Elements of Metaphysics").

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- Turner, W., "History of Philosophy," pp. 674, Boston, 1903. Useful for its unusually long and careful treatment of mediæval philosophy.
- Erdmann, J. E., "History of Philosophy," 3 vols., Lond., 1890, transl. W. Hough from the German, "Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie," 4th ed., Berlin, 1895.
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ARTHUR COLLIER.

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